Destructive realism: Metaphysics as the foundation of natural science by Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick
Durham E-Theses




Rowbottom, Darrell Patrick (2004) Destructive realism: Metaphysics as the foundation of natural science,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2824/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
D E S T R U C T I V E R E A L I S M : METAPHYSICS AS T H E 
FOUNDATION OF NATURAL S C I E N C E 
D A R R E L L PATRICK ROWBOTTOM 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE D E G R E E OF P H D IN PHILOSOPHY, 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
2004 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis has two philosophical positions as its targets. The first is 'scientific 
realism' of the form defended by Boyd, (the early) Putnam, and most recently Psillos. 
The second is empiricism in the vein of Mi l l , Mach, Ayer, Carnap, and Van Fraassen. 
My objections to both have a rather Popperian flavour. For I argue that 
'confirmation' is a misnomer, that so-called 'ampliative inferences' are heuristics at 
best, and that naturalism and subjectivism are regressive doctrines. At the heart of 
genuine realism, I argue, is a stance on the issues of perception and conception. In 
particular, I hold that to be a realist is to reject the notion that there are representations 
which have some sort of epistemic priority. And along related lines, I maintain that 
the closely aligned doctrine of physicalism cannot simply be presupposed. What this 
amounts to is that the search for some sort of 'solid foundation' for 'knowledge' is a 
futile enterprise. Such a foundation would be unimportant, even i f there were to be 
one, and we ought to be free to critically examine any claim we like. So rather than 
sapere aude, I would have 'dare to err', and place an intersubjective emphasis on 
inquiry. And this goes for metaphysics, logic, and mathematics, as well as for natural 
science. 
Yet I also advocate the view that we ought to be optimistic about our ability to find 
the truth, ceteris paribus. And to this end, I argue that we should accept that our 
faculty of conception is sufficient to allow us to connect with the possibilities of 
being, whereas our faculty of sense is sufficient to allow us to connect with that which 
is actual; this, given considerable critical struggle on our parts, both individually and 
collectively. I urge that it is methodologically advisable to behave as i f this is so, if 
we are not to achieve only the self-paralysis of the Pyrrhonist. 
In a nutshell, destructive realism says that natural science progresses by ruling out 
possibilities, in particular by ruling out possible worlds as candidates for the actual 
world, but that this is a two-stage process, involving both an a priori (metaphysical) 
and an a posteriori (observational) component. The aim of natural science is to 
eliminate false theories. Its aspiration is truth. 
We are all metaphysicians; and science derives historically from metaphysics. 
POPPER 
[W]hen the love of ideas and fancies becomes a substitute for the love of living 
people, the lover, the committed man, often subordinates the requirements of human 
beings to the claims of his idea - the "demand of the object". Thus, that most 
inhuman of transformations occurs: human beings become objects, to be bent, broken, 
molded, even "educated," for the love of an idea. 
B A R T L E Y 
PROLOGUE 
Ostensibly, this is a thesis about the epistemic status of natural science, and the 
judgement to be offered is based upon a particular understanding of its necessary, as 
opposed to contingent, features. I tackle 'scientific realism', 'constructive 
empiricism', and other trendy positions, in order to dismantle some of the prevalent 
contemporary perspectives, and then attempt to put something in their place. 
Curiously, however, the replacement is almost trite in its simplicity, in so far as I 
arrive primarily at the suggestion that a Socratic approach to inquiry is best. Indeed, 
it is actually saying anything more than this - trying to formulate all-embracing 
epistemic principles, general methods, and the like - that I argue against. As such I 
might come across as a 'spoiler', in the vein of Feyerabend, but I take this sort of 
spoiling activity to show exactly what I am arguing for. In other words, I take the 
means by which I conduct my investigation to be entirely consistent with my final 
conclusion, and while neither might be to the reader's taste, to do things differently 
would be dishonest. After all, this is an inquiry into inquiry. 
So I ask the reader not to expect a sequentially constructed position, where each 
single section is slotted neatly into its preordained place in a preconceived jigsaw 
puzzle. I am not interested in puzzles in the Kuhnian sense, but rather problems, and 
hence present a smorgasbord of dialectical discussions on issues which are generally 
taken to be important in what has unfortunately become known as 'philosophy of 
science'. If there is mystery, or if I do not understand something, I say so. Further, I 
mean it: I should not like the reader to take such declarations as substitutes for 
argument, but rather as frank admissions that I , and we, have limits. I will confess to 
suspicions that many of the positions I argue against are contrivances designed to 
preserve dogmas, precisely because of their dismissal (or avoidance) of deep 
mysteries, but do not make it my business to throw around such accusations. The 
reader can judge for herself. 
One would be unwise to think that the core issue is unimportant; an abstract matter 
only worthy of consideration by a 'philosopher's philosopher'. Given the high level 
of trust placed in even the most radical claims of natural scientists in the West', most 
pertinently within its schools, courts, and governments, such investigations become 
vital.^ The faith in the authority of the natural scientist, or at least natural science, 
which seems to be burgeoning - and which is, alarmingly, oft accompanied by a 
considerable lack of detailed knowledge, even on trivial matters such as whether 
astronomers think that the Sun revolves around the Earth, or vice versa - may have 
disastrous consequences.^  And when one finds philosophers making claims such as 
'In science (and only in science) can we say that we have made genuine progress: that 
' In recent interviews performed for a report to the British government, O S T & Wellcome Trust [2000], 
it was found that only 21 percent of the public sample agreed with the statement: 'The achievements of 
science are overrated'. 
^ The McLean vs. Arkansas case is an excellent illustration. See Ruse [1982a], Laudan [1982], and 
Ruse [1982b]. 
^ Evidence of public misunderstanding of science is considerable. See, for example, National Science 
Foundation [2002]. 55% of respondents thought it was true that "Lasers work by focusing sound 
waves", which seems to suggest they didn't even realise that ' L A S E R ' is an acronym. More 
worryingly, 35% of respondents thought it was true that 'radioactive milk [can] be made safe by 
boiling it', and 49% that antibiotics can kill viruses. 
we know more than we did before.' , one wonders if it is seriously being suggested 
that we should disregard the work of those such as Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, 
Archimedes, and Apollonius of Perga. Can it really be right that they were discussing 
mere trivialities, with which we can readily dispense, since we are blessed to find 
ourselves in a 'special period' where the truth is almost manifest? That philosophy is 
dead, or lives on only in so far as it is fed by the scraps that natural science throws it? 
One might be forgiven for missing the subtext to my discussions, which is humanistic 
(yet not anti-religious), and ethical. But to attempt to spell this out in a sentence or 
two would be a mistake; perhaps Wittgenstein was right that some things can only be 
shown, and I have a particular mode of engagement - one that I strive for - in mind. 
With this said, let us begin. 
Popper [1970], p.57. As I shall argue later, though, this statement is out of character, given Popper's 
radically anti-authoritarian perspective. 
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REALISM ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE: DISPELLING THE MYTHS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I endeavour to provide both a systematic overview of 'scientific 
realism', and a subsequent critique. But in doing so, I should make it clear from the 
start that I take 'scientific realism' to be a philosophical position with a definitive 
history, which is entirely different from realism about science; indeed, I argue this. 
To be more specific, I take 'scientific realism' to be a particular kind of realism about 
science, the root of which lies in the 1960s. Broadly, I take it to have begun with 
Maxwell [1962], and Smart [1963], to have been further developed in pieces such as 
Boyd [1973] and Putnam [1975], and to have been recently developed and defended 
in Leplin [1997], and Psillos [1999]. Nonetheless, I hold that 'scientific realism' can 
be fairly characterised in terms of a number of distinct theses, several of which, but 
not all of which, I wish to challenge. 
This strategy has its risks, however. For one who would call herself a 'scientific 
realist' might well pick and choose from several of the theses I outline, and have it 
that I present a caricature of her views. However, to this sort of potential objection, I 
should like to say first that I take Psillos [1999] to be a trustworthy source on what 
this position now involves, since it is its most recent defence. Second, and far more 
important, that in so far as I argue against specific theses (or conjunctions of theses) 
which I take to be parts of 'scientific realism', I also take myself to be arguing against 
anyone who holds those same theses (or conjunctions of theses). So even i f no-one is 
a 'scientific realist' in exactly the manner I suggest, I hold that there are highly similar 
positions which my arguments strike against. For instance, in so far as I offer an 
argument against the claim that theories can achieve degrees of confirmation (rather 
than corroboration), I also take this to preclude the views of science which are 
advocated by all the aforementioned authors, i f it is successful. 
In outline, I shall proceed as follows. In the first section, I present the theses which I 
take to constitute 'scientific realism': metaphysical (MT), semantic (ST), epistemic 
(ET), teleological (TT), alethic (AT), and naturalist (NT). And with these explained, I 
then proceed to attack three of them - MT, ET, and NT - in part by considering their 
respective roles in the system, and in part by taking them in isolation. In 2.1,1 argue 
that MT is too weak and vague, but that NT 'tops it up', hi 2.2 through 2.4, the bulk 
of this chapter, I argue against ET. And in the final section, 2.5,1 explain my 
objections to NT. As such, I try to dismantle 'scientific realism', and rule out 
particular theses thereof, in order that an alternative position might be developed later. 
And I take it that the reasons for which I rule out those theses serve to shape my 
responses to the problems which remain; that is, not only to delimit the possibility 
space for philosophical positions with respect to science, but also to be suggestive of a 
particular class of alternatives. 
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1. 'SCIENTIFIC REALISM' APRICATED 
A prudent means by which to begin to grapple with 'scientific realism' is to dissect it 
into several distinct theses, which mutually constitute it, yet are each in need of a 
detailed defence. As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere, one popular divisional 
scheme is as follows:"^ 
Metaphysical Thesis (MT): The world is populated by entities that are both objective 
and mind-independent. Objective, since they are not dependent for their existence 
upon our thinking or conceiving of them, or our ability to think or conceive of them 
(if we can). Mind-independent, since they are not constituted by the mental, e.g. 
bundles of 'ideas' in Berkeley's sense.^  
Semantic Thesis (ST): Theories in natural science should be understood literally, as 
involving assertions about the world and its contents. They are capable of being true 
or false, so construed. If any given theory is true, then the terms employed therein, be 
they 'observational' or not, refer to entities that exist.^ 
Epistemic Thesis (ET): Scientific theories can achieve degrees of confirmation, 
through their predictive successes. A well-confirmed theory in a mature (viz. well-
established) natural science is approximately true. 
However, I will now argue that these theses, taken alone, are insufficient to unveil the 
ful l commitments of the 'scientific realist'. For there are related theses that are 
essential to the position as typically defended, yet are not entailed by MT, ST, or ET, 
taken either in isolation, or in combination. 
The first of these, which is suggested by Hendry, is teleological: it specifies the aim of 
natural science as an activity, rather than the goals of all, or even any, scientists.^ And 
it is important for exactly the reason which Hendry states, specifically that it allows 
for a distinction to be made between anti-realist and realist positions which both deny 
ET; for example, constructive empiricism, on the one hand, and critical rationahsm, 
on the other. (Here, Hendry is thinking of realism about science in general, rather 
than 'scientific realism' as an essential position, or class of highly similar positions. 
This is commendable, i f discussion of these issues is not to be confined to the 
boundaries defined in fashionable schools of thought; as Popper puts it: 'To resist a 
new fashion needs perhaps as much courage as was needed to bring it about.'^) I do 
' Rowbottom [2002], sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
* 'Mind-independent' is sometimes used to mean what I have defined as 'objective'; but here, I heed a 
scientific realist. See Devitt [1984], p.l5. 
^ Some scientific realists would add the rider 'central', to the talk of terms. Given this, I try to invoke 
only terms that are widely agreed to be 'central' to a given theoretical framework, or to several such 
frameworks in a discipline, in my subsequent discussion. 
* Hendry [1995], p.58. Hendry dubs this thesis 'aspirational', but I prefer 'teleological' just because I 
do not believe that 'aspiration' is synonymous with 'aim'. As Watkins has pointed out, it may be 
rational to aspire to that at which one cannot rationally aim. For example, science may aspire after 
truth, but not aim at it, even if its methods are not necessarily sufficient for establishing the truth, or 
bringing its successive theories closer to the truth. See Watkins [1997], section 13. 
' Here, there is also a link to another theme, to which I shall return. It is what Popper called the 'great 
danger in the increase of specialisation'. And this may be true of the divisions within philosophy itself, 
both in formal, and social, respects. Popper [1970], pp.52-53. 
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think it is correct that this teleological thesis, as follows, is strongly suggested by MT, 
ST, and ET, taken together, but simply because one (or all) of those may fall, it need 
not:'° 
Teleological Thesis (TT): The aim of natural science, qua activity, is truth. This is 
not to say that natural science will converge upon the 'whole truth'; to defend the 
notion that its aim is truth, it is sufficient to defend the claim that natural science 
makes progressive steps towards the truth.'' (For example, that each successive 
generation of theories is more verisimilar than that before it.) 
Second, and clearly more fundamental, is a thesis that specifically tackles truth. For 
although it is implicit, from MT, that some form of absolute truth, along 
correspondence lines, is compatible with 'scientific realism', the adoption of such is 
not necessitated even by its combination with ST and ET. For example, even were 
IVIT and ST accepted, the understanding of 'truth' operating in ET could be one of 
redundancy, following Ramsey and Prior, or a straightforward deflationary account, 
uncoupled from a substantive component. Trivially, just because a theory in natural 
science should be understood as referring to entities which would exist, were it to be 
true, it need not follow that those entities could fu l f i l a role as truth-makers. There 
are, therefore, some rather curious, and intuitively artificial, positions which could be 
invented in order to sever the intended link between ST and ET. And while I do the 
'scientific realist' no injustice by the inclusion of the following thesis, since Psillos 
himself writes that: 'truth is a non-epistemic concept... assertions have truth-
makers... these truth-makers hinge ultimately upon what the world is like', I think 
that it ought to be stated clearly}^ 
Alethic Thesis (AT): Truth is absolute, rather than relative. Assertions are, or 
disclose, truth-bearers.'^ (This renders the intended understanding of ST.) Truth-
makers are objective and mind-independent entities. (That is, in the senses outlined in 
MT.) 
Third, and finally, is the most curiously understated aspect of 'scientific realism'. In 
his formulation of the theses, or 'stances' as he calls them, Psillos seems to smuggle it 
in by inserting the casual phrase 'natural-kind' into MT; specifically, he states that 
'The world... has a natural-kind structure'. (And that is the only mention of 'natural', 
in his initial formulation.) But what, precisely, does this apparently innocent addition 
really amount to? The answer comes just beforehand, where he baldly asserts that 
'° Indeed, it is plausible that: M T & S T & E T & A T |= T T . A T is discussed just below. 
" Laudan [1981] offers a powerful argument against convergent realism, although it must be added that 
this partially relies on an inductive move. 
Psillos [1999], p.xxi. Psillos later states that the following is an anti-realist view of truth: 'if an 
assertion cannot be known to be true, or if it cannot be recognised as true, then it cannot possibly be 
true' (p.232). This seems misguided to me, since such a position is perfectly consistent with the view 
that for any possible world in which humans exist, humans are capable in principle of knowing all that 
which is true, when that which is true is only dependent on mind-independent and objective entities. 
Indeed, I believe he completely misses Dummett's real point, even though he quotes him just a line 
later: '[a] statement cannot be true.. .unless there exists that which, were we aware of it, would yield 
such knowledge'. One can, of course, call this 'anti-realism' if one likes; but one may very well call it 
'optimistic realism', since it does not rule out a correspondence view. 
What I mean, here, is that sentences might be secondary truth-bearers, and propositions might be 
primary truth-bearers. But this is not the place for a metaphysical analysis of assertion, sentence tokens 
vs. sentence types, and propositions qua abstract entities. 
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'Going for realism is going for a philosophical package which includes a naturalised 
approach to human knowledge and a belief that the world has an objective natural-
kind structure.' ''^  Now I daresay that I am not the only self-professed realist - that is 
realist about science, not 'scientific realist' - who would want to strenuously object, 
pace Papineau and Boyd, from whom Psillos says he learned this 'lesson'. But I shall 
save my criticism of this thesis, an outline of which follows, until later: 
Naturalist Thesis (NT): 
a) Natural kinds are part of the structure of the physical world: to say that two tokens 
are of the same kind is to say that they have the same 'internal structure'.^^ 
(Although 'a kind-term refers to a natural kind [only] by virtue of the fact that the 
body of information which is typically associated with a kind-term has its causal 
origin in the kind-constitutive properties of the kind.''^ This is a descriptivist 
moderation of a full-blooded causal theory of reference.) Essentially, there are only 
natural kinds if there are 'kind-constitutive properties'.'^ These are 'natural 
properties' and there are also 'natural relations'; in general, the world is populated by 
entities which fall into 'natural classes'.'^ 
co) Human knowledge is to be explained in terms of a. 
Now while there are other realist theses about science which might be suggested, such 
as a methodological thesis, involving the claim that natural scientists who are also 
realists are better equipped to perform successful natural science, the foregoing 
classification scheme should prove sufficient for my purposes.'^ That is, in so far as it 
imposes a useful structure upon the debate, which should not be taken to be final, or 
binding. For all too often, it is strict adherence to such conventional schemes that 
leads debates astray, or distracts attention from promising alternatives. 
Armed with these theses, it is possible to elucidate the claims of specific philosophers 
with greater ease. For example, van Fraassen, in his Scientific Image, might be seen 
to be making the following claims, among others: 
M T & S T & A T |=~nET 




" Ibid, p.288. 
Ibid., p.66. And note that what is meant here is metaphysically presumptuous; Psillos means classes, 
not categories. 
Such a methodological thesis is the concern of Hendry [1995] and Rowbottom [2002]; however, 
while such a thesis might raise the plausibility of realism about science, were it to stand, it remains 
unclear that it would have any decisive philosophical impact. Primarily, this is because even if it is 
right that scientists should (or do) behave as (/their theories are true, or approximately true, this does 
not entail that they are. Moreover, mere acceptance of theory, rather than belief in its truth, might 
suffice for all practical purposes; this is the view defended in van Fraassen [1980]. 
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Similarly, one might take Popper's core claim - at least, the one that has been 
20 
subjected to criticism by Lakatos and Putnam - to be something like: 
0(MT & ST & AT & ~ET & TT) 
In common, and as alluded to above, both van Fraassen (constructive empiricist) and 
Popper (critical rationalist) have objections to ET on inferential grounds; Popper 
because of his general anti-inductivist and anti-justificationist stance, van Fraassen 
because of his doubts about the validity of abduction as a means to judge between 
empirically equivalent theories which posit different unobservable entities (inter alia). 
But Popper claims that he is a realist, whereas van Fraassen claims that he is not; 
crucially, they differ on their beliefs about the truth of TT. Here, I mention this 
merely as an illustration of the fruitfulness of the theses I have proposed, as aids to 
discussion, but I shall return to this issue in greater depth later. 
2. SCIENTIFIC REALISM DESSICATED 
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, I intend to attack 'scientific realism' 
on three distinct grounds. I can now add that in doing so, I will accept throughout that 
ST and AT are true. This is no/just a matter of convenience, however: since these 
theses are generally agreed on by proponents of the positions I inveigh against herein 
(viz. scientific realism, and later empiricism), and I am also predisposed towards 
them, they constitute common ground on which the debate may take place. Besides, 
since each of my objections is explicitly expressed in conditional form, it is my hope 
that the reader will remain aware of these assumptions, which might be challenged in 
their own right. 
Before I continue, however, I should add a word about the formal logical notation that 
I employ in some of this chapter. It is there just to make it clear what I think the 
relations between the theses are, understood broadly - as a heuristic, to aid in 
understanding. Strictly speaking, then, some of my claims might be a little loose: for 
example, were I to write that ST [= MT & AT, I might better be understood to be 
saying ST & x f: AT & MT, where x is implicit, rather than explicit, in my initial 
formulation of ST. (Remember, all the theses, such as ST, involve a large number of 
propositions.) Such problems are unavoidable when dealing with a subject matter of 
this complexity, and my arguments in no sense depend upon the formalism I use in an 
attempt to present them in a pellucid fashion. In short, i f there are faults that I have 
missed in any of my reasoning, I should like to make them easy for others to spot; this 
is the aim of the notation. 
Now if MR is taken to denote a weak form of Medieval realism, involving the claim 
that abstracta might exist, then my first line of attack, in 1.2.1, might be expressed as 
follows: ST & AT ^ MT & MR. That is to say, if the semantic and alethic theses are 
true, then the metaphysical thesis is true, and abstracta might exist. Indeed, along 
related lines, I shall also defend the claim that: MT & ST & AT & ET [= MR. This is a 
serious inmianent critique of 'scientific realism' when it is taken to be devoid of NT, 
and its aim is to show that MT is not sufficient, taken alone, to account for the 
' Lakatos [1969] and Putnam [1969]. 
14 
metaphysical commitments inherent in the position. Further, it links in to my third 
objection, as wil l become clear. 
My second objection is simply, and directly, AT = ~ET; in particular, i f truth is 
absolute, and truth-makers are objective and mind-independent entities, then theories 
cannot achieve degrees of confirmation. This will prove to be the most difficult and 
time consuming of my objections to defend, running through three distinct sections 
(I.2.2-I.2.4), but requires careful treatment due to its highly controversial nature. The 
ground, as already mentioned, wil l be inferential; specifically, I will follow Popper in 
denying both that there is such a thing as justification, in so far as that might involve 
'good reasons' of a Humean sort, and that induction is a rational, or failing that 
genuine, form of inference. In short, as Popper explains towards the beginning of his 
Logik der Forschung, this move involves a separation of the context of justification 
from the context of discovery.'' 
Third, I shall cast serious doubt on NT, in 1.2.5, by showing 0(MT & ST & ET & TT 
& AT & -NT). The significance of this result is not to be underestimated, and will be 
highlighted, in particular, by consideration of the anti-scientistic consequence to the 
effect that (MT & ST & ET & AT) |= 0~NT. In plain English, the point is that even 
if our theories in contemporary science are approximately true in the sense that the 
'scientific realist' intends (which may itself legitimately be doubted), it does not 
follow that the naturahst thesis - or more generally, naturalism - is entailed.^^ Nor 
indeed is it rendered any 'more probable', as my second objection to scientific 
realism, outlined above, should serve to make clear. What is needed for a defensible 
realism about science is, instead, a metaphysical core which is more robust than MT 
(from the first objection), yet simultaneously yielding to the possibility that the 
naturalist thesis is utterly incorrect, both on its account of kinds, and indeed on its 
hasty epistemological proclamations. 
With scientific realism fully dessicated, it will then be my goal to reconstitute the 
remnants in the subsequent chapters, and arrive at a suitable replacement. 
2.1 THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE METAPHYSICAL THESIS 
The metaphysical thesis of scientific realism is plausibly its foundation stone, yet 
many authors on the position tend to rush over it, or even to advocate it as some sort 
of common sense basis for the position, which is not itself in need of analysis, let 
alone defence (or, for many of these authors, the justification which they profess to 
think so vital). Psillos runs it together with AT, and holds that it is part of 'a basic 
philosophical presupposition' made to avoid idealism, phenomenalism, and 
verificationism.^^ Newton-Smith does the same - both he and Psillos seem to dismiss 
'^ Popper [1959], ch. 1, sections 2 & 3. 
Naturally, it is important to remember that they may be approximately true, whether or not we can 
establish that they are. It is only our alleged ability to establish that they are approximately true that 
comes under attack in my second objection. ( E T has two central components, which should not be 
conflated, although I have grouped them for convenience.) 
•^^  Psillos [1999], p.xix. Against him, it can obviously stand without the A T , even when characterised 
in his own words, as being simply the claim 'that the world has a definite and mind-independent 
15 
positions such as Kant's without a mention^"* - and adds a bizarre comment about the 
inadequacy of a view expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by 
characterising minimal realism as: 
[T]he assumption that scientific propositions are true or false where truth is 
understood in terms of a cleaned-up version of the correspondence theory of truth. 
By this latter qualification I mean that we are assuming that to be true (false) is to be 
true (false) in virtue of how the world is independently of ourselves. The notion of 
correspondence is not to be understood as, say, propositions picturing or mirroring 
the world a la early Wittgenstein.^ '^  
For Rescher, who at least recognises its independence, MT is posited on a pragmatic 
basis, and its acceptance is necessary before the very practice of natural science could 
be thought worthwhile: '[It is a] postulation made on functional rather than evidential 
grounds.'^^ And even Popper seems to despair of treating its defence rigorously, 
instead admitting that idealism is irrefutable, while maintaining that '[Metaphysical] 
realism is so obviously true that even a straightforward argument... is just a little 
distasteful.''^ (Note well: Popper's use of 'metaphysical realism' should not be 
confused with that of metaphysicians such as Loux, who use the same tag to refer to 
what I call 'Medieval realism', that is belief in the existence of universals.^*) 
Now I have started this section in such a vein in order to draw attention to a genuine 
scandal in post-Kantian philosophy. It consists of the tame acceptance that the 
fundamental question - about the very nature of the world, and our interaction with it 
- is quite beyond our ability to answer decisively. I f we asseverate that MT is just a 
presupposition, then we should want to take work in the Kantian tradition, inter alia, 
as seriously as we do the claims of modern natural science. Worse, i f MT can only be 
defended on the basis of a pragmatic turn, then so much the better for pragmatism; so 
much the better, that is, for positions such as constructive empiricism. For is it not an 
inauspicious start for scientific realism to be founded on a pragmatic move, when its 
proponents want to vie against the pragmatic moves of others, not to mention 
wholesale pragmatism? I answer in the affirmative, and would urge that it is one 
thing to admit one's fallibility, but quite another to invite the sceptic in. 
However, let me return to the work of Popper, which has been characterised 
somewhat unfairly above. First, because Popper holds that MT plays no part as a 
presupposition in his epistemology of science, as such. Second, because he does not 
natural-kind structure'. To reiterate my earlier point, in 1.1: it says nothing explicit about what truth-
makers are. One might even claim that the M T is true on an anti-realist account of truth! 
~* See, for example, Kant [1787], A49. He writes: 'space and time, as the necessary conditions of all 
(outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which 
therefore all objects are mere appearances... much may be said a priori that concerns their form, but 
nothing whatsoever about the things in themselves that may ground them.' 
" Newton-Smith [1981], pp.28-29. His ruling out of the notion of propositions 'picturing or mirroring' 
the world is mistaken; he still wants to have them as truth-bearers himself, so all that is in dispute, here, 
is how they bear the truth. Needless to say, this has nothing, whatsoever, to do with what truth-makers 
are. 
Rescher [1987], p. 126. However, he does seem to shoot himself in the foot a little later, on p. 140, 
when he writes that 'The utility of the conception of reality is such that even if reality were not there, 
we would have to invent it.' Such a comment only plays into the hands of the Neo-Kantian. 
Popper [1983], p.85. 
See Loux [1998], ch. l . 
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confuse it with the issues surrounding truth - indeed, he thinks, perhaps mistakenly, 
that Tarski's account is sufficient for his purposes. Third, because he thinks that there 
are strong critical reasons for believing in M T , and that these are not merely 
pragmatic. In his words: 
Metaphysical realism is nowhere used to support any of the solutions proposed in 
LSc.D [The Logic of Scientific Discovery]... It forms a background that gives point 
to our search for truth. Rational discussion, that is, critical argument in the interest of 
getting nearer to the truth, would be pointless without an objective reality, a world 
which we make it our task to discover... [T]here is no factual knowledge which is 
supported by more or by stronger (even though inconclusive) arguments.^' 
Now with all this I agree, except the claim that the arguments against idealism are 
'inconclusive', beyond the sense in which the conclusion of any argument is never 
absolutely certain. Rather, I hold that the arguments are decisive, when it is taken as 
a premiss that truth is absolute, because all idealist talk must be understood to be 
veiled realist talk, i f it is not to be strictly meaningless, or allegorical.^" Here, I raise 
the issue only in order to give an early suggestion of just how shaky M T really is, 
even by the admission of the scientific realist camp. And I shall argue below that this 
is because it is far too weak - in so far as vague and diaphanous - a thesis. 
Beforehand, I should state clearly that I do believe there is an intimate l ink between 
M T and A T , and that it is not surprising, as such, to f ind some authors running them 
together. My objection to such an approach is just that it neglects the analysis of this 
link, between two logically distinct sets of claims, which proves quite revealing. 
Indeed, it is plausible that the M T and the A T should be combined with the benefit of 
an appropriate gel, in order to provide a decent foundation for a realist take on natural 
science. The gel is precisely that which is missing f rom too many realist accounts. 
ST&AT \=MT&MR 
According to ST, theories in natural science should be understood literally and are 
capable of being true or false, so construed. According to A T , assertions are truth-
bearers, and truth-makers are mind-independent, objective, entities. Thus, were the 
assertions issued by (or 'that compose') theories in natural science to be true, the 
entities thereby referred to would exist. But this draws our attention to a serious 
problem, which tends to hamper much work in the philosophy of science: what, 
precisely, are theories? Unfortunately, I cannot hope to give a satisfactory answer to 
this important question here, so I w i l l remain agnostic on the issue. What I w i l l point 
out, instead, is that it should be evident that modern physics involves talk of 
'electrons', chemistry of 'bonds', and biology of 'cells'. And for present purposes, it 
is sufficient for us to recognise that i f one accepts A T and ST, one should accept that 
such talk is about posited entities. Entities that really would exist, were particular 
theories in contemporary natural science to be true. 
Now given this, M T follows as a direct consequence, on the assumption that at least 
one possible scientific theory - not necessarily a contemporary one - must be true. 
Popper [1983], pp.81-83. 
See 1.2.2, under the sub-section 'From Knowledge as 'Justified True Belief to Fallibilism'. 
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This should hardly be surprising, since ST and A T provide accounts of what it is for 
something to be true (viz. to have mind-independent, objective, truth-makers), and 
what sort of things (viz. assertions, and theories) have the potential to be true. For 
example, ask a scientist whether electrons, bonds, or cells were around before 
humans, according to the accepted view in science, and she w i l l state that they were. 
Thus, according to said view, they do not depend upon our existence, or upon us 
undertaking any activity (such as imagining, conceiving, believing, etc.), for their 
existence. They are mind-independent, and objective: natural scientists don't bother 
generating theories about things that aren't, like money. ( I f everyone on earth were to 
cease to believe in money, or to be eradicated, there would be no money. This, 
although many notes and coins might, of course, remain.) Another way of looking at 
this is that both M T and A T are necessary prerequisites for ST - i f they fa l l , it falls, 
and ST & A T |= M T is a sound argument just because ~ M T u - A T |= ~ST, as is 
evinced by the actual claims in actual natural science. ( I am at pains to emphasise, 
however, that 0(MT & A T & ~ST).) 
It should be noticed, however, that there is absolutely nothing about ST that precludes 
the existence of objects that serve as truth-makers, but do not exist ' i n ' space and 
time. Still further, ST in no way denies that such entities could play a part in 
scientific theories, at least in principle. Thus, ST is consistent with the fol lowing 
claim: 
Weak Medieval Realism (MR): Abstracta might exist.^' 
This result is a direct consequence of the fact that none of the theses treated here, 
indeed none of those outlined in the previous section save NT, serve to restrict the 
domain of natural science beyond that which is mind-independent and objective. In 
other words, it could not be thought verboten, on the basis of M T , A T , and ST, for a 
scientist to put forward a theory (or world-view) that gave active roles to entities such 
as universals, or sets. What is more, and this may seem curious, it could not even be 
thought wrong for a scientist to put forward a theory that had elements which were 
not supposed to be taken to be actual. (A good example would be one that depended 
upon Plantinga's theory of possible worlds.'" As Armstrong puts it: ' [ I ] t is often true 
that some state of affairs is possible, although the state of affairs does not obtain. 
Again, it is often true that it is possible that some object exists, although the object 
does not exist. What truthmakers are we going to supply for these truths?''''') There is 
no mention of either actual world or physical 'world' (which I take to mean physical 
things in the actual world, subject to the caveat in footnote 31) in M T , A T , or ST, 
although perhaps there should be. 
Already, then, i t becomes clear that M T is insufficient to provide a proper basis for 
scientific inquiry, let alone a serious philosophical account of science, even when 
conjoined with AT . The assumptions that must be made in order to enable these 
" Here I use 'abstract' in the sense of 'non-concrete', and am broadly partial to the account of abstract 
entities given in section II of Lowe [1995]: 'To exist in space and time is not to have a special kind of 
existence - for the notion of existence, like that of identity, is univocal. Rather, it is just to have certain 
sorts of properties and relations - spatiotemporal ones.' 
See Plantinga[1974],IV.3. 
"Armstrong [1997], p. 149. 
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projects are meatier, and I shall return to this point after I have shown why NT, which 
attempts to attend to the omissions revealed above, is far too presumptuous. 
There is, however, a possible line of objection to my main argument here, which runs 
as follows: on the assumption that the contemporary (mature, predictively successful) 
theories in natural science are approximately true, abstracta do not exist. The thought 
would be that although science might have allowed abstracta to be posited, at one 
time or another, it has already ruled them out as potential 'inhabitants' of the world."^'* 
I now turn to the rejection of this claim. 
MT&ST&AT&ET \^MR 
To many scientific realists, talk of abstracta may seem to be quite out of place in 
contemporary science. It may seem that entities in such a category - those 'outside' 
space and time - have no place in scientific discourse, and are certainly not employed 
in current theories. For example, I have already mentioned posited entities such as the 
electron, bond, and cell - entities that many scientific realists would take to exist. But 
each of these is 'located' in space and time, according to the status quo in science, is 
it not? 
True. But now one might ask the scientific realist how to characterise such an entity: 
take the electron as an example. Is it not the case that he would want to say it is a 
natural kind, rather than a classification made on the basis of convention? That it is 
an entity-type that has been discovered, rather than invented? Further, would he not 
want to characterise the electron as possessing a definite rest mass of (approx.) 
9.109390 X lO""" kg, a definite charge of (approx.) -1.602177 x 10''^ C, and a spin of 
1/2? I f so, then he needs to think quite carefully about what he is saying. First, 
because it is far f rom obvious that the natural kind 'electron', rather than any 
individual electron, exists in space and time, or 'exists' only in so far as it is a useful 
way of talking about similar things. Second, because mass, charge, and spin all 
presumably exist, at least according to the scientific realist - there are plenty of m-
terms, q-terms, and indeed S-terms, in the mathematical laws of physics. A few 
examples:"*^ 
Relativistic Momentum Equation: p = ymov 
Coulomb's Law of Electrostatics: F = qiqiMTisor" 
Magnetic Moment of Electron (about axis i ) : j i j = qeSj/nie 
The final equation provides the most striking example, since it involves the use of 
each of the aforementioned terms. And it might be understood, by anyone with good 
physical intuition (something akin to Duhem's bon sens, perhaps^^), to show how 
each of the properties that these correspond to are responsible for the electron having 
An analogous claim could be made about non-actual entities having been ruled out, but I take this to 
be so obviously false that it does not merit discussion. 
I would agree with Lowe that all these laws have 'from a logical point of view...the same status as 
such grandiose principles as Newton's laws of motion'. See Lowe [1987], p.326. 
Duhem[1954],pp.216-218. 
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a magnetic moment (about a given axis): in other words, that all |a-property talk, with 
respect to electrons, is translatable into talk of more fundamental properties. The 
equation might be understood to (strongly) imply that electrons only have magnetic 
moments in so far as they have spin, charge, and mass. Further, such a claim is 
defensible f rom a historical perspective, for an electron possessing both definite 
charge and rest mass was posited long before the possibility of its possessing a 'spin' 
had been considered; this was a suggestion first made in 1925, by Goudsmidt and 
Uhlenbeck."^^ (That electrons had a magnetic moment was, of course, suggested 
before 1925, e.g. in the 1922 experiments of Stern and Gerlach.^^ But such moments 
were never just assumed to be primitive properties of the electron; this was due, in no 
small part, to Maxwell 's equations. In particular, V • B = 0, f rom Gauss' law, which 
precludes the existence of magnetic monopoles, and V x B - |ioeo3E/9t = \ M ) J , the 
modified version of Ampere's law^^, which suggests that charge movement, or charge 
change, is responsible for magnetic effects. I have run a similar argument, elsewhere, 
which defends the view that the speed of light may be seen only to be a consequence 
of the permittivity and permeability of free space, plus Maxwell 's laws/equations.'^^ 
The key equation, which may be derived f rom these laws (acting in free space), is: c = 
l/V(Hoeo).) 
A step back f rom the detailed physics, though. What are these things that electrons -
inter alia - are said to possess? For example, what are mass and charge! According 
to the austere scientific realist, the theories containing these terms are approximately 
true, and thus it would seem to fol low that mass and charge are properties, and are not 
be confused with those concreta capable of possessing them. But an account of 
concrete objects as bundles of compresent tropes is by no means suggested by 
anything in physics; i f anything, such a view would be discouraged by the manner in 
which many laws involve relations only between properties, e.g. K = mv^/2 in 
classical mechanics. In plain language, the kinetic energy of any body is proportional 
to both its mass, and the square of its speed'*': nothing else about the body - whether it 
is green or red, small or big, round or square, plastic or elastic, metallic or wooden -
matters. So it would not appear to be just a law about bodies, at least at first sight; 
rather, it would seem to stipulate a relationship between properties either necessarily 
(mass) or contingently (velocity, under a classical understanding'*^) possessed by 
bodies. 
G .E. Uhlenbeck and S. Goudsmit, Naturwissenschaften 47 (1925), 953. There is also a rather 
interesting transcript of a talk by Goudsmit, on the discovery of spin, which is available at the 
following URL: h l l p : / / w \ v \ v . l o i en l z . J e ide tu i i i i v . n l / h i s l (> ry / sp in /go i i d sn i i l . h in i l . He says, for instance: 
'When the day came I had to tell Uhlenbeck about the Pauli principle - of course using my own 
quantum numbers - then he said to me: "But don't you see what this implies? It means that there is a 
fourth degree of freedom for the electron. It means that the electron has a spin, that it rotates"... And 
when he said: "That means a fourth degree of freedom", then I asked him: "What is a degree of 
freedom?'" 
Stern, O, and Gerlach, W., 'Der experimentelle Nachweis der Richtungsquantelung im Magnetfeld', 
Z.Phys. 9, 349-352. 
The initial version of Ampere's law would have read V x B = Ho J . but Maxwell modified it to 
include a displacement current, and provide greater symmetry with Faraday' law of induction, V x E + 
aB/at = 0. 
Rowbottom [2002], 'The Semantic Thesis', in section 1.1. 
This, for v^  = |v|". Kinetic energy is a scalar, and only dependent upon the product of two scalars, in 
the non-relativistic case. 
Take the equipartition theorem, which states that a gas molecule has an average kinetic energy of 
kT/2 per degree of freedom; at absolute zero, then, the average kinetic energy would be zero, thus the 
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Furthermore, to return to electrons, we might also note that what is supposed to be 
essential to them is not merely that they possess a mass and a charge, but rather that 
they possess a specific mass and specific charge. Now this may seem to suggest that 
it is essential to the electron that i t possesses particular modes, or tropes, of the 
corresponding universals. Two roses may be of the same species while displaying 
different shades of red, but two electrons may never have different 'quantities of 
matter' composing them.'*'' 
In summary, then, it is not the case that M R is precluded, and unclear how it could 
ever be conclusively precluded, by scientific theories, or more generally in the process 
of empirical inquiry, even i f M T , ST, AT, and ET hold.'*^ But this should not really 
be a surprise, since empirical inquiry is restricted to the domain of the physical, or 
what might be better understood to be the concrete^^ Indeed, it is this very fact that 
makes it radically dependent upon metaphysical assumptions - one is precisely that 
there is a distinction between the concrete and the abstract, whether or not any 
abstracta exist - be they implicit or explicit. But I do not want to suggest, here, that 
all natural scientists, such as physicists, need to study the work of contemporary 
metaphysicians in order to press ahead. Indeed, it would be undesirable to restrict 
them in such a way; they need not worry overly about the underdetermination of 
theories by evidence, except in periods of crisis. Let them press ahead, and leave it to 
the metaphysicians (or theoretical physicists) to unveil what is compatible, i f 
anything, with the 'predictive machinery', or 'experimental laws', which they 
produce.''^ As Duhem memorably puts it: 
To explain (explicate, explicare) is to strip reality of the appearances covering it like 
a veil, in order to see the bare reality itself [to this, the scientific realist does, I hold, 
commit]... Therefore, if the aim of physical theories is to explain experimental laws, 
theoretical physics is not an autonomous science; it is subordinate to metaphysics.^^ 
Now Duhem was convinced about the autonomy of physics, but what he failed to 
recognise is that it may be effectively 'autonomous', descriptively speaking, i f the 
bulk of non-theoretical physicists are just uncritical about the ontologies that they 
employ, and adopt dominant research programmes in order to 'puzzle solve' in the 
sense suggested by Kuhn. And I say this without suggesting that they would be right 
kinetic energy of each molecule would be zero, since the kinetic energy of any molecule could not take 
a value lower than zero, unless there were negative masses. (According to the quantum theory of heat 
capacities, on the other hand, rotational and vibrational energy of molecules is quantised. For example, 
a diatomic molecule could never have less vibrational energy than h(i)/47t, where (fl=V(k/m), and m is 
reduced mass, mim2/mi+m2.) 
It is worth noting that this construal of mass is not the only one, but I need not treat the 
incommensurability issue here. See van Fraassen [2002], pp.113-114. 
One important caveat: if a fictionalist or nominalist account of the role of mathematics in science is 
correct, then my argument might very well fail. But I do not take such an account to be part of 
'scientific realism', and it would seem to be an ad hoc addition if it were cobbled on merely to 
motivate the rejection of MR. 
I come to demarcation later, in II.4. 
'^ ^ I might add that there are some physicists who are very 'metaphysically minded', and strangely 
enough they tend to be associated with revolutionary theories. Bohm is a case in point: see II. 1.3. 
Duhem [1954], pp.7-10. It should be noted, though, that some empiricists, e.g. van Fraassen, adopt 
different views of explanation. 
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to do so - that they would be doing the best possible science, or anything better than 
applied science - although I postpone detailed discussion of this issue until II .4. 
For the moment, let me just point to an illuminating discussion by Popper, in which 
he points out that many scientific papers are structured in an entirely misleading 
fashion, 'an inductive style', which involves a listing of observations in a manner that 
appears to be completely theory-neutral, and only then the so-called 'generation' of a 
theory. He writes: 
No doubt the idea which inspires the inductive style - the idea of adhering strictly to 
the observed facts and of excluding bias and prejudice - is laudable.... [But] 
objectivity, and also unbiased observation, are the results of criticism, including the 
criticism of observational reports. For we cannot avoid or suppress our theories, or 
prevent them from influencing our observations; yet we can try to recognize them as 
hypothetical and to formulate them explicitly, so that they may be criticized.'*^ 
Indeed, this 'inductive style' is demanded of pupils f rom the time they start to study 
natural sciences - 1 can corroborate that this expectation continues at undergraduate 
level - although it serves to encourage avoidance of foundational issues. And there is 
a simple lesson here, on which many a philosopher of science can agree: that we 
should look to what natural scientists actually do, rather just than what they say that 
they do, or how they present their work, i f we are to understand why so many might 
think that science does not involve (or rest upon implicit) metaphysics. As Zahar puts 
it: 
In certain cases, scientists have written about their methodology and about their 
heuristics. However, the scientist's reports cannot always be taken at face value: he 
may either knowingly disguise the truth, or else he may be sincere but have a false 
consciousness of his own activity... a scientists' explicitly professed methodology, as 
distinct from his singular and often tacit value-judgments, has by itself no 
methodological significance.''^ 
This said, I shall revisit the issue of the ontological status of properties in 1.2.5, where 
I argue that NT is plausibly incompatible with the other components of 'scientific 
realism'. And it should be remembered that my core claim is as follows: N T is 
needed just because M T is too weak and vague, but NT is far too strong, viz. 
unmitigated. 
2.2 AGAINST JUSTIFICATIONISM AND INDUCTION: QUID JURIS 
(AT 1= ~ E T ) 
The goal of science has come to be envisaged as the accumulation of highly confirmed, or 
highly probable, or well-supported hypotheses; and only derivatively as an accumulation of 
truths. - Miller^" 
Popper [1983], p.48. 
Zahar [1989], pp.3-4 
'"Miller [1994], p.2. 
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A common dogma, widely adhered to in contemporary philosophy, is that knowledge 
is justified true belief.'^' To know that one knew that a proposition was true, under 
this understanding, would be to have a completely justified true belief, on pain of 
allowing for an infinite regress of 'knowing': for justified true beliefs, about justified 
true beliefs, ad infinitumP But is such complete justification really attainable? 
Before I turn to answer this question, though, a word about terminology. For 
'justificationism' is a rather old notion in philosophy of science, but could be taken, 
by contemporary epistemologists, to mean something other than that which I intend. 
Thus, I offer a straightforward definition f rom Lakatos: 
Justificationism, that is, the identification of knowledge with proven knowledge, was 
the dominant tradition in rational thought throughout the ages... It turned out that all 
theories are equally unprovable... classical justificationists feared that once they 
conceded that theoretical science is unprovable, they would have to conclude that it is 
sophistry and illusion, a dishonest fraud. The philosophical importance of 
probabilism (or 'neojustificationism') lies in the denial that such a conclusion is 
necessary.'^ 
For convenience, I do not use the tokens 'justificationism' and 'neojustificationism' in 
what follows, but bundle both under the former term; by remaining cognisant of this, 
the reader should avoid confusion. 
From Knowledge as 'Justified True Belief to Fallibilism 
The basic statements at which we stop, which we decide to accept as satisfactory, and as 
sufficiently tested, have admittedly the character of dogmas, but only in so far as we may 
desist from justifying them by further arguments (or further tests). - Popper'"* 
Nowadays, the majority of philosophers hold that most, i f not all, synthetic 
knowledge is fallible. (Indeed, fol lowing Quine, some would hold that there is not 
even a legitimate analytic-synthetic distinction to be made.''^) In the case of much a 
posteriori knowledge, because it is a general feature of ampliative (e.g. inductive) 
arguments that their consequences are only partially entailed by their premises; in 
other words, that they are not always truth-preserving. As Psillos, a scientific realist, 
puts it: 'certainty in decision procedures is a Utopian aim, and hence... it must be 
abandoned.'^^ In the case of much supposedly a priori knowledge, because history 
has taught us that many axioms which once seemed self-evident - for example, that 
two parallel lines never diverge or converge - were plausibly just conventions; that 
they were not just concepts, or categorial axioms, to which we were in some sense 
" Here, I refer to knowledge in an informational sense, rather than as competence (e.g. 'I know how to 
play the violin'), or acquaintance (e.g. 'I know Jonathan Lowe'). See Lehrer [1990], pp.3-4, and also 
my discussion in II.3. 
If a pure coherence model of justification is adopted, viz. coherentism rather than foundationalism, 
this becomes, instead, a vicious circle of 'knowing'. I put this to one side, for the moment, in the 
interests of clarity. 
" Lakatos [1970], pp.94-95. 
*^ Popper [1959], section 29. 
" In his words: 'Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough 
adjustments elsewhere in the system'. Quine [1951], p.43. 
Psillos [1999], p. 181. 
23 
'bound'. And even Lowe, a champion of metaphysical realism, writes that: 'as far 
as actuality is concerned, metaphysics cannot provide us with certainties.'^^ 
Indubitably, Kant deserves a mention here. For he holds to a three-way distinction 
between opinion, belief, and knowledge, which is made in terms of two conditions, 
subjective sufficiency and objective sufficiency, that correspond, respectively, to 
conviction and certainty. To opine is to take 'something to be true with the 
consciousness that it is subjectively as well as objectively insufficient'. To believe is 
to take 'something to be true [which] is only subjectively sufficient and is at the same 
time held to be objectively insufficient'. Finally, to know is to take something to be 
true which is both objectively sufficient and subjectively sufficient. These 
relationships are depicted below: 
F I G . 1.1 - K A N T ' S A C C O U N T O F OPINION, B E L I E F , A N D K N O W L E D G E 
SIjH.Ii:CTIV F. SUFFICIFNCV 
(CONVICIION) 
O H. 11; CI 1V1; SI j F11 c 11: N C ^  
( C F R I A I N r V ) 
OPINION X X 
B E L I E F X 
K N O W L E D G E 
Yet Kant also wants to have it that: 
I must never undertake to have an opinion without at least knowing something by 
means of which the in itself merely problematic judgement acquires a connection 
with truth which, although it is not complete, is nevertheless more than an arbitrary 
invention. Furthermore, the law of such connection must be certain. For i f in regard 
to this too I have nothing but opinion, then it is all only a game of imagination 
without the least connection to truth. In judging from pure reason, to have an opinion 
is not allowed at all. For since it will not be supported on grounds of experience, but 
everything that is necessary should be cognized a priori, the principle of connection 
requires universality and necessity, thus complete certainty, otherwise no guidance to 
the truth is forthcoming at all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure 
mathematics: one must know, or else refrain from all judgement.^' 
Here, however, the lynchpin of a problem for Kant's account of knowledge becomes 
apparent. It is as follows: i f truth is taken to be mere consensus (not even consensus 
in the ideal l imit of inquiry), the same scheme, depicted in the table above, seems to 
remain perfectly intact. Indeed, a l ink between conviction and certainty (understood 
as consensus) becomes apparent, in so far as anything on which all of a community's 
members agree (viz. are all convinced of) w i l l be, by force of such a definition of 
truth, certain. And surely this would be to describe a community in a 'dogmatic 
slumber' - perhaps even a rather unimaginative slumber - i f ever there were to be 
one. Admittedly, this criticism does not appear, prima facie, to be sufficiently 
To admit this is as problematic for the transcendental realist as it is for the transcendental idealist, I 
think. So here is a genuine philosophical challenge, which is perhaps suggestive of Fries' trilemma. I 
discuss this in II.4. 
Lowe [1998], p.27. 
Kant [1787], A822-A823. 
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devastating to suggest that Kant's account should be dismissed out of hand. But it 
does cut, I w i l l contend, to the very core of the problem with his approach. 
Essentially, this is because Kant would want to appeal to phenomena as being that 
which we could know (be convinced of and certain of) , and say, further, that such 
knowing is grounded in the operation of a certain form of a priori knowledge - our 
innate ways of 'seeing', or the necessary preconditions for our experiencing, the 
world - on the things-in-themselves that 'underlie' the phenomena; hence, his 
accounts of space and time.^° (In that sense, Kant has a thoroughgoing empirical 
realism, which relates only to the appearances, emerge f rom his transcendental 
idealism. This realism is, I contend, his goal.) But what is to say that such a claim is, 
itself, not merely an imagined one? What is the relation between the phenomena and 
the things-in-themselves, or the thinkable and those things which are responsible, in 
part, for their thinkability? How is Kant even capable of thinking that there might be 
things-in-themselves? Could he be certain that there are, without holding that this 
was merely a way in which he was forced to think of phenomena, which was itself a 
mere precondition of experience? These questions do not seem unfair, for although 
the things-in-themselves are not outside us in a spatio-temporal sense, on Kant's 
account, they are nonetheless not held to be a part of us, and are thus 'external' in the 
same sense that abstracta are, on the account of a Platonist. And the point is just that 
Kant cannot know (be convinced and certain), according to his own position on what 
constitutes knowledge (conviction and certainty), that his account in the Critique is 
true.^' A similar line of attack is proffered by BonJour, who writes: 
Suppose that we are concerned with some specific proposition P that is apparently 
synthetic a priori. Kant's suggestion is then that we can know P a priori in spite of 
its synthetic character because the mind so operates in structuring or "synthesising" 
experience as to make P invariably true within the experiential realm... But is easy to 
see that Kant's position offers no reason at all for thinking that the original 
proposition P is even tme, let alone justifiable or knowable a priori. What would 
have to be true if Kant's account were correct is, not the original proposition P, but 
rather the apparently quite different proposition: within the bounds of experience, P; 
call this proposition P*. And thus, insofar as the original intuitive datum to be 
accounted for is the apparent a pnon justification of P itself, Kant's explanadon does 
not really even speak to the issue.^" 
Now i f a correspondence theory of truth is taken to be based on more than the mere 
appearances - more than the 'phenomenal world ' - then there becomes a sense in 
which it is precisely the 'external' in which one should be interested; and fal l ibi l ism 
is, unavoidably, part of such a package. Yet this need not be of any great concern, 
just because the recommendation to behave as i f one is fallible seems to be, as far can 
be gathered f rom the history of ideas, methodologically advisable. That is to say, 
Kant's requirement for 'judging f rom pure reason', in the passage quoted above. 
*° Ibid., A23-A26, and A31-A33. 
In so far as Kant shows how the world would have to be, in order for us to have certainty and still be 
able to learn from experience (while simultaneously holding to a weak version of the correspondence 
theory of truth, at least), his achievement is most impressive. Alas, he could not show that things could 
be such a way, without appealing to traditional - that is, realist - metaphysics: in other words, his 
conclusions about 'any future metaphysics' cannot be right on the basis of his argument, since he 
employs more than that 'future metaphysics' in his Critique. 
BonJour [1998], pp.23-24. 
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seems to be too stringent. Is it is really wrong for one to have the opinion that 
Fermat's last theorem is true? On what grounds can this claim be criticised, in light 
of current evidence?^^ Moreover, is it not plausible that extremely useful 
mathematical operators have sometimes been invented, or discovered, without strict 
appeal to any prior mathematical 'proofs'? Consider the Dirac delta-function, the 
status of which was still being debated by mathematicians long after its use was 
accepted in the physics community.^"* 
Thus, I do not recognise the force of the claim that there need be any non-
psychological - that is epistemologically significant, in so far as truth-conducive -
difference between opinion and belief, albeit that there should be an important 
difference between belief and knowledge, i f a distinction between true belief and false 
belief is to be upheld. That is to say, there is an important sense in which all beliefs 
are just opinions; all are subject to revision in the light of criticism, in principle.^^ 
(Here, the use of 'belief versus 'opinion' in pre-philosophical discourse is 
unenlightening. But see the discussion of 'degree of bel ief , when I cover the 
subjective interpretation of probability, below.) And i f the goal of inquiry is just truth 
simpliciter, in the sense of correspondence to reality, then surely one should only be 
interested in settling upon beliefs which are true; one does not need certainty, or 
certainties. Or to put it differently, i f there are no such things as certainties, it does 
not fol low that there are no such things as true beliefs. Nor does it fol low that true 
beliefs are unattainable by humans. Lowe puts it so: 
The reason why Kant sought to redefine the nature of metaphysical claims as being 
claims about the structure of our thought about reality rather than the structure of 
reality itself is that he believed that only in this way could the absolutely certain and 
non-empirical character of metaphysical knowledge be explained... however, even 
granting the truth of this metaphysical assertion, why shouldn't we respond to it by 
saying not that metaphysical knowledge as traditionally conceived is impossible...but 
rather that metaphysical knowledge is almost never certain knowledge - that is, that 
metaphysical knowledge-claims can almost never be absolutely invulnerable to 
falsification or disproof?*^ 
To go even further, one might point to Kant's central claim, that we reside in some 
sort of prison of representations; whatever that is supposed to mean, without allowing 
for traditional metaphysics (and in particular, distinctions of being between things in 
themselves and things in themselves as thought). In his own words: 
If we let outer objects count as things in themselves, then it is absolutely impossible 
to comprehend how we are to acquire cognition of their reality outside us, since we 
base this merely on the representation, which is in us.*^  
''^  No concrete instances have been found to allow this claim to be strongly criticised, yet surely it is 
falsifiable, even if the means by which it is derivable cannot be found 
65 
"See Lutzen[1982]. 
Here I gesture again towards the difference between context of justification and context of discovery, 
which I will deal with in greater depth later. See Popper [1959], pp.31-32, 'Elimination of 
Psychologism'. Another way of explaining this is via the Quinean 'web of beliefs'. See Quine [1951]. 
Lowe [2002], p.9. I would want to delete the mentions of 'almost', since they seem to take the sting 
out of this point. I discuss this further in 111.5.3. 
Kant [1787]. A378. 
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Stroud characterises this passage as a clear indication that 'The doctrine of the 
epistemic priority of representations... seems simply to have been removed f rom the 
empirical to the transcendental level.'^^ But this doctrine, which arguably has a 
Cartesian root, is not itself defended by Kant, and is precisely the one that any self-
respecting transcendental realist would want to criticise in the strongest terms.^^ First, 
because even were it the case that we could not 'comprehend' such a link, it would 
obviously not fol low that there was not such a link; rather, there might simply be a 
l imit to our explanatory ability. (Taken alone, this is sufficient to show that Kant's 
position is fallible.) Second, and more destructively, just because other alternatives 
are, I would claim, perfectly comprehensible. In the interests of brevity, I w i l l only 
offer two examples, and leave the rest as an exercise to the reader: 
i) I , i f I exist, am either part of a world containing more than one entity, or am 
the sole entity that constitutes the world. In the first case, I may either enter 
into relations with other entities in the world, or not. (Here, for simplicity's 
sake, I do not consider the fact that I may have parts, and other entities may 
have parts, which might enter into internal and external relations as well . In 
any event, it is by no means necessary that a relation between two entities, 
taken holistically, need be affected by the internal or external relations of the 
parts of those entities which enter into it.) I f the former, then the relations 
between myself and other entities w i l l depend for their existence upon both 
myself, and the other entities in the world. Moreover, it is not necessary that I 
should stand in only one relation to each other entity; I could stand in many 
such relations. There could be conceivability relations. There could also be 
perceivability relations. There could be relations responsible for my a priori 
knowledge of categories of being; said knowledge might also be pre-rational 
and innate, although dormant and unrecognisable without the application of 
reason, in a similar fashion to that suggested in Plato's MenoJ^ (Under such 
an understanding, it is clear that the conversion of such insight into explicit 
and criticisable conjectures would involve considerable work.) 
i i ) Just as it may be a necessary precondition of my experience that there is 
something to experience, it may also be a necessary precondition of my ability 
to conceive that there are things to conceive of. Just as it does not fol low that 
I need experience only myself, or parts of myself, it does not follow that I 
need conceive only of myself, or parts of myself. Furthermore, it simply does 
not fol low that things in themselves are not responsible for my conceiving of 
things in themselves, and so forth. (And Kant does conceive of things in 
themselves, as well as things in themselves as thought.) 
None of this is verboten in the realm of metaphysical possibility; I do not assert that 
these outlines successfully describe the actual world, only that they might. And I f ind 
the foregoing to be pellucid, and quite comprehensible. Indeed, I also understand why 
transcendental idealism might appeal to some - I confess it is common to see some 
statements as certain - but also see why there is simply no certainty that there are 
Stroud [1984], pp. 163-164. 
This links in to my discussion in II.2, and is a core contention of the thesis. And indeed the next sub-
section is suggestive of the discussion in II.3: as such, there are glimpses of the position I wish to 
develop that already begin to emerge here, but which require weaving together. 
™ Plato, Meno, 79e-86c. 
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certainties. And overall my point is that the links I speculate about may very well be 
comprehensible without being analysable; they may be fundamental, in the same way 
that some take personhood to be. 
From Fallibilism to the Rejection of Justificationisni'^ 
.. .induction being weaker than deduction, we now get merely an Ersatz certainty: probability 
comes in as the substitute, or surrogate, of certainty - not quite the thing, but at least the next 
best thing, and at any rate approaching it. Al l this is unacceptable. - Popper^" 
With one's fal l ibi l i ty accepted, one might nonetheless still want to hold that a belief 
must be sufficiently justified, as well as true, in order for it to constitute knowledge; 
but sufficient justification would, then, consist of something other than certainty (e.g. 
something other than a conclusion derived f rom a valid argument based on 'a self-
evidently' truth-preserving form of inference, and a set of axioms which were 'self-
evident truths'). However, I shall argue, fol lowing Popper, Bartley, and Miller , that 
there is no such thing as justification, because there are no such things as good 
reasons, albeit that there may be 'the subjective feeling of being in possession of good 
reasons ' .Moreover , that being in possession of 'good reasons' for holding any 
given true belief would be of no more practical benefit than merely holding said true 
belief, and that it is not methodologically necessary for us to seek out 'good reasons' 
in order to make rational decisions. (As Mil ler puts it , the goal should be 'rational 
decision-making', rather than 'rational-decision making'.^'*) 
Take a simple example: imagine that both I , and my supervisor, predict that the 
internal examiner of this PhD thesis w i l l be a philosopher of science (viz. w i l l have 
'philosophy of science' as his, or her, area of specialisation).^'^ I predict this simply 
because I believe that the only suitable internal examiner, in Durham's philosophy 
department, is Robin Hendry. M y supervisor, on the other hand, predicts the same 
only because he has heard that Robin Hendry is about to be sacked, and replaced by 
another philosopher of science. Dr. G, who w i l l be even better equipped to examine 
this thesis, because she has great expertise in metaphysics. Now imagine that Robin 
Hendry does, indeed, get the sack, and is replaced by Dr. G; further, that she is 
subsequently selected as the internal examiner of this thesis. 
Was my supervisor's prediction sufficiently justifiedl Presumably, the justificationist 
would want to answer in the positive, or at least hold that it was highly justified. Was 
It must be added, however, that one could opt for anti-realism, or reject AT, instead. For example, a 
'justification' condition may be based on consensus, and coupled to a theory of truth based on 
consensus. In any thesis on such a broad topic, some avenues will remain open (in so far as not 
critically examined), but it must be remembered that my primary targets are scientific realism and 
empiricism, particularly constructive empiricism, both of which generally involve AT. 
Popper [1983], p.222. 
" Miller [1994], p.66. 
" Ibid., p.43. 
The example used here might seem to be closely related to that presented in Gettier [1963], pp. 121-
123. But notice that I am not attempting to formulate a situation such that there needs to be a condition 
in addition to justification in order for a true belief to constitute 'knowledge'. Rather, I am suggesting 
that one might attempt to resolve the apparent problem in this case - albeit, as I will urge below, 
mistakenly - by appeal to degrees of justification. See also Russell [1912], ch. 13. 
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my prediction, by comparison? I f I were a justificationist, I should want to say that it 
had some justification, at the very least; merely because I had no 'good reason(s)' to 
believe that Robin Hendry was about to be sacked, it does not fol low that my 
prediction was not 'partially entailed', or 'rendered more probable', by the premises 
that I accepted.^^ Intuitively, in common parlance, one might want to say that I did 
not know the internal examiner of this thesis would be a philosopher of science. But 
then, it might be held that my supervisor did know, even though his prediction may 
also have been wrong, just because Dr. G may have been run over by a bus before 
being able to examine this thesis! The difference might seem to be only that my 
supervisor's prediction was more justified than mine, whether or not it was sufficiently 
justified. 
One notices, then, that both the predictions made above might be understood, by the 
justificationist, to be inductive in nature: 'a matter of weighing evidence, and judging 
likelihood, not of proof.'^^ And one begins to wonder, therefore, what use 
justification could actually be in the quest for truth, and how such a notion, along with 
that of a 'good reason', could be formally represented. What is needed is an account 
of how evidence (one set of propositions, premises, which are accepted as true, or 
held themselves for 'good reasons') bears on conclusions (another set of 
propositions), when the conclusions in question do not deductively fol low f rom the 
evidence. In other words, of how one gets f rom fallible axioms which are accepted as 
true to conclusions which there are 'good reasons' to believe in although they are not 
logically entailed, or even f rom one set of propositions believed for 'good reasons' to 
another. And any such account, no matter how diaphanous, should involve discussion 
of probabilities, because it is clear that it w i l l involve degrees of justification, and that 
these w i l l often depend - most obviously in the field of natural science - on the 
degree of confirmation of a theory. (Remember Upton's explicit mention of 
'likelihood'.) As Popper writes, in his discussion of the infinite regress which 
inductive logic falls foul of: 'Kant tried to force his way out of this diff iculty by 
taking the principle of induction (which he formulated as the 'principle of universal 
causation') to be 'apriori valid'. '^^ This points to the l ink between induction and 
justification that emerges when the quest for certainty is sacrificed; and as argued in 
the previous section, this sacrifice is needed. 
Even i f the justificationist wants now to chicane, in anticipation of that which is to 
come, and elect to hold that any given belief is either sufficiently justified (or i f 
preferred, just ' justified') or not justified at all (relative to the evidence for/against i t ) , 
it is still incumbent on her to show how degrees of belief can, do, and should change, 
and state at which point it is, precisely, that a degree of belief (or rational degree of 
belief) becomes sufficiently high to constitute a sufficient justification. For whether 
there really is such an inductive logic is precisely the point at issue, and those who 
would answer in the positive should be expected to put up a model for critical 
examination, rather than rely on vague appeals to intuition and 'common practice'. 
And I shall argue that, all too often, the mere falling of a leaf (or an apple) is taken to 
have great inductive significance, when it is simply a fallible observation (which may 
be expressed by a particular statement). 
''^  Here, it is plausible that many of my implicit premises were very similar to, or even the same as, 
those held by my supervisor. 
"Upton [1991], p.6. 
Popper [1959], p.29. 
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'Probably' Useless - The Problem with Probabilistic Accounts of Justification 
When dealing with probabilities, the golden rule is to recognise that they may be 
interpreted in several different fashions. Consider that I hold a coin in my hand, and 
ask, "When I f l ip this coin, what is the probability that it w i l l land heads-up?" Two 
answers, equally valid, are common: (i) "One half, because even i f it is biased, I don't 
know which way it is biased."; (ii) " I have no idea whatsoever." One who offers the 
first answer is taking the use of probability to be related to one's ignorance: a view 
which is still , surprisingly, uncritically asserted in many not-so-ancient undergraduate 
textbooks. Witness Boas, who writes: 
The word "probably" is frequently used in everyday life. We say "The test will 
probably be hard," "It will probably snow today," "We will probably win this game," 
and so on. Such statements always imply a state of partial ignorance about the 
outcome of some event; we do not say "probably" about something whose outcome 
we know. The theory of probability tries to express more precisely just what our state 
of ignorance is. We say that the probability of getting a head in one toss of a coin is 
Vi, and similarly for a taUJ'^ [Emphasis mine] 
One who offers the second answer, on the other hand, is operating under a different, 
non-epistemic, understanding of probability. The thought is, instead, that there really 
is a probability inherent in each f l ip , or that would emerge (be determinable) after an 
infinite number of repeated flips (i.e. repeated experiments in approximately the same 
conditions, or same relevant conditions), which might take any value, between zero 
and one, whatsoever. Hacking sums up the differences between the two approaches 
in a most memorable fashion: 
probability.. .is Janus-faced. On the one side it is statistical, concerning itself with 
stochastic laws of chance processes. On the other side it is epistemological, dedicated 
to assessing reasonable degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical 
background.^" 
The terminology which he employs to express this distinction is also that which I w i l l 
adopt. Any interpretation is either: (a) epistemic (or epistemological), meaning that it 
takes probability to be a measure of degree of belief, degree of rational belief, or 
perhaps even degree of knowledge; or (b) aleatory, meaning that it takes probabilities 
to be mind-independent features of the world, e.g. that possessed by a uranium atom 
with respect to its decay over any arbitrary period of time. This leads to a 
classification scheme which is represented in the table below: 
™ Boas [1983], p.685. This is a textbook which was, and perhaps still is, recommended to 
undergraduates reading physics at the University of Bristol. 
*° Hacking [1975], p. 12. 
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F I G . 1.2 - C L A S S I H C A T I O N S C H E M E FOR I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S O F P R O B A B I L I T Y 
E P I S T E M I C A L E A I O R Y 
C L A S S I C A L 
(Bernoulli, Laplace) 
F R E Q U E N C Y 
(Ellis, Venn, von Mises, Reichenbach) 
L O G I C A L 
(Johnson, Keynes, Jeffreys, Carnap, 
Jaynes) 
P R O P E N S I T Y 
(Popper, Mil ler) 
S U B J E C T I V E 
(Ramsey, De Finetti) 
I N T E R S U B J E C T I V E 
(Gillies) 
Now I should hope it is reasonably obvious that aleatory interpretations of probability 
are unsuited to the task of providing an account of justification. Primarily, just 
because were they to be so suited, then there would have to be a continuum between 
truth and falsehood, whereby a proposition really could be probably true, in an utterly 
non-epistemic sense. And somehow, evidence would be responsible for altering the 
truth-value (here, take truth to be 1, falsity to be 0, and the interim values to be 
probable truths) of any given proposition - a notion that should seem ridiculous 
indeed, f rom the point of view of one who holds out for correspondence truth. For on 
any other account, for example where i t is assumed that frequencies exist, and one can 
justify one's beliefs merely by spotting them - something akin to Reichenbach's view 
- there is a fatal objection.^' As Lehrer puts it, in the specific case of sense-data 
samples taken as basic beliefs: 
To know the frequency of the presence of external objects.. .in the sense-data 
sample...one would have to know precisely what the frequency probability statement 
was supposed to enable us to know, namely, that beliefs about the external 
objects...are true. The attempt to justify statements about external objects by appeal 
to frequency statements is, therefore, futile.^^ 
Even i f this is recognised, it is still possible to argue that the beliefs in frequencies are 
themselves basic, but then they would have to be self-justified! And I agree with 
Lehrer that such a 'proposed solution...has the twin disadvantages o f being 
unenlightening and i n c o r r e c t ' s i m p l y because it reduces to an exercise in asserting, 
and repeating with a foot-stamp, " I am justified". 
For a fuller discussion along related lines, see the outline of Reichenbach's position, and the criticism 
thereof, in Cower [1997], ch. 10. Cohen expresses a similar view, open to the same criticism as above, 
and writes: 'It was a reasonable inference if it was the kind of inference that in an overwhelming 
number of cases leads to the truth if the premises are true. The probability of an inference, then, is the 
relative Irequency with which its kind or type leads to true conclusions from true premises.' Cohen 
[1931], p. 130. The point is that this may be accepted, and it may then be asked how on earth we can 
tell what is a 'reasonable inference' on such a criterion, and what could license the move to the 
acceptance of any particular instance of that kind as being truth-preserving. 
Lehrer [1990], p.77. 
'^ Ibid., p.79. 
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The justificationist is left, then, only with the option of using an epistemic 
interpretation of probability: classical, logical, subjective, or intersubjective. 
Therefore I shall proceed by examining each of these in turn - save the last, since the 
architect himself suggests that it is incompatible with confirmation (rather than 
corroboration)^'* - and comparing their relative weaknesses and strengths. Two w i l l 
be ruled out purely on the basis of their internal features: 
Classical 
This early interpretation of probability, which has its roots in the work of Bernoulli, 
but was first popularised by Laplace in his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, is a 
product of the Enlightenment era.^^ Underlying it is the mechanistic philosophy 
which was so prevalent in that period, and the belief in universal determinism - the 
thesis that the present state of the universe is caused by the prior state, etc.^^ (Here, 
the notion of a 'clockwork universe' w i l l suffice.) And due precisely to this 
acceptance of universal determinism is the corollary that probabilities are used only 
because of human ignorance. Specifically, given a situation in which one knows that 
a finite number of (mutually exclusive) events could occur, it follows that one event 
simply must occur, and i f one does not know enough about the system which w i l l lead 
to the outcome - the initial conditions of the system, plus the laws that relate those 
conditions to subsequent conditions - to expect one outcome over another, then one 
has recourse to probabilities. Central to this interpretation is the idea that probabilities 
are only applicable when faced with a finite number of equipossible potential 
outcomes; and that equipossibility can only be legitimately posited i f there is no 
reason, whatsoever, to prefer one potential outcome, or one set of potential outcomes, 
over another. Hence, the central role of the Principle ofNon Sufficient Reason as 
initially formulated by Bernoulli, which was only later dubbed the Principle of 
Indifference by K e y n e s . I n Laplace's words: 
Probability is relative, in part to this ignorance, in part to our knowledge.. .The theory 
of chance consists in reducing all the events of the same kind to a certain number of 
cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as we may be equally undecided about in 
Gillies holds that his interpretation is not really suited to the Bayesian approach, particularly because 
P(h,b) is highly variable between research programmes, and more vitally that: '[D]ifferent individuals 
may come to quite different conclusions even though they have the same background knowledge and 
expertise in the relevant area, and even though they are all quite rational. A single rational degree of 
belief on which all rational human beings should agree seems to be a myth.' Gillies [1991], p.523. 
For a brief history, see Gillies, [2000], p.3-13. For greater detail, see Hacking [1975]. 
Laplace puts it so: 'We ought.. .to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior 
state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could 
comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who 
compose it - an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis - it would embrace in the 
same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for 
it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past would be present to its eyes'. Laplace [1814], 
D.4. 
' For the moment, I will assume that the reader is reasonably familiar with the idea of this a priori 
synthetic principle, although it will be treated in greater detail during the subsequent discussion of the 
logical interpretation of probability. It is related, of course, to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. On 
this see Cohen [1931], pp. 150-156. 
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regard to their existence, and in determining the number of cases favorable to the 
event whose probability is sought. 
This given, and in general, the probability of an event, E, is defined as the number of 
possible outcomes favourable to the event, «/, divided by the total number of 
outcomes possible, n,„ when those outcomes are equally possible, mutually exclusive, 
and collectively exhaustive: 
P(E) = Hf/n,, 
To clarify, consider the following example. An experiment is to be performed which 
will involve two flips of a coin, and one is asked to predict how likely it is that a 
'heads' result will occur (viz. subsequent to at least one flip, the coin will land heads-
up). Given that one knows that each flip may result either in heads or tails, there are 
four outcomes, overall, to consider: 
FIG. 1.3 
Outcome w Outcome x Outcome y 1 Outcome z 
1 ! Heads Heads Tails % Tails 
2 i Heads Tails Heads 1 Tails 
^ . a 
Now let 'at least one flip has a 'heads' result' be the event whose probability one 
wishes to estimate, E. Take each possible outcome to be equipossible, for there is no 
reason to expect one over other; this is an application of the Principle ofNon 
Sufficient Reason. Since w, x, and y are the mutually exclusive outcomes favourable 
to E, Hf is equal to three. Since w, x, y, and z are the mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive possible outcomes, Hp is equal to four. Thus, P(E) = %. 
Simple enough. 
However, there are several criticisms of this interpretation of probability - based on 
problems that it should tackle, but cannot - which are sufficient, when taken together, 
to falsify it. First, it explicitly forbids the application of probability to non-uniform 
sample spaces, just because probability is defined in terms of equipossible outcomes. 
So when faced with an experiment involving repeated throws of a biased coin, say 
where the outcome 'heads' is far more likely than the outcome 'tails', one can 
apparently say nothing, just because probability talk cannot apply. Yet curiously, 
Laplace himself mentions the case of a biased coin, and suggests that probabilities can 
be applied in such instances. And thus, I am in agreement with Gillies, who 
concludes that: 'It looks as if Laplace forgot his philosophical foundations when 
developing the mathematical theory.'**^ 
Second, since Laplace's only motivation for advancing it is a rather extreme 
metaphysical claim, specifically that universal determinism holds in the actual world, 
one who endorses this interpretation would seem to be committed to a dogma which is 
irrelevant for the purposes of providing an account of justification, or indeed of 
probability qua mathematical notion. (Gushing has recently argued that the question 
Laplace [1814], p.6. 
'"Gillies [2000], p. 18. 
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of determinism seems to be underdetermined by the evidence at hand.^°) Since one is 
plausibly ignorant about whether such determinism does hold, it just seems to beg the 
question. How could the claim 'Universal determinism holds in the actual world' 
ever become sufficiently justified, under such an account of probability? Surely not 
on the grounds that probability as defined by Laplace is used herein! 
The justificationist must look elsewhere. 
Logical 
The logical understanding of probability, at least in its Keynesian formulation, 
involves the idea that probabilities are objective in a Platonic sense, yet are not 
aleatory. Specifically, they are relations that subsist between propositions, and groups 
of propositions, which one is capable of intuitively grasping, or knowing by 
acquaintance. On the one hand, 'The Theory of Probability... is concerned with the 
degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given conditions'.^' On the other, 
Keynes also writes that these relations are equivalent to degrees of partial entailment, 
and is quite explicit that his project is to provide an account of justification: 
Let our premisses consist of any set of propositions h, and our conclusion consist of 
any set of propositions a, then, if a knowledge of h justifies a rational belief in a of 
degree a, we say that there is a probability-relation of degree a between a and / i . ^^ 
There does not seem to be any obvious tension between these two claims, which I 
have presented in an order that Keynes would, perhaps, have found inverted. His 
position is best understood as follows: (i) There are partial degrees of entailment 
between propositions, and sets of propositions, which subsist; (ii) Given that there are 
partial degrees of entailment which subsist between propositions, or sets of 
propositions, one is only rational when making a probability judgement if one arrives 
at the degree of entailment in question. So according to Keynes, 'degrees of partial 
entailment' map onto 'degrees of rational belief, but this need not be seen as an 
identity claim, or a conflation.^^ 
Yet while Keynes' work is admirable due to its clarity, and his forthright delineation 
of potential objections to his view - to which I shall come in due course - is 
refreshing, it must be emphasised that it is founded, at its core, on what are supposed 
to be certainties; his philosophy is a product of the pre-war (and pre-Wittgenstein) 
Cambridge philosophy of Russell and Moore.''* For first, his view of knowledge is 
that it requires certainty: 'The highest degree of rational belief, which is termed 
certain rational belief, corresponds to knowledge.. .knowledge of a proposition always 
corresponds to certainty of rational belief in it and at the same time to actual truth in 
See Gushing [ 1994], sections 11.2.2-11.4. 90 
Keynes [1921], p.4 
Ibid., p.4 
For Popper, 'degrees of partial entailment' (or logical proximity between statements) do not map 
onto 'degrees of rational belief; his understanding of the logical interpretation of probability is 
therefore quite distinct from that of Keynes, or indeed Carnap. 
See, for example, Russell [1912] 
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the proposition itself.'^'* And second, he holds that we can know (viz. be certain) that 
a given probabihty-relation obtains just because there are particular propositions, 
which he calls 'secondary propositions', that we can grasp by direct acquaintance. 
Let me now explain this idea: 
A primary proposition, p, is one in which we have a rational degree of belief, r. And 
the rational degree of belief is dependent upon our evidence, e, which is comprised of 
propositions - there are no unconditional probabilities, for Keynes.^^ In standard 
notation, then, P(p, e)=r; that is to say 'The probability of p, given e, is r', or in terms 
more amenable to Keynes, 'The probability-relation between p and e is r.' And the 
secondary proposition is precisely this. It is knowledge of this secondary proposition 
that serves to warrant a rational belief of degree r in the primary proposition p, given 
e. So Keynes' idea is that we can be certain there is a given probability-relation 
between two sets of propositions, say hypotheses and evidence, quite irrespective of 
whether any of the propositions comprising the evidence happen to be true or not. 
Assume the evidence to be true - better still, know that it is true - and a rational 
degree of belief in the hypotheses follows. 
A l l this is wrong, however, primarily for the reasons already stated in my prior 
discussion of fallibilism; indeed, even the laws of deductive logic are not self-evident, 
beyond revision, or immune from criticism.^^ And as i f this were not enough, Keynes 
encounters another problem, which is that he needs to account for the fact that many 
individuals differ on their probability assessments. Thus, he writes: 
Some men - indeed it is obviously the case - may have a greater power of logical 
intuition than others. Further, the difference between some kinds of propositions over 
which human intuition seems to have power, and some over which it has none, may 
depend wholly upon the constitution of our minds and have no significance for a 
perfectly objective logic. We can no more assume that all true secondary 
propositions are or ought to be universally known than that all true primary 
propositions are known. The perceptions of some relations of probability may be 
outside the powers of some or all of us.^ ^ 
Arguing for direct acquaintance with concrete objects, sense-impressions, or moods -
big tables, yellow hues, anxiety, etc. - is one thing. However, as Ramsey points out, 
it really does not seem to be the case that anyone can grasp probability-relations in the 
manner suggested by Keynes. Of the latter's logical relations, the former writes: 
"'Keynes [1921], pp.lO-ll. 
He writes: 'It is as useless... to say "b is probable" as it would be to say "b is equal," or "b is greater 
than," and as unwarranted to conclude that, because a makes b probable, therefore a and c together 
make b probable, as to argue that because a is less than b, therefore a and c together are less than b.' 
Ibid., pp.6-7. 
More carefully, I might contend that even if there are some respects in which logic is not revisable, 
this does not mean that it is therefore infallible. In saying this, I agree with Haack that properly 
speaking, it is agents that are fallible: so all I am really claiming is that we ought not to be certain that 
our logic is correct, given that it might not be, since we are fallible with respect to identifying 'the 
correct' logic(s), on the assumption that such an (anti-instrumentalist) notion makes sense. See Haack 
[1978], pp.232-238. I might add that even under an instrumentalist view of logic, we would still, I 
hold, be fallible with respect to identifying the most useful logic(s). 
Ibid., p. 18. 
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All we appear to know about them are certain general propositions, the laws of 
addition and multiplication; it is as if everyone knew the laws of geometry but no one 
could tell whether any given object were round or square; and I find it hard to 
imagine how so large a body of general knowledge can be combined with so slender a 
stock of particular facts... If. . . we take the simplest possible pairs of propositions, 
such as "This is red" and "That is blue" or "This is red" and "That is red", whose 
logical relations should surely be easiest to see, no one, I think, pretends to be sure 
what is the probability relation which connects them.'' 
Indeed, paradoxically, it seems that we only find ourselves capable of making 
probability judgements in rather complicated situations; those in which we cannot 
even state all our premises, viz. what we take to be our evidence. But could Keynes 
account for this? From a modem perspective, one novel idea would be to employ the 
notion of possible worlds, in the recognition that strictly speaking, 'all propositions 
are true or false'.'^^ And we might then think that what is held as evidence serves to 
narrow down the set of possible worlds under discussion in a probability assessment; 
that if the evidence is too limited, then the set of possible worlds is not sufficiently 
narrowed to allow us to reach a proper assessment. Under such an understanding, 
given a set of evidence sufficient to specify a set of possible worlds, e, we could 
examine in what percentage of those possible worlds a particular hypothesis, h, holds. 
For example, it could be the case that in 73% of the worlds in which e is true, h is 
true. It would then follow that the probability of h, given e, is 0.73. 
This is a rather clever idea. However, I believe it is flawed on three distinct grounds. 
First, and foremost, it is not clear that there are many cases, i f any, in which our 
evidence specifies a finite set of possible worlds - in many cases, then, the probability 
relation between the evidence and any hypothesis would be incalculable. Second, 
even i f the evidence did specify a finite set of possible worlds, it would not 
necessarily follow that it was rational to commit to belief in a given probability for h, 
since each of us is bound to one particular world, namely the actual one; we would 
require something like the principle of indifference, or a principle of randomness, 
operating over worlds, in order to merit belief in the statement 'It is just as likely for 
me to find myself in any one of the set of worlds under discussion, as any other'. 
(And as I will argue below, such a principle is indefensible as aught other than a 
heuristic.) Third, and finally, in order to specify a set of possible worlds it is 
necessary to specify the laws that obtain in those worlds, and there are some instances 
in which we might want to posit probabilistic laws, as suggested by Popper's 
propensity interpretation of probability; in such cases the rational degree of belief, 
say in an atom of lead-214 (with a half-life 26.8 minutes) decaying over a one hour 
period, would seem to be parasitic on an aleatory posit. 
However, even putting this line of objection aside - perhaps on the basis that the 
distinction between primary and secondary propositions may be abandoned, as 
Carnap suggests" '^ - there are further problems with the logical interpretation of 
probability, from a mathematical perspective. In particular, because 'In order that 
numerical measurement may be possible, we must be given a number of equally 
''Ramsey [1931], p. 162. 
Keynes [1921], p.8. As I have already mentioned, in my rejection of the notion that aleatory 
probabilities can be employed to account for confirmation, I agree; no proposition can be 'probably 
true' in an objective sense. 
See Carnap [1962] 
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probable alternatives'.(Keynes allows for non-numerical probabilities, but I will 
not discuss that notion here. This, since it is surely a requirement of any 
interpretation of probability that it be mathematically satisfactory, and any 
interpretation of probability which does not allow for numerical probabilities is 
clearly not mathematically satisfactory.) But how are we to determine when we are 
faced with a number of equipossible alternatives? Enter the principle of indifference, 
the alleged a priori synthetic principle that I briefly mentioned previously: 
The Principle of Indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for predicating 
of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such 
knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability. 
Thus equal probabilities must be assigned to each of several arguments, if there is an 
absence of positive ground for assigning unequal ones.'°^ 
Now as Keynes admits, this principle 'may lead to paradoxical and even contradictory 
conclusions', at least in its current form. There are several examples of such 
paradoxes presented by Gillies, but I will concentrate on one of the most troubling, 
and most fascinating - a geometrical paradox that was first formulated by Bertrand, in 
1889. La question? 'On trace AM/ja.sarJ une corde dans un cercle. Quelle est la 
probabilite pour qu'elle soit plus petite que le cote du triangle equilateral inscrit?''°'* 
So let us take an equilateral triangle with centre O, inscribed in a circle with radius R: 
FIG. 1.4 - SITUATIONAL DEPICTION OF BERTRAND'S PARADOX 105 
The chord passing through B and O - a diameter - bisects AC (viz. AD = DC). Thus, 
<ODC> is a right angle, and OD = Rsin30 = R/2. Now our problem: if we select a 
chord of the circle at random, what is the probability that it will have a length greater 
than the side of the triangle ABC, p(^)? Well first, we might let XY be a random 
Keynes [1921], p.41 
Ibid., p.42. 
""Bertrand [1889], p.4 
There are no diagrams in Bertrand [1889]; those I employ here are based upon Gillies [2000], but 
altered with a view to improving clarity. 
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chord, and OZ be the line bisecting XY at point W, spanning from the centre of the 
circle to its edge: 
FIG. 1.5 
Now we have no known reason to presume that W is at any particular point on OZ 
rather than any other, thus all points along OZ are equipossible locations thereof, by 
the principle of indifference. In other words, OW has a uniform probability density in 
the interval [0,R]. And XY will be longer than the side of the triangle ABC if and 
only i f OW is less than R/2. (Remember, OD, depicted in fig. 1.4, had length R/2.) 
Thus, 
P(^) = p(OW < R/2) = 1/2 (Resuh 1) 
Second, let AA' be a chord of the circle, with an angle 6 to the tangent to the circle at 
point A (which is, remember, one of the vertices of the equilateral triangle ABC), as 
depicted below: 
FIG. 1.6 
Now if A A ' is to be longer than the side of the triangle (e.g. AB), 0 must be between 
7i/3 radians and 27r/3 radians. And we have no known reason to suppose that 0 has 
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any particular value between 0 and n radians, rather than any other, hence by the 
principle of indifference, 6 has a uniform probability density in the interval [0, T I ] . 
Thus, 
P(^) = p(7i/3 < 0 < 271/3) = '/3 (Result 2) 
Third, and finally, let us inscribe a circle in the triangle ABC - the 'secondary circle' 
- that will have a radius of R/2 (which is half that of the circle in which ABC is 
inscribed, the 'primary circle'). And let the chord be XY, drawn between any two 
distinct points on the circle's circumference. The situation is then as depicted below 
(with the triangle ABC omitted, for clarity): 
FIG. 1.7 
X 
Now if it is to be the case that XY is longer than the side of ABC, it must be the case 
that its central point - call this W - lies inside the secondary circle. And we have no 
known reason to presume that W lies at any point inside the primary circle rather than 
any other, thus W has a uniform probability density in the primary circle, according to 
the principle of indifference. It follows, then, that: 
2 2 
P(^) = Area of secondary circle/Area of primary circle = ;iR /4nR = VA 
(Result 3) 
It seems, then, that the principle of indifference has led us astray, for we have three 
candidate answers to our problem, as initially defined. Moreover, I have noticed that 
Bertrand's third case may be extended, and rendered even more problematic. The 
idea is as follows: there are an infinite number of chords that have their centre as O -
that is, the centre of the primary circle - but for any other point inside the primary 
circle, there is only one chord with that point as its central point. Upon my pointing 
this out to Gillies, he added: 
I think the consideration you introduce is rather ingenious and I haven't seen it in the 
literature. You could even use it to argue that P(CLSE) [my PC¥)] = 1/2 + (l/4)(l/2) 
= 5/8. The first 1/2 would refer to the chords through the centre which are LSE, 
[longer than the side of the equilateral triangle] while the second 1/2 would refer to 
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the remaining chords dealt with as previously to give 1/4. This would give yet another 
value for P(CLSE) making the paradox worse.[Personal correspondence] 
In the words of Bertrand: 'Entre ces trois reponses, quelle est la veritable? Aucune 
des trois n'est fausse, aucune n'est exacte, la question est mal posee.''°^ Yet Jaynes 
has argued that one of these candidate answers is, in fact, correct; it is result 1.' ^ His 
idea is that the correct solution must obey invariance principles, with respect to 
rotation, scale, and translation. And what is more, he has tested result 1 empirically, 
after selecting it on the basis of said principles, and found it to be corroborated. 
But let us accept that Jaynes is correct that invariance principles can solve certain 
apparent paradoxes; it remains the case that there might have been 'no known reason' 
for employing them in the example above, on the part of a hypothetical theorist, and 
the results obtained would, in fact, have been contradictory. The point: it is not 
acceptable to just apply the principle, see that it fails in a particular case, and then say 
'there is something we should have known, or realised, or that we knew without 
knowing that we knew it ' . For that would be a means of immunising the principle, 
qua logical (rather than heuristic), from criticism. (We should also be wary of 
immunising alleged deductive laws, such as that of the excluded middle, in a similar 
fashion.) 
Still further, as Gillies points out, even i f the principle of indifference is to be altered 
to involve appeal to invariance principles, all possible paradoxes cannot be evaded: 
It is easy to see how we can generalise.. .to produce a paradox in any case which 
concerns a continuous parameter (6 say) which takes values in an interval [a, b]. All 
we have to do is consider (p =/(0), where/is a continuous and suitably regular 
function in the interval [a, b] so that a < 0 < ^ 7 is logically equivalent toJ{a) < (p ^j{b). 
If we have no reason to suppose that 0 is at one point of the interval [a, b] rather than 
another, we can then use the Principle of Indifference to give 0 a uniform probability 
density in [a, b]. However, we have correspondingly no reason to suppose that cp is at 
one point of the interval [/(a),y(b)] rather than another. So it seems we can equally 
well use the Principle of Indifference to give (p a uniform probability density in \j{a), 
/(b)]. However, the probabilities based on 0 having a uniform probability density will 
in general be different from those based on cp having a uniform probability density; 
and thus the Principle of Indifference leads to contradictions.'^ 
But what does Keynes say about all this? Remarkably, he was prescient of such 
problems, and introduces an indivisibility criterion, which is as follows: 
It should be noted, however, that Bertrand may well have wanted to rule out this idea. For he 
writes: '[L]'infini n'est pas un nombre; on ne doit pas, sans explication, I'introduire dans les 
raisonnements. La precision illusoire des mots pourrait faire naitre des contradictions. Choisir au 
hasard, entre un nombre infmi de cas possibles, n'est pas une indication suffisante.' He continues by 
pointing out that choosing at random any number - 'entier ou fractionnaire, commensurable ou 
incommensurable' - between 0 and 100 which is greater than 50 is equivalent to choosing at random 
any number between 0 and 10000 which is greater than 2500, since 10000 is just the square of 100, and 
2500 is just the square of 50. Yet in the first case, the probability would seem to be '/2, whereas in the 
second it would seem to be VA. He adds: 'D'ou vient la difference des reponses? Le enonces manquent 
de precision. Les contradictions de ce genre peuvent etre multiplees a I'infini.' Bertrand [1889], p.4. 
'°'lbid.,p.5 
Jaynes [1973]. 
'"'Gillies [2000], pp.41-42. 
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Let the alternatives, the equipossibility of which we seek to establish by means of the 
Principle of Indifference, be 0 (ai ) , 0(a2), ..., 0(ar), and let the evidence be h. Then it 
is a necessary condition for the application of the principle that these should be, 
relatively to the evidence, indivisible alternatives of the form 0 (x)."° 
However, this is, I think, a very important concession when it is taken literally, for it 
would mean that the principle of indifference is inapplicable in continuous cases. (As 
it happens, Keynes himself seems to back away from this idea, quite mistakenly, by 
introducing the idea of using arbitrary finite intervals in continuous cases."' The 
problem is that these are sub-divisible, and that any sub-division is itself sub-divisible, 
ad infinitum.) But what of non-continuous cases, viz. those involving a finite number 
of discrete alternatives? I have argued elsewhere that the logical view may be 
construed as a 'topping-up' to the subjective interpretation (discussion of which 
follows) in such cases, and that the principle of indifference is an a priori synthetic 
principle, when the criterion of indivisibility is introduced (or more properly, included 
in the formulation of the principle itself); a position from which I would now wish to 
dissociate myself somewhat."^ (One obvious problem: we can never know in 
Keynes's sense, i.e. be certain, that a given set of finite alternatives are, in fact, 
indivisible.) Yet it is interesting to note that that even when I did believe in 'partial 
degrees of entailment', I did not - indeed, could not, on pain of contradiction - find 
the Bayesian model of confirmation, discussed in greater detail shortly, to be 
acceptable. Let me now explain why, in a manner that I think is particularly 
revealing: 
i) Let us imagine that we know of an event, E, only that it may or may not occur on 
a given number of trials, n. Let n=2. 
ii) Let 1 denote that E occurs on any given trial, and 0 denote that it fails to occur on 
any given trial. Thus, there are four possible sequences that we might obtain, 
specifically 00, 01, 10, and 11. 
iii) We might choose to apply the Principle of Indifference in two different fashions. 
On the one hand, we might posit that each sequence is equipossible, and arrive at 
Pi(01 or 10)=l/2. On the other hand, we might take each total number of 
occurrences of E (0, 1 or 2) to be equipossible, and arrive at a different 
probability distribution, specifically P2(01 or 10)=l/3. 
iv) If anything, Keynes' indivisibility criterion suggests that P| is valid whereas P2 is 
not (E occurring once is divisible into the two sequences 01 and 10); if this is not 
taken to be the case, then i) - iii) is an exemplar of a paradox in a non-continuous 
case which his criterion does not resolve. 
v) Using P| in Bayes' theorem would mean that learning from experience was just 
impossible. For, if e is the result of the two trials, and h the hypothesis that E 
""Keynes [1921], p.60. 
Ibid.,p.62 
112 Rowbottom [2001]. On 'topping-up', see Gillies [1988]: the basic idea is that the Kolmogorov 
axioms serve as rationality constraints in the subjective interpretation, as I shall explain below in 
presenting the Ramsey-De Flnetti theorem, but that further constraints may be suggested as 'top ups' 
The POI is one possibility. 
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occurs on the third trial, then P(e)=l/4 (since there are four sequences) and 
P(h)= 1/2. Thus, P(e&h)= 1/8. 
If we now apply the following simple form of Bayes' theorem: 
P(h|e)= P(e & h)/P(e) provided P(e);tO 
It follows that P(h|e)=4/8=l/2=P(h); viz. that the posterior probability is equal to 
the prior probability. 113 
Now as I add, in a footnote, 'Camap was the first to identify this problem; he 
considered two confirmation functions, c^ (state-description) and c* (structure-
description), which are equivalent to Pi and P2, respectively.'"'* But Carnap's 
preference for the second, c* (or P2) is simply not permissible - Gillies is kinder in 
merely calling it ad hoc - i f the principle of indifference is to be defended by appeal 
to indivisibility. Indeed, there is a dilemma: sacrifice Bayesianism, or sacrifice the 
logical interpretation (in its Keynesian formulation, at least). At this juncture, then, 
it would therefore seem advisable to move on to discuss the subjective interpretation 
of probability, and then Bayesianism. 
Beforehand, I ought to re-emphasise that while I take myself to have shown that the 
logical interpretation is unacceptable in its Keynesian formulation, there are other 
approaches, most notably Popper's, which are quite distinctive. Popper's idea is that 
degree of probability - the probability relation between two propositions, or sets of 
propositions (although Popper uses sentence-types) - is not equivalent to rational 
degree of belief. Indeed, for Popper, C(a,b);tP(a,b). I touch upon this later, but here it 
is not relevant, in so far as Popper argues precisely that 'confirmation' has nothing 
whatsoever to do with probability, although it may be defined in terms 0/(logical) 
probabilities. Popper abandoned the word 'confirmation' precisely because it became 
associated with the Bayesian programme of those such as Carnap: 
Until recently... I did not use the term 'degree of corroboration', but, in its place, the 
term 'degree of confirmation'. And I made use of this term... because of the need to 
avoid the term 'probability'... Until recently I used the label 'degree of confirmation' 
because this was Carnap's translation, in his 'Testability and Meaning', of my term 
'Grad der Bewahrung'... However, the term was soon used with a new and different 
meaning; for Camap assumed without further ado in the first sentence of his book 
Logical Foundations of Probability that the 'degree of confirmation' of a hypothesis 
satisfied the rules of the calculus of probability... I found this situation a little 
embarrassing, and when I published a paper (entitled 'Degree of Confirmation') in 
which I gave a definition of what I now propose to call 'degree o/corroboration', I 
referred to this development in a footnote... My paper received a reply from 
J.Kemeny... 'It should be pointed out that Popper used the term 'degree of 
confirmation' first - twenty years ago - and hence it is unfortunate that in recent 
years it has been widely used in a sense not intended by Popper...' As far as 'degree 
of confirmation' is concerned - in its more recent sense which makes it a probability 
Rowbottom [2001], pp. 10-11. 113 
See Garnap [1962], pp.562-565. 
""' But notice that Popper does sacrifice Bayesianism - indeed, puts it to the sword - even though his 
view of the logical interpretation is not Keynesian. The real dilemma, then, might be said to lie in 
choosing between probability as a measure of degree of rational belief and the principle of indifference 
as an a priori synthetic principle, given that the latter is only defensible by appeal to indivisibility. 
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- 1 cannot help feehng that the term is redundant. Why not stick to 'probability'?... 
Incidentally, I do prefer the label 'degree of corroboration'... For the term 
'confirmation' may easily suggest a wrong idea. It contains the root 'firm', and it 
suggests either a process of making a hypothesis by degrees more certain, or even a 
process of making it finally secure. In other words, the term 'confirmation has 
strong verificationist associations}^^ 
Now I follow Popper's usage, since I agree that the connotations of ' f i rm' are 
unfortunate. (While it is true that both 'roborare' and 'firmare' can be understood as 
'to strengthen', the latter is also employed, in Latin, in order to denote 'to prove', as 
indeed is 'probare'Move, decisively, the adjective 'firmus' is used figuratively in 
order to convey both 'true' and 'sure'; on the other hand, 'robustus' conveys much 
the same as its modern equivalent in English, for instance 'mature', and 'rugged'."*) 
Thus I shall say that I am not necessarily opposed to the notion of corroboration -
although this need not be limited to Popper's formal theory thereof - yet I argue 
against that of confirmation (and Bayesianism, qua theory of confirmation). I expect 
this to become clearer as I progress. 
Subjective 
According to the subjective approach, probabilities are degrees of belief, but not 
rational degrees of belief. In the words of De Finetti: '...only subjective probabilities 
exist - i.e. the degree of belief in the occurrence of an event attributed by a given 
person at a given instant with a given set of information.'' And to reiterate the 
comments of Ramsey on probabilistic relations, mentioned previously: 'A l l we appear 
to know about them are certain general propositions... the laws of addition and 
multiplication'. 
The greatest success of the subjective interpretation of probability is taken to be that 
this core assumption - that probabilities reflect degrees of personal belief - allows 
one to derive the axioms of probability, via what I shall henceforth call the Ramsey-
De Finetti theorem, with the invocation of only two additional assumptions. First, 
that gambling is a reasonable means by which to ascertain an individual's degree of 
belief. Second, that a bettor ought to obey the rationality constraint of coherence; that 
he must not allow a Dutch Book to be made against him. Let me now explain in 
further detail, while noting that this sort of positive result simply does not seem to be 
achievable by classical or logical approaches: 
(a) Gambling as a Measure of Degree of Belief 
Popper [1983], pp.228-230. 
So here we see that Popper does have a genuine point: if by 'firmare' one means 'probare', then 
why not just say 'probare'l Why confuse matters, by the use of allegory? Is probability really 
provability, in the sense of the root of 'probabilis', or not? 
A hypothesis which has withstood many challenges, and the most difficult challenges we have yet 
conceived of, would fairly be described as 'mature' and 'rugged'. 
"' De Finetti [1970], pp. 3-4. This quotation also gives me the perfect opportunity to point out that I 
am a pluralist about probability {inter alia\)\ at the very least, I hold that aleatory and subjective 
interpretations are applicable in different contexts, and that all probability talk cannot neatly be reduced 
to either. 
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We start with the idea that a tester, T, wants to measure the degree of belief of a 
bettor, B, in either the truth of a proposition, R, or the occurrence of an event, E.'^" 
And for simplicity's sake, let us assume here that for each possible R on which a bet 
can legitimately be made, Ri, Rn, there corresponds an event, Ei, such that if Ri is 
true, then Ei will occur.(Henceforth, then, I shall only write of the probability of 
the occurrence of a given event, expressed as E.) 
T asks B to choose a number q, his betting quotient on E, under the understanding that 
T will then choose a stake S, and that B will then pay T the sum of qS, and will win S 
in return, if E does, in fact, occur; otherwise, T keeps the sum of qS. S may be 
positive or negative, but must possess a magnitude such that it is neither large, nor 
trivially small, in relation to the total wealth of B.'^^ (Note, of course, that if S is 
negative, then T will pay B the sum of q ISI, in return for ISI i f E does occur; else, B 
will keep q S .) 
Now, one is asked to make an important assumption which I will refer to as the 
ignorance assumption, LA. It is as follows: 
Ignorance Assumption (lA): B does not know, when choosing q, whether T will 
choose S to be positive or negative. 
Plausibly, i f B knew that T would choose S negative, he would choose q extremely 
high; conversely, if B knew that T would choose S positive, he would choose q 
extremely low. (This, given appropriate auxiliary assumptions, based on our 
understanding of 'real world' betting behaviour.) And then, q would not correspond 
to his actual degree of belief about the likelihood of E occurring; B would just be 
ensuring that he made as much money as possible from the bet! 
Gillies offers the useful example of the jobber in the stock market when he discusses 
this.'^-' And it seems right that if one approaches a car salesman saying that one wants 
to buy a given make and model of car, one will be 'quoted' a higher price than i f one 
says that one wants to sell the very same make and model. Typically, the correct 
strategy for one to ascertain the true belief of an individual in the value of a 
commodity seems to be to ask "How much do you think the commodity is worth?", 
and withhold information about whether one wishes to buy or sell it. 
It is also worth adding that the notion of precise numerical values for degrees of belief 
is admitted to be somewhat of a fiction. As Gillies points out, De Finetti tackles this 
point quite explicitly: 
Strangely, adherents to the subjective interpretation seem to leap to talk of the probability of events 
(occurring), rather than that of propositions (being true), but I shall overlook this here, even though the 
move is somewhat suspect. (It is unclear how anything other than a proposition could be the object of 
an attitude such as belief, but I do the subjectivist the favour of assuming that this issue can be dealt 
with satisfactorily, perhaps by the process I mention above.) 
Again for purposes of simplicity, I assume the bets are only about the future. 
Note that there is some difference of opinion between Ramsey and De Finetti on the question of 
whether utilities, rather than monetary sums, are better employed in order to measure degree of belief 
via betting. I am willing to take it that such difficulties can be satisfactorily resolved, however, and 
broadly agree with Gillies that the monetary approach of (the early) De Finetti seems most 
unproblematic. See the discussion in Gillies [2000], pp.56-58. 
Gillies [2000], p.55 
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.. .if you want to apply mathematics, you must act as though the measured 
magnitudes have precise values. This fiction is very fruitful, as everybody knows; the 
fact that it is only a fiction does not diminish its value as long as we bear in mind that 
the precision of the result will be what it will be... To go, with the valid help of 
mathematics, from approximate premises to approximate conclusions, I must go by 
way of an exact algorithm, even though I consider it an artifice.'^'' 
(b) Coherence^^^ 
The idea of coherence is introduced as the means by which the subjectivist can show 
that bare degrees of belief - understood, here, as those things measured as betting 
quotients - ought to obey the axioms of probability. It is as follows: 
Coherence (C): If B bets on the occurrence of a set of events, Ei, his betting 
quotients which correspond to those events, qi, ..., qn, are coherent only if T cannot 
choose a set of stakes. Si, ..., Sn, such that B loses (money) no matter what occurs. 
As Gillies says: 'It is taken as obvious that Mr B will want his bets to be coherent, 
that is to say he will want to avoid the possibility of his losing whatever happens. 
Surprisingly, this condition is both necessary and sufficient for betting quotients to 
satisfy the axioms of probability.' '^ ^ Yet I do not agree that it is sufficient, although it 
is necessary, since further posits are required about the potential behaviour of the 
tester, and B's beliefs about that potential behaviour, in order to render the desired 
result. For one thing, LA is also being 'taken as obvious'. But yet further, the fact that 
the tester will attempt to win - to draw up a Dutch Book, given the chance - is also 
being 'taken as obvious'. (Or is it just that the tester believes this that is being 'taken 
as obvious'? What seems like a pellucid idea on the surface is less so, when it is 
critically examined.) Indeed, it may very well be the case that T is mathematically 
incompetent, and does not know how to draw up a Dutch Book. And I raise these 
considerations just to gesture at the underlying problems of specification, here. To 
point out that we would do well not to become carried away by what is indubitably a 
nice model, but is only a model. 
(c) The Ramsey-De Finetti Theorem 
Given coherence, lA, and the equivalence between a bettor's degree(s) of belief and 
his chosen betting quotient(s) on the occurrence of an event (or events), all the axioms 
of probability are supposed to follow. (As I have just mentioned, I think there are 
further assumptions, but I gloss over those for the moment. The basic idea seems 
acceptable, and it does not do to nitpick aimlessly, although I have a salient point to 
add below.) 
For example, the first axiom has two parts: 
la . P(Q)=1, where Q is the certain event. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p.57. (Quoting De Finetti.) 
Ramsey called this 'consistency', but De Finetti's 'coherence' is preferable, since it avoids 
confusion with the logical use of the former term. See Ramsey [1931], p. 182. 
'-" Gillies [2000], p.58. 
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lb. For any E, 1>P(E) >0. 
And the argument takes the form that for any E, q(E)=P(E), and given the condition of 
coherence, etc., q(Q)=l, and l>q(E) >0. Let us just consider la, and show how it is 
supposed to follow. 
Well, taking into account lA, the bettor B realises that if he selects a q(Q) such that 
q(Q.)^l, then T can choose an S such that T wins. If B chooses q(Q)<l, then T need 
only choose a negative value for S. Similarly, i f B chooses q(Q)>l, then T need only 
choose a positive value for S. 
But let us now express this 'proof of la in a more detailed fashion: 
There are two relevant possibilities which B considers, given his assumption that the 
event on which he is betting will definitely occur. 
a) T chooses S negative. 
P) T chooses S positive. 
Now if he chooses q(Q)=l, then he will break even in either event, a or (3; he 
renounces the chance for gain, as well as the chance for loss. But notice, i f you would 
again, that i f B takes P(a)«P(P), even has sound evidence on which to base such a 
hypothesis, then the situation is very different. There might be some suspicion, then, 
that something like the principle of indifference is creeping in, here - that it is being 
assumed that the probability of alpha and beta is equal, ceteris paribus, or that it is 
reasonable for B to assume this. More nearly, it might be said that if the value 
selected for q is dependent on the values assigned to P(a) and P(P), in addition to the 
value assigned to P(Q), then q(Q,a, P)=P(Q)=1 only if P(a)=P(P), or perhaps 
P(a)>P(P). But the genuine idea behind coherence seems to be, on the other hand, 
that P(a) & P(P) are dependent on q; that T is not going to respond in a set fashion, 
independently of what value B selects for q. In other words, imagine the Martian who 
understands little of human affairs, but is assigned the role of T, and always selects 
the sign of S by rolling a fair die, and choosing S positive only if the result of the roll 
is 6: in this event, q(Q)?iP(Q). (If this is still unclear, let me try to put the point more 
simply: if I think an event is highly likely, even certain, but also that someone else 
thinks it to be highly unlikely, then it is reasonable for me to expect that they will bet 
against the occurrence of the event, and select a quotient accordingly, upon proposing 
a bet to said person. In genuine betting situations such considerations are vital, and 
this highlights the thinly-veiled artificiality of lA.'^' ' For example, i f you want good 
odds for a bet on England emerging victorious in an international football match, then 
it is better to bet on them outside England. Why? The bookmakers are aware that 
™ As I mention in II.3,1 have general problems with such thought-experimental situations when they 
are used to draw sweeping epistemological lessons, or lessons about what is 'rational', because they 
tend to run roughshod over fine distinctions which are of considerable importance. But at least what 
the subjectivisls are claiming here is rather weak and unobjectionable - unlike the Bayesian 
programme that is often tacked on. 
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more people will bet on England winning than on them losing, in England; this means 
they have an idea of something like P(P), construed as a relative frequency }^^) 
Now this ought to be enough to give a flavour of the general approach of the theorem, 
and I shall not go through the rigmarole of deriving each axiom, since I take the 
foregoing discussion to indicate roughly how loose these 'derivations' are, which is 
not to say that they are unsatisfactory by intuitive standards, rather than those of the 
unusually pedantic philosopher. (I do, after all, have a cross to bear.) Overall, it has 
to be said that the idea is fruitful, and pretty much works. Indeed, it might be said, 
further, that the axioms arrived at are better than Kolmogorov's in some respects; for 
instance, conditional probabilities are not merely introduced by definition, but instead 
are introduced axiomatically, via a lengthy argument.'^^ So while I think that Gillies 
gets a little carried away in writing the following - the italics are mine, and I take the 
opportunity to show where I would moderate somewhat, without wanting to impugn 
the spirit - I assent to the claim that the theorem is impressive: 
The Ramsey-De Finetti theorem... clearly demonstrates [strongly suggests?] the 
superiority of the subjective to the logical theory [that is, in its Keynesian and 
Carnapian variants?]. Whereas in the logical theory the axioms of probability could 
only be justified by a vague and unsatisfactory appeal to intuition, in the subjective 
theory they can be proved rigorously [argued for, or strongly defended?] from the 
eminently plausible condition of coherence [and several other auxiliary 
assumptions]... In addition, the subjective theory solves [avoids?] the paradoxes of 
the principle of indifference by, in effect making this principle unnecessary, or at 
most a heuristic device.'^ " 
On, then, to Bayesianism: the static rational-decision theory which epitomises the 
justificationist approach that I argue against herein For like any good Popperian, I am 
not in favour of any all-encompassing 'rational-decision' theory, or decision theory 
period, if that is to extend beyond a statement of Socratic platitudes about decision-
making. Instead, I seek to motivate the view that the search for such is a waste of 
time, when we might instead get on with the process of inquiry. As Miller puts it: 
[I]f our goal is simply to sort out what is true, the detour through probability or 
confirmation, or support, in the company of the imaginary principle P [that is, such as 
one of a given 'rational decision theory', or of the nature of 'justification' as a 
component of 'knowledge'], is plainly gratuitous. For rather than spend our time 
trying to classify some absurdly general principle like P as true we would do better to 
investigate, and to classify as true (or as false) those much more manageable, yet 
much more interesting, factual statements that are at the centre of our concerns, 
namely genuine scientific hypotheses. Such classification cannot always be done by 
appeal to empirical support... some classification must precede all certification. 
[Emphasis mine]'^' 
In other words, they will estimate the ratio of the number bets on England winning to the total 
number of bets on the match. 
'^' The derivations, and a brief comparison between the Ramsey-De Finetti axioms and those of 
Kolmogorov, are available in Gillies [2000], pp.59-69. The issue of countable additivity versus finite 
additivity, which I cannot spare the time to cover here, is particularly interesting with respect to the 
logical interpretation. For more on this, see Williamson [1999]. 
"° Gillies [2000], p.64. 
Miller [1994], p.4. I elaborate this line in the next chapter; see II.3. I might also add that I would 
disagree with Miller's implication, here, that scientific hypotheses either are, or ought to be, at the 
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The Banality of Bayesianism 
Bayesianism voids scientific activity of its true purpose, and reduces the study of human 
knowledge to the study of how beliefs change, rather than to the study of how they are to be 
changed. - Miller'^' 
[I]t is trivially possible to reconstruct everyone as a conditionalizer. But not fruitful. - van 
Fraassen'^ '' 
Prima facie, and for once the appearances do not mislead, Bayes' theorem is trivial. 
In its simple form, as mentioned briefly in my discussion of the logical interpretation, 
it is as follows: 
P(h|e) = P(e&h)/P(e) provided P(e)^0 
However, I think it is important to be crystal clear about the nature of epistemic 
probabilities, in particular with respect to the fact that they are always conditional: to 
reiterate, I agree with Keynes that ' I t is as useless... to say "b is probable" as it would 
be to say "b is equal," or "b is greater than,"...' And no doubt Popper shared this 
insight, in so far as his corroboration function is defined in terms of h, e, and b, where 
b is taken to denote 'background knowledge'.'^"* (I will repeat that I prefer 
'Assumptions not taken to be under investigation in the test', and add that such 
assumptions are, of course, up for grabs in principle. What isn't?) The point is 
blindingly simple: it makes no sense to ask what the probability of any proposition is 
(or propositions are) in an epistemic sense, i f given nothing, e.g. no other 
proposition(s), to measure it by. Hence, Bayes' theorem is to be properly written in 
the fashion suggested by Salmon, inter alios, in so far as it is relevant to epistemic 
probabilities:' " 
P(h|e&b) = P(e|h&b)P(h|b)/P(e|b) provided P(e|b)^0 
The fundamental notion underlying Bayesianism is, then, that we must - or do, or 
ought to, for Bayesianism is ecumenical - conditionalise the prior probabilities we 
assign to hypotheses according to the antecedent theorem. That is, that we must, 
ought to, or do, update our probability assignments when evidence is encountered, 
such that the posterior probability of a hypothesis on a given piece of evidence is 
equal to the conditional probability of the hypothesis on the evidence which was 
assigned beforehand. Update our degrees of belief, that is, i f my prior arguments 
against the classical and logical interpretations - and indeed for the radical 
incompatibility of the Keynesian/Camapian logical view and Bayesianism, given the 
requirement of indivisibility - go through. As Glymour puts it: 
centre of our concerns. Of course, this is not to say that scientific hypotheses ought not to be among 
our most important concerns. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 132. 
Van Fraassen [1989], p.348 
In his words, ?{a,b) measures: 'the degree to which a statement a contains information which is 
contained by b'. Popper [1983], p.293 
See Salmon [1990] 
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According to personalists [advocates of subjective Bayesianism]... an ideally rational 
agent always has his degrees of belief distributed so as to satisfy the axioms of 
probability, and when he comes to accept a new belief he also forms new degrees of 
belief by conditionalizing on the newly accepted belief. There are any number of 
refinements, of course, but that is the basic view."* 
But what is more, it is important to notice that what is being suggested here is not that 
such an agent makes (or ought to make) objective (viz. intersubjective or aleatory) 
probability estimates that are then (or ought to be) corrected by application of Bayes' 
theorem, in order to move them closer to 'a proper objective answer', as such. For 
instance, De Finetti holds, and is right to say that he can hold, according to the 
subjective Bayesianism of which he is arguably the father. 
Whatever be the influence of observation on predictions of the future, it never implies 
and never signifies that we corrective primitive evaluation of the probability P(En+i) 
after it has been disproved by experience and substitute for it another P*(E„+i) which 
conforms to that experience and is therefore probably closer to the real probability; 
on the contrary, it manifests itself solely in the sense that when experience teaches us 
the result A on the first n trials, our judgment will be expressed by the probability 
P(En+i) no longer, but by the probability P(En+i|A), i.e. that which our initial opinion 
would already attribute to the event En+i considered as conditioned on the outcome A. 
Nothing of this initial opinion is repudiated or corrected; it is not the function P which 
has been modified (replaced by another P*), but rather the argument En+i which has 
been replaced by En+i |A, and this is just to remain faithful to our original opinion (as 
manifested in the choice of the function P) and coherent in our judgment that our 
predictions vary when a change takes place in the known circumstances.'^ ^ 
Perhaps this gives an early indication of why I called this theory 'static' in the 
previous sub-section; there is little room, if any, for creativity, flair, or inspiration. 
And as I shall endeavour to show, the objections to subjective Bayesianism are so 
many and varied that it seems fair to conclude that it is devoid of philosophical 
significance in either its descriptive or normative variants. Indeed, there are so many 
lines of attack available that I cannot spare the space to cover them all.'"^^ 
For starters, it might be pointed out that learning would be radically impossible under 
this scheme if it were the case that P(h|b), the prior probability for a given hypothesis, 
were assigned a value of zero. Indeed, since the subjectivist only relies on obedience 
to the axioms of probability as a 'rationality constraint' - those very same axioms that 
emerge via the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem, and would lead to doubts over its 
plausibility i f embellished upon, thereby vitiating the best argument for the subjective 
interpretation - this is not explicitly forbidden. But as I have argued elsewhere: 
[T]here was certainly a time when I would have assigned a prior probability of zero to 
the hypothesis 'All the air in my study will rush into its top left-hand comer, and 
remain there for thirty seconds', although I would now assign it a non-zero value. 
Admittedly, the Bayesian could claim that I have not learned this, but it would follow 
'^ ^ Glymour[1980],p.588. 
De Finetti [1937], pp.146-147. 
For example, see Miller [1994], 6.5-8, and Glymour [1980]. Also note that the defence of 
Bayesianism presented in Howson and Urbach [1989] comes under a particularly strong challenge from 
the example of the 'chaotic clock' in Albert [1999], which is also discussed in Gillies [2000], pp.83-84. 
Chapter 8 of Miller [1994] mounts an attack along similar lines. 
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that 'studying' statistical mechanics in a physics course at university does not 
constitute a learning process! Intuitively, I should say that such a conclusion would 
be absurd.'^ " 
From this straightforward move, I thereby conclude that all learning, let alone 
adjustment of degree of belief, cannot be by Bayesian means; rather, that our 
background assumptions shift in a fashion that she is ill-equipped, nay powerless, to 
explain. What is worse is that they may very well shift in the course of an experiment 
(or series of experiments); for, to do her the favour of putting the point in terms that 
she would find amenable, P(b|e) may also be under consideration. I take it that this is 
of no serious surprise, even to many Bayesians, though. The idea that such a petty 
mathematical formula could facilitate a comprehensive analysis of how we always 
learn, or always ought to update our beliefs, is not only silly. It is positively crass. 
Still, it might be said, more modestly, that we often do, or often should, update our 
degrees of belief according to the Bayesian scheme. (When or when not is an issue 
on which Bayesians do not have a unified account. And I have never seen a 
convincing one, but am again happy to let this slide, for there is a much more incisive 
criticism, which follows.) However, the burning questions, i f I may cut to the chase 
rather than take a detour through needless technicalities, are as follows: what link, i f 
any, does the mere process of updating degrees of belief by Bayes' theorem have to 
do with acquiring the truth!; what does it even have to do with empirical adequacy?; 
what does it have to do, period, with any worthwhile aim (or aspiration) of science? 
And I hold that the answers are: none; nothing; nothing. That is, unless an epistemic 
account of truth is to be adopted. ^ '^^ 
For whereas under the logical interpretation there is taken to be a genuine objective 
link between propositions or sets of propositions with respect to entailment - indeed, 
this is precisely why Keynes and Carnap adopt it - the subjective account is utterly 
silent on this matter. In other words, subjective Bayesianism may well give an 
account of how probabilities of propositions may be (or ought sometimes to be) 
adjusted, but not how the probabilities of their truth may be (or ought sometimes to 
be) adjusted. And in so far as there could be said to be an aim of science, for such a 
Bayesian, it could only be, to a first approximation, 'to acquire propositions with high 
probability relative to other propositions accepted'. It could not be 'to acquire 
propositions with high probability of truth relative to other propositions accepted as 
true'.''*' In other words, the aim of science would really seem to be just high 
probability in a subjective sense. And this is not a realist thesis; the most suitable 
RowboUom [2001]. I should add that I meant, inter alia, that I would have assigned a betting 
quotient of 0 to said hypothesis, when it was taken to range over my entire life. (Indeed I still would, 
for all practical purposes, which is also to criticise the idea that betting behaviour could be an accurate 
measure of probability assignment.) 
'""^  And remember, the core premiss I accept in this section is AT. 
I am not denying the Tarski equivalence, here. Remember, I am talking of 'truth' in an absolute, 
correspondence, sense. And I am pointing out that the actual ofc/'ec«'ve probability of the truth of a 
proposition, given the actual truth of other propositions, does not necessarily correspond to the 
subjectively assigned probability of the truth of the same. No bridge between the two is proposed by 
the subjectivist, as I point out with the following quotation from De Finetti. Moreover, as I go on to 
suggest thereafter, it seems that what is measured by betting quotients is willingness to act on a given 
proposition, given others (as true). But willingness to act as if true need not neatly map on to degree of 
belief in truth. 
50 
adjective is, i f I may borrow from Miller, 'spooky'. De Finetti is commendably 
honest about this, and writes: 
Our point of view remains in all cases the same: to show that there are rather 
profound psychological reasons which make the exact or approximate agreement that 
is observed between the opinions of different individuals very natural, but that there 
are no reasons, rational, positive, or metaphysical, that can give this fact any 
meaning beyond that of a simple agreement of subjective opinions}"^^ 
However, to build upon this, it might be added that some subjective theorists - as is 
made explicit above, De Finetti is an exemplar, in having it that all probability is 
subjective''*'' - hold that no matter the value of one's starting priors (provided, of 
course, that these are not zero), adjustment by Bayesian conditionalisation with 
respect to specific chains of experimental (or experiential) results can, and generally 
does, cause the degrees of belief of different individuals to coincide, in the long run. 
Now although this is dubious, let it be granted."*'* Then it might be claimed that the 
aim of science is truth according to the Bayesian account, if truth is construed as 
consensus in the ideal limit of inquiry. Fair enough, say I . First, I am quite happy to 
grant this in context, since I only argue for AT |= ~ET. But second, I am more than 
happy to grant it, since it is richly suggestive of the idea that there is a tension 
between subjective Bayesianism and the notion that the aim of science is absolute 
truth. There is no solace here for the scientific realist, who seeks an inductive logic 
that is applicable to a non-epistemic theory of truth. 
Moreover - and I prefer this criticism because it does not seem to be strongly 
emphasised in the literature I have cited - it might be the case that the whole notion of 
'degrees of belief is incorrect. Instead, it might be said that one either adopts the 
attitude of belief towards a proposition or not, and that the betting procedure 
suggested by Ramsey and De Finetti approximately measures only willingness to act 
on a belief, degree of confidence in a belief with respect to action, or even willingness 
to commit to belief in a proposition {or propositions) that have been considered. (It 
would, after all, be counterintuitive to say " I believe 'God exists' to degree 0.001", 
rather than " I do not believe that 'God exists'." And given that I am an agnostic, what 
degree of belief would that suggest in "God exists", under the subjectivist model? 0.5 
would seem to be the best fit, and Glymour agrees, but I do not think this can be right, 
since I really do not have either the belief that "God exists" or the belief that "God 
does not exist".''*^ A weakness in the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem is that it 
presupposes a willingness to bet provided the risk of loss is not too great, whereas 
there may be principled reasons for refusing to bet which are not related merely to 
such potential risks.) The problem of context then rears it ugly head, for it may well 
be the case that what we are willing to act on in a theoretical respect is rather different 
to what we are willing to act on in a practical respect. Most obviously, I might 
employ a theory which is falsified, viz. has been classified as false, in order to aid in 
'"^  De Finetti [1937], p. 152. 
'"^  For a more Gomplete treatment, see the discussion of exchangeability in Gillies [2000], pp.69-75. 
As already mentioned, see Albert [1999], Gillies [2000], pp.83-84, and Miller [1994], ch.8. 
Glymour writes: 'one...is agnostic just if his degree of belief is somewhere near a half. Glymour 
[1980], pr588. Notice that "I do not believe that God exists" does not entail "I believe that God does 
not exist". Absence of belief that p need not result in belief that not-p, and this is interesting in the 
example presented because it just so happens that I have considered p, with respect to evaluating its 
truth, at some length. 
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the construction of a successor theory which, according to the statements accepted in 
order to falsify its predecessor, might be true. It does not follow that I would prefer 
the predecessor as a basis for action in a given practical context, particularly if the 
anticipated risks of failure were great. In the words of Watkins: 
[0]ur methods of hypothesis-selection in practical life should be well suited to our 
practical aims, just as our methods of hypothesis-selection in theoretical science 
should be well suited to our theoretical aims; and the two kinds of method may very 
well yield different answers in a particular case.'''^  
But to return to the quotation that opens this sub-section, and attempt to bring together 
my lengthy objections to the justificationist approach and inductivism generally, the 
time has come to give a flavour of the alternative that is advocated by one who would 
link 'rationality' to criticism, rather than justification.''*^ This may be summed up, 
broadly, as the advocacy of a dynamic approach to inquiry, based on critical 
examination, and with argument itself doing the work, rather than any hallowed 
'epistemic principle' (or principles). As a basis for comparison, and to drive a wedge 
between the quest for truth and the quest for (high) probability, let me take the 
following issue: 
Which ticket would you prefer to draw in a sweepstake: the one bearing the 
favourite's name, or the one bearing the winner's? The answer I receive is almost 
always that the winning ticket is, of course, the best one to draw; and an agent's 
preference in the abstract would be for this ticket. But I am forcefully reminded after 
a semicolon's pause that, until the race is over, no one can know which ticket is the 
winning ticket, and as a matter of tactics the rational agent therefore prefers the ticket 
for which there is the best reason to expect victory. It is the 'therefore' here that 
takes my breath away. If the tactical preference for the most favoured ticket is not to 
be simply an underhand repudiation of the abstract preference for the winning ticket, 
then the agent must have conjectured that the ticket most likely to win actually will 
win; and he prefers the favourite not because it is the favourite but because he 
conjectures that it will be the winner, and evaluates the truth of that conjecture in the 
light of the evidence... what matters is the conjectured classification of the 
hypothesis as true... not its assessment as probable or reasonable.'''^  
Now it just so happens that I have encountered similar resistance to that of which 
Miller writes, in my many discussions with justificationists (and indeed inductivists, 
as a subclass thereof).''*^ So allow me to expand, by offering a specific example. 
Imagine I am entering into a lottery, and my aim is to win. The problem is clear, 
given my background assumptions (which I shall not, because I cannot, state in full): 
'^ * Watkins [1968], p.65. 
'•'^  This is a suggestion that is made by Hartley [1962] (see particularly chapters IV and V). I develop 
this line further in II.3 and II.4. 
Miller [1994], p.66. 
This passage is also singled out for criticism in Watkins [1995], pp.613-614. He writes: 
'[P]redictions that are true are reliable as well. A true prediction that we do not know to be true is still 
reliable... If, as he says, the demand for reliability cannot be met, then nor can the demand for truth. 
This pseudo-opposition between truth and reliability is systematic of a false antithesis that crops up all 
too frequently in this book.' However, Miller's entire point in section 3.4 is that truth is sufficient for 
reliability; indeed, that were we to have the whole truth, then we would never go astray. Yet on the 
other hand, a reliable belief (or proposition), and particularly what might seem to be a reliable belief, 
may very well be false. And this is Miller's real point, I think: from 'reliable-so-far', 'reliable' does 
not follow without truth. 
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which ticket will in fact, or actually, win? And what I should like is a true answer to 
this question. 
To keep the situation simple, let us imagine, further, that I can buy only one ticket, 
and that there are just six tickets available, numbered from one to six. The winning 
number will be determined by the roll of a die, which will be performed by a 
mechanical contraption; the number on the top face of the die, when it comes to rest, 
will correspond to the number printed on, and thus determine, the winning ticket. Al l 
this I am aware of, and accept as true. 
So what to do? Well initially, I would come up with an idea - a tentative hypothesis -
of how the contraption, henceforth 'the rolling machine', operated. And I would 
prefer in the first instance, and therefore select i f available, a hypothesis that could be 
tested somewhat (although not without the possibility of error) before the roll to 
determine the winning ticket was made. For instance, I might think like this: 
There are only six ways the die can land, such that there is a result relevant to the 
lottery. Six results are conceivable, given the accepted situation and constraints 
(represented by propositions). But from this, it does not follow that all six results are 
physically (or nomically) possible, let alone objectively equipossible - that is, 
equipossible in an aleatory sense - given the way that the machine works. From the 
axioms of probability, which I am not going to question in this context, I say 
p(l)+p(2)+p(3)+p(4)-i-p(5)-f-p(6)=l, since these events are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaust ive.This is some sort of start, but I am still left with an infinite 
number of potential assignments to each of these probabilities; for example, it might 
be the case that p ( l )= l , and hence that ticket one is sure to win (objectively speaking), 
as would become clear to me could I view the rolling machine operate an infinite 
number of times. So I am now interested in some experimentation with the rolling 
machine, or in some information about how it works, i f either of these options seems 
to be available.'"" '^ (If they are not, I will emphatically nor just assume that 'any ticket 
is as likely to win as any other', or apply the principle of indifference as more than a 
heuristic. I will try to think of a different line of attack, and if I cannot then I may 
very well resort to picking a ticket on what / would consider to be a whim - the one 
bearing my 'lucky number', the number that 1 find most aesthetically pleasing, or 
what have you.) 
To cut a long story short, then, I will proceed to do my best to determine which ticket 
will win, via determining how the die will land, or how the die is most likely, 
objectively speaking, to land. (Here I have in mind questions such as 'What is the 
propensity for the die to land on one?', 'Is the probability of each result 
independent?', and so forth.) If I am allowed to see the rolling machine run before 
buying a ticket, I shall try to see as many 'repeat experiments' as I can. I might even 
be mindful of the possibility that the machine has a hidden switch by which the 
operator can ' f ix ' the result of a given roll. If I cannot see such a switch, I may 
conjecture that there is not one. And so on. The process is dynamic, interactive, and 
'^ ^ Imagine that should the machine fail, or another contingency prevent a roll being made, my ticket 
will be refunded; hence I can 'effectively exclude' such possibilities. 
Here, then, the demand for new evidence. Whence does this spring, for the Bayesian? 
'Maximisation of expected utility' does not quite do the job; see Miller [1994], ch.7. 
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investigative, rather than a static one of updating probability assignments, in the 
fashion suggested by the approach of the Bayesian. 
Al l this is, of course, perfectly consistent with what Miller has to say. Notice, in 
particular, how the use of probability entered my (supposed) deliberation: it was 
precisely such that there was a link between 'most likely to win' and 'wi l l win'. The 
only thing I was ever really interested in, contextually, was which ticket would win -
that was my problem - and my invocation of 'probability' was only derivative. At no 
point did I mention that I assigned a value of (epistemic) probability to the hypothesis 
that the rolling machine had a particular propensity to issue each of the results 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, and 6. That simply did not enter my deliberations at all. 
To this, the Bayesian (or indeed the inductivist) might say that I have left out an 
account of some 'sub-personal process'; that somehow I hit upon an idea based on 
probability theory, rather than on astrology (or readings of tea-leaves). My rejoinder 
is that a 'sub-personal process' can hardly be an inference, and that the answer to how 
I arrive at various ideas is, at least in part, a matter for experimental psychology to 
decide. (As I have already mentioned, what it genuinely means to talk of 'degree of 
behef is at stake, inter alia, and a specific take on this is not even part of a well-
corroborated scientific theory, as far as I am aware.) Furthermore, indeed, it is hardly 
the case that because I came up with my ideas in a particular way that might be 
labelled 'inductive' - this is highly dubious, as I argue below, in 1.2.4 - then there is, 
of necessity, something intrinsically 'rational' about the process. To claim otherwise 
would merely be to conflate the quidfacti and the quid juris: the descriptive and the 
normative.'^ And what kind of message is "How we are predisposed to behave, or 
just so happen to behave, is how we ought to behave"? 
Another line of attack on the anti-inductivist's position - and honestly, the genuine 
anti-inductivist prefers attacks, rather than requests for justification - is, however, 
available. It is put forward by Salmon, and built upon by those such as Newton-Smith 
and O'Hear: 
When, for example, scientists first assembled the first man-made atomic pile under 
the West Stands at the University of Chicago, they had to make a prediction as to 
whether the nuclear chain reaction they initiated could be controlled, or whether it 
would spread to surrounding materials and engulf the entire city - and perhaps the 
whole earth - in a nuclear holocaust. Their predictions had both theoretical and 
practical interest. Contemporary cosmologists, for another example, would like to 
explain certain features of our universe in terms of its origin in a "big bang"; many of 
them are trying to predict whether it will end in a "big cmnch." In this case, the 
predictive question seems motivated by pure intellectual curiosity, quite unattached to 
concerns regarding practical decision making."' 
The idea - here, with reference to my imaginary situation, involving the rolling 
machine - is as follows. Why ought I to have relied, or why was it rational for me to 
rely, on what I held true, in order to tackle the problem? For example, what licensed 
'^ ^ It is interesting that this distinction should be central to my rejection of induction, while also being 
key to my rejection of naturalism. I suspect, indeed, that the focus on this distinction is characteristic 
of the rationalist's approach - rather than that of the empiricist, for instance - and am rather confident 
that it is a motivating force for Popper's critical rationalism. 
'"Salmon [1981], p.443. 
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my employment of probability theory, rather than the generation of an entirely new 
theory, such as "My friend Tony Booth always correctly predicts the winning ticket in 
a lottery"? That is, with a view to actionl^^'* 
The short answer is: nothing. Nothing, that is, in so far as I had no guarantee, or 
partial guarantee, that tackling the problem via probability theory (and working to a 
particular interpretation of probability) would prove any more successful than asking 
Tony Booth. How there could be any such thing, I confess and repeatedly stress, is 
beyond my ken. (And if I may be impertinent, I hazard a guess that it is beyond 
anyone who does not simply assert that there is some sort of 'foundation of 
knowledge' - sense-impressions, physical objects, intuitions, or whatever other 
poison is preferred. But such bare assertion may only give us false hope.) 
The inductivist may press further, though, and ask why I do not (or do not usually) 
swap hypotheses at random; why I do not ride the tempestuous waves of the sea of 
potential conjectures in a carefree fashion. The answer is that when I come up with 
an idea, I want to test it, and I will not relinquish it unless I come to accept the truth of 
a proposition that is inconsistent with it. (By which I mean incompatible with it, from 
the point of view of deductive logic.) I add that this is precisely what makes me 
'rational', in so far as I am happy to use this word; because I test my hypotheses, and 
stick with them until they seem to fail. When do they 'seem to fail'? There is no 
ultimate algorithm, probabilistic or otherwise, that provides a decisive answer to this 
question. And I wonder i f this is not the inductivist's real problem with 
understanding critical rationalism; that a refusal to say altogether too much - to splash 
around general 'epistemic principles' in a vain attempt to convert vague hopes into 
putative realities - is construed as some sort of surrender to scepticism. The critical 
approach is quite different, and Hartley quotes Shaw in this regard: 
The reasonable man adapts himself to the conditions which surround him. The 
unreasonable man persists in trying to adapt surrounding conditions to himself... All 
progress depends on the unreasonable man.'''^  
What I am suggesting, then, is not that one ought to stick with a well-corroborated 
hypothesis, say, because its degree of corroboration is any indicator of its future 
success. (Popper never said so either, despite all the rather unnecessary fuss that has 
been generated on this score.'^ ^) Not at all. Rather, one should stick with a well-
corroborated hypothesis - or even one selected in the first instance due to its mere 
consistency with one's other beliefs, its apparent scope, its expected ease of 
testability, and the like - because it may very well be true, and one ought to be 
interested in subjecting it to searching criticism. In putting it to the test. So what I am 
suggesting is that the answer to Salmon's insightful challenge amounts to this: it is not 
rational to classify a proposition or theory as true, and then declassify it at a whim, or 
As Curd and Cover put it: 'If corroboration statements are solely about the past, how, without tacitly 
making an inductive inference, can they justify the choice of a theory on which to base predictions 
about the future?' Curd and Cover (eds.) [1998], p.510. As I shall shortly point out, however, the main 
problem here is their very request for 'a justification'; they have missed the point. 
Hartley [1984], p.xiii. He adds: 'I mean by "reasonable" what Shaw means by "unreasonable"; and 
I agree with what Shaw says.' Ibid., p.xvii. 
In his words: 'I regarded (and I still regard) the degree of corroboration of a theory merely as a 
critical report on the quality of past performance: it could not be used to predict future peiformance.' 
See Schilpp [1974], p.82. 
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vice versa. Fundamentally, acts of reclassification (but not necessarily initial 
classification) ought to be based on critical activity, be that reflective or discursive. 
And this is, after all, precisely the Socratic root of Popper's thought, at least according 
to those who are sympathetic to his work.'^^ (How could this have been so badly 
misunderstood? I try to given an answer in the next chapter.) 
But one final thing. And here, I quote myself, for I was once a defender of induction 
(or at least the idea that TT was indefensible without ET, and that ET was 
indefensible without appeal to induction, in so far as it is reliant upon the notion of 
confirmation): 
[0]ne might legitimately ask why the critical rationalist does not just accept 
induction, in the same way that he accepts thesis M [MT] (and thesis S) [ST], as a 
working hypothesis.'^ ^ [Footnote from original] Surely he would not want to contend 
that induction has been subjected to enough criticism (and remember, the criticism 
that it is unjustifiable is not important) to render it [conclusively] falsified? If so, 
then I shall invite the next critical rationalist that I meet to hold his hand in a candle 
flame. And when he replies that he will not, just because he accepts a theory that 
doing so will cause him pain, my rejoinder will be "Should you not subject that 
theory to another test? Should you not be actively trying to refute that theory, at 
every given opportunity? After all, to assume that a theory is confirmed, just because 
it is corroborated, is the sort of sin committed by your arch-enemy, the vile 
inductivist!"'^' 
At the time this seemed to me to be a sharp criticism. But it is really extremely poor. 
It is question begging. For to demand justification in the face of one that holds it is 
unnecessary is simply to miss their point. The critical rationalist referred to above has 
classified a particular statement, about the effects of holding one's hand in a candle 
flame (under a suitably specified set of potential circumstances, which are implicit in 
the context of the relevant utterance) as true.'^° And thus his reply might simply be " I 
say it is true, and further that the test you suggest is not of sufficient severity to make 
it worthwhile; indeed, there is a similarity of circumstance, here, to the last time I 
tried holding my hand in a candle flame, which leads me to conjecture - given the 
laws of nature I believe to be true, and appropriate auxiliary assumptions - that it wil l 
burn me. Besides which, you generate an artificial problem-situation. What criticism 
is it that you have of my position that putting my hand in the candle flame wil l burn 
me, i f any? If it is good enough, then I will be more than happy to perform the 
experiment." The mere existence of a (sceptical) possibility does not necessarily 
make it worth investigating; needs must we pick what we investigate or test with care, 
and with a view to solving authentic problems. 
For a useful overview of two different views of Popper, of which I prefer the second, see Boland 
[1994]. This aspect blossoms in Hartley [1962], and is emphasised most clearly by Popper himself in 
Popper [1983]. 
One answer might be that no-one has managed to properly c/asji^ what does, and does not, count as 
'inductive logic'. However, this is insufficient, for I might ask "Why not accept that there are 
inductive inferences, as a working hypothesis, and join in the quest to classify them?" 
'^ ^ Rowbottom [2002], pr38 
It might, of course, be the case that the critical rationalist in question has only classified a less 
general hypothesis as true, say that 'The next time I hold my hand in a candle flame, it will burn me'; 
but here I appeal to common sense. 
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All this said, however, there is one final option available for those who would 
champion inductivism; to claim that it is, in fact, the case that we learn by induction in 
something akin to a Humean format, and further that the very notion of 'rationality' is 
parasitic upon such learning processes. (The stratagem is similar to an 'analytic 
justification' of induction.) This dogma is still reasonably popular in contemporary 
psychology, but the purpose of the next section is to quash it, and thereby achieve 
emancipation from the highly addictive neurotoxin that is justificationism. 
2.3 AGAINST INDUCTION: QUID FACTI 
Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes. - Wilde 
That all knowledge begins with the perception of the individual and then goes on by 
abstraction to the universal is a widespread dogma... We are impressed with a stranger's 
beauty, agreeableness, or reliability before we can specify his features or traits. It is therefore 
quite in harmony with fact to urge that the perception of universals is as primary as the 
perception of particulars. The process of reflection is necessary to make the universal clear 
and distinct, but as the discriminating element in observation it aids us to recognize the 
individual... A student will make little progress in geometry if his attention is solicited by the 
special features of his particular diagram rather than by the universal relations which the 
diagram imperfectly embodies... without some perception of the abstract or universal traits 
which the new shares with the old, we cannot recognize or discover new truths. - Cohen'*' 
In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume clearly distinguishes 
between two epistemic questions that may legitimately be asked with regard to 
'Matters of Fact'. (For Hume, disciplines such as geometry involve the acquisition of 
'Relations of Ideas'; the truths, therein, can be determined by 'the mere operation of 
thought', and with 'certainty'.'^^) The first, 'What is the nature of all our reasonings 
concerning matter of fact?', he answers with 'they are founded on the relation of 
cause and effect', and further claims that our conclusions based on this putative 
relation are derived from experience, rather than aught else.'^ "* The second, 'What is 
the foundation of all conclusions from experience?', he takes to be the genuinely 
tricky problem, at least for the 'philosopher', rather than the 'agent'.'*'* And this is 
the one with which we are all familiar: the infamous 'Problem of Induction'. That is, 
the problem of justifying induction, rather than describing it, on the assumption that it 
occurs. 
In Kantian terminology, one might think of the first question as quid facti, and the 
second as quid juris (or was Rechtens ist)}^^ But when the distinction between them 
is put in such a fashion, it becomes readily apparent that any attempt to deal with the 
quid juris question need not fundamentally depend on the answer which one accepts 
to the quid facti question. In short, the first question has a metaphysical (or factual) 
flavour, whereas the second has, rather, an epistemic flavour. And one need not 
accept Hume's claim that all our reasoning concerning matters of fact is genuinely 
founded on causal considerations. 
Cohen [1931], pp.124-125. 
'"^  Hume [1748], 4.1. 
'"ibid., 4.14. 
'*•• Ibid., 4.21. 
'"•'Kant [ 1787], A84. 
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Yet some seem to have denied that the quid juris issue genuinely arises, due to their 
confidence in particular quidfacti accounts of how we learn, coupled with their other 
philosophical commitments, such as naturalism (to which I turn in the next section). 
That is to say, there are those who would deny that we are entitled to ask the quid 
juris question, for it is so clear how we do learn that it makes no sense to ask it. For 
example, Strawson might be accused of adopting just such a strategy (and following 
in Wittgenstein's footsteps), in arguing that: 
Every successful method or recipe for finding out about the unobserved must be one 
which has inductive support; for to say that a recipe is successful is to say that it has 
been repeatedly applied with success.'*^  
However, as Popper points out, this is a trick with considerable vintage, and consists 
of: 
pointing to the psychological/ac/ that we do, in fact, think in this way - or that we 
are, in fact, compelled to think in this way, or compelled to admit that certain... 
inferences are inescapable or 'necessary'.'*' 
Such prestidigitation is not impressive. First, because it is unnecessarily pessimistic 
to assert that we are so surely bounded: fettered to adopt practices which are not 
revisable, or subject to critical scrutiny. Second, because it seems factually dubious 
that we are so fettered; to draw a deductive analogy, it does seem quite possible to 
question the validity of the law of the excluded middle, and it was possible for 
Enlightenment philosophers to forswear dependence upon syllogistic reasoning. 
(There is also a persuasive mathematical analogy in the parallel line axiom of Euclid, 
which once seemed undeniable.) Third, and against Strawson's argument in 
particular, because it is not acceptable to merely declare that validity is constituted by 
success. No one seriously thought that quantum mechanics had been unsuccessful in 
1952, yet this did not stop Bohm from successfully criticising the Copenhagen 
Interpretation which was so entrenched at that time, and showing how it was not 
entailed by the evidence which it accounted for, even though it may have been 
compatible with the same. (Bohm's drive was his dissatisfaction with the theory as 
compared with his philosophical predilections. His goal was truth, not 'success'.'^*) 
More trivially, in a moral context, I could adopt many underhanded methods to 
achieve success in academia, such as bribing the internal examiner of this thesis, or 
sleeping with the editor of a journal, to persuade him (or her) to publish my work. 
But would those methods seriously be valid? In the words of Popper: 
.. .even if all of us who deny the existence of 'inductive procedures' are wrong, it 
would be the height of dogmatism to assert that these disputed 'facts' create standards 
of reasoning whose validity is not open to further discussion.'*' 
I daresay that Kant would have agreed. And from a chronological perspective, 
perhaps he deserves the final word on this matter: 
'**' Strawson [1952], p.505. 
'*'Popper [1983], p.38. 
'*^  See my further discussion on Bohm in II.1.3, Bohm [1987], Gushing [1994], and Rowbottom 
[2002]. 
Popper [1983], pp.38-39. 
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We are... not justified in repudiating these problems under the exercise of our 
incapacity, as if their solution really lay in the nature of things, and in rejecting 
further investigation, since reason has given birth to these ideas from its womb alone, 
and is therefore liable to give account of either their validity or their dialectical 
illusion... mere censure can... never bring to an end the controversy about what is 
lawful in human reason.'™ 
Of course, what is being objected to, here, is not the approach taken by Keynes, 
Carnap, and other confirmation theorists, who would link the calculus of probability 
to the canons of (alleged) inductive reasoning. To those, the anti-inductivist will pay 
due respect, as did Popper. And although I would contend that all attempts to 
generate a satisfactory confirmation theory have failed, so far, I welcome the work of 
those who would seek to forge inductive logics; that is, those who treat the quid juris 
question seriously. Indeed, were I to be presented with a sufficiently robust account 
of inductive inference, I would genuinely believe that that our contemporary theories 
in natural philosophy - that is, physics, chemistry, and biology - could achieve 
degrees of confirmation, rather than mere corroboration. 
But what to do with the stalwart individual who is utterly unconvinced by the 
foregoing arguments? What to do, when confronted by the woman who baldly, and 
repeatedly, asserts that we all have to learn by induction, because we all do learn by 
induction, and that is simply the end of the discussion? It might be tempting to show 
disdain, and shake one's head in utter disbelief although this would not be liable to 
convince. Instead, begrudgingly, one might attempt to question her premises: that is, 
to push upon her assertion that we do, in fact, learn in the method suggested by Hume. 
This is not to deny, or dissociate oneself from the points already made - rather, it is 
to mount an attack on different lines, and to attempt to poison the roots of her 
position. Prima facie, this might seem brave indeed, i f not foolhardy, since the belief 
that we proceed by so-called 'inductive procedures' is so widespread, not only in 
philosophy, but also in psychology, biology, and folklore.'^' Nonetheless, this is 
what I shall attempt. 
Elucidation of the Position under Attack 
Before I undertake this, however, it is important that what is under attack be 
elucidated, lest I merely cast an ignited match onto a straw woman. First, it should be 
'™ Kant [1787], B791-B792. 
Take, for instance, the discussion in ch.7 of Garnham and Oakhill [1994], a textbook used in 
psychology. Popper is given fair mention, but not treated seriously, and it is baldly asserted that: 
'Inductive reasoning is important both in everyday life and in academic, in particular scientific, 
investigation.' Yet just afterwards, it is admitted that: '.. .there is no generally agreed definition of 
inductive reasoning and, indeed, the term induction is used in several ways in the psychological 
literature on thinking and reasoning.' And this seems contradictory. The authors prefer Johnson-
Laird's view that 'an induction is "any process of thought yielding a conclusion that increases the 
semantic information in its initial observations or premises".', but then the question of whether such 
processes are rational, or not, or are even processes of reasoning, is simply ignored. Still further, the 
question of what counts as a 'process of thought' is not tackled. AH this is unsatisfactorily -
presumptive, and in any event it might be said that hypothesis generation does not yield 'a conclusion' 
in any sense, but only a conjecture. Reasoning seems to me to be an activity, and not one that we are 
constantly engaged in: if we were, then I daresay that philosophy would be much easier! 
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emphasised that I am willing to accept the claim that all learning is 'learning from 
experience'. Second, that I accept the claim that some of our hypotheses, at least, 
involve causal considerations.'^^ Third, and finally, that I do not wish to argue that no 
human (or animal) ever proceeds, or has ever proceeded, by using what might appear 
to be, on the surface, 'inductive procedures'. And this, of course, raises the question 
which I have not yet tackled in any serious depth: what, precisely, is an 'inductive 
procedure'? 
For Hume, it clearly involves learning from repetition of observations: his view is that 
this can provide some surety with respect to drawing universal statements. He writes: 
In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity, which we 
discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects 
similar to those, which we have found to follow from such objects... It is only after a 
long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and 
security with regard to a particular event.'^ ^ 
So that which Hume has in mind, here, is not induction of an Aristotelian nature. For 
when Aristotle wrote in his Posterior Analytics that 
demonstration depends on universals and induction on particulars, and it is 
impossible to consider universals except through induction.. .and it is impossible to 
get an induction without a perception - for of particulars there is a perception... 
he was simply developing a chain of thought which he earlier expressed in his Prior 
Analytics, by stating: 
The method is the same in all cases, in philosophy and in any art or study... it is the 
business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject.'^ ' 
That is to say, to do astronomy, we must see shining lights in the sky, and see that 
they differ in brightness, and that they flicker, and generally move as i f they are 
following a circular path apart from a few 'wanderers' (planets), etc. This is hardly 
objectionable. But now consider geometry. For Aristotle, our acquisition of 
knowledge of the essential properties of the triangle is based on the observation of 
(approximate) triangles which we have drawn; yet for Hume, as I have already 
mentioned, geometry only involves 'Relations between Ideas'. Thus, curiously, there 
is a sense in which Aristotle is more of an empiricist than Hume; he also avoids 
conflating the issues surrounding 'cause and effect' with the question of how we 
learn. 
'^ ^ It might be added, however, that causal reasoning may be distinct from inductive reasoning and 
deductive reasoning. This is the claim defended in Lowe [1975], and if he is correct then one might be 
an anti-inductivist without being a (pure) deductivist. 
Hume [1748], 4.20. 
Op Cit., Sl^l-lO. 
Op Cit.,46M-35. 
The celebrated 'four causes' of Aristode are simply not 'causes' in the contemporary sense. They 
are not 'secret powers' of entities, in a Humean sense. They are properly understood as the 'four 
becauses'; that is, as an outline of the forms of explanation which we employ. (In other words, "ama' 
is best translated as 'explanation', or perhaps 'ground'.) I argue this in III.2, and in Aristotle's words: 
'Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped 
the 'why' of it.' Aristode, Physics, 194''15-25. 
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So what does Hume have in mind? Unsurprisingly, taking his work in historical 
context, his position is more akin to a Baconian account of induction.'^^ In Bacon's 
words: 
It cannot be that axioms established by argumentation should avail for the discovery 
of new works; for the subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety 
of argument. But axioms duly and orderly formed from particulars easily discover 
the way to new particulars, and thus render sciences active... Though all the wits of 
all the ages should meet together and combine and transmit their labours, yet will not 
great progress ever be made in science by means of anticipations; for radical errors in 
the first concoction of the mind are not to be cured by the excellence of subsequent 
functions and remedies... One method of discovery alone remains to us, which is 
simply this. We must lead men to the particulars themselves, and their series and 
order; while men on their side must force themselves for a while to lay their notions 
by and begin to familiarise themselves with facts.. .'^ ^ 
And while it would be foolish to draw too strong an analogy between Bacon's thought 
and that of Hume - for the former prescribes, whereas the latter describes (or rather, 
attempts to describe) - there are salient similarities: emphasis upon efficient and 
material causes, rather than formal and final; the idea that particulars are given to us, 
and that general classificatory notions such as 'Man, Dog, Dove... Hot, Cold, 
White... do not materially deceive us'.'^^ Moreover, both make claims about how we 
should, or how we do, learn. 
Yet while I am willing, unsurprisingly, to agree with both Bacon and Hume that 
observation is of vital importance in learning, their understanding of what it is 'to 
observe', or more precisely 'to perceive', might be criticised, and found wanting. If 
this were possible, the 'inductive procedures' they had in mind would simply not 
exist. Furthermore, even i f perception were to be as they thought it, then the 
significance of repetition in learning might itself be questioned. And here, I shall 
concentrate only on this second line-of-attack, and execute my offensive primarily on 
evidential grounds. (I shall put off the former line in the interest of clarity, since it 
arises more naturally in my discussion of 'The Observability Criterion' of empiricism, 
in ni.4. Thus, only later will it fully emerge how my account of the significance of 
repetition is compatible with my rationalistic view of observation, or perception.) 
Beforehand, it is worth re-emphasising that although some people might get their best 
ideas by making some sort of 'repeated observations', on occasion, this doesn't mean 
that they learn in such a fashion. I might get my best ideas by drinking seven pints of 
ale, or snorting a line of cocaine; this doesn't mean that it is either methodologically 
advisable, or - God forbid - necessary, that schoolchildren be encouraged to indulge 
in the same activities. 
'" Of course, I am not arguing against 'eliminative induction' if that is taken to be a purely deductive 
procedure. But I am not convinced that this was really Bacon's view^ despite his recognition thatthe 
negative instance has greater force, and take it that the next quotation can do the talking on this score. 
In any event, I do not think that particulars simply 'give themselves to us' in the fashion that Bacon 
suggests; observation is theory, and category, laden. Moreover, I argue below that 'anticipations' are at 
the heart of the scientific enterprise. 
™ Bacon [1620], Book 1, Aphorisms 24-36. 
'™ Ibid., Book 1, Aphorism 16. 
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The Significance of Repetition in Learning 
In order to discuss the significance of repetition in the process of learning, it is 
necessary, first, to distinguish between different forms of learning; that is, between 
different types of activities which may be commonly thought to constitute learning 
processes. Popper suggests three: trial and error, habit formation, and imitation.'^ 
They might be characterised as follows: 
(i) Trial and Error 
As may be thought from a common sense understanding of the phrase, 'trial and 
error' consists of repeated, and varied, attempts to solve a problem. That is to say, 
when we encounter a problem which, i f not resolved, would serve to 'continue to 
irritate us', we generally attempt to solve it by several different lines of attack. If one 
line of attack fails, then we adopt another, and so on, until we discover an approach 
which appears to have been successful. 
Here, there are many examples that one may draw upon. For instance, I was recently 
watching a group of rats, in my mother's garden, which were attempting to reach a 
container of nuts: it was hanging from a tree, by a thin wire, and was so located in the 
hope that only birds, among the wildlife that frequented the garden, could reach it. 
The problem situation, from an anthropomorphic perspective, was easily accounted 
for - the rats were hungry, and irritated by that hunger; they could smell where there 
was some food, and wanted to get to it, to satiate their hunger, and remove the 
associated irritation. Now near the tree was a hedge, and I watched as the rats 
attempted to jump from various places thereon, in order to reach the container of nuts. 
It seemed as if each rat took a turn from the point on the hedge which was closest to 
the container, and failed. At this point, my mother, who was also watching, 
laughingly voiced the opinion that the nuts were safe from the rats. But I was not 
convinced, for I could see a different approach. And sure enough, just a few minutes 
later, I noticed a rat on the tree, running along the branch to which the container's 
wire was attached. It nimbly slid down the wire, and began to enjoy its breakfast. 
Unremarkably, the other rats soon joined it, and all three dined in peace, although at 
rather odd orientations; impressed by their ingenuity, we left them to their feast. 
But the story does not end there, for after they had eaten their f i l l , they began to 
realise that they could not return the way they had come. That is, after each had tried 
to ascend via the wire. Their next step was to attempt to gnaw through it, presumably 
in the expectation that the container would drop, and them with it. A new problem, 
and a new process of trial and error began. One jumped towards the hedge, and didn't 
make it. So did another, and although it jumped from the very top of the container, it 
still failed to make it. The third paused, then began to swing the container, and only 
jumped when it was closer to the hedge; it was successful. But the story has a happy 
ending, since none of the rats appeared to be seriously hurt, and they all scampered 
off together, to the field adjoining the garden. The rats had learned much, as had I . 
'^ ° Popper [1983], part 1, section 3. 
62 
At a human level, of course, things are slightly different. And Popper suggests that it 
is important to distinguish between systematic and chance observations, when 
considering learning of a 'trial and error' format. On the one hand, systematic 
observation involves intentional problem solving or conjecture testing; and naturally, 
such a process will always require hypotheses and expectations in the mind of the 
agent. Take any investigation in natural philosophy as an example, or even a 
seemingly trivial act such as measuring the dimensions of a room. (Here, the problem 
situation may arise because we are irritated by the decor of a room, and wish to 
replace the wallpaper.) One would not think it important to use a ruler, rather than a 
tape measure, or vice versa. Moreover, we all share the conjecture - hopefully - that 
placing such measuring devices against a wall does not significantly change the height 
of the wall itself. Of course, the inductivist may want to point out, here, that often 
one would check the measurements, perhaps in order to 'confirm them'. But if 
enumerative induction were a genuine practice, then would we not want to measure 
the room a few hundred times? We do not, I would say, just because we hold a 
hypothesis that such measurements are insensitive to slight variations in background 
conditions. (Among others.) The situation is different in some laboratory settings, 
say in performing an experiment to measure the gravitational constant, where the 
slightest of disturbances, such as a tremor caused by a passing lorry outside, can affect 
the outcome. 
On the other hand, chance observation involves stumbling into a situation, or noticing 
an occurrence, which goes against one's expectations, and would lead one to reject a 
hypothesis. This, then, is the sort of observation suggested by the quotation from 
Wilde at the beginning of this section. My life, for one, is replete with examples of 
such learning. A trivial example involves my biting into an olive from a jar of 
supposedly 'pitted olives' which still contained its stone. More seriously, I remember 
expecting, when I was younger, that if the driver of a car signalled to turn left when 
she reached a junction, then she would turn her car left; and my misplaced confidence 
was soon to result in an accident at a crossroads. My experiences aside, however, 
there are also some rather spectacular examples of important discoveries that have 
been made in such a fashion. Popper mentions several, but I will concentrate on just 
two. 
First is a rather infamous episode, namely Roentgen's discovery of X-rays in 1895. 
For those unfamiliar with the story. Roentgen was investigating the emissions 
generated by discharging electric currents in partially evacuated glass tubes, known as 
Hittorf-Crooks tubes. And one day, there 'just so happened' to be a fluorescent 
(barium platinocyanide coated) screen on a table adjacent to the tube, which he 
noticed was glowing. He posited that it couldn't be the cathode rays themselves 
which were causing the glow, due to the large distance between the screen and the 
tube. Over the following weeks, he tried covering the tube with various materials, 
none of which prevented the screen glowing when it was nearby, and he eventually 
realised that objects between the tube and the screen could create an image thereon. 
But what Popper points out, incisively, is that the fluorescent screen would not have 
been there if Roentgen had not been investigating invisible rays, that is cathode rays, 
to start with. Indeed, further, that Roentgen himself said " I was searching for 
invisible rays"!'^' Now it is important to note that it had been noticed by others. 
Popper [1983], p.41 
63 
beforehand, that photographic plates stored near Hittorf-Crooks tubes had become 
fogged. So why they did not make the same discovery that Roentgen did? Curiously, 
Popper seems to think that this is a point against his account. However, I think the 
answer is just that such occurrences didn't counter their expectations in so obvious a 
fashion as a glowing screen would have. It is also possible that they may not have 
been so alert to conjectures involving invisible rays as Roentgen clearly was. 
Similarly, many of us 'explain away' unusual occurrences, such as prophetic dreams, 
by snap judgements. In that sense, "The exposed photographic plates must have been 
accidentally exposed to light" is analogous to "The correlation between events in the 
dream and reality was sheer coincidence". 
The second example involves a much more amusing episode: a serendipitous blunder 
by a German chemist named Sapper. While heating a batch of organic chemicals, he 
accidentally broke a thermometer into the mixture. But then he noticed a change in 
the reaction, and discovered, after further testing, that phthalic anhydride had been 
produced; the mercury from the thermometer had acted as a catalyst that helped the 
oxidation of naphthalene. Why was this important? Just because phthalic anhydride 
could be easily converted into indigo, which was a highly desirable dye at the time. 
(In India, there were two million acres of land growing indigo plants.'^^) Again, the 
point is that Sapper was only alert to the observation because of a problem situation 
(in this case, of industrial chemistry). In the words of a great scientist, Louis Pasteur: 
'In the field of observations, chance favours only the prepared mind.' 
Now if this account of chance observations seems plausible, then it suggests that the 
inductivist story is thoroughly misguided. For the claim is that we don't just spot 
connections, and then account for them. Rather, in Popper's words: 
A 'chance observation' is like an unexpected stone in our path: we stumble over it 
just because we did not expect it - or more precisely because we did expect, though 
unconsciously, that the path would be smooth.'^' 
(ii) Habit Formation 
So far, I have not discussed skill acquisition. Yet surely most would agree that one 
must practice regularly to become a genuinely good swimmer, high jumper, or pianist. 
Similarly, many will remember being required to recite their 'times tables' as a young 
child - perhaps to their chagrin! And it would certainly seem to be fair to contend 
that some form of learning, by 'mechanical repetition', or 'repetition proper', occurs 
in such a fashion.'^'' 
However, Popper would ask us to consider what the purpose of such 'learning' is. 
Consider his example of the pianist; and let us imagine that she is practising a 
particularly difficult piece, such as Rachmaninov's third piano concerto. Now 
initially, she may make fingering errors, and proceed to correct them as she replays 
the piece; but then, it does not seem unreasonable to contend that she will settle upon 
certain techniques which succeed, on the basis of such trial and error. At this stage, 
she arguably knows how to play the piece, but perhaps she can only do so slowly, or 
http://wwwl.umn.edu/ships/modules/polymerl.htm 
Popper [1983], p.40. 
Ibid., p.42. 
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with a great deal of concentration and effort. And this, Popper plausibly claims, is 
precisely why she will continue to practice: 
.. .the function of mechanical repetition - of 'practising', or 'learning by rote' - is not 
to discover something new, but to establish familiarity with something previously 
discovered. Its function is not to make us conscious of a new problem (as in the 
function of testing repeatedly some tentative solutions) but to eliminate as far as 
possible the element of consciousness from our performance.'^ ' 
In the case of the pianist, to remove the need for concentration on the mere mechanics 
of a piece - the obsession with simply pressing the correct keys at the correct time - is 
arguably a prerequisite for achieving mastery in playing it. For only when such 
mechanics become unconscious can she concentrate on the content of the piece itself: 
'the musical idea, the phrasing of the passage'. 
Similarly, in the case of 'learning' one's 'times tables', one is not truly acquiring 
knowledge of how the mathematical operation of multiplication works; one is merely 
gaining familiarity with the results of its use in particular cases. And arguably, what 
separates someone who is good at arithmetic from one who is not is their ability to 
deal with more complex formulae. Personally, from my time studying physics, I can 
attest that there are certain 'tricks' which I use when multiplying; for example, i f I am 
asked to multiply a large number by nine, then I often multiply it by ten - it is easy to 
add a zero onto the end, or shift the decimal point - and then subtract the initial 
number from the result. I acquired this technique through trial and error, not mere 
practice. I was never taught it at school, or university. And I practiced using the 
technique, by repeatedly solving mathematical problems, simply to improve my speed 
in applying it. (Of course, there are many other such 'tricks' that one may learn in 
applied mathematics, for example, in solving problems in mechanics which involve 
use of the constant acceleration equations.) To leave the final word on this to Popper: 
Repetition as such cannot attract our attention; rather, it tends to make our 
expectations unconscious. (We may not hear the clock ticking, but we may 'hear' it 
stop.) 
(iii) Imitation 
Finally, one might briefly discuss learning by imitation. For example, one watches a 
martial arts instructor perform a move, and then attempts to emulate that movement. 
But naturally, the instructor will correct one's failed attempts to emulate it, and thus 
trial and error is still at the heart of the enterprise. Indeed, in certain circumstances, 
one may even correct oneself, say in repeated attempts to learn how to walk, or how 
to pronounce a certain word. Naturally, when such imitation becomes successful, one 
may then make the newly acquired skill into a habit by practice, or repetition proper, 
as mentioned above. Thus, I type on this keyboard without needing to consciously 
think about which keys to press - instead, I focus upon my thoughts, and the best 






Now the charge levelled at the inductivist is that she mixes up the aforementioned 
forms of learning, and fails to distinguish properly, in particular, between the first -
that is, trial and error - and the second - that is, habit formation through repetition 
proper. It is agreed that we learn by experience, and that our knowledge either 
consists of, or is partly constituted by, expectations. But whereas the inductivist 
thinks that expectations are based on memories of observations that were somehow 
linked by associations discovered through repetition. Popper's charge is that new 
expectations are truly formed by the process of trial and error. Our initial 
expectations in a new field, or when confronted with a new problem situation, are 
tentative. If they mislead us, or fail us, then we revise them. But if they lead to 
success after success then we come to trust them; they become unconscious, as is my 
belief, at the moment, that I will not fall through the floor. (Of course, that doesn't 
mean that such trust is justified in the standard philosophical sense.) As Popper puts 
it, such expectations: 
...may become (by repetition) automatic, unconscious, and petrified, and we 
gradually cease to be able to learn in that particular field.'^' 
Most of us will have encountered individuals who are rightly described as being 'set 
in their ways'; often these are old people, some of whom will even admit this of 
themselves. But is such a condition enviable? Surely not; and that, I would argue, is 
the true beauty of philosophy qua activity. It fosters and sustains our critical instincts. 
In the words of Bertrand Russell: 
Philosophy is to be studied.. .because these questions enlarge our conception of what 
is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance 
which closes the mind against speculation...'^ ^ 
And since I started this section with a quotation from a modern playwright, perhaps I 
should finish with another from an ancient one: 
Knowledge must come through action; you can have no test which is not fanciful, 
save by trial. - Sophocles, Trachiniae 
This concludes my assault on inductivism, although I shall offer a further critique of 
the very notion of 'justification' in a qualitative (and non-formal) sense, in particular 
with respect to the fiction of 'knowledge', in the next chapter (II.3). My purpose 
there will be to dissect this (long) dead horse - mercifully put out of its suffering by 
Popper, in the mid thirties - rather than merely flog it. I should add that I do not 
believe in either resurrection or reincarnation, although the next section is designed to 
show why this would be undesirable in any event. Its character is apologetic. 
Ibid., p.44. 
'^ ^ Russell [1912],p.l61. 
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2.4 ANTI-INDUCTIVISM SETTLED: A MODEST PROPOSAL 
Anti-inductivism might appear to be perversely extreme: to be a position that only a 
philosopher's philosopher, and an awkward one at that, could ever entertain.'^^ So as 
my Parthian shot on the 'induction issue', I want to emphasise the core insight of the 
position, and explain how, and why, it is really much more moderate - not to mention 
modest, and cautious - than inductivism. In doing so, I shall draw primarily upon a 
discussion article by Settle, written in reply to a critique of Popper by Swann. 
Now according to Settle, the Humean view of rationality is decidedly narrow. 
Narrow, that is, in so far as Hume assumes that in order for a belief to be tenable, it 
must be rationally justifiable. In other words, he holds to an epistemic law such that: 
one ought not to commit to belief in p - that is, in the truth of p - unless one is in 
possession of good reasons for belief in p. Cue the problem of induction. 
But it is precisely this assumption that Popper rejects, and hence his solution to - or 
more properly, dissolution o f - Hume's problem. In the words of Settle: 
Popperians commonly think that NR [the narrow view of rationality] creates an 
impasse. Irrationalism becomes a rationally excused alternative, if almost nothing 
worth believing can be rationally justified. Popper's alternative to the demand that to 
be rationally tenable our beliefs must be rationally justifiable, is then something of a 
relief. On his view, a person is rationally permitted to hold views that cannot be 
rationally justified, provided that they are not rationally prohibited, and provided 
they are not held dogmatically (uncritically)}^ [Emphasis mine] 
To expand upon this, we ought to note that for Popper 'an inductive inference' -
although such a phrase has the character of an oxymoron for him, as I shall explain -
is simply not, and ought not to be, rationally compelling. And what is 'rationally 
prohibited', as Settle puts it, is the adoption of contradictions, or inconsistencies 
(either internal or external, viz. with respect to a particular view itself, or that view in 
relation to others held). In the general spirit of critical rationalism, it might therefore 
be said that there are ways of ruling views out, but not ruling them in; i f ' in ' , then ' in ' 
only provisionally, and conjecturally. But this goes for everything, and what is out 
today may indeed be ' in ' tomorrow. Not even a particular system of deductive logic 
is presumed, although one system or another will clearly be required in order to do 
any ruling.'^' Modus tollens, construed quite literally as the 'the mood that denies' 
rather than as a form of argument, takes precedence over modus ponens. That is, 
although classical logic does not seem to be deficient in the relevant area, given the 
current state of critical debate. 
'^ ^ I think that this is just because of the popularity of justificationism, in natural science and 
philosophy, which is in turn based upon the common use of 'probable' in everyday discourse. As an 
ex-physicist, I can say that there was a time when I was so sure of the pronouncements of 
contemporary physics that I wanted there, to be such a thing as inductive support. Wanted it to suggest 
that my faith - what I now recognise as my faith, what I was subjectively sure about - should be 
everyone else's. I was a dogmatist, hiding behind authority claims. 
Settle [1990], pp. 4Gh403 
As to the means by which a logical system can be criticised: this is most obviously by transcendent 
means, namely by comparison with another such system. How the second system would serve to alter 
the classification of statements provided by the first may be examined. 
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So when faced with an argument for p which is not truth-preserving, Popper holds 
that one is not compelled to accept the truth of p - or more importantly, and 
significantly, ought not to be compelled to accept the truth of p - even if one believes 
that the premises of the argument are all true (or, in fact, they are all true). In the 
critical rationalist's view, what is held up as 'an ampliative inference to p' is akin to 
'an attempted defence of p', 'a statement of the perceived advantages of believing in 
p', or more properly 'a statement of what p is consistent with', since there are not any 
genuine rules of ampliative inference. But put this way. Popper's point seems 
thoroughly unobjectionable. By contrast, inductivism seems to be very bold, at least 
in particular incarnations. For example, can it be right that 'the probability of the sun 
rising tomorrow is 0.999999', established by enumerative induction over a set of 
propositions that I accept as true (or even are true), constituting reports only of the 
sun having risen on previous days, thereby necessitates my conmiitting - or ought to 
compel me to commit, if I am to remain rational - to belief in 'The sun will rise 
tomorrow', provided I accept no other premises that would contradict such a 
proposition? 
So Popper's central point might be understood as follows: no matter how convincing 
an argument that is not truth-preserving may seem, it simply ought not to be 
compelling. Thus, we ought to be rather wary of such arguments, and see them in 
such a light: approach them, as it were, with our eyes open to the (obvious) risk of 
error. And as such. Popper's point that inductive arguments are not truth-preserving 
has real sting; because not truth-preserving, not rationally compelling, even if we are 
predisposed to find them appealing. As Settle puts it: 
[Popperians] think the point is that inductive inferences are not compelling, so that no 
one should be thought irrational who refrains from accepting conclusions from them. 
Other people think it irrational not to believe what induction supports, even though 
deduction is non-demonstrative [although I would say, for emphasis, not truth-
preserving]. I find it hard to sympathize with this latter view, hard to locate what it is 
about inductive arguments that warrants such a demand upon my allegiance. And I 
agree with Popper that the view seems mischievous. Why should I feel rationally 
compelled, as opposed to psychologically or physically constrained, to believe what 
may turn out to be false? And why rationally compelled, as opposed to invited or 
attracted? If the conclusions of non-demonstrative arguments with true premises 
could be false, would not that be a reason for refraining from belief, for exercising 
caution, especially if the price of wrong belief were high?... [T]he dispute... is 
not.. .empty... The issues connected with scientific realism, to instance a matter of 
philosophical interest, turn upon it."' 
Of course it needs to be frankly admitted that what we think are truth-preserving 
inferences may sometimes not be. We are fallible. But even the inductivist will 
admit, surely, that so-called 'inductive inferences' are not truth-preserving! Does she 
seriously want us, nevertheless, to find them compelling? This is the essence of the 
Popperian line-of-attack. And if the inductivist claim is just that one should assign a 
particular value of probability to a particular proposition, given a set of premises 
which allegedly 'partially entail' it, then this may be agreed. The link between 




It must be added - 1 said I would get to this - that Popper does not like the phrase 
'inductive inference' precisely because his view is that an inference must be rationally 
compelling, and thus truth-preserving.'^'' Else, an inference could merely be a tool of 
persuasion; a rhetorical device. (Popper is deadly serious about the quest for truth, 
and about eliminating error in this quest, whence the focus on criticism rather than 
justification springs.) 
But notice that what inductivists call 'inductive inferences' are simply not forbidden 
in the sense that one ought never to employ them. Far from it, for Popper himself 
offers arguments which he does not take to be rationally compelling, as he candidly 
admits.'^'* Still further, he is not beyond making appeals to 'best explanations' in 
advancing his positions, although he nowhere claims that there is anything like 
abduction, or 'inference to the best explanation'. And I take this to be because he 
believes that there is no such thing.'^ "^ 
Settle's insightful recognition is, then, that 'inductive arguments' can be arguments 
for the rational permissibility of particular claims (given particular premises, 
'background knowledge', and so forth). And none of this is to suggest that there are 
degrees of rational permissibility, which can be determined by use of the probability 
calculus. Rather, he introduces an extremely interesting posit which he does not, alas, 
go on to develop: the idea that 'inductive arguments' are only persuasive in so far as 
they are enthymematic. This is to say, in so far as a listener (or reader) may import 
the premises necessary to make them truth-preserving (or deductively valid), and then 
evaluate the truth-values of those imported premises, inter alia, in assessing what use 
the purported argument is. 
This is an ingenious suggestion. But is it plausible? Well to return to the previous 
example of enumerative induction, it might be said that it seems wrong - I take it that 
many an inductivist would agree, in this particular instance - because we take it that 
not only some laws of physics would need to be introduced in order to have the 
conclusion follow, but there would also need to be a specification of the condition of 
the universe at a given stage, perhaps a comment on its being indeterministic (or 
deterministic), and so forth. And what we might very well find is that the premises of 
the initial argument would prove barely relevant to the conclusion! Yet on the other 
hand, 'Socrates is a man, 99% of men are mortal, therefore the probability that 
Socrates is mortal is 0.99' seems much better because all that is required to be added, 
in order to render it valid, is 'Socrates is picked at random from the set of men' 
(meaning something like 'Socrates is as likely to be any one man as any other, in the 
class of men'). So prima facie, at least, here is an explanans for the persuasive force 
of particular inductive-looking arguments. And its significance should not be 
underestimated, since this force is precisely what many inductivists seek to persuade 
of. 
'^ ^ It is best put this way: If not truth-preserving, then not rationally compelling. If not rationally 
compelling, then not an inference. Therefore, if not truth-preserving, then not an inference. 
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Miller agrees. (Personal correspondence) 
See, for instance. Popper [1983], pp.80-88 
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2.5 AGAINST NATURALISM 
"After all," Searle rhetorically asks, "do we not know/ro/n the discoveries of science that 
there is really nothing in the universe but physical particles and fields of forces acting on 
physical particles?" The answer, contrary to his assumption, is "No, we do not."... could he 
possibly just point out when, where, how and by whom this "discovery of science" was 
made? Was it made? - Willard'^* 
Naturalism is so plausibly false, i f we are to take it that we have any evidence that we 
can evaluate - here I point to the preconditions of our even having evidence, our 
having the ability to recognise it as such, and indeed our having the ability for making 
judgements on the basis of it - that I find it difficult to take seriously. (Yes, I am 
suggesting that i f we have evidence, and do inquire with a modicum of success, then 
naturalism is false. As Garver and Hare put it: '[SJtimuli do not come to us marked as 
"evidence."... the only ones that count as evidence are those that ought to determine 
our beliefs and actions in a certain way.' '^^) And if the argument here suffers because 
of this, then I must apologise in advance, yet steadfastly refuse to embeUish it. 
But what do I take naturalism to involve, beyond the approximate specification in 
NT? In effect, this is a catchall term for the positions of a fugitive band of 
philosophers - I say 'fugitive' because it is unclear that they allow for there to be such 
an enterprise as philosophy - who share, in varying degrees, commitment to: monism, 
scientism, physicalism, materialism, and reductionism. But this does not get us very 
far, of course, since we are now faced with further -isms, and perhaps the best way 
ahead is to perform a brief review of what anti-naturalists see themselves opposing, 
and ferret out how these strands are interrelated. Let us start with Moser and Yandell, 
who highlight the monism of the naturalist as follows: 
Many philosophers have held, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, that there are 
uniquely philosophical, non-empirical methods of inquiry and that there are things 
whose investigation is reliably conducted via such methods. Rejection of any such 
methods or any such objects other than those available to sense experience or 
scientific methods traces back to the monism of the presocratic philosophers... 
Philosophical monism in general, including idealism as well as materialism, demands 
a single standard in metaphysics or epistemology, contrary to pluralism... 
Philosophical dispute concerning naturalism ranges over many issues, but at bottom it 
concerns the namre of philosophy. A basic question is whether there is a legitimate 
form of philosophical procedure, often called "first philosophy," that has ontological 
authority but employs methods "prior to" or at least not based on sense experience or 
the empirical sciences. In particular, can a philosopher operating without reliance on 
sensation or the empirical sciences legitimately engage in inquiry that posits real 
objects or at least yields genuine truths? Naturahsts say no; antinaturahsts, yes."^ 
Now what this means, happily, is that the naturalist must be opposed to the very 
project of this thesis, in so far as she could not agree that there were a non-empirical 
discipline named 'metaphysics' which involved delineation of any possibilities - let 
alone possibilities of being - in order to enable sensory faculties, or more generally 
experience, to select the actual. Rather, her view must be that not only the actual, but 
'^''Willard[2000], p.29. 
'"^  Garver and Hare [1986], p. 12 
I " " Moser and Yandell [2000], pp.3-4. 
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also evidence, is somehow (and at the very least to a significant extent) 'handed to 
us'; a view which I argue against throughout this thesis, for example in sections n.2, 
II.3, and III.4. (Of course, both Popper and Feyerabend shared a similar dislike of 
such a view.'^^ But looking even earlier, one sees a similar vein in the work of the 
lesser-known Morris Raphael Cohen.^°'^) So allow me to put this aside, and offer an 
initial, and unavoidably passionate rebuttal - I believe in passion, as the naturalist 
cannot, you see - of this anti-philosophical stance: 
We live in a world where norms pervade, and which is replete with content. We are 
capable of love, independence, vanity, and anger. We are capable of thought, 
imagination, and reasoned reflection. We have responsibilities to self and other. And 
paedophilia is wrong. But what can the austere naturalist tell us about this? What, 
moreover, can natural science tell us about this? Or about the interpersonal 
relationships of those very individuals that perform natural science? About their 
hopes, fears, and dreams? About what it is that they strive for? About the very spirit 
of wonder that drives natural science (and natural scientists) ahead, or about the 
necessary social conditions for natural science to even take place? "The complete 
natural science(s) will tell us" is not an acceptable answer, because it presupposes that 
there is an 'us' capable of 'completing natural science', rather than a simple collection 
of electrons, protons, neutrons, strings, and/or what have you. "The physical 
interactions will continue" would be a dam sight more honest - but notice, nothing in 
natural science can even tell us that much conclusively - and my fundamental 
challenge to the naturalist is along these lines: do you like to relax in the bath, to get 
drunk with your friends, or to make love to your partner? Whence the truth-makers 
for these facts? Or are they not, after all, facts? (Is there even a 'natural science' to 
speak of? What are its physical identity conditions? Worse, are identity conditions 
themselves physical?) And if any given naturalist is just a collection of physical 
entities, then why on earth ought I not to slay naturalists on sight? Why would this be 
any different, ethically speaking, than my pulling up a weed in the garden? In short, 
why ought one to seek the truth, or anything else, at all? In the words of Putnam, who 
agrees with me that reason cannot be naturalised: 
Why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that we aren't 
thinkers, that our thoughts aren't really about anything, noumenal or phenomenal, 
that there is no sense in which any thought is right or wrong (including the thought 
that no thought is right or wrong) beyond being the verdict of the moment, and so on? 
This is a self-refuting enterprise is there ever was one!^ "' 
199 See, for instance, Feyerabend [1981a], pp.17-36. 
Cohen writes: 'It is easy for those who have not reflected on actual scientific procedure to say: 
Begin with the facts. But an even more fundamental difficulty faces us. What are the facts? To 
determine them is the very object of the scientists' investigations, and if that were but the beginning or 
first stage of science, the other stages might be dispensed with... Our expectations and prepossessions 
make us see things which do not in fact happen, and without the proper previous reflection we fail to 
notice many obvious things which do happen... Popular empiricism speaks as if we can readily 
eliminate all error and attain absolute and indubitable truth by purifying the facts given in sense 
perception from all taint of inference or interpretation. Error, it is said, comes in judgement, not in 
perception. But if we did eliminate all inference and interpretation would sense perception give us any 
facts? Certainly not enough to constitute any science, social or physical. For assertions of fact involve 
all sorts otassumptions. .. [I]f the iQim scientific method is used in any significant sense it cannot be 
said to begin with a tabula rasa and pure sense-impressions on it, such as the new born babe is 
supposed to have.' Cohen [1931], p.78 
-°' Putnam [1983], p.246. 
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Indeed, Geach offers an even more memorable line, which is supported in Flew 
[1986]: 
When we hear of some new attempt to explain reasoning or language or choice 
naturalistically, we ought to react as if we were told someone had squared the circle 
or proved V2 to be rational: only the mildest curiosity is in order - how well has the 
fallacy been concealed? 
Now it may, of course, be said that a purely descriptive psychology can answer such 
questions in principle, and that norms can, as a matter of fact, be dispensed with. ( I 
do not grant this, but will play along for a moment.) But then, I think, an important 
question is raised; for what, pray tell, is supposed to be so naturalistic about 
description! As Willard puts it: 
A description will be naturalistic only if what it is about - its content, what it 
mentions - fits into a naturalistic ontology. The issue for naturalism certainly is not 
just about normativity. What, for example, would make one think that an adequate 
description of the formation of belief by means of a reliable process would mention 
only things that would fit into a naturalistic ontology? Only, I suggest, the prior 
assumption that the "science" of psychology will, when fully perfected, be 
appropriately natural - that it will "emerge" from biology as biology from chemistry 
and chemistry from physics, or something like that... And this does not even raise the 
issue of whether or not description as such can be understood in naturalistic terms, or 
whether describing itself is an entirely natural event or fact. A fully naturalized 
semantics is, once again, just presupposed in the move to "description" without 
norms. But would not the description (of reliable processes of belief formation, etc.) 
itself have to be "correct," "right," "adequate," "justified"? And have we then gotten 
rid of norms if we simply do not mention them in our descriptions of epistemic 
processes?^"' 
Admittedly, as Willard also points out, there are some self-styled naturalists who 
would simply accept, in the face of this burgeoning storm, that norms are perfectly 
natural: he instances Dewey as a case in point. But what would they be claiming 
then, precisely? On the one hand, they might state that we must merely look to 
natural science in the ideal limit in order to show us precisely what norms should be 
understood to be. (Does the notion of such a limit make sense, from a realist 
perspective, viz. i f truth is absolute and the theories of science are to be taken 
literally? Laudan [1981] provides an extremely powerful argument that it does not, 
which most 'scientific realists' have incidentally come to accept.) On the other, they 
might urge that i f norms have any effect on the physical world, they must themselves 
be a part of that world, since it is causally closed. Besides, does science not tell us 
that the only things which exist are 'in space and time'? 
The distinction between these two lines is generally cashed out in terms of ontological 
and methodological naturalism, but unfortunately authors seem to disagree on what it 
is, exactly, that these broad groupings involve. For example, of the former, Koons 
writes: 'Ontological naturalism is the thesis that nothing can have any influence on 
events and conditions in space and time. According to the ontological naturalist, there 
are no causal influences ffoiri things "outside" space: either there are no Such things, 
Willard [2000], p.27. 
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or they have nothing to do with us and our world.'^^•^ Yet Moser and Yandell write: 
'Ontological naturalism takes various forms. We will understand such naturalism in 
terms of this core view: every real entity either consists of or is somehow ontically 
grounded in the objects countenanced by the hypothetically completed empirical 
sciences (that is, in the objects of a natural ontology)' However, I say the 
confusion is perfectly understandable, for the naturalist tends to vacillate between the 
specific claims (or theoretical content) of contemporary science - which she takes to 
be highly verisimilar and reducible, whence a tendency to physicalism - and the 
authority of 'science' (usually in virtue of its alleged method). (The latter stratagem 
comes into play when she is pressed hard upon what she takes to be statements of 
'obvious scientific fact'. But there is much ammunition available, in history, for the 
challenger: failed theories about crystalline spheres, corpuscular light, caloric, 
phlogiston, luminiferous aether, and so forth.^^^) So when all is said and done, 
naturalism amounts to methodological monism: the naturalist is fundamentally of a 
scientistic mindset, and appeals to the authority of science qua discipline, in virtue of 
its putative method, and thus its content, both presently and in the final analysis.^ "*' 
Challenge a claim allegedly resulting from contemporary science, and i f the naturalist 
finds the going hard - your arguments too plausible - then she will retreat to talk of 
the impossible fiction of 'complete science'. As Willard puts it: 
Naturalism staggers back and forth between physicalism (materialism) as a general 
ontology and first philosophy, and outright physics-ism or scientism (which need not 
take the form of physics-ism) - often, though not always, trying to derive physics-ism 
from scientism and then physicalism from physics-ism. This continues up to the 
present.^ "^  
If no space is left for inquiry outside natural science, however, then this must amount 
to empty rhetoric. Ontological naturalism would seem to stand or fall on the issue of 
whether methodological naturalism is correct - why else say not only that there are 
only physical things, but also that one is irrational to believe otherwise?^°^ - yet 
methodological naturalism must be defended, i f it is to be defended, on the basis of 
serious history of science, rather than textbook entries.^ '^ ^ (And as I argue later in I I . 1, 
Koons [2000], p.50. 
Moser and Yandell [2000], p.4. 
I should add that I am not sympathetic to the pessimistic meta-induction, in so far as it is an 
induction. So while I take it that this line of argument cannot establish that scientific inquiry will 
systematically continue to involve spectacular failures, it does, I think, establish the fallibility of 
inquiry. 
Is it this monism which brings about particular metaphysical and epistemological commitments, or 
the case that an unexamined set of such commitments brings about the monism? I think this varies 
from naturalist to naturalist: in any event, it is precisely the commitment that is the problem, as I try to 
explain in II.4. 
Willard [2000], pp.29-30. 
Notice that from Moser and Yandell's version of ontological naturalism, the leap to Koon's version, 
from the current theories in science, would be highly dubious. For how can we know what will, in fact, 
be the ontology in the 'final science', even assuming that such a terminus is possible? Further, what 
non-methodological reason is there for accepting Koon's version, other than appeal to 'scientific 
realism'? As we shall see, it is actually naturalism that is supposed to be required in order to support 
'scientific realism', according to Boyd. So 'scientific realism' cannot simultaneously support 
naturalism! Furthermore, remember that I have already argued at length against E T , given AT. 
I take it, here, that ontological naturalism is not just nominalism, say of the form advocated by 
Sellars, who writes: '[A]lthough there are attributes, there really are no attributes... the qualification 
'really' indicates that a philosophical point is being made, for in the ordinary sense of 'really,' of 
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there is much that would seem to suggest the indispensability of a non-empirical 
dimension to inquiry, and there is an impressive array of historians, who have 
performed far more extensive historical research than I have, that agree.^'°) The 
point: how could we establish within natural science that its methods were sufficient 
to the task of providing a true theory-of-world, and have already made progress 
toward this goal? If we cannot, then methodological monism about natural science is 
indefensible, and arguably dogmatic: the project to defend it rests upon cognitive 
history, and thereby vitiates an argument for methodological monism about anything 
other than cognitive history. (I take 'cognitive history' to refer to a broad class of 
historical approaches which involve rational reconstruction of human behaviour, and 
an attempt to understand the thought-processes of 'the scientific greats', among other 
things: Zahar [1989] and Netz [1997] are exemplars of this.) Furthermore, on this 
historical line one might urge that the invocation of universals is absolutely vital to 
history, and thereby vitiates ontological naturalism too. Cohen puts this elegantly, 
while also suggesting - and foreshadowing one of the core claims I defend - that the 
proper method of science is not really distinct from the proper method of history, just 
because there is really only one overarching method of inquiry: 
If what is abstract is unreal, then the detached and characterless individual is the 
worst of all abstractions, and the most unreal!... [N]o historical description or 
explanation can possibly dispense with abstractions. Consider the description of any 
historical event whatsoever, e.g. the life or death of Caesar. Can we say that Caesar 
was rich, profligate, brave, ambitious, or what not, without using abstractions or 
aspects of life capable of indefinite repetitions?... [W]hen we see a critical historian 
engaged in determining whether an alleged fact did or did not take place, his 
weighing of evidence does not differ in method from that employed in natural 
science?^^ [Emphasis mine] 
Indeed, we may press further by asking about the status of mathematics and logic, the 
very tools which scientists regularly employ. Ought we to rewrite history such that 
these were products of natural science?^Or can we throw such ladders away, in a 
Wittgensteinian manoeuvre? (I refer to the penultimate paragraph of his Tractatus.) 
Is the claim, now, that the final natural science(s) will be non-mathematical, or that 
mathematics will be 'retro-naturalised'? On this note, Willard is astute to point out 
that those who appeal to 'science' in support of naturalism tend only to appeal, in 
truth, to bizarre abstractions from the genuine article. For although individual 
scientists may say all sorts of strange things - take Bohr's obscure comments about 
'complementarity' as a case in point^'^ - it is hardly the case that it is a result of 
course, there really are attributes.' Indeed, his project is just, in his own words, to 'lay the groundwork 
for a theory of reference... which can claim to be the very foundation of a naturalistic ontology.' 
Sellars[1979],p.47. 
'^^  Their mere agreement is not an argument, of course, and I do not seek to use it as one; I merely wish 
to highlight that my view is not controversial. 
-"Cohen [1931], pp.14-15. 
-'^ For instance, Netz [1999] argues that the development of mathematics was quite separate from 
philosophy, let alone anything resembling contemporary science. This, although I should want to 
dispute whether there were some ontological assumptions that underpinned the exercise. 
On which, see Beller [1998]. In a subsequent letter to the periodical (August 1999, Physics Today), 
Sokal and Bricindnt express considerable sympathy: 'Beller Observes, correctly, that farfibus physicists 
such as Bohr, Born, and Pauli engaged at times in dubious (to say the least) extrapolations of ideas 
from quantum physics to politics, psychology, philosophy, and religion. She also notes that these 
writings were sometimes treated by physicists with excessive reverence, rather than being subjected to 
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natural science that the only things that exist do so in space and time. Rather, those 
things are the objects of inquiry with which natural science is concerned: 
Could one possibly find the place in some comprehensive and duly accredited 
scientific text or treatment, or some technical paper, where it is demonstrated or 
necessarily assumed by the science concerned that all that exists consists of particles 
or fields or strings - or whatever the proper subject matter of the science is? Would 
Searle or anyone else be able to mention the name of the physicist who established 
this as an "obvious fact of physics"? Exactly where in the "atomic theory of maUer" 
is the claim about what "the universe consists entirely o f to be found?^''* 
As such, some analogues may be useful: where is the Neo-Pythagorean philosopher 
who wil l claim that only mathematical entities exist, and that this is a result of 
mathematics? Or the political theorist who will claim that only societies exist, and 
that this is a result of sociology?^''' (To the extent that there are such soi-disant 
philosophers in the latter case, the so-called 'Postmodernists', comparing them with 
naturalists is entirely appropriate. Crazies abound.) Indeed, one of the central points 
of this thesis is precisely that there is no overarching scientific method, as such. It is 
a fiction, as anyone who has really done science must surely understand; courses on 
'scientific method' are not found outside philosophy departments. Rather, 'natural 
science' is an epiphenomenon of inquisitive people - I hope the hypothesis that 
scientists are people is not too implausible - engaging in critical discourse about 
particular problems which they attempt to state clearly, and tackle in earnest in order 
that they might discover the truth (or truths). And like all us humans, not only do they 
tend to concentrate only on a specific set of the available problems, but they also 
make mistakes. Trial and error is the game, and criticism the organon. To which I 
might add that it is a delightful irony that naturalists eschew precisely the kind of free-
thinking, and critical exploration, that has been, and continues to be, vital to the 
practitioners of science. No doubt they would have been appalled by the notion of 
'action at a distance' in Newtonian mechanics, Kepler's posit of an anima motrix 
emitted from Sol, Descartes' postulations about light and vision (despite his 
remarkable account of the rainbow), the explicit non-locality of Bohm's interpretation 
of quantum mechanics, Mpemba's claim that hot milk can freeze faster than cold, and 
so forth, were they to have found themselves in the relevant historical settings."'^ 
Appalled, that is, because instilled with a misplaced confidence in the then status quo; 
intoxicated by a heady cocktail of faith in authority and Kuhnian 'normal science', 
and badly in need of a sober historical perspective, in order to motivate future 
the critical analysis they deserve. Finally, she observes, again correctly, that the popular writings of 
these and other physicists - in which the foundational issues associated with quantum mechanics are 
often grossly oversimplified - served as one source of inspiration (among many others) for 
postmodernist musings about science.' 
'^"^  Willard [2000], p.29. 
I do not assume that there are only natural-scientific questions, according to the methodological 
naturalist. Rather, she might hold that the only questions which can be satisfactorily answered, and are 
hence either (a) meaningful, or (b) worth discussing, are answerable by natural science(s). However, 
the problem is that endorsement of 'the one methodology' would then seem to be an act of faith, and 
open to the tu quoque objection proposed by Bartley, as I will explain in II.4. 
'^^  For example, Kepler's belief that an 'emotion' (from animi motus) was only emitted along the plane 
of the ecliptic led to what would now be seen as a mistake, namely the inverse-distance speed law. 
However, the underlying notion of force, understood by Kepler as 'the will of the sun', perhaps, proved 
fruitful indeed. (That is to say, neo-Platonic thought, along animist lines, contributed to a progressive 
research programme.) See Kuhn [1957], pp.214-216 & 245-249. 
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moderation. (I do not want to suggest that there is anything wrong with a bold 
hypothesis, as such: what is wrong is making such a hypothesis into a pet.) 
Moreover, I ought to add a reminder that I have already argued in 1.2.1 - I hope 
effectively - that the metaphysical foundation of 'scientific realism', MT, simply does 
not rule out an anti-naturalist stance with respect to the nature of properties (or indeed 
kinds, natural numbers, and so forth). It does not rule out MR, and does not suggest 
that ontological naturalism is a sustainable view. (Indeed, there is no mention of 
nominalism, or the need for any particular view on language, meaning, or reference, 
in the formulation of any of the theses that Psillos explicitly puts forward as 
constituting 'scientific realism'. But i f additional theses are to be vital to the basic 
position he defends, then he owes us a straightforward statement to this effect. And 
the result would be that the system would become even more implausible: yet more 
ad hoc adjustments would be made in the attempt to render it 'effectively sustainable' 
in the light of criticism.) Now on this point, Moreland [2000] deserves a mention -
although I cannot devote the space to outline his lengthy argument in ful l - since one 
of his fundamental claims is that there are many so-called naturalists who 'Accept a 
traditional realist construal of properties', but that 'often do so apparently without 
being aware of the fundamental issues involved... because these issues are matters of 
so-called first philosophy.'"'^ Enough said. 
I ought also to mention that in so far as I object to the epistemic thesis of 'scientific 
realism' (ET), and have argued against it in 1.2.2-1.2.3, my attitude towards those who 
become obsessed with the content of contemporary science tout court, who almost 
deify it, is understandably one of disdain. (Theories have to be critically examined 
piecemeal. The mere fact that a theory is accepted into the corpus of a special science 
such as physics, even that it makes it into the textbooks employed to train young 
practitioners, does not thereby give it some sort of privileged epistemic status. Inter 
alia, it may not be well corroborated, and most expert physicists may correctly think it 
false, or to be of low verisimilitude. There may simply be nothing better to put in its 
place at a given point in time. And as a matter of fact, does anyone seriously think 
that one scientist will necessarily believe what another says simply because she has 
used a particular method to get her result, or that he really ought tol It is never that 
simple.) And here, interestingly, is ground on which I - and more generally critical 
rationalists, I think - can agree with some of the views advanced by van Fraassen, 
which I cover in greater detail later herein.^For the moment, let me just say that 
van Fraassen's brand of empiricism is, I would hold, a lesser evil than naturalism; for 
it is undogmatic to the extent that he would have it be a 'stance', and that he does not 
claim we are rationally compelled to be empiricists, or indeed to commit to belief in 
constructive empiricism. He argues, rather, why he is perfectly rational to be a 
constructive empiricist. And this I grant with admiration, although I strenuously 
disagree with his position. 
Now to sum up, and tie this discussion to that of 'scientific realism', I ought to point 
out that I agree with Boyd that: 
Scientific realism is, by the lights of most of its defenders, the sciences' own 
philosophy of science. Considerations of the significant philosophical challenges 
^" Moreland [2000], p.69. 
"^See II. 1.3,1II.4-III.5.4. 
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which it faces indicate that it can be effectively defended only by the adoption of a 
mefaphilosophical approach which is also closely tied to the science, viz., some 
version or other of philosophical naturalism.'" 
Yet i f methodological monism fails, which is all that I really take myself to have 
argued for convincingly, then it seems plausible that metaphilosophical disputes 
cannot be answered by appeal to science. (And to appeal to 'scientific realism', for 
Boyd, would be viciously circular.) Moreover, a significant sub-set of the views that 
go under the moniker 'naturalism' - e.g. materialism - suffer from a lack of serious 
motivation, except in so far as they might serve as research programmes for specific 
special sciences. This does not show them to he false, but rather entirely unmotivated 
in so far as they do not solve any problem(s), but rather create problems (such as the 
question about the status of norms), when applied in anything beyond such narrow 
domains. 
Boyd [2002], section 6.6. 
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I I 
O N M E T A P H Y S I C S , REALISIVI, AND INQUIRY: PREPARING T H E 
G R O U N D 
INTRODUCTION 
Thus far, my approach has been decidedly critical. I have tried to illustrate where I find 
'scientific realism' to be lacking, even unacceptably dogmatic, with particular emphasis 
upon its metaphysical and epistemic foundations. Yet I should emphasise that I see 
epistemology, properly construed, as lying within the domain of the philosophy of mind. 
And I see the domain of philosophy of mind as lying within that of metaphysics; as such, 
epistemology is just applied metaphysics, where the objects of inquiry are persons - not 
minds, which are at best only parts of persons - and their interactions with other entities.' 
But what motivates this view, and why do I think it not only to be worth defending, but 
also to be progressive? In this chapter, I will answer this question in some detail, while 
also trying to advance several theses about realism - in so far as such an overused word 
refers, and is useful - and metaphysics. Further, I shall try to draw some general lessons 
about inquiry, while elucidating the critical rationalism that I prefer, on the foregoing 
basis. As such, this chapter sets the stage for the remainder of this thesis, and the view of 
the relationship between metaphysics and natural science that will be developed 
hereafter. 
First, then, by way of a historical perspective to motivate my view, I want to examine the 
significance of Aristotle's thought in the Latin West between the Fall of the Roman 
Empire and the oft-hailed 'Enlightenment', with particular emphasis on the question of 
ontological continuity. For it is claimed by some, mistakenly I think, that the rejection of 
Aristotle's metaphysics - in particular, his view of auia - both actually occurred, and 
was vital for the 'birth' of natural science. That is, for its 'emergence' from previous 
'natural philosophy', and its growth into a distinctive discipline with a privileged 
epistemic status. But against this, I shall argue that Aristotle was precisely the father of 
science - as far as we can tell, it must be added - and that his (admittedly imperfect) 
mode of inquiry set the standard for that which followed. As such, I defend the view that 
natural science began with Aristotle, or perhaps even earlier, rather than two thousand 
years later, in Western Europe. Indeed, that it was practised in various enclaves, with 
varying degrees of success, not only in the Latin West, but also in Ancient Greece, the 
Byzantine Empire, the Greek East, and the Islamic world. 
Second, I want to explore the nature of 'realism', while trying to avoid mere quibbles 
' I ought to clarify that I am not discussing pure metaphysics, as a priori discipline, here. The view is that 
if we do our metaphysics well, and do our natural philosophy well, then the correct epistemological 
perspective will drop out. Epistemological inquiry would, I hold, be radically impossible without a 
backbone of categorial access and a body of sense faculties. 
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over the 'proper' meaning of the word. For 'realism' really stems, in its modern 
incarnation, from a rejection of the doctrine that representations, rather than things-in-
themselves, have some sort of epistemic priority, be that with respect to perceiving the 
actual, or indeed conceiving of the possible.^ The distinction between transcendental and 
empirical 'levels' is significant here, and I shall want to argue that although genuine 
realism must start from the transcendental level - indeed, that transcendental idealism is 
ultimately self-refuting - it must nevertheless avoid the pitfall of empirical idealism (such 
as that of Berkeley, or indeed Mil l ) . As such, the theory of perception lies at the heart of 
the realist-idealist debate (see the previous footnote); for true realism is founded upon the 
hope - and perhaps it is only a hope - that there are not mystical 'barriers' between us, 
qua sentient organisms, and the other entities that inhabit the world. As I have already 
argued in the previous chapter, i f fallibilism is forced upon us, as it seems to be, then 
realism seems our best bet. The reason is that it would be curious to merely assume the 
worst - that we are trapped in a prison of representations, even assuming 'we' genuinely 
refers - and thereby achieve only a dogmatic self-paralysis. (Even under Kant's 
ingenious view, the things we can be 'certain' about are hardly interesting. There is 
hardly a world we can make it our task to discover; it is all there, in so far as we could 
grasp it,/or the sensing?) To put it bluntly, then, my view is that realism is 
methodologically advisable, and perhaps psychologically and ethically so, to boot. Still 
further, that the distinction between 'transcendental' and 'empirical' is just fallacious, 
although it provides a useful heuristic for discussion, unless it amounts to a distinction 
between conception and perception, or more properly different modes of investigation of 
being. Of that which might be, and of that which is, in a robustly existential sense. 
Third, I want to explain precisely how and why it is a mistake to think that one can do 
epistemology without ontology, or that epistemology is First Philosophy, and my vehicle 
for this discussion will be the very idea of 'knowledge'. For I shall argue that this is a 
^ We might note that the Greeks of Aristotle's period never encountered the mind-body problem, but that 
this was not due to an oversight. Matson [1966] provides a plausible explanation: 'It is true that in 
translations of De Anima one finds "sensation" and "perception" used freely where Aristotle has aisthesis. 
But this is seldom right. Aisthesis means "sense" ("the five senses") or "sensing" (a generic term for cases 
of seeing, hearing, etc., individually or collectively taken). Perceptions and sensations are had, while the 
word-for-word equivalent in Greek of "to have a sensation," aisthesin echein, would mean (if it meant 
anything) "to be sensed," i.e., to have an aisthesis directed toward one, to be the object of an aisthesis... an 
aisthesis must have a cause, though it may turn out not to be what it was thought to be at first...the 
comparatively rare formation aisthema, "that which is the consequence of the activity in aisthesis," occurs 
in Aristotle's writings some ten times, and in three of these cases it is natural and perhaps inevitable to 
translate it by "sensation," "sense impression," or even "sense datum." All of them, though, occur in the 
treatise On Dreams (460b2, 461al9, 461b22), and the spooky context, the need for a word to designate a 
floating image not ascribable to sense perception, explains the usage... On the whole, it seems that the 
Greeks found it no more necessary, or even possible, to talk "phenomenal language" or "raw-feel-talk" than 
we do, and that their philosophers lacked motives... for exhorting them to do so. And no sensations, no 
mind-body problem.' 
In other words, I would suggest that Kant is the most devout of empirical realists, but that this 'realism' 
comes at a terrible price. As I have suggested beforehand, in section 1.2.2, his very mention of things-in-
themselves would seem impermissible if we can only come into contact - intellectually or perceptually -
with representations. But then the very notion of 'representation' becomes dubious. For that which 
represents must have something to represent; and ultimately, what this amounts to is that 'presentation' 
would be a better notion, as I later suggest. 
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hollow notion when it is understood in the sense advocated in much of contemporary 
epistemology, viz. 'justified true belief. Further, that what we should be interested in is 
just that which is true, and that a wedge may be driven between the quest for truth (or 
true propositions as objects of belief) and the (mere) quest for 'knowledge', the former 
being preferable from an axiological perspective. That is, provided truth is understood in 
a non-epistemic fashion - that AT holds - such that a given proposition maintains its 
truth value irrespective of our inquiry, characterised in terms of means or otherwise."^ In 
short, I hold that the absolute truth is that which we ought to seek, for reasons which may 
seem rather Platonic, and that our proper means of going about this task are 
fundamentally Socratic. Hence, that a woman who seeks only 'knowledge' may very 
well be a sophist or a rhetorician, with no interest - or at least a minimal and superficial 
interest - in that which is, and that which is the case. 
Fourth, I should like to say something about the issue of demarcation. For the reader may 
have noticed that I have been careful to employ the phrase 'natural science' in my 
antecedent discussions, and have used this interchangeably with 'natural philosophy', and 
it now behoves me to explain why. In essence, this is since I take the view that a 
discipline is properly defined by the objects of its inquiry, rather than its methods, and as 
such that the only important demarcation criterion for science and non-science is whether 
the approach taken to the subject matter is critical or not. (This does link into the idea of 
whether the claims made therein are, or are not, severely tested; that is, tested to the best 
of our ability, in an ongoing process of investigation. My sympathy with Popper's 
critical rationalism should be obvious by now, and I make no apology for this.) To put 
this differently, a putative discipline of inquiry is simply not a discipline - a science, in 
the sense of scientia - unless it involves a critical approach to problems about some 
aspect of the world (understood, I emphasise again, as the sum total of that which 
exists).^ Hence, I say mathematics is a science, and metaphysics is a science - the First, 
as it happens - as much as physics, chemistry, and biology are.^  None of this is to deny 
that there are local methods, suitable to the performance of particular tasks such as 
solving a quadratic equation in algebra, or performing a statistical analysis of the results 
of an experiment to measure a posited constant (e.g. the gravitational constant, or the 
permeability of free space) in nature. It is to say that those methods do not characterise 
'* If that which is 'true' is to be based on consensus, even in Peirce's 'ideal limit of inquiry', then I will 
agree that justification is of great import; further, as suggested earlier, that so-called 'inductive inferences' 
are important, since they clearly persuade. Yet I reject this theory of truth, which is fundamentally anti-
realist, since it denies inquiry a satisfactory (or desirable) aspiration. This said, it should be sufficient in 
context to point out that I agree with Hendry [1995], p.58: 'There is...a sense in which the issue of whether 
theories can be confirmed as true arises in an interesting way oidy if a non-epistemic theory of truth is 
agreed upon...Putnam's acceptance of the epistemic component [what I call ET] is rendered Pickwickian 
on this view by its identification of truth with rational acceptability in the ideal limit of enquiry.' 
It might be added that this approximate explanation will not do in the final analysis, for metaphysics is, 
under my view, an examination of that which might be, and hence only derivatively involves a critical 
approach to problems about some aspect of this world. (In other words, it involves, to a first 
approximation, a critical approach to problems about some aspect of broadly logically possible worlds.) I 
ought also to add that my talk here is supposed to be atemporal; i:e. 'that which is in the actual world' 
should not be confused with 'that which is the case at present in the actual world'. 
^ This is not to say that there are not 'soi-disant metaphysicians', and 'soi-disant natural scientists', of 
course. 
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disciplines, as such - they are more like problem-solving strategies for specific problems, 
which involve objects of inquiry (or manipulation) that fall into the domain of a particular 
discipline. In a nutshell, this is again rather Popperian - at least as I understand Popper -
in so far as there is no 'scientific method' above and beyond 'the one [proper] method of 
philosophy'7 
Finally, I ought to mention here that my foremost target in the remainder of this thesis is 
empiricism, and more generally subjectivism (which I see as having been at the heart of 
the empiricist project, historically speaking), which I see as a Scylla to the Charybdis of 
'scientific realism'. (Indeed, although I wish to navigate us safely between these two, I 
would point out that the Scylla is a fearsome monster, whereas the Charybdis is natural 
enough, and would prove a less horrific way to bite the dust.) My arguments against such 
doctrines will come to a head in the subsequent chapter, but I begin to chip away at them 
here, in preparation for the battle proper. Secdon 4, in particular, draws together an 
important thread - on the role of authority - which runs, quietly, through this entire 
chapter. 
1. THE RISE OF ARISTOTELIAN THOUGHT 
Aristotelian philosophy did not fill an intellectual vacuum, but invaded occupied territory -
Lindbergh 
After the fall of Rome in the fif th century, the tenuous link between the Latin West and 
the Greek East, which had long been divided along administrative lines, was finally 
severed. As Barker puts it: 
[T]he empire in the West after 476 A.D. was in abeyance for some hundreds of years, so 
far as a visible emperor, or a capital, or a system of administration was concerned.^  
The vast majority of Greek manuscripts became inaccessible in the West, due both to 
linguistic and geographical barriers, and scholarship entered into decline, in both quality 
and quantity.'*^ And whereas great centres of learning existed in the East, such as 
Constanfinople and Alexandria, academic pursuits in the West were generally confined to 
monasteries. 
However, due primarily to the efforts of Boethius (480-524), a small number of 
Aristotle's logical works were translated into Latin, and made available to ecclesiasts." 
Through the use of scriptoria, these were preserved and disseminated somewhat, and 
^Popper [1980], p. 16. 
*Lindberg[1992], p.216. 
"Barker [1923], p.84. 
'° The Roman society did not do a good job of preserving and translating the abstract work of the Greeks. 
As Singer argues: 'The matter seems to have lain deep in the Roman character...is not improbably related 
to the Roman obsession for Rhetoric...[and ultimately] by the Roman desire for 'useful studies'.' Singer 
[1923],pp.268-269. 
" On Boethius, see Clagett [1957], pp. 150-153. Calcidus had earlier translated some of Plato's work, most 
notably his Timaeus. 
became accessible to successive generations. Such philosophia - when it was appealed 
to - was initially expected to play a handmaiden role to the Christian faith. But it proved 
to be an impressive one, nevertheless: 
For [apologetics]... the logical tools developed within the Greek philosophy proved 
indispensable.'" 
Indeed, Aristotelian logic had considerable influence on the works of: Isidore of Seville 
(ca. 560-626); Gregory of Tours (d. 595); Gregory the Great (ca. 550-604); and the 
Venerable Bede (d. 735).'-^ 
Now this would seem to suggest that the value of critical thought - viz. the careful 
application of reasoned argument, rather than rhetoric and appeal to authority - became 
inexorably greater in the eyes of religious scholars. And although this development was 
unavoidably slow, given the unpleasant situation in the West, it is not inconceivable that 
it might have occurred more swiftly, in a different socio-political setting. For a vital 
factor in the promotion of scholarship is security, in both economic and military respects; 
only when leisure time is available, travel is not periculous, large communities are 
established, and ideas can be readily exchanged, does it become possible for literati to 
become maximally productive.''* 
The plausibility of this claim is bolstered, first, by the fact that the greatest scholars of the 
ninth and tenth centuries - namely John Scotus Eriugena (f l . 850-75) and Gerbert (ca. 
935-1003) - were both beneficiaries of the educational reforms made in the Carolingian 
Empire, under the guidance of Alcuin (ca. 730-804).'"'' And the first chapter of the 
former's Treatise on Divine Predestination, for example, is entitled precisely 'That Every 
Question Is Solved by the Fourfold System of the Four Rules of the Whole of 
Philosophy', and the influence of Greek thought is manifest as he continues by writing: 
AIAIPETIKH, OPICTIKH, AOOAIKTIKH, ANAAITIKH... No man instructed in the 
art of disputation has any doubt that it is indeed by means of those four parts, as by some 
useful and honourable fourfold method of human reasoning, that the very art of 
disputation, which is truth, is arrived at.'* 
Second, it is supported by the approaches of Anselm (1033-1109) and Peter Abelard (ca. 
1079-ca. 1142), who were both bom into a considerably more secure West.''' The 
former's infamous 'ontological proof, in his Proslogion, is a fine exemplar of an attempt 
''Lindberg[1992], p.l50. 
'•* Ibid., pp.158-159, and pp.184-185. I should also add, at this stage, that there are also signs of Plato's 
influence in such works. See, for instance, Bede's striking reference to 'a secular writer [who] very truly 
said, the world would be in the happiest possible state if kings were philosophers or philosophers were 
kings.' Bede [731], p.309. 
'•* I am not claiming security is a sufficient factor, just a necessary one. 
" Charlemagne brought Alcuin in from York. See Lindberg [1992], pp. 185-190 
Eriugena [850], p.8 
" In the words of Lindberg: 'When Gerbert died.. .Western Europe was on the eve of political, social, and 
economic renewal.' Ibid., p.190 
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at syllogistic reasoning, devoid of authority-based claims. And arguably his earlier 
Monologion is intended to be entirely devoid of appeal to authority, since as he explains: 
Some of my brethren have often and earnestly asked me to write down, as a kind of 
model mediation, some of the things I have said, in everyday language... They 
specified... the following form for this written meditation: nothing whatsoever to be 
argued on the basis of the authority of Scripture, but the constraints of reason concisely to 
prove, and the clarity of truth clearly to show, in the plain style, with the everyday 
arguments, and down-to-earth dialectic, the conclusions of distinct investigations.'^  
The latter's 'Sic et non' is clearly designed to encourage the reader to employ critical 
faculties, and engage in philosophical reflection, as indeed are several of his other works. 
Indeed, in his Dialogue Between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian we find a 
particularly strong focus on dialectic: '[I]t's the philosophers' job to investigate the truth 
by means of reasons, and in all things to follow not people's opinion but reason's lead.''^ 
In both Anselm and Abelard, then, we find the beginnings of a confiict between reason 
and faith - a rationalist turn, whereby the learned began to place greater trust in the 
capacities of their own minds and senses, was underway. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that Anselm writes of 'the truth of the senses', talks of their potential deception, and even 
mentions the example of the stick that appears to be bent when part of it is underwater."° 
This said, it might still be denied that such a turn could truly be considered to have been 
due, even in part, to the influence of Aristotle's logical works. Moreover, it might be 
argued that the development of such a conflict did not constitute any sort of progress, at 
least with respect to encouraging either the practice of, or the development of a suitable 
methodology for, science. Both these objections will need to be countered, i f my central 
claim in this sub-section, specifically that Aristotle's logical works encouraged the 
adoption of an attitude beneficial for scientific work, is to be maintained. 
To the first objection, which I consider to be the easier to counter (given the foregoing 
historical examples), I think it best to offer a couple of quotations directly from 
Aristotle:'' 
The method is the same in all cases, in philosophy and in any art or study... it is the 
business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject.^ ^ [Emphasis 
mine! 
Anselm [1059-1107], p.5. See also passage 66 of the Monologion, p.72. Further, note that his work On 
Truth also suggests something like a correspondence account of the truth of statements, and a rather 
sophisticated distinction between 'two truths'. He writes: 'A statement is then right and true either 
because it is correctly formed or because it fulfils its function of signifying correctly. The former belongs 
immutably to it, the latter is mutable. The former it always has, the latter not always. The former it 
naturally has, the latter accidentally and according to use.' See pp. 154-155 
Abelard [1136-1139], p.59. Of course, this chain of thought comes to Aristotle, presumably, via Plato, 
and thus Socrates (from what we can tell, on the basis of Plato's, and to a lesser extent Xenophon's, 
characterisations of him). 
Anselm [1059-n07], On Truth, pp. 158-160: 
Admittedly, there may still be some doubts about whether these aspects of Aristotle's thought were 
noticed, and interpreted in a literal fashion, but it seems plausible to assume that they were, without 
available evidence to the contrary. 
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[C]onvention represents the opinion of the majority, whereas the wise speak according to 
the standard of nature and truth. 
To answer the second, and more difficult, objection, there can be no finer place to look 
than to the core debate in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. For on the one hand, 
Kuhn argues that a revolution can only occur when a 'critical-mass of anomalies' (viz. 
predictive errors, or explanatory gaps) are seen to confront a dominant disciplinary 
matrix, or 'constellation of group commitments'.^'* Whereas on the other, those such as 
Popper and Watkins hold that revolutions can also be brought about by direct criticism of 
the status quo.^ "^  Unsurprisingly, this is a reasonably complex discussion, which would 
require considerable time to fully unveil and examine. Gladly, however, this will not 
prove necessary, since I hold that my argument goes through under either viewpoint.^^ 
Prima facie, it should seem obvious that this second stage of my claim would be 
supported by both Popper, and his 'critical rationalist' followers.^' Indeed, they would 
likely want to characterise the aforementioned 'rationalist turn' as representing a shift 
from an uncritical acceptance of Christian (esp. Biblical) doctrine, to a recognition that 
criticism was indispensable, both to resolve literal contradictions, and to persuade the 
unbeliever.^* hiitially, such criticism may only have aimed at comprehension of the 
(often obscure) doctrine - but this was just a slippery slope, which eventually led to 
claims such as "Moses was a (white) liar"^^, and "God cannot bring about the logically 
(or even ontologically) impossible". 
But how is my claim also compatible with the Kuhnian view? (There was no obvious 
'critical-mass of anomalies'.) Well it might be argued that Aristotelian logic managed to 
take its place as an exemplar (or shared example)."" Specifically, that Aristotle's 
demonstrative arguments provided a 'pattern' which was subsequently emulated by 
theologians. Why should this be significant? Just because, as already mentioned, it then 
" Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 46''l-30. Barnes (ed.) [1984], p.73. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 173''25-30. Ibid., p.294. 
This is bound up with the Kuhnian notion of 'normal science', which involves attempts to solve the 
puzzles that are generated by the belief in (or acceptance of) a given disciplinary matrix. When a 
community is engaged in 'normal science', the failure to solve a puzzle is seen to be the fault of the puzzle-
solver - any schoolboy can botch the simplest of experiments - but when belief in a disciplinary matrix is 
shaken, by its repeated failure to predict/explain certain phenomena, the community may then come to see 
this as problematic for said matrix. ('Extraordinary science' will then ensue.) See Kuhn [1996], ch.4, 6 & 
7, and Kuhn [1977], pp.266-292. 
" Popper [1970] and Watkins [1970]. 
I discuss these conflicting views further when I come on to the issue of demarcation, in II.4. 
" For a modern overview of this position, see Miller [1994]. For particular emphasis on this aspect of 




That is, criticism based both on reason, and experience. 
Here, I refer to Aquinas's explanation of Genesis 1:6. See Kuhn [1957], pp.110-111. 
In the thirteenth century, some theologians claimed that God could not move outside the universe, or 
create a universal without something to exemplify it. Lindberg [1992], pp.237"-238. 
I try to avoid talk of 'paradigms', because the term is notoriously inaccurate. (See Masterman [1970].) 
Instead, I refer either to 'disciplinary matrices', or 'exemplars'. For an explanation of these two distinct, 
yet intertwined, ideas, see the postscript in Kuhn [1996], pp.176-191. 
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becomes 'the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject', 
and movement towards a 'critical-mass' becomes possible. In simpler terms, it is surely 
true that, for a scienfific approach to have a chance of emerging in a community, it is 
better for it to believe that experience plays some role in the search for truth, rather than 
none whatsoever 
Furthermore, it should be noted that even i f Miller is right, ultimately, that 'Scientific 
hypotheses propose order for the world; they do not presuppose it'^^, it remains plausible 
that the presupposition of an order to the world, when widespread in the members of a 
community, plays an important role in motivating natural philosophy. 
1.1 THE DOMINANCE OF ARISTOTELIAN THOUGHT 
Revolutions through criticism demand normal science no less than revolutions through crisis. -
Kuhn^ '* 
In the twelfth century, when the Latin West had achieved greater stability, the chance 
came to gain access to more of Aristotle's work. This was quickly leapt upon by men 
such as Gerard of Cremona (ca. 1114-87), who translated several of Aristotle's works 
from Arabic manuscripts, and culminated in the translation of the entire Aristotelian 
corpus directly from Greek, by William of Moerbeke (f l . 1260-86).^^ During the period 
which separated these two men, it became clear to scholars just how much scope the 
Aristotelian philosophy truly had, and its study became mandatory in the newly formed 
universities. In the words of Lindberg: 'by the second half of the thirteenth century.. .no 
student emerged from a university education without a thorough grounding in 
Aristotelian natural philosophy.' And as the natural culmination of my argument above: 
'Methodologically, the universities were committed to the critical examination of 
knowledge claims through the use of Aristotelian logic.'^^ 
Understandably, given the situation beforehand, Aristotle began to be seen as an authority 
himself - hence, worthy of the title Philosophus - and this led to an uncritical acceptance 
of his overall cosmological framework. So while the scholastics did enter into serious 
criticism of the minutiae therein, much as Kuhn's aforementioned model of 'disciplinary 
matrices' might suggest, they were loath to reject any core elements of his system, in 
particular the central Earth.^ To the men of the Middle Ages, the suggestion that the 
Earth revolved around the Sun would probably have seemed just as ridiculous as the 
'None whatsoever', that is, beyond the trivial sense in which one must use one's senses in order to read 
'the word of God'. 
Miller [1994], p.27 
^''Kuhn[1970],p.233 
Lindberg [1992], pp.204-205 
Ibid., p.212. The first claim is too bold, and 'very few students' should replace 'no student'. 
This is firmly entrenched in an Aristotelian worldview, linking to the notion of generation and corruption 
on Earth, the natural positions of the elements in the sublunary region, the physical determinism of the 
universe (and hence astrology), etc. Of course, it might be argued, fairly enough, that this held back 
astronomy's progress. 
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inverse suggestion, in the modern day; and understandably, given the nature of their 
research programme. 
So I am perfectly willing to concede that Aristotle's cosmology, taken holistically, did not 
constitute, contribute to, or even partially engender, a progressive (rather than 
degenerative) metaphysical research programme. But might it not be the case that the 
devil was, to a considerable extent, in the detail thereof? And might it not be held, 
furthermore, that there were several aspects of his ontology, and moreover his 
methodology, which not only served to promote a more scientific approach in the Latin 
West, but were also retained in the so-called 'scientific revolution'? I shall argue that the 
answers to both these questions are affirmative. 
Superficially, it certainly appears that McMullin would want to disagree, holding instead 
that: 'the new science [of the Renaissance] involved a revolution in the domain of 
method'?^ This 'new science' was, he claims, different from the 'Aristotelian science' in 
four distinct respects: 
i) It did not rely on a priori and demonstrative argumentation, of the sort 
advocated in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. 
ii) It had a quantitative, rather than qualitative, character. It involved the 
application of mathemaUcs to the descripfion of nature; a process which 
Aristotle did not recommend. 
iii) It examined phenomena in contexts which Aristotle would have called 'non-
natural', and therefore advised the scientist to ignore.''^ 
iv) It unified the previously separate Greek concepts of Gecopla and xsjcvri: '[a] 
possibility that...could scarcely even have crossed Aristotle's mind. ,41 
I would, however, beg to partially differ. And in reply to the antecedent assertions, 
sequentially: 
i) In his biological work, Aristotle does not stringently follow (or even appear to 
be particularly concerned with) the method that he advocates in his Posterior 
Analytics. On the contrary, he makes striking statements, such as that which 
follows, which seem to suggest an almost Baconian view: 
Here, I allude to a Lakatosian idea. The central Earth might be seen as part of the negative heuristic, or 
'hard core', of the medieval natural philosophers' research programme. See Lakatos [1970], pp. 133-138. 
McMullin [1965],p.l08 
°^ To clarify, Aristotle held that certain types of motion were 'artificial', insofar as they were brought about 
by {inter'alia, personal) agents. He would therefore consider a projectile, such as a thrown javelin, to be 
behaving 'artificially'. Likewise, he would consider a stone held in the hand to be 'constrained', viz. 
prevented from undergoing its natural motion toward the centre of the universe. 
McMullin [1965], p. 123 
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Such appears to be the truth about the generation of bees, judging from theory 
and from what are believed to be the facts about them; the facts, however, have 
not yet been sufficiently grasped; if ever they are, then credit must be given 
rather to observation than to theories, and to theories only if what they affirm 
agrees with the observed facts."*' 
Unfortunately, this may have gone somewhat unnoticed just because medieval 
scholars tended to concentrate on the Aristotelian Organon (logical works) 
first, and the Libri Naturales second: '[even] less frequently would a student 
encounter the large group of works on zoological subjects.'''^ 
More importantly, Aristotle's methodology in the Posterior Analytics is not 
really a priori in the sense that McMullin intends. For as I have already 
mentioned, the first principles used in demonstrative arguments must be 
arrived at via experience, and involve the careful observation of particulars. A 
plausible reading of the Aristotelian claim that 'all intellectual learning 
come[s] about from already existing knowledge' is, I venture, that the human 
intuition, and ability to conceive, is (only) capable of delimiting the 
ontological possibilities!^ In Aristotle's words: 
.. .demonstration depends on universals and induction on particulars, and it is 
impossible to consider universals except through induction.. .and it is impossible 
to get an induction without perception - for of particulars there is a perception; 
for it is not possible to get understanding of them; for it can be got neither from 
universals without induction nor through induction without perception.'*^ 
Thus vouq has its place, but is inextricably bound to STnaxfuar). Lloyd would 
agree: 
.. .if there is a lesson to be learned from his work in dynamics for his method and 
approach to scientific problems as a whole, it is not, as has sometimes been 
maintained, that he blandly ignored facts in constructing his theories on a priori 
principles, but rather that his theories are hasty generalisations based on 
admittedly rather superficial observations."** 
ii) I f anything, Aristotle took a neutral position on 'the question of the 
applicability of mathematics to nature'.'*^ Against McMullin - who fails to 
cite where Aristotle putafively disavows such an idea - he thought that 
mathemafics could play an important explanatory role with respect to natural 
philosophy: 
Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 760''29-33. Barnes [1984], p.l 178 
'*^  Copenhaver & SchmiU [1991], p. 10 
^ This is Lowe's central thesis in his [1998], although he does not directly attribute it to Aiistotle, and is a 
view I develop in III . 1. 
"*' Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 81''40-8l''9. Barnes [1984], p.l32. It might also be added that Aristotle 
admits 'it often happens that we make mistakes...if there were no triangles other than the isosceles, having 




it is for the doctor to know the fact that circular wounds heal more slowly, and 
for the geometer to know the reason why."*^  
I think it is correct to say that Aristotle viewed areas such as medicine and 
geometry as radically separate, in principle. Still, this would not preclude a 
medic from studying geometry, and using it in both explanatory and heuristic 
medical roles (viz. to generate medical hypotheses). (As a matter of fact, does 
the modern doctor not attain a measure of competence in pure mathematics, 
during his schooling?) Besides, it must be remembered how much Aristotle 
valued explanation; aixia play a core role in his Metaphysics. 
iii) There is evidence from Aristotle's zoological works, as mentioned in (i), 
which suggests that his natural/non-natural distinction is more subtle than is 
oft appreciated. For example, Aristotle writes that 'what is done by violence 
is contrary to nature', yet he clearly examined the internal organs of animals 
which were killed by his own hand.'*^ (Here, perhaps the death of the animal 
may be considered unnatural, but its formation, prior to that point, assumed to 
be natural.•^°) Moreover, his intellectual grandson, namely Strato, 'more than 
any earlier Greek scientist.. .tried to use experimentation to investigate 
physical problems.'"^' Is it plausible to suggest that this bears no causal 
relation whatever to Aristotle's earlier work? I should say not, and suggest 
that Aristotle's approach may have served to encourage Strato to undertake 
such investigations. 
iv) Guessing what may or may not have crossed Aristotle's mind is surely 
inadvisable. He was clearly an extremely competent philosopher, capable of 
much original thought - this, surely, is why his works were prized enough to 
have survived the Hellenic era. This aside, as far as the written evidence 
goes, Aristotle seems to have held the view that these 'two-tiers' of human 
endeavour interacted; much as the foreman (theorist) on a building site does 
with the workers (technicians) under his guidance. For example, he writes: 
With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and we even 
see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without 
experience.. .But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art 
rather than experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of 
experience.. .and this is because the former know the cause, and the latter do not. 
Hence we think that the master-workers in each craft are more honourable and 
know in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers.. 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 79M4-17. Barnes [1984], p.l29 
*^  Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 788''28-29. Ibid., p.l218 
°^ Ironically, killing an animal does, of course, have an effect on the whereabouts of the blood in its body. 
(This is why dissection of animals might be seen to support the notion of vital heat.) 
" Lloyd [1973], p. 19. I say more on Strato later. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981'13-31. Barnes [1984], pp.1552-1553 
88 
Now to my reading, this suggests a feedback loop between xexyri and Gscopla. 
Specifically, that the former could serve to elucidate new phenomena 
(whether understood as 'constant conjunctions of events', or 'facts', etc.) 
which demanded subsequent causal explanation by the latter. 
Thus, while it is clear that the scientific revolution was a great cosmological revolution, it 
is less clear that it needed to involve any significant, rather than merely superficial, 
methodological or ontological revolution. Curiously, McMullin himself admits: 
.. .a measure of continuity is being taken for granted [in this paper], a continuity of belief 
53 in the generalizing power of the human mind. 
Moreover, he does want to agree that: 
[Aristotle] was the first to vindicate in detail the claim of the human mind to discover 
intelligible permanent patterns intrinsic to nature. He stressed the importance of 
observation more than anyone else had done up to his time.''* 
And finally, that: 
.. .there is scarcely a single element in the new methodological complex that did not have 
some precedent... 55 
So it emerges, first, that McMullin and I differ mainly in emphasis; he makes his 
comments about continuity only in passing. Second, that he points to a revolution which 
I would claim was only contingently beneficial, just because medieval philosophers did 
not read Aristotle in the correct fashion, and placed too much faith in his cosmological 
conclusions, rather than the method (and associated ontology) by which he reached them. 
This picture does not seem unreasonable, given that the curriculum in medieval 
universities rarely included Aristotie's zoological works, and that the scope of the 
Aristotelian corpus was far in excess of the available competition. 
To put it bluntly, I would therefore hold that Aristotle's philosophy was not 
methodologically 'regressive' with respect to its true content, but rather its perceived 
content.'^ 
1.2 Two HISTORICAL THESES 
Bacon's attempts to construct a discipline of observation were little better in their direct benefits 
for the practice of natural philosophy, but at least they proclaimed an empiricist ideal that proved 
more inspiring than Zabarella's efforts to reform Peripatetic methodology. -
Copenhaver and Schmitt" 
McMullin [1965],p.l08 
Ibid., p. 127 
Ibid., p. 129 
Analogously, in the modern day, many scientists claim to support Popper's falsificationist view, but 
mistakenly understand the Popperian notion of 'corroboration' to be confirmation. That is to say, they 
support a vulgar version of Popper's methodology, which is not anti-inductivist. 
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If my conclusions in the foregoing section are correct, then it would follow that Greek 
natural philosophy after Aristotle had every chance of making considerable progress, and 
perhaps even did. IVIoreover, it would also follow that (most of) Aristotle's methodology 
and ontology might have been left intact during the Renaissance, to no detrimental effect, 
provided that his cosmology was rejected, and that his empirical claims (in particular, 
observation statements) were re-examined. I shall now argue that there is some 
evidence, albeit not conclusive, in favour of both these claims. 
On Greek Science 
In favour of the first claim, there is the work of several historians, who would all agree 
with Farrington that: 
Taking into account its content and methods only, Greek science from the 2"'' century 
B.C. onward was ready for the scientific revolution.'^ 
Which non-methodological factors may have prevented the revolution? According to 
Farrington, slavery. According to Clagett, the influence of the Romans, and the growth 
of ChrisUanity. According to Lloyd, the lack of printing, and the absence of social 
support for natural philosophers (i.e. they were neither seen, nor treated, as a 
professionals).^'^ A sensible view seems to be that each of the aforementioned were 
causally contributory, to a lesser or greater extent. 
But I need not, and do not want to, defend such a bold thesis as Farrington's.^*^ Instead, it 
is sufficient for me to point out that progress was made, in the work of Aristotle's 
intellectual grandson, Strato of Lampsacus.^' From what can be gathered, he argued that: 
a) All bodies hold a degree of weight (so 'heavy' and 'light' are not contraries); 
lighter bodies are displaced by heavier bodies. Obviously, this interpretation 
is more amenable to a mathematical treatment than Aristotle's. For degrees of 
weight may be expressed numerically, in terms of an arbitrary unit. 
b) When bodies are moving naturally, they move ever more quickly as they 
approach their natural place (e.g. falling bodies accelerate). The impact of a 
falling body depends not only on its weight, but also the height from which it 
is dropped. This demonstrates that he grasped the notion of instantaneous, 
rather than average, velocity. It also suggests a proportionality relationship 
" Copenhaver and Schmitt [ 1991 ], p. 121. 
Cohen [1994], pp. 249 
For a brief overview of all these positions, see Ibid., pp.249-255 
For I would hold that there was also one significant methodological factor: the geometrical, rather than 
algebraic, approach adopted by Greek mathematicians. 
"' See Lloyd [1973], pp. 16-19 
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between potential energy and height, and potential energy and weight, for 
bodies near to Earth.^^ 
This achievement is all the more remarkable because Strato was born a generation before 
Archimedes, and was probably not prompted by the great mathematician's 'lever law'. 
Indeed, on a slight tangent, this draws it our attenUon that the greatest mathematicians of 
ancient Greece (of which we know) with the exception of Euclid (fl.380 B.C.), namely 
the aforemendoned Archimedes (ca.287-212 B.C.), and ApoUonius of Perga (fl.210 
B.C.), both came after Aristotle. So we are left to wonder if Aristotle would not have 
recognised that mathematics could play a greater role in natural philosophy, and achieved 
even greater things, had he been exposed to their work. 
It is also worth adding that medieval natural philosophers were not, in general, versed in 
the later mathemafical work of the ancient Greeks. According to Boas: 
The works [sic] of the best period of Greek Science, of the Hellenistic scientists of c.300-
150 B.C., was little known in the Middle Ages, partly because it was often highly 
mathematical and always complex and difficult.*^ 
Given this, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a general lack of mathematical 
sophistication was responsible, to some extent, for the inability of Medieval natural 
philosophers to bring about a 'scientific revolution'. Although it is conceivable to blame 
this lack on the dominance of Aristotle's philosophy, it is hardly plausible; for Aristotle 
certainly promoted mathematics as a worthwhile area of study, albeit not necessarily for 
natural philosophical goals.^ "* 
On Methodology: Zabarella vs. Bacon 
In support of the second claim, we might look to the work of Pietro Pomponazzi (b.l463) 
and Jacobo Zabarella (b. 1533), who were both devoted Aristotelians. The former was 
certainly a man of empirical colours, whose 'whole strategy was to find purely natural 
causes for effects that seemed to be supernatural...leaving no room in his philosophy for 
faith or supernatural agency.'^'' The latter, along similar lines, thought that the Peripatefic 
philosophy should undergo an empirical 'reformation', and stated (in support of some of 
my earlier suggestions): 
I will never be satisfied with Aristotle's authority alone, I will always rely upon reason... 
and.. .imitate Aristotle in using reason.** 
Thus, ipso facto, it was possible to commit to belief in Aristotelian method, and still be of 
a scientific bent. Furthermore, it was only contingent that Pomponazzi and Zabarella did 
I allude to the Newtonian approximation, that gravitational potential energy is mgh, or wh. 
Boas n962], p.25 
For example, Aristotle took the mathematical proof as prime exemplar of valid demonstrative argument. 
' Copenhaver and SchmiU [1991], p. 105 
Ibid., p. 121 
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not happen to be highly skilled mathematicians, and it does not seem ridiculous to believe 
that they may have made some impressive discoveries, had they been exposed to the 
treatises of the later Greek mathematicians. William Harvey, another Aristotelian, 
certainly made some useful progress in medicine, where mathematical considerations 
were somewhat less important! ^ 
How, then, might the attack on Aristotle's methodology - which is clearly what men such 
as Francis Bacon intended - be thought to have been a good thing? Well, in so far as 
attacking a methodology might lead to serious doubts about all the conclusions reached 
by its application, it is clearly an efficacious means to encourage criticism thereof (More 
efficacious, surely, than attempting a piecemeal analysis of all Aristotle's conclusions in 
natural philosophy, using his own methods; that was Zabarella's project.) Attack a 
method cogently, and the authority of its user, along with the validity of his conclusions 
and observation statements, becomes dubious. And a rejection of Aristotle's cosmology 
was vital for progress, especially in astronomy. 
1.3 SYNOPSIS: ON AUTHORITY AND METHOD 
Before moving on, let me elucidate some themes in this 'brief history' further, and try to 
draw some additional points from them: 
Authority, and the Distinction between Metaphysics and Cosmology 
Aristotle's philosophy became dangerous, or at least a barrier to progress, only when 
Aristotle came to be seen as an authority, whose cosmological conclusions were 
'approximately true'; the Scholastics' fixation with the role of the central Earth, because 
of its apparently fruitful explanatory role in his overall cosmology, is a case in point. 
Yet ironically, the dominant religions in the Latin West were sometimes a barrier to 
progress for similar, i f not isomorphic, reasons; because their hierarchy relied on 
authority-based claims about what was true of the world - e.g. how it was created - and 
tried to stifle those who disagreed. And Aristotle's philosophical method provided a 
means by which not only their authority would be challenged, but also his own. 
One lesson, here, is this: philosophy should not - and perhaps cannot, for any extended 
period of time - be made to play a handmaiden role to any other discipline. Not 
theology, and not contemporary science. Obsession with the cosmological conclusions of 
contemporary science might be a barrier to progress too: something with which van 
Fraassen, i f I understand him correctly, rightly agrees. 
The re-emergence of metaphysics, in our age, might therefore be seen as a just reaction to 
the passiiig posJ-Enlighteiiment illusionjhat philosophy had becQme_a handmaiden to 
" Ibid., p.61 I might also mention the importance of the 'final cause' in biology: the relevance of this type 
of causation in other contexts was challenged by Francis Bacon. 
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science. Philosophers have done much to question the value of contemporary science, 
and its boundaries (in several senses, limited not just to the epistemic). And there is 
absolutely no reason why the contemporary metaphysician cannot agree with those such 
as van Fraassen that 'analytic ontology' of a Quinean form is abhorrent, and that it may 
be inadvisable, even dangerous, to promote the idea that all theories in contemporary 
science are 'approximately true'. (Here, I take the usage to mean 'highly verisimilar', not 
'possess a degree of verisimilitude'.) AM contraire, I would claim the true 'metaphysical 
stance' is anti-scientistic (but not anti-science); take Lowe's view, qua metaphysician in 
the Aristotelian tradition, as a case in point: 
[T]he role of philosophy is quite as much normative as descriptive - with everything, 
including science, coming within its critical purview... the critical thinking that must be 
done cannot look to the methods and objects of empirical science for its model 
So it would be right to suggest that the metaphysician is interested in the content of 
contemporary science. Yet likewise, she is interested in all claims about the nature of 
being - from theology, in philosophy of mind, and even in our daily lives. 
('Metaphysics' is no easier to demarcate than 'empirical science', or 'natural 
philosophy', is.) But I shall say more on this subsequently, when I explain my 
conception of pure metaphysics, or 'First Philosophy', in the next chapter. 
No Revolution in Method 
The Enlightenment period was 'special' only in so far as there was an increase in 
mathematical sophistication, the adoption of a more critical attitude, the availability of 
means by which to accrue and effectively disseminate objective knowledge (viz. printing, 
secure trade routes, universities, etc.), a widespread belief in the intrinsic order of nature, 
and an unswerving faith in the capacities of man to understand his lot (and thus mankind 
to understand its). Of course, there was also an increased interest in experience as a 
means by which to disclose the actual: but that was a corollary. Still further, for these 
men to devise an experiment would have required much prior metaphysical thought. 
Take the confusion between average and instantaneous velocities that was tackled by 
Galileo: this required him to consider how motion could be, thus how space and time 
could be. (Not how they obviously were, or are.) And it is all very well for those such as 
van Fraassen to try to explain how Newton was 'really' successful in spite of his 
metaphysical commitments - let's assume he is right, although this is dubious. Another 
question still remains: could Newton - not you and I , here and now - have arrived at his 
laws of gravitation, and motion, without having any such commitments (or just ideas), 
and engaging in thought about the possibilities of being? 
I say not. Moreover, that many such commitments still ground contemporary science, 
although we have now had more time - metaphysicians and natural scientists alike - to 
examine them, and make some of them explicit. And Bohm' s work in the early"I950s is a 
Lowe [1998], p.5. 
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case par excellence of theory-construction inspired by metaphysical thought. In Bohm's 
own words: 
What I felt to be especially unsatisfactory was the fact that the quantum theory had no 
place in it for an adequate notion of an independent actuality - i.e. of an actual movement 
or activity by which one physical state could pass into another. My main difficulty 
was.. .that the wave function.. .could only be discussed in terms of the results of an 
experiment or an observation, which has to be treated as a set of phenomena that are 
ultimately not further analysable or explainable in any terms at all. So, the theory could 
not go beyond the phenomena or appearances... On thinking about what all this meant, it 
began to occur to me that the quantum theory might actually be giving a fragmentary 
view of reality, [emphasis mine]''' 
Now, inter alia, van Fraassen professes to be a pragmatist. But can he provide a sound 
defence of the claim that metaphysical thought has no practical value whatsoever? Did 
Bohm teach us something, or absolutely nothing?^ *^ Is it not feasible that his 
interpretation of quantum mechanics could have suggested avenues of inquiry that might 
have proven fruitful, and which the Copenhagen interpretation did not? Is it not possible 
his interpretation might be a better way to teach quantum mechanics, in comparison to 
the Copenhagen hegemony? Does Bohm's model not make the notion of non-local 
connections explicit, and easy to grasp, in a way that of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Born, does 
not?^' 
I suspect van Fraassen's line of reply, or more generally the 'anti-metaphysics 
empiricist's' might be something like this: Bohm taught us something, but didn't really 
explain his motivation and thought-process very well in the passage above, and neither 
engaged in, nor was inspired by, thought about the nature of being. However, this would 
be a tenuous line to walk. For it verges on the precipice of the claim that anything which 
looks like metaphysical thought and is practically useful is not, in fact, metaphysical 
thought. 
This aside, there are many philosophers who have tried to show the value of metaphysical 
thought in empirical science (and with whom van Fraassen, who will later emerge as one 
of my targets, does not seem to engage in The Empirical Stance). A brief list which is by 
no means exhaustive: Duhem, Popper, Lakatos, and Zahar. As Gillies puts it: 
The conclusion seems to be inescapable that metaphysical ideas are not only meaningful, 
but necessary for science. They provide an indispensable framework within which 
scientific theories can be constructed and compared with experience. Metaphysics acts as 
a guide, or heuristic, for science.^ ^ 
Indeed, even if one is more partial to Kuhn's philosophy, as van Fraassen seems to be, 
one might note his later thoughts: 
Bohm [1987], pp.33-34. 
™ Gushing [1994] argues that he did. 
'^ Chang [1995] argues that it does. 
Gillies [1993],p.201. 
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Obviously the degree of a community's commitment varies as one goes from heuristic to 
metaphysical models, but the nature of the models' cognitive function seems to be the 
73 
same. 
For with this concession, half the battle is won for the advocate of metaphysics. If the 
cognitive function of metaphysical models is isomorphic with that of putative 'heuristics' 
- what these are supposed to be, if they aren't metaphysical, Kuhn doesn't tell us - the 
only reason not to adopt a metaphysical model would be if it really involved commitment 
to belief. Point is, it doesn't. Rather, a given model may be preferred on pragmatic 
grounds, considerations involving internal and external consistency aside. It is still a 
candidate for being true, though, as long as it saves the phenomena; and this gets to the 
heart of what applied metaphysics is! A theory in natural philosophy (and for the matter, 
metaphysics) is put forward as true, literally construed, and critically examined on 
precisely that basis. It is not put forward as a mere story, to be liked or disliked, and 
embellished upon, or altered, according to whim. 
2. MULTUM IN PARVO: N A I V E EMPIRICISM, REPRESENTATIONS, 
EPISTEMIC 'FOUNDATIONS', AND SUBJECTIVISM 
It was clear from Descartes's reflections that the epistemic priority of ideas or appearances or 
perceptions over external physical objects has fatal consequences... The challenge is to reveal the 
incoherence of the traditional conception, and perhaps even supply an alternative we can 
understand, without falling once again into a form of idealism.. .'"* 
There is an unfortunate tradition in Western philosophy, which runs from as early as 
Empiricus, resurfaces through Descartes, and gains a foothold in the work of the British 
empiricists, that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between the appearances 
and that which underlies them.^ '^  But more than this, there is a suggestion, made manifest 
in the work of Hume and Mi l l , that the foundation of our knowledge is at the level of the 
'appearance'. That at this level, one of 'being hot' and 'seeing red', for instance, no 
deception is possible. Indeed, it is telling that Descartes did not consider whether he 
could be deceived as to that which he perceived: he was concerned, rather, about whether 
what appeared to be the case was, in fact, the case. Only hence did he invoke the 
possibility of the malin genieJ^ 
Now I do not have the space to chart the development of this idea in ful l , although such a 
process would likely prove enlightening. Instead, I will provide a brief overview of how 
widespread it was, and is, in order to motivate my contention that the dubious distinction 
between that which is sensed and that which is responsible for that which is sensed - be 
that thing-in-itself, interaction between thing-in-itself and a priori internal categories, or 
what have you - has not been given the critical examination it deserves. This, although 
the distinction is a prime motivator for scepticism, and Kant's work was designed to 
" Kuhn-[ I977], p.298 
'•* Stroud [1984] ,p.255-274 
I deal with Empiricus in greater detail later: see III.4. 
Yet even this ought not to arise unless a genuine possibility can be arrived at, as I discuss in III . 1. 
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address precisely such a problem, as I have already mentioned in 1.2.2. To remind, I 
there supported Stroud's position that: 'the Kantian view would block scepticism and 
supplant the traditional conception, but only by giving us a 'transcendental' theory 
which... seems no more satisfactory than the idealism it is meant to replace.'^^ In short, 
Kant's move was precisely to shift the doctrine of the epistemic priority of 
representations to the transcendental level, and thereby achieve empirical realism; this, as 
against those such as Berkeley, who preferred transcendental realism, but coupled it with 
empirical idealism. There is a curious to-and-fro here, which is reminiscent of the variety 
of responses to another pseudo-problem: "Which came first, the chicken, or the egg?" 
Now this distinction became so endemic, after the time of the British empiricists, that it 
wound a route through the work of Mach, the Cambridge School, the Vienna Circle, and 
Ayer: the presumption was that there are 'sense-impressions', or 'sense-data', which have 
epistemic priority, and are directly 'known' (in the sense of 'knowledge by 
acquaintance'). An early discussion of Russell encapsulates this popular viewpoint 
particularly clearly: 
Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in 
sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so 
on...whatever else may be doubtful, some at least of our immediate experiences seem 
absolutely certain...[I]t is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive 
certainty.. .Here, therefore, we have, for what it is worth, a solid basis from which to 
begin our pursuit of knowledge.^ * 
Furthermore, Thomson suggests that the aim of early experimental psychology was 
precisely 'to make the old associationist-empiricist philosophy of mind into an empirical 
and experimental science.'^ ^ And while it is true that associationism has diminished in 
popularity, in part because of the failures of introspectionism and behaviourism - perhaps 
the arguments from Popper, which I outlined in 1.2.3, had some effect on this score - it 
remains the case that the notion of representations has underpinned most approaches to 
experimental psychology, save perhaps the psychometric one.*° As a recently written 
psychology textbook puts it: 'Modern approaches to thinking and reasoning focus 
primarily on the mental representations and processes that underlie our ability to think, 
and the limitations on it.'* In other words, mental representations and processes 
involving them are just assumed: the contemporary debate in psychology is about what 
processes might be involved, and what representations might be. 
However, whatever predictive success a computational approach to the mind might 
enjoy, the mere fact that one can model behaviour by employing the notion of 
information-processing does not decisively answer the deeper ontological and epistemic 
" Stroud [1984], p.274 
Russell [1912], pp. 12-19. 
™ Thomson [1968], p.89 
°^ The Gestalt school also deserve a mention, at least in so far as they held that mental contents could not be" 
derived, or understood, by a component-by-component analysis such as that advocated by Wundt, and the 
introspectionisl school. 
'^ Garnham and Oakhill [1994], p.lO 
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questions. Indeed, the issue of the underdetermination of theory by evidence is 
particularly important here, and even those who are scientific realists when it comes to 
mature sciences - physics, chemistry, and biology - might pause before endorsing ET 
with respect to such a young discipline; effectively, a child o/empiricism. In fact, there 
is a deeper irony in all this, for empiricists often want to tell us that we should suspend 
judgement in so far as theoretical entities are concerned, but mental representations 
would seem to be theoretical entities themselves. And as such, there would seem to be 
inconsistency at the heart of the research programme: such empiricism can only be 
fleshed out, and be made fruitful, by making posits about putative entities that it tells us 
not to commit to belief in. 
Today, judging by the number of times I have been asked " I f a tree falls in a forest when 
no-one is around, does it make a sound?" upon telling a stranger I was a philosopher, I 
would say that this way of thinking is dominant in Western thought. (Agassi calls it 
'sensationalism', and it is sensational in more than one sense.^ )^ It is the most 
entrenched of ontological assumptions, having transcended disciplinary boundaries with 
remarkable ease, even though it would now seem that some philosophers of mind - say 
those that prefer disjunctive theories of perception - are finally giving it a more thorough 
examination than it has previously enjoyed. I , on the other hand, think that we should put 
it to the sword. 
But I should add that I only mean 'put it to the sword' in so far as its putative epistemic 
consequences are concerned, because our actual dilemma is an inter subjective one, and 
the truth or falsity of this sort of distinction is itself up for grabs; as Popper puts it: 'We 
move, from the very start, in the field of intersubjectivity, of the give-and-take of 
proposals and of rational criticism.'^^ In other words, I do not have a problem with 
someone working on the idea - using a metaphysical research programme involving as 
one of its core assumptions - that we possess internal representations of external objects. 
It may, after all, be true. What I object to, rather, is the curious leap from the recognition 
that this may be the case, or even the belief that this is the case, to some sort of 
retrodiction about how we came even to entertain said hypothesis. Moreover, I see no 
reason why the fact that we require internal representations in order to see, if we do, leads 
into the idea that all we see are internal representations. As a more concrete example, let 
us accept that without an image on my retina - a 'representation of something' - I cannot 
see, or have a so-called 'veridical perception'. Why then say that all I can see are such 
images? This seems to me to be an entirely different line of argument, and a rather 
dubious one i f we are to take experiments such as Stratton's, with the 'inverting goggles', 
seriously.^ "* After all, it may very well be the case that I cannot see without a brain. It 
does not follow that in seeing, I see my brain. Furthermore, it may well be the case that I 
cannot see without an object of the perceptive act; and the object perceived may be a 
necessary component of any perception. 
See Agassi [1966] 
" Popper 119831, p.87 
^ Stratton [1897]. See also Carr [1935], pp. 18-57. 
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A further analogy might be useful, here. Imagine I am looking at myself in a mirror -
notice that the language we naturally employ suggests, precisely, that I am looking at 
myself- and asking whether it might be the case that I am viewing a mere image, or a 
'representation of my appearance'. How to answer? Well in physics, there is an 
important distinction to be made between a real image, and a virtual image: but both can 
appear precisely the same. Consider the following figures: 
F I G . I I . 1 - REFLECTION OF POINT OBJECT AT 
A SPHERICAL SURFACE 
The mirror is concave, and the image O ' is 
real. 
O' 4 
F I G . II.2 - REFLECTION OF POINT OBJECT AT 
A PLANE SURFACE 
The mirror is flat, and the image at O ' is 
virtual. 
In the first case, fig. I I . 1, rays of light are said to converge upon the point O' , and thereby 
form a real image (which would be seen on a screen, were it to be placed there). But in 
the second case, fig. II.2., the image appears to be behind the mirror: it is precisely as i f it 
were projected onto a screen at a point behind the mirror, equidistant from the mirror's 
surface with the object being reflected. In other words, in the second case, what is being 
represented to me is what would be seen by an observer who was looking at me, with 
eyes at the same height as mine, and at the point of the virtual image, were there no 
intervening mirror. (This, save that it is inverted.) It is a 'representation' only in so far 
as I cannot step outside myself, and take a look at my body while swapping the positions 
of my left and right eyes; 'representation' has a modal underpinning. 
Now this suggests that one may hack away at the concept of 'representation', in so far as 
it makes sense with respect to perception (or indeed conception, i f we are to believe in 
such a faculty)". 1 understahdlvell, I^would'Kazafd a"gliess, wHat'it is for a photograph to 
be a representation of a scene: a potential (historical) perceptual encounter. (We all 
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understand, of course, that it is insufficient in many respects.) But the notion that any 
given thought (or thought-content), let alone a given perceptual experience, is a 
representation of that which is (or may be)? 
Well think of it this way: we can surely think about thought. So what then? We 
presumably have a representation of a representation, which would seem to suggest that 
we cannot understand thought as being representational, rather than representationally 
representational, after all. ( I don't think this is a sophistic point.^^) What's worse, the 
reader may now be thinking about thinking about thought, as I was when I wrote the 
above. And then he might think about thinking about thinking about thought, and wonder 
whether this suggests that an infinite regress of representations of representations is not 
on the cards, here. He might think about whether his thinking about thinking about 
thinking about thought suggests this. 
The invocation of representations seems to amount to hand-waving desperation: one has 
some sort of idea that content emerges out of thought kind of mirroring, or sort of 
representing, the way that 'other things in the world' sort of, really, perhaps, are. But the 
mirror analogy seems to fail given its modal foundation, as I have argued above, and the 
invocation of this comes across to me as a smokescreen for a fundamental mystery, that 
would be better stated explicitly. 
In fact, I wonder i f there are actually such things as mind-independent representations. 
Go back to the example of the photograph. When we say it is a representation, do we not 
mean that it represents something to us, rather than that it has the property of being a 
representation! But then, no representation without perception, and indeed the 
perceiver! If this line is accepted, then the claim that there are mental representations 
seems to become almost Pickwickian; to be a colourful, but misguided, bit of tropology. 
Why say that thought (or perception) represents, rather than presents! (Remember now 
the mirror analogy.) How else, after all, is anything then to be presented! And what 
would it mean to represent that which cannot be presented? I am afraid that the answer 
seems to be nothing whatsoever, as far as I can fathom; it simply makes no sense.^ ^ If 
this is just a failing on my part, then so be it: I would prefer to say that I have no idea 
what is being suggested here, rather than feign insight on the basis of crude figures-of-
speech. 
Richard de-Blacquiere Clarkson has suggested to me thai this is a similar point to one made by 
Wittgenstein, as part of his private language argument. He goes on to suggest [personal correspondence]: 
'the problem is that many representational theorists subscribe to this metarepresentational view explicitly in 
combination with a frequently implicit constitutive analysis of belief: subpersonal (representational) beliefs 
are partly constituted by the existence of a personal (metarepresentational) belief.' My general objection 
to this view, which is championed by those such as Perner, Gurrie, and Leslie, is provided by my comments 
about presentation versus representation, below. 
I do see that it is possible to represent something to another that is presented (or has been presented) to 
one's self, but"caiinot"bepfesented to the other, say via a picture drawn frommemory, of along dead 
relative. Further, I understand.how^one nught try to represent colours to a person born blind, by reference 
to different tones (or frequencies of sound, rather than frequencies of light). But none of this will do, for in 
these cases there is one who has the initial presentation. 
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Swings and Roundabouts: On Empiricism, Physicalism and Subjectivism 
But there is, of course, a different route for the seeker of 'solid foundations' for 
'Icnowledge'. To reject the notion of sense-data, at least ostensibly, and instead go for the 
primacy of observables, construed as physical (viz. material) objects. And although I 
think the distinction between 'observable' and 'unobservable' is quite misguided - I 
come to discuss this later, when I tackle van Fraassen's view of observation, in ni.4 - let 
us accept, for the moment, that it is sound. What motivates the account? 
Well unfortunately, I take it that the fundamental point - the underlying starting point 
between physicalism and sense-data empiricism, and the unspoken assumption - is that 
each of us is alone in the world, having come into being as a tabula rasa and been 
suddenly confronted by experiences, understood as something like 'raw feels', which we 
subsequently attempt to make some sort of sense of. Yet although I would not say this is 
conclusively wrong - it is, though, wrong - it seems to me that it cannot just be 
presupposed that it is correct. In other words, I think it entirely mistaken to adopt 
subjectivism as a dogma - but not as an explicitly stated research programme, embarked 
upon tentatively - when there are other approaches, most notably intersubjective ones, 
which seem to fit the very nature of inquiry far better. Indeed, surely it is the case that 
there is an argument to be had against physicalism, as I shall show, and hence our inquiry 
should not presuppose physicalism. For that matter, I hold it should not presuppose 
anything else, other than that we might get to the truth by stating our problems clearly, 
proposing solutions, and pouring the strongest criticism we can onto those tentative 
solutions, to see if they hold up. But I explain this in II.3 and II.4, below. 
So let me move on to offer some direct criticisms of physicalism, since the antecedent 
metaphilosophical point may seem, taken alone, to be too cheap. And let me choose 
Carnap as my point of engagement, since he came to recognise the inadequacies of the 
idea of 'sense-data', and adopted precisely a physicalist line, in order to shore up the 
positivist programme.^^ He rarely discussed this in a great deal of detail, but the most 
pertinent and clear passage I have been able to uncover comes in a reply of his to a piece 
by Feigl, and starts as follows: 
At the present time I prefer not to emphasize the requirement of intersubjective 
confirmability as much as we used to previously, but rather to consider it to be of 
secondary importance. I regard as meaningful for me whatever I can, in principle, 
confirm subjectively. This statement may be taken as a rough formulation of the 
principle of empiricism?^ 
Now this makes it clear that the subject, the individual, is at the very core of Carnap's 
philosophy - in this period, at least - and, he agrees with me, empiricism. As such, 
'confirmability' as a thoroughly intersubjective notion, founded in the ability of an idea 
It is worth noting that the move from vefificationism on the basis of sense-impressions, to probabilism on 
the basis of physical objects, would seem to illustrate a degenerating research programme if ever there were 
one! But much credit is due to Carnap, for his willingness to be responsive to criticism. 
Carnap [1963], p.882. 
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(or hypothesis) to stand up to crificism, is already out. (We are lonely little selves, in a 
fearsome battle with 'the world', struggling for subjective confirmation.) But still 
further, Carnap has an empirical notion of 'confirmability' at work, here. One option 
would be to go for the epistemic priority of representations already discussed above, as 
did many of the Vienna Circle, but he takes another. Thus, he continues: 
Now we come to physicalism. In this world, I find the following features which are 
empirical but, unlike single facts, belong to what is sometimes called "the all-pervading 
fundamental features" of the world and of the language in which the world can be 
described: 
(1) There are beings similar to myself with whom I am able to communicate by 
language. 
(2) 1 find myself able to give to others a signal indicating any kind of experience which I 
have; or, in case I should be unable to give an intentional signal, others could, under 
suitable circumstances, infer my state from observable symptoms. 
(3) Therefore, everything I know, including what I know by introspection, is in principle 
confirmable by others on the basis of their observations. 
(4) Therefore it is possible, and convenient for practical purposes, to begin the 
construction of the language with primitive predicates designating properties of 
things that are intersubjectively observable (e.g. "red, "hot"). 
Predicates designating properties only subjectively observable, though intersubjectively 
confirmable (as e.g. "angry", "having a toothache") may be introduced derivatively. It 
should be emphasized that the difference between these two kinds of thing properties is 
not a matter of principle, but merely of degree.^ ' 
However, I take this argument to be enthymematic to a vitiating degree, even under the 
most favourable interpretation. Most vitally, the talk 'all-pervading fundamental 
features' of the world which are all empirical strikes me as being curious, given the 
invocation of knowledge and introspection in (3). In other words, the invocation of 'all-
pervading fundamental features' seems to be a fig-leaf for his particular (materialist) 
metaphysical outlook; the very same outlook that he might not even have realised he had, 
and could very well have been ruled out as 'meaningless' according to his own principle 
of empiricism. I should add that it would not have done for him to have suggested " I 
only believe (l)-(4) because science says so", for reasons already stated in 1.2.5, although 
I doubt whether it would even have occurred to him, qua genuine philosopher, to do so. 
To his specific formulafion, though. (1)1 agree with, but the quesfion is whether his 
principle of empiricism has the resources to deal with it, in so far as making it 
'subjectively eonfirmable'. I suspect not, since 'beings similar to myself are hardly 
confirmable by - although they are surely consistent with - 'observations' in Carnap's 
sense,_by which J think he jneans perceptions (or serisory experiences) alone^ At ieast, 
not if perception is to be based on 'raw feels', as he suggests with his mentions of 'red' 
Carnap [1963], pp.882-883. 
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and 'hot' in (4).^° 
(2) is dubious, and seems insufficient for Carnap's purposes. First, for I am not sure how 
one is supposed to 'give a signal' that one is having a (visually based) dream, or how 
one's state could be 'inferred from observable symptoms' of the sort that he seems to 
have in mind. Even if a subject is wired up to a machine monitoring 'brain waves', the 
only means by which it can be properly tested whether a particular pattern (or cluster of 
activity) corresponds to a dream-state is to wake the subject and ask "Were you just 
dreaming?"; any future 'inference to the subject's state', with respect to similar tests, is 
parasitic on this sort of desideratum. Second, even i f it is right that one can always give 
to others a signal indicating any kind of experience which one has, it does not actually 
follow that this is the basis of our ability to communicate. Taken alone, it would be 
insufficient to allow communication at all, in so far as this is an interactive process. 
(3) does not follow from (1) and (2). 'Know' has suddenly entered, not too 
surreptitiously, yet no mention of 'knowing' has been made in (1) or (2). But how would 
one 'give a signal' - or how is it to be inferred from one's 'observable symptoms' - that 
one knows a given proposition, p7 Or that one has a true belief, or a justified belief, or a 
justified true belief in p?^' In extreme, is there a brain state for every true proposition 
such that when one believes in said proposition, its truth is evident/ram that specific 
state! This is extremely implausible, and highlights how Camap's use of 'know' 
conceals a shift in what is being discussed. In place of (3) should be something like this: 
(3*) Therefore, everything I experience, including what I experience by introspection, 
is in principle confirmable by others on the basis of their observations [which are 
their experiences?]. 
Yet even this is dubious without strong modal force being given to 'in principle'. How a 
modern person could get anywhere near confirming 'on the basis of their observations' 
that the Roman Empire existed would seem to be a complete mystery. Indeed, even that 
someone else once experienced something they called 'The Roman Empire' (or just a 
part of something called that) would not seem to be a potential item of contemporary 
knowledge under this view. 
In (4), we have a mention of 'the language'. What Carnap means is something like the 
object language, but without a metaphysically robust account of propositions - and their 
relation to sentences, utterances, and so forth - his view would seem unmotivated. 
Besides, could this language really be devoid of reference to non-experiences (which is 
all that is actually consistent with what he has said in the foregoing quotation), or devoid 
of reference to non-physical objects (which is what he really wanted to argue for, as far 
as I can tell)? The project to produce such would seem to be a fool's errand, but far be it 
from me to disallow others from pursuing it. The challenge: show me the language. 
(And until you can show me the language, do not say you can show me 'inductive logic', 
^ please.) ,Show_me ajanguage - a useable language - without terms that refer to relations. 
' If perception is concept-dependent, then this problem disappears. But then, so does physicalism. 
I prefer a distinction between 'true' and 'reasoned', as I suggest in II.3, below. 
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properties, universals, abstracta, numbers, geometrical figures, and so forth. And show 
me a tenseless language, too: for time is not a physical thing, nor indeed an 'experience' 
qua raw feel. 
In all, then, I opine that Camap did not come to terms with his deeply held metaphysical 
views, because he never came to the recognition that natural science has limits as a mode 
of inquiry, and is parasitic on distinctive disciplines, such as mathematics and ontology. 
He never saw that natural scientists cannot be 'natural scientists' in the sense that he 
would have had them be, since they are men and women of passion: lovers, murderers, 
dreamers, and philosophers. 
Still, it may be asked whether I do not have my own dogmas. To this, I should say that I 
am strongly convinced about a particular view of the world, and our place in it (or rather 
the pragmatic and epistemic value in adopting such a view, ceteris paribus) : truth is 
absolute (AT), language can successfully map onto aspects of the world (ST), some of the 
distinctions we employ are not just conventions (a version of MT), we have a chance to 
find truths, and it is rational to hope for 'the best'. Yet while I here defend some ideas I 
have (or others have had) - 1 am giving them the best run I can, to test them out - 1 am 
also prepared to commit this thesis to the flames. This is the spirit I advocate, and this, I 
will not willingly give up. But I take it to be precisely an anti-dogmatic spirit, although it 
might be suggested that to adopt it come what may is, at some level or another, a kind of 
dogma; a matter of blind faith (from an immanent perspective, at least). I try to explain 
why I do not think this is the case in II.4, but to give an early flavour of where I am 
leading: 
We can assume or be convinced of the truth of something without being committed to its 
truth...[A] pancritical rationalist, like other people, holds countless unexamined 
presuppositions and assumptions, many of which may be false. His rationality consists in 
his willingness to submit these to critical consideration when he discovers them or when 
they are pointed out to him.'^ 
To sum up, it might be suggested that our metaphilosophy should be the same as our 
meta-metaphilosophy, in order to prevent an infinite regress of strategies - in particular, 
appeal to foundational authorities such as 'sense experience', 'intuition', or 'common 
sense' - for dealing with disputes. And while such a statement may seem cryptic, or even 
gnomic, I shall endeavour first to motivate it, and then to explicate it, in the remainder of 
this chapter. Here, I have only provided a sketch of my disenchantment with particular 
programmes, and their overarching approach. I have said what realism is not, in so far as 
it does not assume any 'ultimate barriers' between us and other components of the world: 
that we see or conceive of things in a 'skewed', or 'represented' fashion. And I take this 
to tell us pretty nearly what realism, qua understanding of the TeA,o<; of inquiry, involves. 
The explicans is epistemic, rather than metaphysical, just because it would be a petitio 
principii to rely on one's take on metaphysics - but not on metaphysical arguments - in 
order to support it. In short, one ought not to freely help oneself to the resources that are 
provided by a realist-understanding-of-metaphysics in order to somehow jM^ri^' that same 
Hartley [1984], pp.121 
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outlook. Nor indeed, to attempt to immunise that outlook from criticism, since its mere 
self-consistency is not sufficient for preferring it with respect to absolute truth. Rather, 
what is a reason for preferring it - the one I have argued for here - is its optimism from 
an epistemic perspective: its value qua regulative ideal in order to motivate inquiry, when 
coupled with AT. Popper expresses this succinctly: 'Rational discussion, that is, critical 
argument in the interest of getting nearer to the truth, would be pointless without an 
objective reality, a world which we make it our task to discover: unknown, or largely 
unknown: a challenge to our intellectual ingenuity, courage, and integrity.'^'' 
3. T H E ABANDONMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
I can well conceive a man without hands, feet, and head (for it is only experience that teaches us 
that the head is more necessary than the feet). But I cannot conceive man without thought... Man 
is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed... All our dignity, then, 
consists in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot 
f i l l . Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the principle of morality. - Pascal'"* 
Despite my antecedent mentions of 'knowledge' - and previous acceptance of its 
standard philosophical definition, namely 'justified true belief'^, in order that I might 
argue concisely against justificationism - 1 think it behoves us not to attach any genuine 
philosophical significance to the term. So here, I shall attempt to show why an 
essentialist approach towards 'knowledge' is liable to lead philosophical debate, and 
more generally inquiry, astray.^ ^ In part, this may be thought of as an illustration that it 
not merely unwise, but also futile, to undertake epistemology without a carefully 
considered ontology.^^ However, more fundamentally this discussion is important, in 
context, because of my views on (so-called) ampliative inferences, and on explanation 
generally. In particular, my rejection of abduction and inducfion has epistemological (or 
rather ann-epistemological) consequences, which I wish to argue for. 
But before I begin this process, it is important to make it clear exactly what I am 
inveighing against when I refer to 'epistemology', or 'epistemologists', in what follows; 
for it is indubitably the case that there aie those who call themselves 'epistemologists' 
and do not undertake to study knowledge, but rather inquiry. And while I have few 
problems with the latter process, an initial exemplar of what I oppose is the following 
view: 
The theory of knowledge... inquires into the nature of knowledge and the justification of 
belief.. ..if philosophy is the quest for truth and wisdom, then we need to know how we 
are to obtain the truth and justify our beliefs... Epistemology is primary interested in... 
'-'Popper [1983], p.81 
Emphasis mine. Pascal [1660], part VI, 339-347. 
'''Gettier[1963]. 
'^ "Note, however, that l argue primarily against the idea that knowledge is ana/^'sa/j/e.-should there be such-
a thing. 
To lay my cards on the table again, and hark back to the introduction to this chapter: I hold that 
epistemology is a sub-domain of metaphysics. 
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propositional knowledge... The field of epistemology seeks to throw light on the 
following kinds of questions: 
1. What is knowledge? That is, what are the essential characteristics of this 
concept? 
2. Can we know anything at all? Or are we doomed to ignorance about the most 
important subjects in life? 
3. How do we obtain knowledge? Through the use of our senses, or our intellect, 
orboth?^^ 
Now to make my position clear, I disagree that the first question is important at all, in so 
far as it assumes there are essential characteristics of 'knowledge'. I disagree that the 
second is pressing, in so far as it might be radonal to hope that we can acquire true 
beliefs, and strive to do so, irrespective of whether we are 'doomed to ignorance' or not. 
And I disagree with the presuppositions underlying the third quesfion, in so far as it 
implies that context of discovery is important; that there are some sort of solid 
foundations for 'knowledge' (or more properly, acquisifion of true belief, true statements 
in a given language, or so forth). 
If any more evidence is required to suggest that this is really how 'epistemology' is sold, 
then let us look to a contemporary textbook: 
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief To engage in this study is to 
seek answers to the following questions: 
Ql What is knowledge? 
Q2 What do we know? 
Q3 What is it for a beUef to be justified? 
Q4 Which of our beliefs are justified?'' 
Since such views seem prevalent - indeed, it is somewhat ironic that these self-styled 
'epistemologists' take it that there is something essential to 'epistemology', for which, 
see my discussion in II.4 - 1 will make no further apology for my use of the term below. 
But it is interesfing to note, nonetheless, that the individual who coined the term, namely 
Ferrier, did not menfion justificafion at all. And still further, he held that agnoiology, the 
study of ignorance, was equally as revealing, and was wont to defend the idea that 'AH 
ignorance is possibly remediable'; that to speak of 'ignorance of p' would have no sense, 
were it the case that p could not be 'known'. In his words: 'No kind of knowledge is 
absolutely inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence. But unless all ignorance were 
possibly remediable, some kind of knowledge would be inconsistent with the nature of all 
'^  Emphasis mineradded to pick ourparticular presumptions. Pojman (ed.) [1999] rpp l-2. I should also 
add thanks to Tony Booth, for some strong (and deserved) criticism about my unfair treatment of 
'epistemologists', in earlier versions of this section. 
'"Sleup[1996],p.l 
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intelligence, to wit the knowledge by which the ignorance in question might be 
remedied.' 
Against Essentialism with respect to 'Knowledge' - A Nominalistic Approach 
In natural language, in our daily lives, we do, indeed, employ the verb 'to know', the 
noun 'knowledge', the adjectives 'knowledgeable' and 'knowing', and the adverb 
'knowingly'.'^' But let us now consider the senses in which it is permissible to use each 
of these forms in various contexts, in order that we might examine what, i f anything, they 
genuinely have in common. 
The verb 'to know' has three main uses. First, it can be employed in a sentence that has 
as its object a noun, or clause, which refers directly to a non-propositional entity, or 
group of entities. Its purpose, in such cases, is to indicate that the subject of the sentence 
is acquainted with said entity, or entit ies.Simple examples are: ' I know Jonathan 
Lowe'; 'Jonathan Lowe knows the lecturers in Durham's philosophy department'; 'We 
know a blue car'; and 'The dog knows where its bone is'. Of course, understanding the 
last two examples in such a fashion is not entirely straightforward. 'We know a blue car' 
is ambiguous, because it might mean that 'we' - taken as the given group, determined by 
context, to which such a deictic, or indexical, term refers - are each familiar with a blue 
car, but not the same blue car. And to rephrase the last example, which might seem to be 
radically different from the rest at first sight, 'The dog is acquainted with the location of 
its bone'. That is to say, in metaphysical terms, the dog is acquainted with a particular 
state-of-affairs, for example, such that its bone is buried under the tree in the garden. It is 
important to recognise that said dog need not have the concepts of 'bone', or 'tree', or 
'garden', in order to have such acquaintance; similarly, I may be acquainted with the 
most talented philosopher in Durham, and it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
I am, without realising that she is the most talented philosopher in Durham. 
Second, 'to know' can be used in order to denote competence, or the possession of a skill, 
or ability, on the part of a subject; in such cases, the object of the sentence is an activity. 
Most typically, such uses involve 'how' clauses, and indeed we speak of individuals 
having 'know-how'. Examples are: ' I know how to ride a bicycle'; 'Karl Popper knew 
how to play the piano'; 'We know how to walk'; and 'Darrell knows French'. In the final 
case, we might say, more precisely, that 'Darrell knows how to speak French', and thus 
are not implying a mere acquaintance with French (in the sense that one could be aware 
of the existence of French, and recognise it when one heard it being spoken, without 
understanding a single word of the language). And note, further, that one can 'know 
'°°Ferrier[ 1854], pp.402 
One may also talk of 'knowingness', but I leave this ugly construction aside, since it is fundamentally 
derived from the adjective 'knowing'. 
Richard de-Blacquiere Clarkson has suggested to me that 'the first use is more or less dispositional -
certain entities under propositional description interact in characteristic ways independent of those" 
descriptions'. [Personal Correspondence] Indeed, this is pretty close to what I want to suggest here: for 
instance, an animal may have the ability to recognise a particular type of entity without having a concept of 
their being such an entity. See the example of the dog, below. 
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French' without being an expert in French - we often say that one knows French without 
knowing it well. (Interestingly, the same is true when we speak of 'to know' in its first 
sense, as 'to be acquainted'; one can be well acquainted with a person, or a place.) This 
is the sense in which I hold that one can know philosophy; it is not a proposition or a 
body of propositions - although some unfortunately treat it as such - but a way of 
thinking to which one may, or may not, be predisposed."'-^ 
Third, and finally, the verb 'to know' may be employed with a sentence, or proposition, 
as its object. And this is all-too-often the philosopher's sense of 'know'; typically such 
usage involves a 'that' clause, which is taken to be the sentence, or disclose the 
proposition, which is 'known' by the subject. Some examples: ' I know that Paris is the 
capital of France'; 'Karl Popper knew that it was a moral imperative to refrain from 
threatening visiting lecturers with pokers'; 'We know that this sentence is here in order to 
serve as an exemplar'; and 'Eudoxus knew [that] the Sun revolves around the Earth'. 
Again, I suspect the final example will seem somewhat curious, from a modem 
perspective. The Sun does not revolve around the Earth, so how could Eudoxus have 
known that the Sun revolves around the Earth? Well let us imagine being contemporaries 
of Eudoxus, and entering into a discussion of the finer points of his system of astronomy. 
It is quite plausible that one of us might say, perhaps after making a critical point, 'Well, 
at least he knows that the Sun revolves around the Earth'. But would we be mistaken to 
use the word 'know' in such a context? This is a core puzzle, to which I shall return 
again in what follows. Yet we should note, even at this early stage, that we might say, 
instead of the above, 'At least he holds the belief that the Sun revolves around the Earth, 
as we do'. And this is an important recognition, because it emerges that 'to know that p' 
is not obviously to have a propositional atfitude toward p. That is to say, 'knowing p' 
does not seem to be akin to 'fearing p', 'wishing p', or indeed 'believing p'. Yet most 
philosophers would accept that one should 'believe p' in order that one should 'know p': 
this, without necessarily implying any relation of supervenience between 'known' and 
'believed', or indeed that 'knowledge' even exists.' "* 
I expect the foregoing classification to seem plausible to the reader, on the assumption 
that she is prejudiced by contemporary positions in analytic philosophy. But even this 
much is not manifestly clear. Take, for example, Darth Vader's infamous utterance to 
Luke Skywalker in The Empire Strikes Back: 'Search your feelings, you know it [that I 
am your father] to be true'. This does not seem to be an inappropriate use of language, in 
context, even though Luke clearly does not believe (at that time) that Vader is his father. 
And Vader's suggestion might be precisely that Luke knows this (as well as fears this), 
but does not believe it, so 'to know p' would, then, be to hold a disfinct propositional 
attitude toward p after all. I am inclined to say that we should take this idea seriously, but 
would point out that the analysis of 'to know' would then enter into the realm of 
psychology, and perhaps phenomenology - this is not my project. (Perhaps one could 
talk of beliefs and repressed beliefs, or appeal to the Freudian nofion of the unconscious?) 
The goal of the activity may well be to separate true propositions from false propositions. See my 
discussion below, in II.4. 
I return to discuss whether 'to know p' can be to hold a propositional attitude toward p when I discuss 
Williamson's work, towards the end of this section. 
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This aside, it remains unclear that 'to know' in the sense suggested by Vader would have 
consequences for considered action. For it is what we believe - even in the sense of 
Sartre's 'bad faith', i f we admit such a notion - that seems to determine how we behave, 
and what we expect (or would p r e d i c t ) . A f t e r all, Sartre's point would seem to be 
precisely that we should 'believe' what we 'Vader-know'. (And we might need to make 
room for self-deception, in epistemology.) 
So far, then, it has been suggested that this simple word root has a multiplicity of senses, 
none of which is obviously more basic (or important) than the others, and most of which 
are expressible in other terms, such as 'belief and 'acquaintance', which might be 
candidates for more fundamental entities, such as 'belief states', and 'acquaintance 
s t a t e s ' . ( I am not presuming, or even suggesting, that there are such states. The point 
is that under a state-model, 'knowledge' seems defunct.) Note further that while 'p but I 
don't believe that p' seems paradoxical (when p is asserted) - indeed, this is Moore's 
paradox - the same does not seem to be translucently true of the following: 'p but I don't 
know that p'; ' I know that p [think Vader-know] but I don't believe that p'; and ' I believe 
that p but I don't know that p'. Thus, it seems that what we are willing to assert, and to 
act upon, are our beliefs. But in spite of this, let us continue this ordinary language 
investigation - while remaining cognisant that the foregoing senses of 'to know' are not 
straightforwardly exhaustive'° - in order to see whether anything else of significance can 
be gleaned. 
The noun 'knowledge' has two fundamental senses. First, we may speak of the 
knowledge of, or possessed by, an individual or group (such as a community), in a 
manner suggested by sentences such as: ' I have knowledge of quantum mechanics'; 'The 
Ancient Greeks had knowledge of astronomy'; 'Doctors have knowledge of medicine'; 
and 'Witchdoctors have knowledge of magical potions'. The first three examples seem 
reasonably uncontroversial, but the fourth might seem dubious, just because there are not 
- at least, according to orthodox Western science - such things as 'magical potions'. 
However, this intuition is not, we might think upon further reflection, manifesdy correct. 
For surely it is the case that one can 'have knowledge' of the creatures of Greek 
Mythology: the Cyclops, the Pegasus, and so forth. Similarly, one can 'have knowledge' 
of logic, without there being such a thing as logic itself. Caution is, therefore, advisable 
in the evaluation of such claims, particularly - although not peculiarly - in respect to 
natural philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange to say that Sir Isaac Newton did not have 
knowledge of mechanics, or that he only had knowledge of mechanics in so far as he 
understood a particular fictional theory that he constructed, because classical mechanics 
is, strictly speaking, false. (An analogous claim may not seem unreasonable in the case 
of the Witchdoctor, it is agreed. But we need to carefully consider the causal factors 
One might, for example, 'know' that one is homosexual, and be homosexual, but 'believe' that one is 
not homosexual. 
In the 'know-how' case, we might also speak of proprioceptive acumen, hand-eye coordination, and so 
forth, say in the example of being a skilled tennis player. None of this seems obviously reducible to 
prepositional attitudes,-or acquaintance states.-though.- _ . 
For example, the OED suggests 'Distinguish; be able to distinguish (one thing)/rom another'. In this 
sense one may 'know right from wrong', but I would be inclined to place this under the notion of 
competence. 
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responsible for what he would call his knowledge. We should also be willing to entertain 
the notion that many of the things that the Witchdoctor believes in virtue of his 
professional training may be true, or verisimilar.'"^ Remedies of traditional African 
medicine should not be dismissed merely upon a whim.) Here, then, comes a suggestion 
that what constitutes knowledge need not be true, or true literally construed. In the 
example involving Newton, we nofice that what counts as 'knowledge' is just reasoned, 
and based on experience (it is impossible to tell conclusively whether it is truth-like, or 
how truth-like it is); this is what seems to characterise the use of the word, in such a 
context. 
But what of the second sense of 'knowledge'? Well, we may speak of 'the knowledge in 
the library', or 'the knowledge contained in Bacon's Novum Organum'. Again, prima 
facie, such usage could seem perverse. But consider a different claim: ' I f you seek 
knowledge, then go to the library'. Now it may be argued, reasonably enough, that such 
a conditional expresses the idea that in order for you to attain knowledge, you must 
undertake an activity, namely reading, and it is only the tools that enable said acfivity 
which are to be found in the library. But why not call the information that really is in 
those books - the many arguments rehearsed there, and assertions made therein -
'knowledge', as Popper suggested? We can say 'It is known how to make bread', 
without supposing that any individual in fact has the skills necessary to make bread. Or 
even more persuasively, we can say that n is known to at least 1.2411 trillion decimal 
places, without implying that any one person can, or could ever, recite the value of TT to 
that number of places.'° So this 'objective knowledge', as Popper would have it called, 
is neither a vague, nor mysterious, posit. We might call it 'information which is the 
product of human activity' i f we like, and prefer the tag 'intersubjective' to 'objective', 
but should hardly say that such is not worthy of the name 'knowledge' because that can 
only be - for want of a less vulgar phrase - in our heads. (Few metaphysicians suggest 
that proposiuons are 'in our heads', i f they believe in said entities, for that matter.) 
Interestingly, the evaluafion criteria for this very PhD thesis involve two mentions of 
'knowledge'. First, 'candidates are required to show ability to...understand the 
relationship of the theme of their investigations to a wider field of knowledge'. I will 
confess that I have no idea whatever why this should be important. (Does the university 
not want the candidate to understand the aforementioned relationship, and show 
understanding of the same, rather than merely show ability to understand it?) In any 
event, it would make better sense to speak of a field of reasoned beliefs, (putatively) true 
beliefs, reasoned proposifions, or (putatively) true propositions. Second, 'the 
thesis...should include an original contribufion to knowledge'. But I should say that 
what is intended here is not 'justified true belief, and that this will be clear to the 
There is an allusion, here, to something like, but weaker than, Feyerabend's 'meaning variance', which 
bears some similarity, in turn to Kuhn's 'incommensurability'. Feyerabend suggests: 'observations are not 
just theory-laden (the views of Toulmin, Hanson and apparently also Kuhn) but fully theoretical and the 
distinction between observation statements... and theoretical statements is a pragmatic distinction, not a 
semantic distinction; there are no special '-observational meanings".' -Feyerabend [-197-5],-pp. 211-21-2. 
I do not mean to suggest that objective knowledge is entirely independent of human capability; in this 
example, pi has actually been calculated to that number of places, by a computer which was programmed 
and designed by humans. 
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examiners, inter alios. Else, my original contribution to knowledge could be this: 'It is 
not the case both that I am a Cadbury's chocolate bar, and that I am not a Cadbury's 
chocolate bar'. For this statement is not found in any of the literature, and is 'certainly 
true' by the guns of those such as Hume and Camap, be it understood as a necessary 
relation between ideas, or as a preclusion relation between propositions. 
At this point, it seems almost unnecessary to point out that an individual may be fairly 
described as 'knowledgeable' without there being any implication that said individual has 
a large set of true beliefs. Rather, her beliefs might have been acquired via a process of 
careful reasoning (and observation); she might simply have done her best (and might be 
continuing to do her best) to separate the true from the false. Indeed, she might even 
have (or at least, strive to have) the skill to do so; that is, possess the 'know-how' of 
philosophy. And this returns us to the astute quotation that heads this section. What is 
really being discussed here is wisdom, in the Socratic sense: 'rational decision-
making... not rational-decision making'."° Indeed, even Ferrier, who coined the term 
'epistemology', recognised that: 'a system which is reasoned, but not true, has always 
some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach 
truth, although it may fail to reach i t . ' " ' 
'Knowledge', then, does nothing."^ That is, beyond being a convenient word. Rather, 
there are quite distinct properties of true and reasoned (viz. reached by the application of 
critical thought), both of which can apply to beliefs, objects of belief (i.e. propositions), 
and that which discloses objects of belief (e.g. a copy of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason).^^^ What else should we need to discuss, save experience and categories, in 
examining the foundations of inquiry? Our quest is for the truth, and we employ reason -
but not good reasons! - in this quest. And we seek the truth because it is sufficient to see 
that we are never led astray, in deed or word. Indeed, it seems as i f Plato was painfully 
close to this fundamental recognition, as the following passage in his Meno shows:"'* 
Socrates: But that one cannot guide correcdy if one does not have knowledge; to 
this our agreement is likely to be incorrect. 
Meno: How do you mean? 
Socrates: I will tell you. A man who knew the way to Larissa, or anywhere else 
you like, and went there and guided others would surely lead them well 
and correctly? 
Meno: Certainly. 
""Miller [1994], p,43. 
"' Ferrier [1854], p.3. 
Note well that I do not add the qualification 'As far as practice is concerned', which Miller appears to 
want to. (I suspect this-may simply be a matter of context.) Miller [1994], p.66. 
A caveat: I do not literally mean that 'reasoned' is a property of propositions, although 'true' may very 
well be. It is, rather, a property of specific sentence tokens, or utterances. 
Plato, yWeA!o, 97a-d. 
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Socrates: What if someone had had a correct opinion as to which was the way but 
had not gone there nor indeed had knowledge of it, would he not also 
lead correctly? 
Meno: Certainly. 
Socrates: And as long as he has the right opinion about that of which the other has 
knowledge, he will not be a worse guide than the one who knows, as he 
has a true opinion, though not knowledge. 
Meno: In no way worse. 
Socrates: So true opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action than 
knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our investigation of the nature of 
virtue, when we said that only knowledge can lead to correct action, for 
true opinion can do so also. 
Meno: So it seems. 
Socrates: So correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge? 
Meno: Yes, to this extent, Socrates. But the man who has knowledge will 
always succeed, whereas he who has true opinion will only succeed at 
times. 
Socrates: How do you mean? Will he who has the right opinion not always 
succeed, as long as his opinion is right? 
Meno: That appears to be so of necessity, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, 
this being the case, why knowledge is prized far more highly than right 
opinion, and why they are different. 
Plato then has Socrates suggest that true opinions are not liable to linger, but instead to 
leave one, unless one 'ties them down by an account of the reason why'. However, how 
precisely we should understand this point is not clear, since it is bound up with the earlier 
discussion of recollection. It seems as i f Socrates is pointing to the value of explanation, 
and claiming that it is by providing an explanation for a true belief that one cements it in 
mind. (As such, explanafion facilitates proper recollection, and that which is properly 
recollected constitutes knowledge.) But against this, I should say that an explanafion can 
serve to cement any belief, true or not, although I would gladly concede that a fleeting 
opinion is liable to be quickly disregarded i f it does not seem, upon reflecfion, to be 
explicable (and thus defensible). Besides, Socrates continues by suggesfing that it is 
wisdom, rather than knowledge, that is 'the guide in public affairs'; that virtue is a gift 
bestowed by the gods, rather than aught else. And might this not also be the case, talk of 
gods aside, with respect to the ability to acquire true belief in general? That one either 
has it, or one does not? 
Going by the Phaedo, which is usually taken to have been written after the Meno, this 
understanding seems sustainable, since Plato has Socrates say ' I know that arguments of 
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which the proof is based on probability are pretentious and, i f one does not guard against 
them, they certainly deceive one, in geometry and everything else.'""\ and 'No sensible 
man would insist that these things [on the soul] are as I have described them, but I think it 
is fitting for a man to risk the belief - for the risk is a noble one...' This draws out two 
important strands of thought. First, the dominance of a belief in a community, or its 
widespread acceptance, should not suffice alone for one's own acceptance, even when 
said belief is seemingly trivial. (But nota bene: I think it unwise to impute the modern 
sense of 'probable' to the text. It is better read in the archaic sense of 'probable doctor', 
viz. 'respected' or 'approved'."^ Hence, Plato's Socrates inveighs against undue respect 
for, or the employment of argument from, authority.) Second, it is quite permissible to 
'go out on a limb' by adopting a belief which is neither proven, nor indeed provable. 
Thus, by extension, it may not be wrong to 'go out on a limb' with a belief that is 
unsupported. For example, although we may not have conclusive reasons (or even good 
reasons) for saying that the application of critical thought is, in fact, sufficient for 
discovering the truth, we may accept that it is; this, as a strategic device, and a rational 
hope. Miller, advocating the critical rationalist perspective with which I have some 
sympathy, puts it so: 
[S]cience is a collection of statements... the business of science is the discovery, as far as 
is practicable, of the truth values (and perhaps relative degrees of approximation to the 
truth) of these statements. The whole business can be explained, quite satisfactorily, 
without any reference to certainty, probability, confirmation, support, reliability, 
confidence, justification, good reasons, or knowledge. Truth and falsehood suffice."^ 
Now what I have said here is, of course, extremely controversial. However, in order to 
defend it, and flesh out my line, I should like to examine a recent account of 
'knowledge', namely that of Williamson: in doing so, I will make some concessions that 
should serve to clarify my posifion, and serve to highlight the relationship between 
externalism and critical rationalism, prior to a further discussion on the issue of 
demarcation. Beforehand, however, a few words about general issues in contemporary 
epistemology would seem to be in order. 
Theories of Justification 
The foregoing discussion is liable to irritate the professional epistemologist. I have not 
mentioned foundafionalism, coherenfism, foundherenUsm, contextualism, or the like. I 
have neither mentioned the distinction between externalist and internalist accounts, nor 
naturalistic epistemology. And thus, it would be easy to presume that I am completely 
unaware of these distinctions, and inveighing against an important area of inquiry of 
which I have no knowledge (in the epistemologist's sense). But I should like to 
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''^ P\alo, Phaedo, 114d. 
Plato, Phaedo, 92d. 
'" See the useful discussion in Hacking [1975], ch.3 
"^Miller [1994], pp.11-12. 
However, my earlier critique of naturalism, in 1.2.5, should make it clear that I would want to dismiss 
the latter. 
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emphasise, against the appearances, that I believe most of these discussions are rather 
pointless (although not without intrinsic interest), because they serve to polarise the 
examination of belief formation in an entirely inappropriate fashion. And what's more, 
I ' l l hold that belief forth as true, but utterly unjustified in the senses of 'verified by my 
evidence', 'probabilified by my evidence', 'confirmed by my evidence', 'partially 
verified (?) by my evidence', 'entailed by my evidence', 'partially entailed (?) by my 
evidence', 'necessitated by my evidence', or 'partially necessitated (?) by my evidence'. 
Instead, I shall say that I have made my decision on the basis of (what I understand to be 
the relevant) experience, and with hard thought. I shall say that I have little else to give, 
and find myself incapable of clinging onto the cuddly toy of 'justification', even though 
to do so would enable me to sleep more restfully. (Dogmatic slumbers may be blissful, 
after all.) 
As a case in point, take the debate between the externalist and the internalist. The former 
might say that 'justification', or more properly warrant, is provided by a reliable process; 
for example, for one to 'know' that one is seeing one's hand, it is necessary not only that 
the belief that one is seeing one's hand is true, but also that said belief has arisen via a 
process suited to 'reliably', or trustworthily, producing true beliefs (in this example, in 
the relevant domain, viz. with respect to perception).' ° (Another externalist option, that 
I put aside here, is to adopt a causal theory of justification.) The latter, on the other hand, 
holds that there is an internal component to knowledge other than, and in addition to, 
belief. Steup's rough characterisation is as follows: 
Our epistemic duty is to believe in accord with our evidence: believe p only if p is 
supported by our evidence, disbelieve p only if p is contradicted by our evidence, and 
suspend judgement about p i f our evidence neither supports nor contradicts p.'^' 
Now I must admit that those who undertake these sort of discussions are smart; their 
analyses are extremely detailed, and worthy of admiration from the point of view of a 
philosopher's philosopher, as exercises in reason. But what, one might ask, are they 
doing? They are not asking how it happens that true beliefs come about. They are not 
asking how we might achieve true beliefs, or even how we ought to go about achieving 
true beliefs. No, they are asking, to use Steup's neologism, what epistemizes belief, or 
what can epistemize true belief And their answer is not Plato's, discussed above. They 
hardly seem to be talking about explanation at all (although they employ it), and do not 
seem to be concerned about how we xmghtfix true beliefs, when we have them. 
To the reliabilist, then, I would say that there may well be reliable means by which to 
establish beliefs; reliable, in so far as truth-conducive. But what are they? How are we 
'"° There are, of course, many variants. For example, Lehrer writes: "What is essential is the reliability or 
trustworthiness of the evidence for what we accept to guide us to acceptance of what is true rather than 
false. The trustworthiness of the evidence makes us trustworthy in the matter, whatever our general 
defects.' Lehrer [1990], p. 173. This is wrong, I say, on two counts: first, since what we take to be 
evidence is theory-dependent (and-there-is no sueh-thing-as 'objective evidence', for-there are no entities 




to recognise these processes? Can we determine which they are? Indeed, how are we to 
evaluate the verisimilitude of the proclamations that the epistemologist makes, given the 
means by which she goes about her work? Do her proclamations even have a chance of 
being true, even though they would seem to be reasoned, and based on experience! 
When Freddy tells me, in the pub, " I know that God exists", what on earth does he really 
mean? Both that "God exists" is true, and that he formed his belief in 'God exists' by a 
reliable process? (There is no trick here, where I move from knowing to 'knowing that 
one knows'; Moore's paradox suggests that Freddy would readily assert, " I believe that I 
know that God exists". Hence, that he believes he arrived at 'God exists' by a reliable 
process, i f the externalist account of 'knowledge' is right, and he understands what 
'know' really means.'"") 
With the internalist - who would presumably agree with the spirit of the questions I pose 
to the externalist - I agree that we do have epistemic duties, which respect to that which 
we have consciously available. If Freddy were to tell me " I know that God exists", I 
would expect him to have done his best to work out whether "God exists" is true, and to 
have paid due attention to what he took to be his relevant evidence.'"^ If he had not, I 
would think he had done himself a disservice, inter alios, for the epistemic buck stops 
with each of us, as free agents, exercising our wills.'^'^ But why should the fact that 
Freddy had fulfilled his duties be sufficient for his establishment of a true belief, in this 
instance or any other? How is Freddy to determine that which constitutes relevant 
evidence, let alone evidence, in the first place? Is 'evidence' simply handed to him on a 
plate, for him to pick at as he wishes? (Is it drip-fed to him?) And even i f it is given to 
him in such a fashion, how much of it should be pick at (or be fed), if he is after true 
beliefs? Sfill further, how does evidence serve to 'support' beliefs in a non-psychological 
sense? (We have seen that the probabilistic approach is no good.) And is it really right 
that Freddy ought to suspend a belief i f he has no evidence to 'support' or 'contradict' it? 
Why can he not have evidence consistent with the belief (jc) that having another belief {y) 
has pragmatic benefits, and therefore commit to belief in y, without any evidence to 
support yl (Pascal's wager springs to mind.) Why, for that matter, can he not just 'take a 
chance' on y, provided he admits to himself that he is so doing, and is happy to give y up 
if (what he takes to be) evidence against it happens to come his way? 
Agreed, I simplify. Agreed, moreover, that the foregoing 'quick-fire' questions would 
seem, taken together, to resemble a rant. But let me emphasise that it is the spirit of my 
objection to contemporary epistemology that I wished to convey above. It is to its very 
futility that I point, as I should like now to affirm in a more conciliatory tone, by 
providing five specific objections to the epistemologist's project. 
It may be objected that Freddy might not be an externalist, so might not be making such a claim. As a 
matter of fact I agree. -But my conclusion is just that 'to know' is hardly ever used in the externalist's 
sense, which makes one wonder if the externalist is discussing what it is 'to know' at all. 
The point here, which I come back to, is that reason has to determine what counts as evidence or not; I 
thoroughly reject thenotion that evidence is handed to us. - - - _ _ _ _ . . _ 
I cannot really be expected to defend the idea that we have free wills here, so ask the reader to let this 
claim ride. After all, what is important in context is that the internalist would generally accept such a 
claim; see Steup [1997] on doxastic voluntarism. 
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First, we should note that epistemologists are typically concerned with a somewhat 
disembodied, even dehumanised, notion of 'justification'. Take a young man with a 
pervasive developmental disorder, who is struggling to fulf i l his epistemic duty, which he 
in fact recognises despite his condition. (I say condition, implying essence, and not 
illness or disease.) Let's call him Nicholas, and let us imagine - as is, I should think, 
plausible - that Nicholas makes his decisions, and his choices to commit to beliefs, in a 
way that I cannot fully comprehend. In some situations, Nicholas does or says things that 
I would gladly label, in casual conversation, as 'unreasonable' or 'irrational'.'^^ But is it, 
then, genuinely the case that Nicholas is irrational, or indeed unreasonable? Is it not 
possible that Nicholas could equally judge much of my behaviour to be pretty weird? 
Now what I am trying to get at, here, is that there is some sort of notion of the 
Ubermensch lurking in the background, when we start to compare the behaviour of 
different individuals with respect to 'rationality'. Many, I think most, would say that one 
such as Nicholas is 'reasoning defective', whereas I am not. Yet while such a belief may 
well be true, and I respect the right of others to hold it - I would not begrudge Nicholas 
his beliefs either, since he fulfils his epistemic duty - 1 do not think it quite follows that 
one such as Nicholas makes unreasonable decisions in an objective sense .What is 
reasonable for Nicholas is, frankly, not what is reasonable for me. But likewise, what is 
reasonable for the reader may not be what is reasonable for me, and what is reasonable 
for David Lewis may not be what is reasonable for Bas van Fraassen. As a community -
of which Nicholas may be a part, as may I - we can, of course, compare what we think is 
reasonable. But who are we to listen to, and who are we not to listen to? I should say 
that if we were able to distinguish between those who were doing their epistemic (viz. 
ethical) duty and those who were not, this would be enough. (Take the intelligent, 
devious, and persuasive man, who does not do his duty, but seeks to convince others of 
the truth of his pronouncements. Is he not the dangerous one?) Further, notice that to 
label another 'reasoning defective' is precisely to accept that the epistemic buck stops 
with one's self. It wil l not do to say that it is really one's community that does the 
labelling, because one has to choose, for oneself, whether to accept that such a label has 
been correctly assigned. And I find it bizarre that any academic philosopher should 
disagree. It is ironic that there should be journals filled with discussions about what is 
and is not objectively reasonable, when it seems so clear that the participants disagree so 
widely just because there is no objective standard. Faced with a paper, the philosopher 
takes herself to be able to make up her own mind about the truth or falsity of the claims 
therein. But where is the philosopher who would say that she does not make reasonable 
decisions? And i f there are so many reasonable philosophers about, then why isn't it 
patently obvious what is reasonable! 
Second, and along related lines, we should note that the thought-experiments which are 
discussed by epistemologists tend to be radically insufficient to their intended task, even 
if we assume there is such a thing as the 'objectively reasonable' decision, or set of 
decisions, for any given situation. And this is precisely because the bulk of these are not 
sufficiently specified with respect_to the individual, and state of the individual, in the 
Note, here, that I do not want to use 'reasonable' in the sense of 'appropriate', in that which follows. 
He may, of course, adjust his beliefs in a fashion that is not truth-conducive in an objective sense. 
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situation. Typically, they are of the following form: in situation a, with experience set e, 
belief set p, and desire set 5, then it is reasonable, rational, or maximally rational, to 
adjust P so as to include/preclude belief B (or set of beliefs { B } , which may or may not 
be a sub-set of P), to perform action a, or so forth. But please, let us try to be serious 
about this. Is it genuinely the case that one can list even one's own beliefs, without 
writing vastly more than a journal article, or even a book? And when we approach such 
examples, do we not tend to project ourselves into them; that is, to try to place ourselves 
in the situation a?'^ ^ (How else to get a handle on what seems 'reasonable' or not? What 
is 'reasonable' is not necessarily what leads to true belief formation, after all.) I think the 
answer is in the affirmative, and that in doing so we tend to import, unavoidably, many of 
our own beliefs and desires.'^ ^ Admittedly, this does not render all such thought-
experiments pointless - we might hope that what many of us import is often similar 
enough to allow us to perform a limited comparison of reasoning strategies - but it 
severely limits their generality. 
Third, there is a curious circularity that is inherent in the project of the epistemologist. 
After all, what she would want us to believe is precisely that her pronouncements about 
'knowledge' are true - it is that which she argues for. She cannot ask us to evaluate 
whether we 'know' (or could know) that such pronouncements are true, on pain of 
incoherence. Hence, evaluation with respect to truth holds primacy. Return to Steup's 
claim, mentioned earlier, that 'Our epistemic duty is... to suspend judgement about p i f 
our evidence neither supports nor contradicts p.' And now let p be precisely "Our 
epistemic duty is to suspend judgement about p i f our evidence neither supports nor 
contradicts p." Should we not, then, suspend judgement about pi What could actually 
count, even in principle, as evidence that either supports, or contradicts, such a normative 
claim? (It is far from obvious that one who is charged with a crime should not be 
presumed innocent.) And should we not end up suspending judgement about whether or 
not 'we should suspend our judgement about p i f our evidence neither supports nor 
contradicts p\ and so on? The lesson seems to be that 'taking a risk' on a belief - that is, 
taking the risk that it is true - is not irrational (nor indeed rational!). 
Fourth, it might be said that classical epistemologists tend to rely on an extremely narrow 
view of rationality, such as that mentioned briefly in 1.2.4. In particular, their focus on 
beliefs is dubious, when it might also be the case that there are rational hopes, fears, and 
even desires. Further, there may even be such things as rational hope-making processes, 
and so forth. The issue is one of 'direction of f i t ' , and it remains unclear to me why 
merely understanding how things are is sufficient to enable reasonable interaction with 
our surroundings, particularly with respect to our fellows: indeed, surely it is the case that 
we seek to understand how we would prefer for things to be, for ethical reasons or 
otherwise, as well as how we would prefer for things not to be. Agreed, we need to 
understand what is possible i f we are to understand what we can achieve, and the 
It may be thought that I assume the truth of something like 'Folk Psychology' or 'simulation' here, but I 
do not. (And in so far as those who theorise about 'rationality' tend to, I would add that this sort of 
-assumption may be found-wanting. This is just another-potential argument against their project.) For one 
may very well say that we import our understanding of social norms into such examples, and point out that 
these can hardly be fully specified either. I am grateful to Matthew Ralcliffe for pointing this out. 
I have not even mentioned moods, which might also be relevant. 
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potential dangers we face, but merely understanding that which is possible does not, in 
itself, tell us what to fear and what to hope for. Moreover, it tells us nothing about what 
attitudes we ought to adopt. In the terms in which Macleod puts this, I am therefore in 
favour of a 'type 3' analysis of 'rationality', in contrast to the 'type 1' and 'type T 
analyses which seem to have been historically favoured: 
Theories (Type 1 theories, let us call them) for which it is beliefs and belief alone to 
which terms like rational and irrational are properly applicable will be very different, 
certainly in scope and probably also in structure, from (Type 2) theories for which actions 
and decisions can also be said to be rational and irrational. And both will be different 
from (Type 3) theories, which seem to make room in addition for rational appraisal of an 
agent's desires and preferences and of the ends, ideals, and principles associated with 
them.'^' 
Finally, and most importantly, there are serious doubts about whether it is worth 
undertaking epistemological inquiry without being in possession of a sound metaphysical 
possibility space. For discussing narrow logical possibilities - using loose talk of 
'reliable processes', 'mental states', 'beliefs', and so forth - is all very well, but it is 
hardly going to shed any light on how we genuinely interact, and how we should best 
interact, with the rest of the world. For example, how are we to understand 'reliable 
processes'? Presumably such things would come about due to laws governing the 
interaction of entities, perhaps both mental and physical, but then our understanding of 
laws becomes relevant. Is there a plausible example of such a process? One could 
simply say 'perception', but this is rather unenlightening unless it is understood precisely 
what the (metaphysical) possibilities pertaining to perception are. For instance, i f 
percepfion is not a causal process, then could it still constitute a 'reliable process'? And 
how, precisely, can the mental and the physical interact? Or is there not really a proper 
ontological (viz. non-phenomenological) distinction to be drawn between the mental and 
the physical? In short, it is not productive to bracket metaphysics and ask questions like 
'What is knowledge?', or even 'What is belief?', for such questions are to be answered, i f 
they are answerable at all, on precisely such a basis; that is, in such a possibility space. 
As such, to make the claim that 'x is knowledge' while bracketing metaphysics is about 
as convincing as making the claim that 'the actual world is deterministic', while 
brackefing physics. About as convincing, that is, as Bill Clinton's claim not to have had 
"sexual relations with that woman". 
It might be said that what all this amounts to, and what I am arguing for, is irrationalism 
(underpinned by a degree of doxastic voluntarism, and indeed voluntarism period as the 
prop for active inquiry). However, i f this is right then I am in fine company: that of 'the 
irrational rationalist' (Popper) and 'the passionate liberal' (Feyerabend).''" For I agree 
with the former that the only method - the one true method of philosophy, nay all inquiry 
- is stating one's problems clearly (or as clearly as one can), and tackling them critically 
(or as critically as one can).'^' And I agree with the latter that there is nothing wrong 
with 'epistemological anarchism', provided such 'anarchism' is governed (or limited) by 
Macleod [1986], p.59 
Newton-Smith [1981] 
' " I take the opportunity to argue this in further depth hereafter, II.4. 
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the aforementioned method.'^^ Indeed, the thread that binds these two views together-
and it is there in Popper's work, under a sympathetic reading - is precisely a 
deontological one. It amounts to what might be called a categorical epistemological 
imperative: do your best to find the truth, given the capacities at your disposal. // is 
epistemological cum ethical, and urges us to employ our wills to a mutually beneficial 
end. And as such, truth is properly an aspiration, rather than an aim; I am content to 
admit this. 
The cat is out of the bag. But I have discovered, to my chagrin, that this sort of 
admission - one that was demanded of Popper by Newton-Smith [1981], O'Hear [1980], 
Salmon [1981], and so forth - seems equally as strange to the scientific realist as it does 
to the empiricist. After all, the scientific realist seems to want the admission just because 
she thinks it makes a mockery of the anti-justificationist (and anti-inductivist) project. (It 
does not. It merely leads to a clear statement of its Socratic root.) The empiricist wants 
to ask why we should still cling on to truth even as aspiration for natural science. But I 
want to emphasise what I have not denied, because otherwise it may appear that I am 
advocating some sort of radical relativism: 
(i) Natural sciences do have their own distinct methodologies (involving many local 
methods, specific to particular experiments, etc.), which are subject to critical 
scrutiny, and revision with a view to improvement. These have significant 
sociological and practical elements; for example, there may be standard practices 
involving paper writing, presentation of data, and so forth. 
(ii) Theories and facts can (together) be evaluated with respect to their verisimilitude, 
albeit that such evaluation is fallible, and never conclusive. (And what counts as 
a fact is a theory-dependent issue; 'non-conceptual experience' is a misnomer, as 
I argue later, in III.4.) This is a piecemeal process: there is no true dictum such as 
'the theories in mature science are generally highly verisimilar', or ET. 
(iii) Local methods can be evaluated with respect to their suitability to achieve a task 
(in an efficacious manner), or provide true conclusions. Further, formal systems 
of inference can be evaluated with respect to their ability to preserve truth. Both 
can be revised with a view to improvement, in epistemic and pragmatic senses. 
(Remember, I agree with the externalist to the extent that there may be reliable 
processes. Finding which they are, on this assumption, is the tricky bit.) 
(iv) We can look for suitable means by which to find the truth - intersubjective ones -
and call such means 'rational', i f liked. But then we would be discussing 
precisely how it is best to think, or to behave, not how it is reasonable to think or 
behave. What it is right to do and what it is reasonable to do (not 'appropriate to 
do') are not the same; we can strive to apply reason with a will to discover the 
former, but there are no guarantees it is sufficient to the task. 
Feyerabend took rather a curious tour in his philosophical life, but towards the end there were 
indications that relativism no longer appealed to him, although his anarchistic spirit was still intact. See, 
for example, Feyerabend [1995J. 
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Against 'Knowledge' as a Propositional Attitude 
O n the standard view, believing is merely a state of mind but knowing is not, because it is factive: 
truth is a non-mental component of knowing. - Will iamson'^' 
I mentioned much earlier that it was not only unclear, but also dubious, that 'to know' a 
proposition can be understood as 'to take an attitude towards' a proposition. Yet to my 
surprise I have found this point to be contentious in my discussions with fellow 
philosophers, and would thus seem to owe a detailed argument to this effect. 
So let us have it that we really possess propositional attitudes, and list some undisputed 
examples thereof: belief; hope; fear; and intuition. And let us notice that the objects of 
these attitudes are precisely, by definition, propositions; they are not a particular sub-set 
of propositions. One can believe that p irrespective of whether p has any particular 
property (save perhaps 'believability', i f one wants to commit to such a notion); one can 
hope that p whether or not p is (objectively) desirable; one can fear that p without it being 
(objectively) fearful; and one can intuit that p (or have the intuition that p) without it 
being the case that p. In all these cases, one can take an attitude to a proposition in spite 
of its properties, unless we want to attribute trivial properties to the propositions that are 
proper objects of these attitudes - to say that they need be, variously, 'believable', 'hope-
able', 'fear-able', and 'intuit-able'. (In a similar fashion, in order that I be able to see x, 
one might say that x need be 'see-able'. But it does not follow that 'see-ability', or 
'observability', is really a simple property possessed by any thing. For one may equally 
say a table is red without meaning that a table has the fundamental property of redness, 
and on a side note I cannot resist adding that van Fraassen's talk of 'observables' seems 
very metaphysical to me.) 
But now let us consider 'knowledge', and allow that - following the trivial attribution of 
properties above - for one 'to know p', p must be {sotto voce) 'knowable'. Can we take a 
basic attitude towards p, such that we know p? Well let us note under the standard 
philosophical account of 'knowledge', it is a prerequisite of 'knowing that p' that one 
believes that p. But i f one believes that p, one takes precisely a propositional attitude to 
p; the consequences are typically that p is worthy of assertion, and action upon, pedantic 
cases aside. 
So i f one knows that p, it is necessarily the case that one believes that p; believes, 
precisely, that p is true (or possesses the property of truth, qua truth-bearer). And to 
believe that p possesses the property of truth (or lacks the property of falsehood) is not to 
require that it does, in fact, possess such a property. Yet in the case of 'knowing that p', 
if 'to know' is to be taken to be a basic attitude, it is required that p does possess the 
property of truth, and perhaps even an additional property of 'being justified'. And we 
might ask, then, why 'knowing' should be the odd attitude out - in comparison to the 
Williamson [2000], p.22 
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other propositional attitudes agreed upon - in so far as it requires that p have non-trivial 
properties. 
That which we 'know', i f there is 'knowledge' in the sense of 'justified true belief, is 
precisely the sub-set of that which we believe - take the attitude of belief to - which just 
so happens to be true, and just so happens to be justified. But what sense does it make to 
speak of a 'justified' proposition? What we surely mean is that how we have come to 
believe in p (adopt the propositional attitude of belief to p) is sufficient to justify our 
taking the propositional attitude of belief to p. Thus, we might say that 'to know p' is 
simply to take the propositional attitude of belief toward p, when it just so happens that p 
is true, and that the propositional attitude of belief toward p was arrived at by a means 
sufficient to justify our taking said attitude toward p. What we 'know' would than be a 
sub-set of what we believe - the propositions we take that attitude towards, first and 
foremost. As such, the notion of 'knowledge' as a distinct propositional attitude seems 
extravagant; indeed, Williamson himself acknowledges that 'believing p truly is not a 
mental state, at least, not when p is an ordinary contingent proposition about the external 
environment'.'^'* 
Of course, a counter argument could be made on the grounds that one only can be 'sad 
that p' and 'happy that p' i f one 'believes that p'. But these attitudes do not require that p 
possess a non-trivial property such as truth, rather than 'potential object of happiness'. (I 
can believe my mother has been cured of cancer, and be happy that my mother has been 
cured of cancer, when she has not, in fact, been cured of cancer.) As Williamson puts it, 
'knowing... is afactive attitude... Other factive attitudes include perceiving that 
something is so, remembering that it is so, and regretting that it is so.' '^ ^ However, 
Williamson's examples are not persuasive in the slightest. First, one can perceive that 
something is so without it being so; one can see that 'there are sheep jumping over a 
fence' in a dream, when there are actually no sheep jumping over any fences, anywhere. 
(Remember, seeing is not seeing that.) Second, one can remember that something is so 
without it being so - Popper remembered his meeting with Wittgenstein at the Moral 
Sciences club in Cambridge very differently from the others there present, and the 
accounts are mutually incompatible. Third, and finally, one can regret never having done 
something when one has, in fact, done it - amnesia is a common enough occurrence, after 
all. What I am suggesting, here, is that there is a qualitative feel associated with attitudes 
such as 'seeing', 'remembering', and 'regretting'. But as I shall endeavour to urge 
below, it would be strange to say there was a qualitative feel to 'knowing', or even 
'believing with a high degree of belief. 
Now we might say that 'sadness' and 'happiness' are akin to second order propositional 
attitudes, in so far as they are attitudes towards propositions that are also objects of belief, 
but even then they would still be disfinct from 'knowledge' in so far as it requires a 
genuine property of the belief object, namely truth. Furthermore, i f we are to be realists 
about truth, then we must hold that p can be true whether it is 'believable' or not. But 
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then, p can be true whether it is 'knowable' or not, precisely because i f it were to be 
'knowable' it would have to be 'believable'. 
So to repeat, there is an obvious phenomenological disfinction between being happy that 
p, fearing that p, believing that p, and so forth. But is there any phenomenological 
distinction between believing that p and knowing that p? One might want to answer in 
the affirmative by claiming that 'knowing p' involves a stronger feeling than 'believing 
p', but this approach is doomed to failure just because attitudes admit of degree. For 
example, one may have a mild fear of open spaces, but an intense fear of spiders, and 
thus fear ' I am in an open space' less than 'There is a spider crawling on my arm'. And 
likewise, one may have a strong belief that one exists, but a less strong belief that 
universals exist, and so forth; indeed, one may even be certain that p, viz. assign it a 
subjective probability of one, when it is not the case that p. Besides, as Ramsey has 
insightfully pointed out: 
We can, in the first place, suppose that the degree of a belief is something perceptible by 
its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling by which they are 
accompanied, which might be called a belief-feeling or feeling of conviction, and that by 
the degree of belief we mean the intensity of this feeling. This view would be very 
inconvenient, for it is not easy to ascribe numbers to the intensities of feelings; but apart 
from this it seems to me observably false, for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are 
often accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels strongly about things he 
takes for granted.'^ * 
There is, however, an ingenious last-ditch defence for the advocate of 'knowledge' as a 
propositional attitude. For what if there were a group of propositions such that, for any 
possible world in which a human could come to believe them (or choose to believe them), 
they would be true? The idea would be precisely that there are some beliefs which 
simply could not be formed (or come about for any human) in any world where their 
(propositional) objects were false. Now this claim strikes me as bold, and I am inclined 
to agree that such objects of belief would genuinely be worthy of the name 'knowledge', 
but it still does not strike me that this model is sufficient to suggest that 'knowing' is a 
fundamental propositional attitude. Again, it would seem to be parasitic on belief, and to 
have no distinctive phenomenological character. And as such, it would seem that those 
who would want to save 'knowledge' as an attitude would do better to suggest its objects 
are facts, states-of-affairs, or other non-propositional entifies.'^^ (This, although one 
might still be able 'to know p' in the sense of 'being acquainted with p', rather than 
'acquainted with the truth-value of p'.) But then we would no longer be discussing the 
proposifions, statements, or arguments, which are the lifeblood of the activity of inquiry. 
We would be back to the notion of acquaintance, with which I started this secfion. 
'-'^  Ramsey [19261, p. 169 
This is suggested by Vendler [1972]. 
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4. O N DEMARCATION AND CRITICAL RATIONALISM 
The importance lent to the falsifiability criterion and demarcation problem by Popper and others 
distorts his thought - Bartley'^ ^ 
[T]he demarcation between science and metaphysics is a special case of the wider problem of 
demarcating criticizable from non-criticizable theories - Popper' 
What demarcates 'science'? This is now a middle-aged question, which has been tackled 
- albeit with difficulty - by many a philosopher. For the Vienna Circle - and following a 
particular understanding of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - it was the 
verifiability of the statements upon which it was founded. For Popper, it was the 
falsifiability of (many of) those statements, and associated theories; at least, going by a 
superficial view of Logik der Forschung.^'^'^ For Kuhn, it seems to have been a particular 
set of virtues which are sought of theories, or models, by certain communities of 
thinkers.''*' And today, we find those such as van Fraassen implying, along related lines, 
that there is something special about its method.'"*^ 
However, the approaches of several of these philosophers have a significant similarity. 
They start by examining actual scientific practice, be it in a philosophical, psychological, 
sociological, or historical, manner. And that which does not conform to their findings is 
labelled, variously, as 'meaningless', 'speculation', 'heuristic', or 'word play'. The word 
'metaphysics' can then be casually attached to that domain, sometimes as if there is 
nothing more to be said. The problem is simple: they seem to make the unspoken 
assumption that there is something special, or important, about this thing called 'science'. 
Then they go out looking for it, think that they find it (because they expect to), and seek 
to denigrate, in varying degrees, that which falls outside its scope. (But is essentialism 
about 'natural science' right? I think not, and am not eager to merely assume, in any 
event, that disciplines such as chemistry and physics are not autonomous, or that the 
former will at some stage become a sub-domain of, or reduced to, the latter.) 
This should be no surprise. For the problem is set up in a way which is conducive to 
making value judgements about (allegedly) different forms of activity, or the products 
thereof; as if one could compare Renoir's Sur le Terrasse with Newton's Principia 
Philosophiae Naturalis, and declare that one was an objectively better piece of work, on 
universal assessment criteria. (Indeed, even Popper, who believed that 'metaphysics' is 
meaningful and indispensable, at least in his later days, still occasionally argued that 
'science' has a greater epistemic status: 'In science (and only in science) can we say that 
"^ Bartley [1968],p.43. 
Popper [1968], p.95. 
Commonly, this is taken to be falsification by observation statements, but I shall say more on this 
below.- - - - -- -
''" These are 'accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness'. Kuhn [1977], p.322. See my 
discussion in Rowbottom [2002], pp.46-53. 
"" See the subsequent discussion in III.5-III.5.4. 
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we have made genuine progress: that we know more than we did before.' ''*"^ ) 
Unfortunately, however, it is not clear that our lot is so simple, although the question of 
demarcation is, as I mentioned in the prologue, important in several non-academic senses. 
Now I do not want to argue that natural philosophy and metaphysics are radically 
incomparable. Rather, to emphasise that any reasoned and considered comparison should 
involve talk of value judgements; much as van Fraassen's recent talk of 'stances' might 
suggest. Or to return to Popper: 
[A]t any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our 
expectations; our past experiences; our language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian 
sense: if we try, we can break out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall 
find ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one; and we can 
at any moment break out again... a critical discussion and comparison of the various 
frameworks is always possible... The Myth of the Framework.. .simply exaggerates a 
difficulty into an impossibility.'*^ 
In this case, the metaphysician might 'turn the tables' on the debate, start with the 
assumption that there is this thing called 'metaphysics' which is 'special' - but not, 
please, in an epistemic sense - then try to demarcate it, and see where that leads. Such an 
analysis might then be compared with that of a Popper or a Kuhn, and prove fruitful in 
clarifying the debate. (It might emerge, for example, that neither approach tackles an 
underlying problem situation, which has not yet been unveiled and examined.) However, 
I shall not make it my task to undertake this here, because I put forward my view of 
metaphysics in the next chapter, in part by building upon the historical theses developed 
in sections 1-1.3 above. Rather, what I want to examine at this stage is the very question 
of how we should expect to demarcate any discipline. And I think that this broader 
question is important to examine precisely such that one is not tempted to make ad hoc 
alterations in one's account in order to preserve putative 'disciplines', or 'areas of 
investigation', with which one takes oneself to be associated. In my case, these might be 
'physics', 'mathematics', 'philosophy', 'epistemology', 'philosophy of science', 'history 
of science', and 'metaphysics'. Indeed, I would not have 'aesthetics' or 'ethics' in my 
mind as I wrote, simply because I am not terribly interested in them, and even have 
doubts, perhaps foolishly, about whether they are distinctive disciplines. 
It should go without saying that it is far from obvious that it only makes sense to carve up 
activities into scientific and non-scientific, or metaphysical and non-metaphysical. For 
example, mathematics might be a domain which is not easily subsumed under either 
'metaphysics' or 'science'; it might be radically distinct from both, although of great 
interest, use, and value - in somewhat different ways - to practitioners of either. Just as a 
painter might employ simple geometry as an end to representing a scene in proper 
perspective, a physicist might employ vectors in order to determine the resultant force on 
Popper [1970], p.57. One way of understanding this claim is that Popper thinks of truth as being 
-grounded-in the-aetualras-well-as-being-absolute-'~the-wording of-Tarski~s-theory-of-truth --it-is-the ease 
that' - might suggest this. However, it is unclear that one cannot say 'It is true that it is possible that p', in 
a substantive sense. 
'^ ^ Ibid., pp.56-57. I build upon this in the next sub-section. 
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an object with both mass and charge, situated in both an electric field and a gravitational 
field. 
Demarcating Proper Inquiry 
On the question of demarcation, my starting point is to recognise that there are two core 
questions that might be asked, which are strongly suggested by the quotations that open 
this secfion. The first is "What are the necessary features of any proper form of 
inquiry?", and 'proper' has normative force. The second question, which is subsidiary, is 
"In virtue of what should we demarcate different forms of inquiry?" Further, I hold that 
the former is the more important, and that to attempt to fuse the two is a serious error. 
Indeed, it seems to me that those who are eager to jump to the claim that the second 
question can be answered by appeal to method, or worse method alone, are only 
conflating it with the first. For while it seems very plausible that inquiry ought to involve 
particular sorts of activity - and here, by 'inquiry', I mean genuine inquiry, rather than 
merely what one group or another does in the name of 'inquiry' it is unclear that there 
ought to be any essential difference between the fundamental approach of those properly 
investigating, period; that is, be they anthropologist or zoologist. 
Now in this regard, I might return to my brief comments about 'normal science', and the 
important debate in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, in I I . 1.'''^ For notice that 
Popper agrees with Kuhn that there really is such an activity as 'normal science', but 
simply disagrees that this acdvity is proper, let alone characteristic of good science. In 
his words: 
'Normal' science, in Kuhn's sense, exists. It is the activity of the non-revolutionary, or 
more precisely, the not-too-critical professional: of the science student who accepts the 
ruling dogma of the day; who does not wish to challenge it; and who accepts a new 
revolutionary theory only if almost everybody else is ready to accept it - if it becomes 
fashionable by a kind of bandwagon effect... I believe, and so do many others, that all 
teaching on the University level (and if possible below) should be training and 
encouragement in critical thinking. The 'normal' scientist, as described by Kuhn, has 
been badly taught. He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of 
indoctrination. He has leamed a technique which can be applied without asking for the 
reason why (especially in quantum mechanics). As a consequence, he has become what 
may be called an applied scientist, in contradistinction to what I should call a pure 
scientist. He is, as Kuhn puts it, content to solve 'puzzles'... it is not really a 
fundamental problem which the 'normal' scientist is prepared to tackle: it is, rather, a 
routine problem, a problem of applying what one has leamed.. 
Of course, it may be the case that there are some people in physics departments, say, that are not really 
engaged in genuine inquiry at all. And it may also be the case that some people do particular things with 
their aspiration as truth, although they are insufficient to the task of achieving it. In short, the mere 
appearance-ofinquiry-occurring-is not-sufficient to make it the case that inquiry-is really occurring. 
For more on 'normal science', see Rowbottom [2002], 'Normative Methods and Normal Science - Logic 
ofDiscoven'',pp.51-6[. 
Popper [1970], pp.52-53 
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This passage is extremely poignant from my personal perspective, and I remember 
clearly the moment when I first read it, just under five years ago. For I believed, and sUll 
believe, that I was taught in the dogmatic fashion that Popper inveighs against. Yet for 
whatever reason - by an implausible innate disposition to be questioning, or more 
cogently an inquisifive disposition fostered by a mother who always did her best to 
answer even my most difficult quesfions, in my early childhood - 1 thankfully came to 
appreciate just that. That I was being subjected to a textbook diet of de-historicised 
'reconstructions', which were devoid of deep insight, and penned by individuals who had 
been through a similar rigmarole in their training, more often than not. Indeed, it is a 
striking coincidence that my encounter with quantum mechanics was precisely the curtain 
call for my time in physics; this, since the Copenhagen view, so uncritically asserted in 
lectures, seemed to me to be utterly nonsensical. I became fascinated with the underlying 
problems - of determinism, measurement, non-locality, and so forth - to the exclusion of 
everything else.''** I sought an answer, and when I eventually encountered the work of 
Bohm it began to dawn on me that this had been marginalised for nothing more than 
political, and social, reasons. (It had literally been written out of the textbooks, as a 
matter of 'historical contingency', as Gushing so plainly puts it.''*^ And as Bohm writes: 
' I felt that the adoption of the current interpretation was a somewhat fortuitous affair, 
since it was affected by the generally posifivist empiricist attitude that pervaded physics 
at the time.' '^°) Worse, I soon discovered that none of my lecturers had even read the 
original work of Bohr, Heisenberg, or Born. No, they were, rather, reporters on the work 
of previous reporters! And so, a philosopher was born. A philosopher that was to find 
great sympathy with the following words of Feyerabend: 
The idea that science can and should be run according to some fixed rules, and that its 
rationality consists in agreement with such rules, is both unreahstic and vicious... 
vicious, since the attempt to enforce the rules will undoubtedly erect barriers to what men 
[and women!] might have been, and will reduce our humanity by increasing our 
professional qualifications.'^' 
[I]f normal science is de facto as monolithic as Kuhn makes it out to be, then where do 
the competing theories come from? And if they do arise, then why should Kuhn take 
them seriously and allow them to bring about a change of the argumentative style, from 
'scientific' (puzzle solving) to 'philosophical'? I remember well how Kuhn criticized 
Bohm for disturbing the uniformity of the contemporary quantum theory. Bohm's theory 
is not permitted to change the argumentative style. Einstein... is permitted to do so... 
Does this mean that proliferation is permitted as long as the competing alternatives are 
firmly entrenched? But pre-science which has exacdy this feature is regarded as inferior 
to science."^ 
Now while this digression might seem self-indulgent, it flags up a very serious concern. 
For while it would be easy for me to pour scorn upon much of what occurs in 
'^ ^ It is ironic, of course, that it was precisely the inconsistency of this theoretical framework with others in 
physics - particularly those of a more classical, deterministic, vein - that prompted my rejection of it. 
''*-'SeeGushing-[-1994] 
Bohm [1987], p.39. 
'-"Feyerabend [1970a], p.91. 
152 Feyerabend [1970b], p.206. 
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contemporary physics - 1 will come to this - it might seem to be the case that learning in 
a didactic fashion is necessary simply to get to grips with the problems that contemporary 
physicists are concerned with. And this, I take to be the thrust of Kuhn's view: that there 
is a point at which a discipline goes through a transhion in order to attain maturity, only 
after which progress becomes an 'obvious characteristic' thereof At that stage a genuine 
'scientific theory' is at hand, and in his words, 'once hope for a therapeutic prescription is 
abandoned, there is no reason to expect anything less [than normal science]...with such a 
theory in hand the time for steady crificism and theory proliferation has passed.' '''^ Yet I 
am not sympathetic to this view, and while I will agree that it has considerable 
descriptive accuracy, with respect to the latter half of the previous century and the status 
quo, I find it normatively unpalatable. For whereas it must be right that one will need to 
understand a great deal of material in order to be able to engage in contemporary work in 
science, the important question is where the emphasis should lie in the teaching process, 
and what sort of activity should be encouraged: critical examination, or puzzle-solving? 
The answer for Kuhn is clearly the latter, for he confinues: 
Even given a theory which permits normal science, however, scientists need not engage 
[sic] the puzzles it supplies. They could instead behave as practitioners of the proto-
sciences must; they could, that is, seek potential weak spots, of which there are always 
large numbers, and endeavour to erect alternate theories around them. Most of my 
present critics believe they should do so. / disagree but exclusively on strategic 
grounds.. .1 confessed to Feyerabend that I shared Bohm's discontent but... No one, I 
suggested, was likely to resolve the paradoxes of the quantum theory until he could relate 
them to some concrete technical puzzle of current physics.. .Because they can ordinarily 
take current theory for granted, exploiting rather than criticizing it, the practitioners of 
mature sciences are freed to explore nature to an esoteric depth and detail otherwise 
unimaginable.'"^ '* [Emphasis mine] 
I disagree, but exclusively on epistemic, and hence deontological, grounds. First, 
because it is surely not right that one has to 'take current theory for granted' in order to 
be 'freed' to employ it howsoever one likes, whether 'esoteric' or not; rather, one may 
simply accept a theory for particular theoretical, practical, or predictive, purposes.'^ ^ Just 
consider that many physicists still employ classical mechanics from time to rime, say 
when concerned with terrestrial projectile motion, although they are under no illusion that 
it is true, or even highly verisimilar. Second, because theoretical frameworks in different 
domains of a discipline might surely be compared with respect to their consistency, each 
with the other; and it is very hard to see how 'a critical mass of anomalies' - which is 
what Kuhn says is generally required for theory-change, and is right to be required -
could account for, or is needed to prompt, the processes of reduction or integration.'^^ 
' " K u h n [1970], p.246. 
'^ * Ibid., p.246. 
' " The distinction between acceptance and belief is, of course, at the core of van Fraassen's approach. In 
the following example, one might 'accept' Newtonian mechanics in precisely his sense. 
'-'—To be entirely-fair to Kuhnrthough, it should be added that he-mentions external consistency as a 
theoretical virtue. See Kuhn [1977], ch. 13. Furthermore, he also discusses three types of 'articulation' in 
his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the third of which may be relevant in this regard, and 'resembles 
exploration'. Unfortunately, however, the discussion is simply too brief to be convincing: it reads precisely 
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Third, because putting all one's eggs in one basket does not prepare one for the day when 
the fox comes, and gobbles them all up; and 'periods of crisis' should, I think, be 
avoided, rather than invited.'" And fourth, last but not least, creativity should be 
fostered, not quashed, i f our objective knowledge is to be increased; for when crisis 
comes, as it is bound to from time to time, despite our best efforts to prevent it, who are 
we going to look to in order to deal with it? Those who have been indoctrinated into a 
disciplinary matrix, been taught not to rock the boat, and had their capacity for 
independent thought eroded by years of monkey practice (viz. 'puzzle-solving')? It 
seems to me that i f Kuhn is descriptively correct that 'Lifelong resistance, particularly 
from those whose productive careers have committed them to an older tradition.. .is not a 
violation of scientific standards' , then this is a sad indictment on science (as is, inter 
alia). Indeed, it seems, further, that the favourite child of the relativist, namely 
'incommensurability', might really be an illusion generated by the exchanges of dogmatic 
thinkers who have become set in their ways, and are no longer willing to fu l f i l their 
epistemic duty.'"^^ 
Overall, then, I should say that students of natural sciences simply ought to be taught 
differently than they presently are (at least from my experience). To be encouraged to 
critically engage with original scientific works, and examine them in historical context, 
while also being expected to understand the course of development of the subject, and to 
attain mastery in the employment of various theoretical frameworks, past and present, in 
order to solve problems (in particular, what were once considered to be pressing 
problems). Furthermore, I say that anyone who was successful in such a programme 
would prove to be capable of doing what Kuhn calls 'puzzle solving' - 1 prefer Popper's 
'applied science' - perfectly well. (After all, it is hardly the case that a philosophy 
student need think that classical logic is absolutely perfect, in order to be proficient in 
employing it!) But what is more, I suspect that such an individual would be better at 
applied science than one who had merely been indoctrinated, i f for no other reason than 
this: she would have been versed in a wide variety of problem solving strategies, and 
have become skilled in mixing and matching them.'^ ** And better still, she would have 
as if he is discussing critical exploration, rather than a simple semblance thereof. See Kuhn [1996], pp.29-
30. 
My point, here, is that if there are several theories on the go, with respect to a particular domain of 
investigation, there is breathing space in the event of systematic failure of one of those theories. And I hold 
this to be a blessing; one which the open-minded individual can be thankful for. 
Kuhn [1962], p. 151. See also Kuhn [1962], p.90, where he writes: 'Almost always the men who achieve 
these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field 
whose paradigm they change.' Yet he admits, in a footnote: 'This generalization... is so common as to be a 
cliche...Nevertheless, the generalization badly needs systematic investigation.' 
Remember, in this regard, my discussion in 1.2.3. 
Popper quotes Oersted in this regard, in opening his Realism and the Aim of Science: 'So much is 
certain: that nothing is better adapted to form a mind which is capable of a great development, than living 
and participating in great scientific revolutions. I would therefore counsel all those whom the period they 
live in has not naturally presented with this advantage, to procure it artificially for themselves, by reading 
the writings of those periods in which the sciences have suffered great changes. To peruse the writings of 
the most opposite systems, and to extract-their hidden truth,-to answer questions raised-by those.opposite 
systems, to transfer the chief theories of the one system into the other, is an exercise which cannot be 
sufficiently recommended to the student. He would certainly be rewarded for this labour, by becoming as 
independent as possible of the narrow opinions of his age.' Popper [1983], p.3. 
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been prepared to make her own innovations: have gained a grasp of the weak points of 
favoured contemporary theories, understood potential ways in which they may be 
corrected, and so forth. She would be prepared for, and equipped to deal with, crisis. 
She would be sent forth as scientist proper, rather than as a fettered hack; as a potential 
contributor to our ongoing critical debate, not just a data-collecting parasite replete with a 
misplaced, but deliberately instilled, certitude about 'textbook science'. (If empirical 
evidence is wanted, just watch a few documentaries about work in modern science, or an 
Open University prograrmne, and listen to the scientists speak. AU-too-often they have 
'proved this', 'proved that', and 'proved the third thing'. Invincible but incapable, their 
self-professed power is breathtaking, but also deeply disturbing.) To sum up, then, I find 
that Watkins is right in writing: 
[A] dominant theory may come to be replaced, not because of growing empirical pressure 
(of which there may be little), but because a new and incompatible theory (inspired 
perhaps by a different metaphysical outlook) has been freely elaborated: a scientific crisis 
may have theoretical rather than empirical causes."'' 
Yet remember that what I am about, here, is a discussion of the issue of demarcation. 
And what I take myself to have argued for - but not proven, thank goodness! - is 
precisely that it would be wrong to say, with Kuhn, that 'Only when they must choose 
between competing theories do scientists behave like philosophers''^^; rather, it should be 
said that ''Bad theoretical scientists only behave like good philosophers when they must 
choose between competing theories." (To which it might be added that I suspect there is 
a closer link between theory-choice and theory-construction than this quotation from 
Kuhn suggests.) What is the lesson? That the means by which to demarcate genuine 
'inquiry' from non-inquiry - or bad inquiry, for I should not want to quibble over a word 
- is very, very, simple. It is a matter of attitude, and Popper hit the nail on the head with 
the humble (but perversely controversial) platitude: 
Scientific theories are distinguished from myths merely in being criticisable, and in being 
open to modifications in the light of criticism... [TJhere is only one way to science - or 
to philosophy, for that matter: to meet a problem, to see its beauty and fall in love with it; 
to get married to it, and to live with it happily, till death do ye part - unless you should 
meet another and even more fascinating problem, or unless, indeed, you should obtain a 
solution. But even if you do obtain a solution, you may then discover, to your delight, 
the existence of a whole family of enchanting though perhaps difficult problem children 
for whose welfare you may work, with a purpose, to the end of your days.'^ ^ 
In other words, the method, of all inquiry, is simply criticism, and this must be tempered 
by a willingness to participate in discussion, in a genuine attempt to pursue the truth. 
(Here is the deontological aspect: one must try one's hardest, qua critic, even though 
there is no guarantee that even this wil l lead to success.) To this we may, i f we like, add 
Watkins [1970], p.31 
"*lKuhn-[1965.],p.7— _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Popper [1983], pp.7-8. I can recommend this short introduction to anyone who wants to understand 
what I lake to be the genuine nature of Popper's view, so often obfuscated by placing too much focus on 
Logik der Forschung. 
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some simple rules about presenting one's opinions clearly, stating the problems they are 
intended to tackle as pellucidly as one can, and respecting the views of others - although 
not blithely agreeing with them - in order not to become distracted from the dialectical 
process through personalising the debate. The notion is that we should stick to world 3 -
that of propositions, and their relations - rather than indulge in world 2 issues, in the 
process of inquiry. This is the Socratic Popper, and I , too, am a disciple of Socrates. As 
Boland puts it, in a useful paper that dispels the pervasive image of Popper as a naive 
falsificationist, which was cultivated to some extent by the machinations of Lakatos and 
Feyerabend: 
It is difficult to see how we could have the current textbook-based education system 
without Kuhn's view being correct. It is exacdy the textbook based education system 
that presents an overwhelming obstacle to the appreciation of the Socratic version of 
Popper's view of science that the disciples promote... The presumption taken for granted 
by all followers of the normal view [of Popper as falsificationist] says that we would 
have to justify our knowledge before we can claim to know anything... What is most 
disturbing for Popper's disciples is the presumption that any success in science must be 
due to a practiced scientific methodology. Again, the disciples take the view that 
methodology has no more guarantees than a Socratic dialogue. Unfortunately, 
proponents of the ordinary view of science seem to want more.'^ 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that at least one critic of Popper, namely O'Hear, seems to 
get to grips, albeit partially, with this aspect of his thought. The quotation which heads 
the next sub-section is therefore his, and it is quite refreshing in comparison to the 
discussions in Stove [1982], Newton-Smith [1981], and Putnam [1969]. 
On Criticism, Criticisability, and Fideism 
Rationality, then, consists primarily in eliminating errors and learning from them. This process is 
not peculiar to empirical science, nor is empirical science furthered by empirical testing alone, 
although it is undoubtedly true that change because of empirical testing is one important mark of 
the scientific and serves to distinguish it from conservative and empirically closed systems such 
as African magic... the importance of distinguishing between science and non-science seems to 
diminish in comparison with the importance of distinguishing what counts as a critical as opposed 
to a dogmatic approach in each particular field of activity. - O'Hear'*' 
Platitudes are helpful, particularly when they seem more plausible, and flexible, than the 
strong dictums offered by justificationists. But there is much more to be said on the 
purpose of critical rationalism, and indeed on its proposed procedures.'^^ In particular, I 
Boland [1994]. On the charge levelled at Lakatos and Feyerabend, I take it that their recently published 
correspondence leaves this matter in somewhat less doubt than beforehand. But in any event, it is 
remarkable how reliant on Popper's thought they both are, particularly with respect to the notion that 
rationality must be linked to criticism, if it is to be linked to anything. This, despite whatever personal 
problems they may have had with him. See, for instance, the table in Lakatos and Feyerabend [1999], 
p.216. -
'^ ^ O'Hear [1980], p.l 11 
Here, it should be noted that I am using 'critical rationalism' broadly, to illustrate approaches to 
rationalism that emphasise criticism. As such, I take Bartley's 'comprehensively critical rationalism' 
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follow Bartley in thinking that the trick is to avoid appeals to authority, and to banish 
dogmatism, while simultaneously making no concessions to irrationalism or Fideism. 
And this is what is so beautiful, so wonderful, about the critical rationalist approach, i f it 
can be made to work. There is almost a Stoic flavour to it, which is summed up elegantly 
by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: 
Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when 
thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou 
wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay.'*^ 
Indeed, it might be said that the purpose of critical rationalism is precisely to defend 
reason, while not succumbing to the prominent objection to justificationist progranames, 
which Bartley - in his marvellous The Retreat to Commitment - sums up as being a tu 
quoque. In his words: 
In sum, the belief that rationality is ultimately limited, by providing an excuse for 
irrational commitment, enables a Protestant, or any other irrationalist, to make an 
irrational commitment without losing intellectual integrity. But at the same time, anyone 
who makes use of this excuse may not, in integrity, criticize the holder of a different 
commitment. One gains the right to be irrational at the expense of losing the right to 
criticize. One gains immunity from criticism for one's own commitment by making any 
criticism of commitments impossible... Moreover if everyone has to be a subjectivist, 
there is a sort of consolation: nobody can look in from the outside. Everyone is alone, 
inside his own mirror cage, staring at his own face. No wonder the existentialists are 
bored... The fact remains that anyone who is bored of being bored must answer the tu 
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quoque. 
And centra] to all this, as I hope I have shown throughout my foregoing discussions, 
particularly in 1.2.2-2.5, I I . 1.3, II.2 and II.3, above, is the rejection of appeal to 
justification, qua authority, or indeed any other form of authority. I f I may again quote 
Bartley at some length, since he sums up what I have been arguing against so pellucidly, 
under the flag 'comprehensive rationalism' (which was earlier Popper's phrase): 
The most common conception of rationalist identity, comprehensive rationalism, 
combines two requirements. (1) A rationalist accepts any position that can be justified or 
established by appeal to the rational criteria or authorities; and (2) he accepts only those 
positions that can be so justified... In the stereotyped way in which it is usually told, the 
history of modem philosophy focuses attention on a number of basically subordinate 
questions that arise only if comprehensive rationalism is assumed to be possible. Among 
these, the most important has probably been: What is the nature of the rational authority 
or criterion to which a rationalist appeals to justify all his opinions? The various theories 
of knowledge are functions of the answers philosophers have given to this question. 
These answers fall into two main categories: 
(Bartley [1962]), or 'pancritical rationalism' (Bartley [1984]), to be versions of critical rationalisin, broadly 
construed as the position advocated-in Popper [-1945b]. I come on to discuss differences between-Bartley 
and Popper in short order. 
Antoninus X I I , 22. 
'^ •^  Bartley [1962], p. 103-104 
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(1) According to the intellectualists (or Rationalists - with a capital "R"), the rational 
authority lies in the intellect (or Reason). A rationalist justifies his beliefs by appealing 
to intellectual intuition. 
(2) According to the empiricists, the rational authority lies in sense experience. An 
empiricist justifies his beliefs by appealing to sense observation. 
The history of these answers is one of failure 169 
I take this to show that one of the central contentions of this thesis is deeply unoriginal -
it is all there in this magnificent work of Hartley's'™ - and will therefore take this 
opportunity to make a confession. Al l that has gone before is so many words, so many 
little quibbles, chipping away at the dogmatic fagade that is contemporary philosophy; 
and none of it really matters. It ought never to have mattered. For while I came into this 
through a philosophical issue about science - mark well how much I have read, and all 
the 'authorities' I have cited, faithful examiners! - it may very well have been an issue 
about theology, or even carpentry. And there is a strong sense in which I have contempt 
for much of this work, precisely because of what is expected of it, and therefore found 
within on the basis of a practical recognition, on my part, about how to best get 'a job in 
philosophy'; lengthy references, 'clever' use of words, and discussions of facile 
distinctions entrenched by 'great philosophers'.'^' But where is the integrity in all this? 
It is a constant struggle not to 'sell out', only occasionally tempting to break the 
unspoken 'rules' (which seem, more often than not, to be a pile of f luff designed to make 
us all think we are 'special', qua academics), but nonetheless I continue, despite what 
might be labelled 'an unfortunate - but bloody honest - outburst'. Some unpublished 
comments of Sir Karl spring to mind here: 
This very fact that this... has so many pages and so many people and so much literature, I 
mean all that is somehow really, really wrong, not only an error and not very clever and 
so on, but morally wrong, because it destroys the moral aspect of that attitude.'^ ^ 
Now putting all this to one side, we might first want to ask whether there is really a form 
of critical rationalism that is immune to the tu quoque move that Bartley explains - that is 
fully resistant to the lure of irrationalism - and here we are moved into a rather 
interesting, and long-standing, difference of opinion between Bartley, and the father-
figure Popper. For what Bartley singles out for attack, particularly in his [1965] and 
[1984], is the following passage from Popper's Open Society and its Enemies: 
[WJhoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, without 
reasoning, some proposal or decision, or belief, or habit, or behavior, which therefore in 
its turn must be called irrational. Whatever it may be, we can describe it as an irrational 
Ibid., pp. 109-110 169 
'™ Incidentally, Popper also held it to be 'extraordinary beautiful book' (here, referring to the first edition). 
See appendix B. 
What makes the philosophers in question 'great' is that they are vehicles.for our iearning.how_to reason,. 
and that they flag potential problem-situations. But part of the very process we must undertake is to decide 
what is, and what is not, a genuine problem. And no-one, but no-one, is an authority on that. 
See appendix C . 
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faith in reason... Accordingly, our choice is open. We are free to choose some form of 
irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a 
critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, and its basis in an 
irrational decision (and so far, a certain priority of irrationalism). 
And further, we should note that Bartley's criticism seems to have had some effect, albeit 
minor, prima facie, since there are alterations to this passage in a later addition, which 
reads instead: 
W]hoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or 
unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour, an adoption which 
may be called 'irrational'. Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled 
habit, we may describe it as an irrational/a«Y/j in reason... [Bold typeface illustrates 
changes]'^ * 
What does Popper think about all this, though? Well, note first that in reply to Bartley's 
charge that 'the problem lies not in the demarcation of the scientific from the non-
scientific, but in the demarcation of the rational from the irrational, the critical from the 
uncritical' he writes ' I can only say that I have constantly suggested this (ever since 
1937) to my readers and to my students... I suggested to my students on countless 
occasions that it is greatly clarifying to identify 'the rational' ( I prefer the term 'the 
attitude of rationality') with the critical attitude, with the critical approach to science and 
philosophy.' '^ ^ So whatever else - 1 do not wish to enter into a 'guessing game' about 
the personal relationship between Hartley and Popper, or whether this is really a 'veiled 
confession' on the latter's part - it seems that they fundamentally agreed on this core 
issue. Where they seem to have disagreed is primarily with respect to the means by 
which this attitude need be adopted; and while Popper seems to have understood 
Bartley's project of avoiding the tu quoque in his approach to a critical version of 
rationalism, he had his doubts about whether it could be achieved. 
Now in this regard, some interesting letters from Popper have come into my possession, 
which were written only two years before his death. These are reproduced in ful l , in 
appendix B, but some of the most vital passages are as follows: 
I pointed out that Fideism - with a capital 'F' - was a simple consequence of the fact that 
you cannot rationally establish any theory... Therefore, if you accept (other than 
tentatively) any theory, it can only be on Faith. I then pointed out that my "critical 
rationalism" was in no sense a theory, and I gave them its formulation (O.S. p.225) ' I 
may be wrong and you may be right, and bv an effort, we may get nearer to the truth': 
and I pointed out the effort was a (problem-oriented) critical discussion (as opposed to a 
person-oriented criticism)... the Eideist argument (as opposed to what one might call my 
fideism) was everywhere criticized in my theories... that a scientist should not believe in 
Bartley adds: 'Popper happened to be admirably open and forthright about his fideism, whereas the 
fideistic character of Ayer's and Putnam's positions is not displayed and may not even be recognized by 
them.-This openness-does not-however, solve the problem.' Bartley [1984], p.104-105-
Popper [1945b], p.255 
'"Bartley [1965], p.64 
Popper [1965], p.99 
132 
his theories (though he may believe that they are preferable to certain altemative 
theories)... I recommended my theory attitude (!) to my readers; just as Bill did... 
because I believed it was a god [sic] attitude - indeed, a morally good attitude... Bill, 
obviously, recommended his pancritical attitude to his readers, and that he would have, if 
asked why, to say something similarly fideistic... I should say, now, that the last 
paragraph on p.231 of O.S. may be misleading. I should, instead, have said something 
about Fideism (as here) and pointed out that my (of course, tentative) belief that the 
attitude of critical rationalism should be accepted, although it is a belief, is obviously not 
a form of Fideism... but a form of tentative fideism which, whenever we recommend 
anything, we should hold, if we are intellectually honest.. .this improvement, in verbal 
formulation, I gladly admit, I owe to Bill. Moreover, I ought to eliminate my concession 
to irrationalism, since it misled Bill. (Although I am doubtful on this point: there is an 
irrational element - though not a Fideistic one - in the adoption of any moral attitude -
even if the adoption is, clearly, tentative.).. .it is clear that, according to Bill's 
terminology, I always was what he calls pancritical.'^ ^ 
So to sum up. Popper's idea is that since there is no justification, the choice to adopt a 
particular theory - including, as is relevant here, the theory that one ought to adopt a 
particular attitude, such as the critical attitude - is always 'fideistic' of a fashion. But this 
'fideism' is not necessarily a bad thing, and this goes back to my earlier discussion in 
II.3, where I argued 'that 'taking a risk' on a belief - that is, taking the risk that it is true -
'is not irrafional (nor indeed rational!)' In other words, I think that Popper's use of the 
word 'fideism' here is still extremely misleading, precisely because the view of 
rationality being promoted is based in the willingness to test, and give up that which one 
believes, or that which one accepts. So I would formulate the line so: the ability (or 
willingness) to adopt some beliefs (or classify some statements) and the adoption (or 
classification) thereof is a prerequisite for being rational, in the critical rationalist's 
sense. But in itself, it is neither irrational nor rational: it is, rather, non-rational, in the 
sense that it has nothing to do with being rational. (If clarificaUon is wanted, I take it that 
having a brain might be necessary for being rational, but not that having a brain is being 
rational. // is non-rational. It is this confusion that I think is central.) On the other hand, 
to be irrational is to do a particular thing with the non-rational beliefs that one has 
adopted: to cling on to them, to seek to preserve them at all costs, or to cherish them in 
virtue of their being 'one's own'. That really is Fideism, in Bartley's sense of 
commitment to an idea. 
If I am right, here, then the point is that one should not be committed to critical 
rationalism (or, i f preferred, 'pancritical rationalism'), and provided that one is not -
provided that one is ready to have it tested, examined, and found wanting - then one can 
avoid the tu quoque with which Bartley is, quite rightly, concerned. The key is that the 
proper crifical rationalist allows his own weapon - that of stating a problem clearly, and 
tackling it critically - to be used against him, and even against his theory that this weapon 
itself ought to be adopted. In particular, he will point out that there are at least two ways 
in which to attack this form of rationalism: (a) 'to produce an argument showing that at 
least some of the unjusfified and unjusfifiable critical standards necessarily used by a 
pancritical rationalism-were uncritieizable to-boot, that here, too, something had to be 
Appendix B. 
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accepted as uncriticizable in order to avoid circular argument and r e g r e s s ' ( b ) ' I f it 
could be shown that justification and criticism are generally, or even largely, inseparable 
in principle'.'^^ Indeed, all this might be summed up by saying that critical rationalists 
are really serious about talking to other people, respecting their views, and trying to find 
the truth by this process: deadly serious, in a way that seems to me to be difficult to even 
want to fault, from a deontological perspective. Yet even this can be faulted. For 
instance, it might be shown that a critical rationalist could do so not without relying on 
authorities; that appeal to authority is necessary for inquiry, or that the adoption of 
authority structures is best (or failing that necessary) for human societies, or social 
groups. Indeed, the critic interested in such a line might look to the work of Milgram, 
who suggests: 
(1) organised social life provides survival benefits to the individuals who are part of it, 
and to the group; (2) whatever behavioural and psychological features have been 
necessary to produce the capacity for organised social life have been shaped by 
evolutionary forces; (3) from the standpoint of cybernetics, the most general need in 
bringing self-regulating automata into a coordinated hierarchy is to suppress individual 
direction and control in favour of control from higher-level components; (4) more 
generally, hierarchies can function only when internal modification occurs in the 
elements of which they are composed; (5) functional hierarchies in social life are 
characterised by each of these features, and (6) the individuals who enter into such 
hierarchies are, of necessity, modified in their functioning. 
This said, let us now look to the modes of criticism which are suggested by Hartley, to 
give an overview of how the critical approach might proceed. This, for different 
disciplines might involve different modes of criticism. 
Modes of Criticism and the Friesian Trilemma 
Statements, in short, are not criticisms; methods of attack are. - Miller'^' 
One of Bartley's most interesting complaints about Popper's position - one with which I 
heartily agree, and is highly relevant to this thesis - is the latter's invocation of what 
would seem to be 'conventions', in his discussion of 'The Empirical Basis'. Specifically, 
Popper writes: 
From a logical point of view, the testing of a theory depends upon basic statements whose 
acceptance and rejection, in its turn, depends upon our decisions. Thus it is decisions 
which settle the fate of theories. To this extent my answer to the question, 'how do we 
Bartley [1984],p.l20 178 , 
Ibid., p. 120, f. 11. For even more potential criticisms, see Miller [1994], pp.81-93 
'^ ^ Milgram [1974], p. 149-150. Yet note that I would want to contest this line, for even if Milgram is right 
that 'There is a fatal flaw nature has designed into us, and which in the long run gives our species only a 
modest chance of survival' - see p.205 - it might-be said that we should-do our best-to-strive against- -
allowing ourselves to be manoeuvred into a situation where this flaw has the chance to do damage. And 
here is a link into Popper's political philosophy; the advocacy of the Open Society. 
Miller [1994], p.85 
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select a theory?' resembles that given by the conventionalist... I hold that what 
characterizes the empirical method is just this: that the convention or decision does not 
immediately determine our acceptance of universal statements but that, on the contrary, it 
enters into our acceptance of the singular statements - that is, the basic statements.'^ " 
Now this approach has been criticised by Ayer, in particular, who writes that ' i f 
observation can only motivate but never justify the acceptance of any statement, this 
principle becomes entirely arbitrary'.'^'' Yet Popper's reply is curious in so far as it 
seems to flirt with 'justification' (construed in an externalist fashion): 'Our experiences 
are not only motives for accepting or rejecting an observational statement, but they may 
even be described as inconclusive reasons. They are reasons because of the generally 
reliable character of our observations; they are inconclusive because of our fallibility.'^^'* 
He does not say "They count as inconclusive reasons because we have a theory that our 
observations have a reliable character", and therefore it strikes me that there is a hint of 
vacillation, here, such that this appeal to reliability cannot hold if critical rationalism is to 
be taken seriously. And i f such an appeal is disallowed, then are we not flirting with 
irrationalism, once more? Even in the terms that the critical rationalist should, I think, 
prefer: why treat the theory (T) that our observations have a reliable character any more 
seriously than a given theory (T2) that some observations are being used to test? Is the 
suggestion that we should be committed to T, or accept it on faith? That we should 
dogmatically, or at the very least arbitrarily, accept (some form of) empiricism! 
Bartley's suggestion is that the confusion, here, is due to the fact that Popper framed his 
initial discussion of this issue by employing the trilemma of Fries, which is better 
understood as one dilemma which then induces another. In short, for Fries this runs as 
follows: if one is not to be a dogmatist, then one must be able to justify the statements 
one employs. However, any given statement can only be justified by another statement 
(or statements), thus an infinite regress beckons. Hence, the only remaining alternative is 
to adopt psychologism, and appeal to something like 'knowledge by acquaintance' of 
'facts', 'sense-impressions', or what have you.'^'' But all this, Bartley suggests, is a toy: 
the point is not to play with it, but to understand how its employment might serve to 
promote a search for firm foundations - or a 'ground of knowledge' - in the sense that I 
have attempted to reject, earlier in this chapter.'^^ 
As it happens, however, the solution is remarkably simple, and involves absolutely no 
appeal to authority, or any slip into arbitrary theory selection. Rather, we return to the 
simple idea of assessment of the current state of the ongoing debate, and preference on 
the basis of that assessment. That is, in so far as there is to be 'faith' in anything, this 
would be 'faith' in ourselves: but that can hardly be any sort of 'faith', since we don't 
really have any opdon on this level. (It will not do to disagree by saying we could place 
faith, instead, in 'God's word', or what have you. For we would still need to assume that 
we were capable of identifying said word, understanding it, and so forth! In this sense. 
'^ ^ Popper [1959], pp.108-109 
'^ ^ Ayer-[i974],-p.687 -
184 Schilpp [1974], p.l 114 
On this, I refer the reader back to my discussion in 11.2. 
See Bartley [1984], appendix 3. 
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the critical rationalist approach is at the very least minimal in so far as 'faith' is 
concerned.) The core idea is that we can 'step outside' of theories, with respect to any 
irrational attachment (or commitment) we may have to them. Bartley puts it so: 
The test statements are intended to be hypothetical, and criticisable and revisable, just 
like everything else in the system; there is no justification, no proof, no fixed point 
anywhere. There is nothing "basic" about basic statements. And hence no possibility of 
dogmatism with respect to them. If such basic statements happen to be incompatible with 
a theory, then the theory is false relative to them; and they are false relative to the theory. 
There is no question of theory proving reports wrong, or reports proving theory wrong. 
Both could be wrong: neither is "basic"...One contributes nothing to this situation by 
adding a requirement that one needs to decide by agreement which reports to accept. 
Moreover, Popper is wrong in claiming that the test will have "led nowhere" without 
such an agreement: it will have led either to problematical or unproblematical basic 
statements... one steps outside the positionality of the theory to commit on the state of 
examination of the theory, treating the theory as an object, not as one's point of view, and 
oneself coming from beyond the theory... 
Now my only objection to this is that Bartley does not, I think, go quite far enough. A 
theory can be 'false' relative to some basic propositions (expressed by statements, or 
sentence types, no doubt), yes, but this 'falsity' is in its own turn relative to a particular 
system of logic. ( I say propositions, because there is the additional issue of falsity with 
respect to hermeneutic appraisal of sentence types within a language. And indeed, 
matters become even more complicated when translation functions between languages 
are required - say when the basic statements are in one language, and the theory is in 
another. Failing to mention such difficulties will not, alas, make them disappear.) Still 
further, even at this level - of recognising an inconsistency between a class of basic 
statements and a theory, given a system of logic - we are still fallible. For i f there were 
to be any suggestion that we were not, then some sort of 'ground' to inquiry would be 
advocated here, after all. What we need, instead, is a frank admission that we can change 
the logic, change the basic statements we hypothesise as being acceptable, change the 
theory, change the language in which we work, change our interpretation of the basic 
statements or theory, or throw a whole system out as entirely unworkable. ("There's 
something wrong here, let's try a different approach!", "IVIaybe the way we've set this 
problem up is wrong?", "Maybe there is no real problem here, and we are asking an 
inappropriate question?", and so forth.) But I take this to be precisely the strength of a 
critical approach. It has no boundaries, yet no infinite regress is on the cards: its potential 
is unlimited. 
Before I move on to discuss modes of criticism, however, I should add that I find it 
curious for Miller to characterise the foregoing quotation in a negative light, by writing: 
'For all Bartley's interest in the truth, and his disdain for justification, he seems, by 
dubbing as irrational those unjustifiable decisions that we make in our quest for truth, to 
have lost his nerve at the very last minute.' '^ ^ This, since I think that Bartley does no 
such thing; rather, he endeavours to show precisely how the 'decisions' about what to 
'^^Bartley [1984],p.215 
Miller [1994], p.93 
136 
accept as basic statements are neither arbitrary, nor justifiable, against two 
understandings - 'willkiirliche Festsetzungen' (arbitrary stipulations)'^^, and then 'based 
on general reliability of observation' - suggested by Popper's writing at different points. 
IVIiller is absolutely right that 'the decisions we make about what to accept and 
reject...are constrained throughout by our desire to discover the t r u t h ' . ( T h i s is the 
deontological backbone of critical rationalism.) Yet Bartley himself says: 'One may go 
on to conjecture about which of the reports are accurate: but this is a conjecture, not a 
decision, and may itself be tested accordingly. Hence a theory may be provisionally and 
conjecturally rejected because it conflicts with some less problematic view.' So I think 
the confusion here is just over the word 'decision'. Of course Bartley doesn't rule out 
our 'deciding' in the sense of 'making conjectures about what is right and wrong on the 
basis of discussion', let alone rule this out as irrational, but he does rule out our 
'deciding' in the sense of 'treating something as i f it is conclusively false'. This, since 
treating something as if it is just false - until it comes up for re-examination - is 
sufficient for practical purposes. Thus, I take it that Miller and Bartley - and I , for that 
matter - would agree here, after all. A quick way of putting this is just that all decisions 
are hypothetical, and open to criticism. But all decisions, themselves, are non-rational, 
which is not to say that decision-making is non-rational, or irrational, or that requiring 
that decision-making take place (from time to time) is non-rational, or irrational.^"^^ I f 
this is still unclear, imagine a woman who has had a theory 'pop into her head', and has 
classified it as true in order to test it (and subject it to criticism), versus a man who has 
classified the same theory as true due to a difficult, and drawn out, process of decision-
making (and is still willing to have it subjected to criticism). Does this mean the theory is 
'rationally held' by the man, but not for the woman? No, it might be rationally held by 
both, and this is the sense in which the decision itself (hut not making that decision) is 
non-rational. For we ought not to say the woman should not instead have classified the 
theory as false, but been willing to test it, and willing to revise that classification (by 
appropriate means). And for that matter, the man may have assessed things differently, 
but that would not be irrational. In sum, it is not how we have classified statements (or 
theories) that matters, but how (and when) we go about re-classifying that which we have 
classified: we ought not to swap classifications on mere whim.'^' 
Let us move on to modes of criticism, though, given that some potential objects of 
criticism - statements, theories, systems of logic, and so forth - have been idenUfied 
above. And here, I want to concentrate on theories as objects, since it would seem to be a 
Bartley [1984], quoting Popper, p.214 
'^°Ibid. 
Bartley [1984], p.216 
Remember my discussion of the dispute between Popper and Bartley, and introduction of the 'non-
rational' element, above. 
There is a small possibility that Miller thinks we can just choose to make no decisions, or choose to have 
no beliefs whatsoever. But I do not believe we can make such choices (except in the trivial sense that one 
can kill oneself, or what have you); choices which would remove, as I see it, the very prerequisites of 
rationality. -Killing oneself does not-make-one-irrational, but denudes one-otthepotentialfor being 
rational, although the choice to kill oneself may not be rationally made (on any given occasion). In other 
words, doxastic voluntarism can be true to a degree, without it being true that one can choose to believe 
literally nothing, or choose to make no decisions whatsoever. 
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reasonable posit that any discipline will involve these: metaphysics, as much as physics 
or chemistry. 
Now as our starting point, we might look at a suggestion of Bartley's: 
We have at least four means for eliminating error by criticizing our conjectures and 
speculations. These checks are listed in descending order according to their importance 
and to the rigor with which they may be applied: 
(1) The check of logic: Is the theory in question consistent? 
(2) The check of sense observation: Is the theory empirically refutable by some sense 
observation? And if it is, do we know of any refutation of it? 
(3) The check of scientific theory: Is the theory, whether or not in conflict with sense 
observation, in conflict with any scientific hypotheses? 
(4) The check of the problem: What problem is the theory intended to solve? Does it do 
so successfully?"'* 
This is some sort of start. But first, I do not agree that any one of these tests is more 
'important' than any other; this, for a theory is either true or false, and any means by 
which it can be excluded, if false, is surely as 'important' as any other. Second, I am not 
really sure about what role the 'scientific' plays in the third check: indeed, in so far as 
there is an implication that checking any theory versus a 'scientific' theory is more 
important than checking it against any other theory held in the light of critical discussion, 
I do not like the implications. Why not make mention of metaphysical or mathematical 
theories, in this regard? 
Before being too unfair to Bartley, though, I should mention that in the second edition of 
The Retreat to Commitment, he admits that 'Where such theories are brought into clash 
with scientific theories, and thus are criticizable in terms of these scientific theories, one 
must not assume too readily, however, that the observation-irrefutable but theory-
refutable statement is wrong and the observation-refutable scientific hypothesis is 
right.' '^ ^ This is what one would expect from the architect of pancritical rationalism. 
Indeed we might also expect, and be glad to find from his personal correspondence, that 
he believed 'there is a "check of metaphysics", as well as a check on metaphysics'.'^^ 
And this being the case, we might well want to change (3) to a check on the external 
consistency of a given theory. Call this (3*). 
Still, I take it that this model of modes of criUcism might be improved by invoking the 
distinction between immanent, and transcendent, criticism. Indeed, checks (1) and (4) 
might be thought of precisely as immanent (when we have opted to hold the system of 
'^ ^ Bartley [1962], p. 158 
Bartley [1984], p.204 
Appendix A. 
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logic constant), whereas checks (2) and (3*) are transcendent.And we might ask, 
further, whether there could be other forms of immanent or transcendent criticism. Here 
are a few suggestions, and I draw on Kuhn's notion of 'theoretical virtues', mentioned 
earlier, in order to make some of them: 
(5) The check of simplicity. Does the theory constitute the simplest available way to 
solve the problem it is designed to solve? 
(6) The check of fruitfulness. Has the theory proven fruitful, in conjunction with other 
theories, in suggesting new approaches, disclosing unexpected observations, or serving as 
an auxiliary to allow their testing by observation? 
(7) The check of conceivability (or intuition). Does the theory have any consequences 
which do not, in the current status of the debate, seem conceivable (or to be intuitable)? 
(8) The check of possibility. Is the theory possibly true, in a non-epistemic sense? 
Let me now say a few words about these suggestions, although more (say about scope, or 
accuracy), could be made. With respect to (5), which can be understood immanently and 
transcendently, simplicity is, at the very least, a pragmatic virtue. This is to say, at a bare 
minimum, that the simpler of two theories is better, but only ceteris paribus. But might 
simplicity not also be an epistemic, in so far as truth-conducive, virtue, even i f only in 
ceteris paribus cases of comparison? I think the critical rationalist can remain neutral, 
but entertain the possibility. (There is nothing 'inductive' about such a suggestion.) 
As to (6), which is a transcendent check, it is sometimes the case that a particular theory 
seems to be responsible for great progress, and hence there is a sense in which it is 
natural to want to stick with it for longer, ceteris paribus. So this check is somewhat 
Lakatosian: it is effectively a check on whether the theory constitutes, or is a part of, 
(what currently seems to be, and have been) a progressive research programme.'^^ Is the 
check merely pragmatic, though? I think the answer seems to lie in the affirmative, since 
it is clear that any false theory can nonetheless be useful in a limited class of applications. 
Yet it is equally clear that as long as its employment leads to great successes, it is not 
unreasonable to continue to employ it, even if there are some serious suspicions about its 
falsity. It should be added that there is no tension with respect to the truth-goal, here. 
For example, we might be interested in the truth of the theory (T') that 'Use of theory T 
is still driving technology ahead'. And we might want to invite those with counter-
theories (i.e. incompatible theories) to start employing those, if we suspect T to be false 
on the basis of other checks, in order that we see whether those can be equally as fruitful, 
or even more so. 
''^ Other than (4), there is the check of whether there is a better available solution. But I take that to be 
transcendent. 
'^ ^ There is some controversy-aboul whether Lakatos-stole' the-idea of metaphysical research .programmes 
from Popper's postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery, to which he had access before its publication. 
But his treatment does, at the very least, bridge some gaps between Popper and Kuhn; it is almost a 
synthesis of their views. 
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(7) and (8) I take to be linked, somewhat, since I think that there is - or rather, we ought 
to behave as there is - a link between conceivability and possibility. This is a subject 
dealt with more fully in the next chapter, but it is worth noting that such a suggestion is 
not against the spirit of critical rationalism - since it does not involve the advocacy of 
radical intellectuaUsm (qua the posifing of 'f irm foundafions' for knowledge) - as Popper 
himself makes clear in writing: 
My opinion is that we can readily admit that we possess something which may be 
described as 'intellectual intuition'; or more precisely, that certain of our intellectual 
experiences may be thus described. Everybody who 'understands' an idea, or a point of 
view, or an arithmetical method, for instance, multiplication, in the sense that he has 'got 
the feel of it', might be said to understand that thing inUiitively; and there are countless 
intellectual experiences of that kind. But I would insist, on the other hand, that these 
experiences, important as they may be for our scientific endeavours, can never serve to 
establish the truth of any idea or theory, however strongly somebody may feel intuitively, 
that it must be true, or it is 'self-evident'... Such intuitions cannot even serve as an 
argument, although they may encourage us to look for arguments."' 
Prima facie, the final comment might seem damning. But it is not, because 'sense 
impressions' cannot serve as arguments either, even if there are such things, from 
Popper's, or more generally the critical rationalist's, perspective. On the contrary, it 
might be suggested that arguments emerge out of either intuition, sensory experience, or 
even a subtle interplay of the two. (Indeed, it may be doubted whether observation is 
possible without intuition, or by a being incapable of intuition. But then, the inverse may 
also be doubted, although I am, personally, somewhat less dubious on this score. Call it 
an intuition.) I f our focus is to be on arguments, then let them be assessed on their own 
merits, no matter what their source. But i f there is to be a check (2), then why not a 
check (7)? Or more plausibly, a check (8) in so far as what is intuitable serves to reveal 
or enable arguments for what is possible? Analogously, it may be said that 'sense-
impressions', were there to be such things, could only play a part in allowing observation 
statements to be made; that is, only play a part in allowing a check (2)! I shall try to 
build on this in the next chapter, but should add right now that it seems to me that check 
(I) is a only special case of check (8), in so far as it is a check on strict, or narrow logical 
possibility. Check (8) is, it seems to me, far more fundamental. But I have said enough, 
here, to conclude the discussion of demarcation of inquiry, and will now return to the 
issue of disciplines. 
Demarcating Disciplines 
[M]y subject does not exist because subject matters in general do not exist. There are no subject 
matters; no branches of learning - or, rather, of inquiry: there are only problems, and the urge to 
solve them. A science such as botany or chemistry (or say, physical chemistry, or 
electrochemistry) is, I contend, merely an administrative unit... even serious students are misled 
by the myth of the subject. - Popper^°° 
'^Popper [1945b], p. 18 
-™ Popper [1983], p.5 
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For once, I employ the foregoing quotation because there is an important sense in which I 
strenuously disagree with it. Right, there are no 'subject matters' - subject matters do not 
exist - but I do think that there are different sorts of enfities in the world. That is, entities 
which fall into different ontological categories, and not just different 'categories' qua 
classificatory 'concepts' of a merely conventional bent. Hence, I hold that there may be, 
and plausibly are, different 'forms of inquiry' in so far as they have different sorts of 
object. Yet further, the nature of the very objects under investigation must, I think, 
partially determine the suitable practical means by which the investigation of them is to 
be undertaken - this, given in addition, our capacities and limitations, qua human 
persons. In a trivial sense, I cannot undertake pure mathemafics by wandering around 
looking for triangles to examine, or for infinitely long parallel lines to walk between. 
Nor, indeed, can I attain understanding the pharmacological effects of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (a.k.a. MDMA) without partaking of it, or reading the 
report(s) of one who has. Indeed, in the latter case we might think I need to make 
observations, or examine observation reports - broadly, employ sensory faculties, 
examination of mood, and so forth - whereas in the former, these do not seem to be 
required.^*" 
It would seem appropriate, here, to engage with Popper's arguments against 
'essentialism', i f only because many of the views I advocate have been prompted by his 
work. And although I do not want to do this at great length, because it will detract from 
the positive aspects of what I suggest, I think that his position is summed up rather well 
by the following: 
Methodological essentialism, i.e. the theory that it is the aim of science to reveal essences 
and describe them by means of definitions, can be.. .understood when contrasted with its 
opposite, methodological nominalism. Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing 
really is, and defining its true nature, methodological nominalism aims at describing how 
a thing behaves in various circumstances, and especially, whether there are any 
regularities in its behaviour. In other words, methodological nominalism sees the aim of 
science in the description of the things and events of our experience, and in an 
'explanation' of these events, i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And it 
sees in our language, and especially in those of its rules which distinguish properly 
constructed sentences from a mere heap of words, the great instrument of scientific 
description; words it considers rather as subsidiary tools for this task, and not as names of 
essences. The methodological nominalist will never think that a question like 'What is 
energy?' or 'What is movement?' or 'What is an atom?' is an important question for 
physics; but he will attach importance to a question like: 'How can the energy of the sun 
be made useful?' or 'How does a planet move?' or 'Under what condition does an atom 
radiate light?''"' 
One might argue that an individual without sensory faculties could not come to grasp the notion of a 
triangle, but this is beside the point. and Lmight accept it despite being doubtful. Eor once 'triangle' is 
grasped, the examination of triangles, qua geometrical entities, becomes possible without observation, or 
employment of observation statements. 
-°- Popper [1945aJ,p.30 
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I suspect, however, that I am not the only one to find this discussion somewhat confusing, 
particularly because Popper advocates what he calls 'metaphysical realism' - something 
like transcendental realism - elsewhere, such as in Realism and the Aim of Science. But 
we must notice that there are two distinct components to what he calls 'methodological 
essentiahsm': first, the view that things have a genuine essence, but second, that one 
should proceed by attempting to define the true nature of things. Yet I think that these 
two component views ought to be separated, as I shall now try to explain. 
On the face of it, it would seem that there are three different ways to ask a 'what is' 
question. First, one may ask this in the sense that one presumes (is committed to the idea 
that) there is such a thing to be inquiring into the nature of Yet second, one may ask this 
in the sense that one wonders i f there really is such a thing to be inquiring into the nature 
of: one is trying to work that out. And third, one may ask it simply in the sense that one 
wants to understand the use of the relevant word, say in a particular context; this use is 
generally translatable into 'What do you mean by x?', or some such. 
In order to disentangle this potenfial mess, though, we should note that to ask 'On the 
assumption that there are such things as electrons, what are their essential and accidental 
properties?' - the second sense of the 'what is' question - surely does not seem 
unreasonable. Indeed, it would seem curious to want to prevent scientists from making 
posits such as 'A necessary property of an electron is that it has a definite rest mass, y, 
the value of which we can investigate by means of an arbitrary unit of mass'; to suggest 
that there is something radically wrong about such an approach. But on the other hand, 
we can see the danger in one physicist claiming that another simply wasn 't talking about 
electrons any more, because in their theory, 'electron' did not ' f i t the definition' of 
'having a definite rest mass, y'. Further, it would be danger for a physicist to just 
presume, or be committed to the idea, that there really are electrons, in the sense of the 
first question. 
The point would seem to be, then, that we might agree with the thrust of Popper's 
objection to a particular methodological approach which is rather uncritical; but in spite 
of the problems with such an approach, this does not speak as to whether there are 
essences for us to discover. And to be more specific, we might discuss the potential uses 
of terms in language. For instance, is it unclear to me that particular terms can never 
properly refer to specific entities, perhaps even rigidly designate as suggested by Kripke. 
Yet likewise, it is unclear to me that sometimes we cannot use a term in the sense of an 
(implicit) definite description (viz. with such a descripfion in mind, in a Neo-Russellian 
fashion), or even in the sense o/the particular types of entity referred to by the term, in 
virtue of their potential uses (which would seem to be somewhat Wittgensteinian). Let 
us take a specific example: imagine I tell you that I can conceive of water not being H2O. 
One of the first questions that should be asked is whether I take the term to be reference-
fixed, or not. 
There are difficulties here, no doubt, but I do not think it would do to exaggerate these. 
For instance, were I to be asked "Do you have a dog?", I woTird'not reply "Actually; I 
have several", in virtue of the fact that I own several stuffed toys which are, in one sense 
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of the word, 'dogs'. (And the question 'Are toy dogs really dogs?' is, I think, silly.) 
Likewise, I do not know of any metaphysicians that suggest we ought to find a mere 
definition of 'property', say in the sense of 'real estate'! Instead, (revisionary) 
metaphysicians tend to abhor the notion that they are playing mere 'language games', or 
are involved in the simple 'clarification of concepts'. (They are violently opposed to the 
Wittgensteinian view of philosophy.) On the contrary, they take themselves to be 
engaged in the task of distinguishing between distinctions which are merely conventional 
and those that are not: and no-one, to the best of my understanding, is currently claiming 
that this is a matter of presenting mere 'definifions'. This aside, though, can they really 
do what they think they are doing? A reasonable view would seem to be that they cannot 
do any harm in the attempt, provided it is undertaken critically. And besides, even 
metaphysical nominalists need to posit some sort of ontological foundation(s); without 
doing so, they would find themselves precisely in the infinite regress (or circularity) of 
definitions which Popper employs as one of his arguments against methodological 
essentialism. 
A clear example of what Popper inveighs against was presented to me this very day, 
while watching Newsnight. With respect to the contemporary crisis in Darfur, some 
politicians seem obsessed with working out whether what is happening fits the definition 
of 'genocide' adopted by the U.N. But this sort of semantic nonsense is abhorrent, given 
the situation; it doesn't even approach the real problem, or how we ought to respond to it. 
Indeed, one even has suspicions that to indulge in such a process - a quibble over 
'genocide' - is part of the process of deflection: a flimsy veil thrown over a washing of 
hands, and an unwillingness to tackle the matters of genuine importance. 
But putting this to one side, it amused me somewhat when I found the following footnote, 
which would seem to state clearly where Popper stood, and put an end to any confusion: 
I do not take up any position towards the metaphysical problem of universals, i.e. towards 
the metaphysical problem of nominalism versus essentialism (a term which I suggest 
should be used instead of the traditional term 'realism'); and I certainly do not advocate a 
metaphysical nominalism, although I advocate a methodological nominalism. The 
opposition between nominalist and essentialist definitions made in the text is an attempt 
to reconstmct the traditional distinction between 'verbal' and 'real' definitions.^ "'^  
So by extension, we might think that Popper did not want to advocate any metaphysical 
position at all, with his comments on 'essentialism': not on the question of properties, but 
also not on the questions of relations, natural kinds, and so forth. Al l this would seem to 
remain open, and thus I will now return to the issue of demarcation, taking it that what I 
suggested in the first paragraph of this sub-section, above, is in no way in conflict with 
the critical rationalist view advocated beforehand. 
But thankfully, I take it that there is now little need to say too much more. A proper 
discipline - not a 'discipline' qua useful administrative unit - ought to have its own 
distinctive objects. This is the fundamental 'demarcation criterion' for disciplines. 
-"^  Popper [1945b], p.322, f.38. 
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although such 'demarcation' is, I think, hardly very important. But further, in so far as 
there may be methodological differences, the nature of those objects (or more pertinently, 
our possible means of investigating them, in virtue of our nature and theirs) will serve to 
partially determine the types of checks employed in the discipline. This is a subsidiary 
'demarcation criterion', in so far as it is parasitic on the first: for instance, there is no 
'check of observation' (2) in pure mathematics, nor need there be. In fact, I take it that 
this should be pretty uncontroversial: we adapt our tools, critical or otherwise, to the task 
at hand (or the investigation being attempted, on our understanding of what might be out 
there). We have to have some idea of what we are looking for, before we work out how 
to look for it. 
However, a result that I did not expect is that it seems plausible, under such a view, to say 
that there is no such discipline as 'science', and indeed no such discipline as 
'philosophy', although there is history of those who have been labelled "scientists", and 
likewise "philosophers". (One can, of course, use discipline words in order to pick out 
groups of thinkers who work on similar sorts of problems, engage with one another's 
work, and so forth; but I am not interested in a socio-historical account of how the mere 
conventions of 'disciplines' emerge.) Yet on the other hand, there might be 'physics', 
'metaphysics', 'chemistry', and so forth; that is, there would seem to be such distinctive 
disciplines, going by the status of our ongoing critical debate. And I should also point 
out that there are resources in my account to explain reduction: how 'acoustics' could 
have been found to have no distinctive object, in so far as one that was not already being 
studied in a different area of physics. But there couldn't be any essential 'scientific 
method' because there is no science in an essential sense. There couldn't be any 
essential 'philosophical method' because there is no philosophy in an essential sense. 
Rather, inquiry is continuous. And in saying this, I hope that I could hardly be accused of 
partisanship. 
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I l l 
DESTRUCTIVE REALISM: NATURAL SCIENCE WITH A 
METAPHYSIC OF IMPOSSIBILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The time has now come for me to attempt to be more creative, and this is an early 
indication that I will say much that is false - but mistakenly think is true - in this final 
chapter. After all, 'throwing spanners into the works' is the task of the critical 
rationalist, or more generally the Socratic philosopher, and this is really the limit of 
my skill, if I have any; only if I am lucky, will I chance upon a few hypotheses that 
are true. 
Herein, I shall attempt to fulfil two distinct tasks. First, to give an overview of how 
metaphysics might be possible, and what it might involve, building upon the findings 
in the previous chapter. Second, to employ this view - which will be (and ought to 
be) little more than a sketch' - in order to provide a counter to some of the 
contemporary 'anti-metaphysics' arguments offered by van Fraassen, and in particular 
his Empirical Stance. And while I shall end without offering a tiresome definition of 
'Destructive Realism', it should emerge that it involves a meeting of pancritical 
rationalism with a realist take on metaphysics - one which is deeply modal - but 
leaves much room for manoeuvre with respect to the fine details. After all, what I 
seek to motivate is a particular view on natural science, via something like an election 
manifesto: I do not want to suggest that it is entirely unproblematic, or to make it so 
specific that only I could find it appealing, or worthy of a bet. 
I start by examining whether there might be any link between conceivability and 
possibility, and try to motivate not only the notion that the metaphysically possible is 
ideally conceivable, but also that the ideally conceivable is metaphysically possible. 
This, when that which is ideally conceivable is construed as that which is not only 
conceived of (by whomever), and formulated for public examination, but also stands 
up to all the criticism that is heaped upon it. My argument for this will be primarily 
epistemic, to wit that we ought to accept that this is the case - although it might not be 
- not only in order to motivate inquiry, but also to provide ourselves with a possibility 
space for our empirical investigations, aimed at uncovering what is actually the case. 
For were we to take (strict or narrow) logical possibility as our starting point, our task 
- our quest for the truth - would seem to be insurmountable. And needs must we try 
to eliminate some logical possibilities, as well as some potential actualities, if we are 
to have any chance of pressing ahead: of generating theories of greater verisimilitude, 
or at least recognising more false theories for what they are. The significance of all 
this might be summed up quite neatly in modal logic: ~0p —> ~p. 
Second, I attempt to motivate the view that one of the things we ought to hold open to 
examination is our very modes of explanation, and provide a defence of the claim that 
' Like Popper, I think it best to oversimplify in order to give an outline of a methodology, rather than 
become embroiled in technicalities that distract attention away from the broader issues. 
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Aristotelian aixva would still seem to be up to the task, when understood as broad 
'becauses', as may have been implied by II. 1. And if I am right, then it is interesting 
to note how long we have been employing these, and how there is a metaphysical 
heart to the very search for explanation, rather than mere description. As such, this 
would be another nail in the coffin of anti-metaphysical approaches to inquiry, let 
alone those to natural science: conventionalism, instrumentalism, constructive 
empiricism, and so forth. 
Third, I should like to tie up my view of metaphysics, by providing an argument that 
metaphysical systems constitute one of the most useful means by which to criticise 
logical systems - in terms of II.4, that we can apply a 'check of metaphysics' to our 
logic (or logics) - just because logic is underpinned by metaphysics. This emerges 
through a discussion of the truth goal, and in particular the theory of truth that we are 
to adopt, which I take to have a radical effect on our potential models of how truth-
preservation comes about, and how we might achieve this. In short, I shall urge that 
since the debate about substantive theories of truth can only be conducted on 
fundamentally metaphysical grounds, and the matter of which theory of truth we 
accept will affect which arguments we prefer, it turns out that logics, and particularly 
revisions to a given system of logic, are subsidiary to metaphysical considerations. 
With my view of metaphysics motivated and partially outlined, I shall move on to 
tackle some of van Fraassen's recent arguments for empiricism, and the adoption of 
an Empirical Stance. In the fourth section, I will tackle the theoretical-observable 
distinction which has been historically central to empiricist accounts of science, and is 
vital to motivate either instrumentalism or constructive empiricism. Through a 
discussion of perception, I shall argue that this distinction has no significance 
whatsoever - indeed, that it is fallacious - although I shall maintain that there is an 
ontological distinction between 'observable entity' and 'non-observable entity', as 
well as an entirely different epistemic distinction between 'theoretical entity' and 
'observed entity'. There is an extent to which this argument builds upon that in II.2, 
in so far as I take it that to appeal to sensory faculties as epistemic authorities is 
unacceptable. 
In the final section, I will attempt to argue that realist metaphysics is in fact 
compatible with not only constructive empiricism, but also some sort of empirical 
stance, even if my arguments about perception are incorrect. In particular, my goal 
will be to defuse van Fraassen's arguments against such metaphysics from an 
immanent perspective, and show further how his invocation of 'stances' is insufficient 
to tackle the view of the pancritical rationalist who is also a metaphysician. As such, I 
shall endeavour to show that the empiricist toolbox provides no specific anmiunition 
to tackle destructive realism, as opposed to scientific realism (which the destructive 
realist opposes for some shared reasons): indeed that destructive realism is a more 
austere position, in so far as it involves a complete rejection of ampliative inferences 
with respect to context of justification. 
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1. T H E POSSIBILITY OF C O N C E I V A B I L I T Y 
I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created 
by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. - Descartes 
The time has now come for me to offer my account of how metaphysics is possible. 
And since this account will itself be metaphysical, which is alas unavoidable, it must 
be taken as a premiss that we can and do perform metaphysics, as I have tried to 
suggest in the previous chapter. 
However, my angle differs from that of many metaphysicians, for instance Lowe, 
whose approach is to 'get on and do' metaphysics, in the belief that the proof lies in 
the pudding.^  For what I wish to do is to champion realist metaphysics from an 
epistemological, and rationalistic, perspective. To argue that reason is the sine qua 
non of not only agency, but also inquiry, in the manner so beautifully suggested by 
Blanshard: 
You are under the constraint of an order that you did not make. To the extent that 
you succeed in thinking rationally, your reasoning is under the control of a reason, in 
the sense of a framework of necessary relations, that is independent of you. You 
think as you do because it is not merely you that guides the thinking; you have 
surrendered yourself to an external and logical order along whose lines you find 
yourself carried... As Plato saw, [man] is in process of escape from a realm of flux 
into a timeless realm of essences, of mastering nature and his own human nature 
through understanding it. 
Philosophy, as I conceive it, is a persistent attempt to satisfy the theoretical impulse; 
such satisfaction is achieved only when the question Why? has been finally answered; 
and that answer in turn is achieved only with the grasp of necessity. But granting that 
thought is thus seeking necessity and can be fully satisfied with nothing less, how do 
we know the world will supply it? The fact is that the hunger for understanding no 
more guarantees an intelligible world than a hunger for caviar ensures all we want of 
it. May we not at any time stumble upon a thing or event that is so unconnected with 
anything around it as to be unintelligible - not only beyond our grasp at the moment, 
but essentially and forever inexplicable? The existence of such an element can hardly 
be denied a priori. On the other hand no hopelessly opaque surd seems yet to have 
appeared... And it would be gratuitous defeatism to launch the enterprise of 
understanding the world with the assumption that it cannot succeed. In raising the 
question Why? it is surely reasonable to assume there is an answer to be found, 
whether in fact we find it or not... unless at every step of the inquiry one can assume 
that intelligibility lies ahead, there would be no point in going on. The ultimate 
intelligibility of things is thus the working postulate of a rationalist philosophy... as 
Locke put it, God did not make man merely two-legged and leave it to Aristotle to 
make him rational.. ^ 
Now all this is just to provide some sort of orientation point; to make it clear which 
stance it is that I find myself in, although this is not entirely by design. Rather, it is as 
^ In short, persuasion of -the enemies of metaphysics' is not his end, nor does he think it ought to_be. 
This is suggested by the manner in which Lowe [1998] and Lowe [2002] begin, and corroborated by 
personal discussions. 
^ Schilpp (ed.) [1980], pp.130-134. 
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a result of my optimistic approach to our epistemic predicament, and my views on 
perception, the means by which we learn, and (the limitations of) natural science. In 
particular, to pre-empt III.4,1 hold that if perception fails us systematically but reason 
does not, then we are in a better position than we would be if reason were to fail us, 
just because perception requires reason; this, for as Blanshard puts it, 'perception is 
judgement... not mere sensation'.'* Indeed, any mechanical thing can respond 
successfully to stimulae, with respect to preserving its function, or maintaining its 
existence, through its nature or pure 'Darwinian luck'. But we are not machines, or 
sophisticated forms of virus. We are sentient. We have a choice about what we do 
and do not believe, how we do and do not act, which brings with it responsibility.'^  
So in short, I would say it is rational to hope - on fundamentally pragmatic grounds -
that we are powerful but nonetheless fallible, rather than powerless and infallible, like 
a stone or a Kantian human would seem to be. I would also add that rational hope-
making is not rational-belief making: the direction of fit between hope and belief is 
quite different, albeit that one might very well want to trim one's hopes to believed 
possibilities, in most circumstances. 
Conceivability and Transworld Modality 
Oftentimes, arguments in philosophy - even in natural philosophy and everyday life -
involve the following a priori move: one can conceive that p, therefore it is possible 
(in some sense) that p. Plausibly, such moves motivate many investigations, and are 
critical in decision-making: consider what motivated (in part) the search for Neptune, 
or what the man who wishes to park his car is doing when he slows it, and looks at the 
gap between two parked vehicles. Indeed, in the case of acts of imagination, which 
might be taken to be a sub-set of conceptions proper - here, I classify the former, for 
convenience, as acts involving the mental construction of one, or more, potential 
sensory perceptions - recent work in child psychology, involving children as young as 
two years old, has suggested that they are indispensable: 
it is not likely that children engage in imaginings that are not inferentially constrained 
and then learn somehow to constrain them... In one experiment children are shown a 
range of soft toy animals. There is also an empty cup which the children are 
encouraged to imagine is full of water. The cup is up-ended over one of the animals: 
the lion, say. The children will spontaneously imagine that the lion is wet, though the 
animal is in fact dry (since the up-ended cup was in fact empty) and no one has 
mentioned the idea of it being wet.^ 
But allow me to put such empirical claims aside, and start my task by introducing two 
operators, for much of that which follows will be couched in modal (or doxastic) 
logic, for purposes of clarity.^ Let Dt mean 'it is transworld necessary that', or 'it is 
the case in all possible worlds that'. Let 0, mean 'it is transworld possible that', or 'it 
Ibid., p. 134. 
• I am aware of the issue of doxastic involuntarism, but agree with Steup [2000] that we exert indirect 
control over our beliefs through many of our actions. 
"CurrieUOOZl.p.lO?.- _ 
' A caveat: I must emphasise that this is purely for purposes of clarity; as an accompaniment to the 
arguments in the text. I do not value formalism for its own sake, do not require the formalism for my 
arguments, and do not want to create the impression that I am doing formal logic, here. 
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is the case in some possible worlds that'. Now let S5 hold as far as these operators 
are concerned. For instance, 
p ^0,p 
• t P ^ P 
• t P - > OtP 
n , n t . . . p ^ D , P 
O A . . . P ^ o,p 
•tO,p ^ OtP 
O A p ^ D t P 
Now all this is, I should hope, reasonably uncontroversial. (I am not going to enter 
into detailed criticisms of S5 logic here, for reasons that I hope shall become clear. 
For these operators, I will just take it that it is 'pretty much' right, since even if a 
slightly different system is required, this would not have a great deal of impact on my 
overarching model.) I call this S5 transworld modality, or S5TWM for short. 
But next I want to introduce another operator, and specify its relation to those outlined 
above. I call it the conceivability operator, ©, and it stands for 'It is clearly and 
distinctly conceivable that'. Fundamentally, I have it that it obeys the following rule: 
©p OtP Weak Conceivability-Possibility Axiom (WCPA) 
I call this a 'weak' axiom because it is not as strong as the one that will follow: it 
simply says that t/something (say a state-of-affairs, which can be represented by a 
proposition) is clearly and distinctly conceivable, then it is the case in some possible 
worlds (or both some possible worlds and all possible worlds, since Dtp Otp). For 
example, if a blue swan is clearly and distinctly conceived here, then the truth of 
'There exists a blue swan' is thereby conceived, and hence there is at least one 
possible world in which 'There exists a blue swan' is true, because there is a blue 
swan therein. For if it is (actually) conceived that p, then it is clearly conceivable that 
P-
The most obvious objection to this is an old one: what distinguishes a 'clear and 
distinct' conception from one that is not, in fact, 'clear and distinct'? My answer is 
rather brief: all proper conceptions are 'clear and distinct', in the same way that all 
proper perceptions are 'clear and distinct'. And to this, I must add that I cannot easily 
explain in words what it is for one to have a 'clear and distinct' conception, any more 
than I can specify what it is for one to have a 'clear and distinct' perception. I cannot 
properly describe how foggy our experiences are when dreaming, or having partaken 
of LSD, any more than I can describe what it is to watch the sun setting over Durham 
cathedral while as sober as a judge. (This, although were I a sufficiently skilled 
writer, I could no doubt evoke the image for some readers.) Nevertheless, it might be 
thought that this claim is deeply problematic, in so far as one might claim to conceive 
of something - say the truth of a proposition - and therefore that it is possible, when 
one has not. To which I reply that there are many people who claim to see 
abominable snowmen, ghosts, or the Loch Ness monster, and therefore that these are 
actual; we do our best to test such claims as a commulTity, and those about"what can 
be conceived are open for investigation just as are those about what can be perceived. 
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(Besides, I hold that perception requires a conceptual component in experience 
anyway. No perception without conception.) It should also go without saying that 
some may be able to perceive better (or less well) than others, and the same is the case 
with conception. 
A second objection might be that I would suggest we are near-omnipotent, or that I 
would have us be more powerful, and insightful, than we really are. But to this it may 
be said that I have not directly mentioned humans at all, just yet: the axiom refers to 
genuine acts of conception, which may or may not be human in nature. And still 
further, in continuing to answer this second objection while tackling a potential third, 
I should answer those who would make the accusation that 'conceivable' is precisely 
a modal notion - Ladyman levels a similar charge at van Fraassen for his use of 
'observable'^  - by pointing out that I thoroughly agree. All that WCPA says is that if 
there is a possible world such that p is conceived in that world, atemporally speaking, 
then p is the case in some possible worlds. At the bare minimum, then, if p is 
conceived in just one world then p must be the case in at least one world - and this 
may or may not be the world in which p is, in fact, conceived. 
A final potential objection is one to which I will return, and will continue to dog my 
efforts. How could it be the case that we could have a faculty such that we could, 
inter alia, stretch out to other 'possible worlds'? (That is, given that I will obviously 
want to introduce humanity into my picture at some stage.) At first blush, it might 
seem that this would necessitate the genuine existence of possible worlds, say as 
maximally consistent sets of propositions, maximally consistent possible states of 
affairs (as Plantinga would have it), or even spatio-temporally bounded separate 
'universes' (as Lewis would have it). And in some of these cases, it might seem that 
we would need to have some sort of extra spatio-temporal ability, or power, to delve 
into these different worlds simply by entering into reflection, or by doing, for 
example, geometry. (Properly conceiving of particular possibilities may not always 
be a matter of mere reflection, of course.) I will put this aside for the moment, 
however, since I actually wish to go further than endorsing just the weak 
conceivability-possibility axiom, which can stand or fall irrespective of the following 
strong version: 
©p 0,p Strong Conceivability-Possibility Axiom (SCPA) 
Of course, if the WCPA raised the reader's eyebrow, then this is liable to raise both, 
and perhaps even the edge of the lip. For the SCPA says, inter alia, that if there is a 
possible world such that p, then there is also a possible world in which it is conceived 
that p. But before I continue, let me pause to reiterate what I said at the beginning of 
this section, and remind the reader of Blanshard's principle of rationalism: to 
emphasise, again, that I want to make the recommendation that we accept this thesis 
as true on an optimistic and pragmatic basis. So while I am quite happy to confess 
that I personally believe in the truth of this axiom, I do not hold forth my arguments 
as being sufficient to demonstrate such. Rather, I seek to motivate its acceptance, on 
methodological grounds, and the positive argument for this, which I call 'the 
argument from the killer possibility', is as follows: 
Ladyman [2000]. 
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If we take seriously the notion that there is a possibility that we could not ever 
recognise, then we must entertain the notion that its consequences might, likewise, be 
entirely inconceivable. But then, they might literally be anything; anything, that is, in 
so far as conceivable and inconceivable simultaneously - whether we could ever 
challenge the law of non-contradiction is irrelevant - or an amalgamation of 
conceivable and inconceivable elements. Now one barely conceivable consequence 
of all this is that we have opened up a can of worms: to admit just one inconceivable 
possibility can be, in virtue of our very inability to conceive of that possibility, to 
admit an infinite number of inconceivable possibilities. This, for that very 
inconceivable possibility might be precisely such that it entails, in a fashion we cannot 
comprehend, an infinite number of inconceivable possibihties. And so forth. 
So the point, here, is that to admit just one inconceivable possibility might as well be 
to reject any link between conceivabtlity and possibility, even a partial one. And as 
such, even scepticism about what would seem to be actual, Cartesian scepticism, 
would not seem to be a relevant concern. For why bother to talk about anything, from 
physical object to malin genie, when it is not a genuine possibility? Why even try to 
inquire, when inquiry is not even a genuine possibility, as far as we can tell? Why 
even give up on inquiry? Radical relativism would seem advisable (and perhaps not 
advisable); mysticism preferable (and perhaps not preferable). 
With this infuriatingly weird argument given, however, let me first try to show a 
couple of basic results that follow from SCPA when it is combined with S5TWM: 
•,p Premiss 
• i P 0,p S5TWM Necessity-Conceivability 
©p <r^ 0,p SCPA 
.-.©p 
p Premiss 
p —> Otp S5TWM Actuality-Conceivability 
©p <^ 0,p SCPA 
.-.©p 
I think that these theses speak for themselves; they knit together in a fashion that is 
elegant (even if completely wrong). So second, it will be useful to pick up on the 
effect of introducing negations into the SCPA, and to show precisely how this is not 
problematic, while also taking the opportunity to cite some specific examples of (what 
are plausibly) transworld laws. I will be concerned, here, with the following two 
results: 
©~p Ot~p SCPA Negative (SCPA-) 
~©p ~Otp Negative SCPA (-SCPA) 
(N.B. The negative sign at the end of SCPA denotes negation introduction with 
respect to the operands, and the negative sign at the beginning of SCPA denotes 
negation introduction with respect to the operators. Neither SCPA"- or -SCPA should 
be confused with axioms themselves.) 
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Now let p be the following: 'There is an entity, such that said entity is a triangle, and 
said entity does not have three sides'. So if T stands for 'is a triangle', and 3 for 'has 
three sides', then p may be expressed as: 3x(Tx & ~3x). And let us take it - as is 
plausibly the case - that it is both conceivable that not-p and indeed not-conceivable 
that p. (Here, I make some sort of non-truth-preserving leap from 'it has not been 
conceived that' to 'it is not conceivable that', in the latter case, yet we must remain 
aware that I have not said anything which would support such a move, just yet. This 
is an outstanding issue.) Now from SCPA-, it follows that it is possible that 'There is 
not a triangle without three sides', and hence that there is at least one possible world 
in which there does not exist an entity such that said entity is a triangle, and does not 
have three sides; in logical notation, 0,{~3x(Tx & ~3x)}. But from -SCPA, it also 
follows that it is not transworld possible that 'There is a triangle without three sides'; 
in other words, that there is a triangle without three sides in any possible world; in 
logical notation ~0,{3x(Tx & ~3x)}, and from S5TWM, •,{~3x(Tx & ~3x)}. In this 
case, then, 0t{~3x(Tx & ~3x)} because •,{~3x(Tx & ~3x)}, as we should expect from 
S5TWM. 
But what of a statement necessarily true due to a law of logic, such as that of non-
contradiction? Let p be 'Ferdy is a female fox and Ferdy is not a female fox', and our 
premises be ©~p and ~©p. We have two results. From SCPA-, it follows that Ot~p; 
that is, it is the case in some worlds that 'It is not the case that Ferdy is a female fox 
and Ferdy is not a female fox'. From -SCPA, it follows that ~Otp; it is not the case in 
any possible worlds that 'Ferdy is a female fox and Ferdy is not a female fox'; thus, 
•,~p. 
Of course, all this should draw to our attention that the introduction of negation with 
respect to both operator and operand has a similarly useful, and interesting, result: 
~©~p ~0,~p -SCPA-
This means that if it is not conceivable that it is not the case that p, then it is not the 
case that it is transworld possible that not-p. (And vice versa.) But this amounts 
precisely to saying that it is transworld necessary that p; that is to say, that it is the 
case that p is true in all possible worlds. (It is not conceivable that not-p, if p is true 
in all possible worlds.) For in logical terms, it is a consequence of S5TWM that ~Ot~p 
- there is not some world such that not p - entails Dtp. And hence that -SCPA- may 
be rewritten as ~©~p <-> Dtp, just as -SCPA may be rewritten as ~©p <-> Dt-p. 
However, even given these examples, it remains plausible that there are entities (or 
states-of-affairs) that can be conceived of yet would seem to some to be impossible, 
and to be referred to as 'impossible' in common parlance. For example, I have been 
asked whether a two-headed swan (or 'There exists a two-headed swan') is 
conceivable, and when I affirmed that this is so, I was then asked a more interesting 
question: 'Is a swan with the same physical composition as a duck conceivable, and 
thus possible?'^ My answer was unhesitatingly in the affirmative, since the question 
was open to several interpretations (and I selected the most lenient). What am I 
getting at? This brings me on to the next section of my account. ' 
I owe these examples to Richard de Blacquiere-Clarkson. 
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Nomological Possibility 
How could 'a swan with the same physical composition as a duck' be construed? 
Well first, this may be taken to suggest that there is a possible world in which swans 
have the same physical composition as ducks (or in which one swan has the same 
physical composition as one duck) because the laws therein make this, or are 
consistent with this being, the case. I say this is possible, for example, because it 
could be a world such that a particular physical composition (or range of 
compositions) created a system whereby there was a propensity for the emergence of 
a swan, and a propensity for the emergence of a duck. (That is, such that one, or the 
other, must emerge.) Whatever else, this is not ruled out on a priori grounds. 
However, this sort of claim brings issues of reference to bear. For by using 'swan' the 
questioner might take it that he rigidly designates - in a Kripkean sense - a particular 
natural kind in this world. And he may go on to claim that it is precisely an essential 
property of a swan (hence any swan) that it is has, say, 'swan DNA'. Likewise, he 
may take 'duck' in a similar fashion. 
My answer to this begins with my pointing out that we were all quite capable of 
picking out swans, and referring to swans, before it was established - if it has been 
established - that swans have DNA. That is to say, swans were proper objects of 
inquiry well before DNA had even been conceived of, and there were no significant 
problems (as far as we are aware) in recognising them. So my point (in answering in 
the affirmative to the overarching question) must, then, be understood as follows: we 
could have found out that swans did not have DNA. (I must emphasise that I am not 
conflating epistemic and metaphysical possibilities here; by 'we' I mean something 
like 'our counterparts in different possible worlds'.) That what we called 'swans', or 
even better 'the bodies of swans' were, instead, otherwise composed. Against the 
BCripkean quibble, I can simply say that //"it is supposedly the case that it is 
'metaphysically impossible' {a posteriori) for what we once meant by 'swan' to not 
have DNA, then there could only ever have been one metaphysical possibility to 
consider, in this regard. As such, it would be a mystery to me why anyone should 
want to say that realist metaphysics had anything to do with, let alone was necessary 
for, the practice of natural science. Rather, would it not be the case that people 
conceived of a lot of metaphysically impossible things, but could only discover they 
were impossible by experience! If so, then 'metaphysically impossible' would seem 
to be readily substituted by 'false' - at least in this sort of instance - and this is 
precisely what the austere empiricist wants to hear. (If this is the account, then I think 
one may as well be an empiricist. One may say that we have mere imaginings that are 
confronted by experience, and that experience is sufficient to enable us to rule some 
of them out as false. No 'special science' of metaphysics, based on distinct 
capacities, in required in such a picture.'*^ ) 
My point is that swans admit of a great deal of variance. Not all swans need have 
feathers, have two wings, and so forth, in order to be swans. So why, then, should it 
'° This is only supposed to be an argument for my view when it is opposed to the Kripkean or Lowean 
alternatives, of course. 
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be metaphysically necessary that they have DNA? (It is not even as if this alone 
marks out a swan, rather than the dead body of a swan, after all.) Might it not be the 
case, instead, that there is an ideal form of the swan, and a variety of entities that 
resemble that form to a greater or lesser extent? (This is meant to be as Platonic as it 
sounds, although I do not want to suggest that such forms are world transcendent, or 
supernatural.) Under such a view, the important question is one of how far an entity 
must diverge from such an ideal, with respect to its properties (and so forth), in order 
to cease to be a swan. And although there are grey areas here, some things do seem to 
be clear. For example, a change of colour, or size, is not obviously sufficient - and I 
urge the reader, again, to cast aside any presuppositions about DNA, or so forth - to 
make a swan into a non-swan. Removal of anima, or the ability to 'self-move', as 
well as undergo any substantial change whatsoever, would seem on the other hand to 
deny the entity in question its very classification as an organism, as Lowe argues." 
Further, and again with sympathy to Lowe - he makes this point in his [1987] - it 
might be added that to be a swan is precisely to have a particular class of dispositions, 
and then asked whether those dispositions are dependent upon a particular (and just 
one) class of physical compositions. Yet while the answer seems to lie in the 
negative, in so far as conceivability is concerned, it is plausibly the case that such 
dispositions are associated with a particular class of physical compositions in this, the 
actual world, and may be associated with different such classes in others. (To which I 
add that I cannot conceive of a swan that does not exist 'in' space and time - that is 
not substantial.) 
It might be thought that I have not taken the possibility of semantic externalism 
seriously, but have instead assumed semantic internalism. However, I hold that such 
an accusation could only be founded on the dogma that externalism - the view that 
some concepts (or, according to Haukioja [2006], propositional contents of intentional 
states) are partially (or wholly) constituted by factors external to an agent - is a thesis 
about factors that are not only external to the agent in a straightforward mereological 
sense, but also a physical sense. In other words, I take it that contemporary 
externalism is founded on the idea that it is causal interaction with instances of 
physical objects which are required to grant concepts of those very same objects. 
Against this, I have urged that the factors - e.g. the form of swan-hood - can be 
perfectly external, as well as immutable, and fully grasped not only on the basis that a 
particular which instantiates that form is encountered, but also on other experiential 
bases. I do not need to have encountered a Cyclops to grasp the form thereof, any 
more than I need encounter a cow in order to grasp the form thereof. If I can grasp 
the form of unicorn-hood without encountering unicorns - and notice that I say this 
because if possibility is to map onto conceivability, we must account for the 
possibility of unicorns, given the apparent fact that we can conceive of unicorns -
then I am already in a position to recognise a unicorn.'^ But I cannot have grasped 
that form on the basis of anyone encountering a unicorn, provided it is correct that 
there are not, and have never been, any unicorns in our world (as of yet). In short, 
then, what I am suggesting might be thought of as a semantic extemalism about 
forms, but not necessarily particulars, although it might be the case that an encounter 
with a particular that instantiates a given form is responsible for helping one to come 
" See, for example, the discussion in Lowe [1998], pp.185-187. 
'- Compare Kripke [1972], p.4 and Kripke [1980], pp.157-158. 
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into contact with the form.'^ Notice that one of the consequences of my view is that 
there can be a form (or kind) in a world where there is nothing that instantiates it (or 
are no members of the kind), although this might seem somewhat counterintuitive. 
My (Platonic) view is that the metaphysical potential for there being such instances is 
provided by the forms, the existence of which is necessary.''* But this is not enough to 
establish the physical (or nomological) potential, as should become clear. 
To return to the initial question, then, under different interpretations. Is there a 
possible world where there are ducks that have the same physical composition as 
swans do here, or vice versa? My answer is yes. Is it possible that a swan here have 
the same physical composition as a duck herel No, if the laws of physics (and 
chemistry and biology) here are similar (or the same as) those still unfalsified in 
contemporary science. This leads me into nomological possibility, which is a notion 
that Lowe would thoroughly, but I think wrongly, reject.'^ 
It is time to return to modal logic, in order to explicate my view. Let D n i w } denote 'it 
is nomologically necessary, in w, that', which means 'There is a law in possible world 
w such that'. Let On{w} denote 'it is nomologically possible, in w, that', which means 
'It is consistent with the laws in possible world w that'. Now let us have it that 
(something like) S4 modal logic holds, with respect to these operators, and that A 
denotes the actual world. What I am saying, inter alia, is that: 
P ^ O n { A } p 
• n { A } p ^ p 
•n{w}p-^On{H'}p 
• n l w l D n l w ) . p ^ D „ { w } p 
On{vv}On{w}...p^On{w}p 0, 
First, it will be noticed that A is employed in the first two equations, whereas w is 
employed in the remainder. Why is this? It is because 'p', as typically employed in 
such logical systems, is normally taken to mean precisely 'it is actually the case that 
p', whereas here this is insufficient. So I shall adopt the following revision: p{w} 
means 'it is the case in world w that p' (or p is true in world w). This, in order that I 
might add the following: 
p{w} ^ O n { w } p 
• n l w l p -»p{w} 
Second, I should also like to add that I want to have it that D n l w l O n i w l p On{w}p 
(based on S5) does hold, but on the other hand that I am not so sure about 
On{vv}Dn{w}p ^ D n l w l p . This is because a law in world w such that 'It is consistent 
Of course, it is completely open to dispute whether I can, in fact, conceive of unicorns. It might be 
that I am conceiving of horses with horns, or some such. So all I am doing here is developing a system 
that is consistent with what would seem to be conceivable, intuitively speaking; and in doing so, I take 
it that I am making my task harder than it would otherwise be. Of course, it should be added that there 
are other potential routes to address these problems. For instance, one could invoke a distinction 
between relational and notional contents of thoughts, or something similar, as does Chalmers [1995]. 
One of the consequences of this view is that I reject the Aristotelian picture according to which the 
existence of primary substances, or physical objects, is necessary. 
" I base this on personal discussions. 
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with the laws in world w that p' seems defunct (and hence it might as well be said 'It 
is consistent with the laws in world vi; that p'), but 'It is consistent with the laws in 
world w that there is a law in world w such that p' is more tricky, when it is taken to 
be atemporal talk. For it could be suggested that any countable (even infinite) 
number of 'levels of laws' is allowed in principle by refusing to allow reduction here, 
and I think this is an option worth leaving open. (To allow the system to deal with 
this is not to suggest that there really are multiple 'levels of laws', of course.) 
But now I should like to raise a problematic idea. It is as follows: if it is just 
consistent with the laws in a given world (w) that p, then it might be thought that it 
ought also to be consistent with those same laws that not-p. Indeed, in a court case a 
lawyer might say 'It is consistent with the forensic evidence that the accused 
committed the crime' - for example, let us say that the accused has group A blood 
and blonde hair, and that a few specks of group A blood and a number of blonde hairs 
were found at the scene of the crime of which she is accused - when the evidence (or 
the accepted basic statements) is insufficient to exclude the possibility that she did, in 
fact, commit the crime. But then again, it is also insufficient, in the example given, to 
show that she did commit the crime; this, given the reasonably obvious premiss that 
there are many people with group A blood and blonde hair. So it might be argued, on 
the basis of this sort of intuition, that the foregoing system is incorrect. Instead, it 
might be thought that the following holds: 
Onp {w} On~p{w} Consistency Axiom (CA)'^ 
I take this quite seriously, in the same way that when someone says it is possible for 
me to catch a flight, I take it that it is also possible for me not to catch said flight, and 
it is neither necessary that I do, or that I do not. Yet it is clear that CA violates the 
foregoing system based on S4, and I should therefore like to suggest that an entirely 
different system of logic is required in order to capture the notion of mere 
consistency. This is as follows, given both CA and DnlwlOnlv i^ lp —> O n l w j p : 
(i) p{w} ^Dr,[w)pv On{w}p 
(ii) Dn{w}p^p{w} 
(iii) On{w}p^~Dn{w}p&~nn {w}~p 
Let me explain this briefly. According to (i), if it is the case that p (in a given world), 
then there must be a law (or cluster of laws) in that world which make it true, viz. 
necessitate its truth therein, or it must merely be consistent with the laws in said 
world. And if it is merely consistent with those laws then p or not-p are mutually 
exclusive but genuine possibilities in that world; for from CA, if it is consistent that p 
then it is also consistent that not-p, and from (iii), if it consistent that p then there is no 
law (or cluster of laws) that necessitates either p or not-p. But perhaps I should 
explain more clearly why it is that I should advocate such a system: 
Another way to think of consistency in this sense is permissibility. A legal analogy may be useful: 
the laws in the U.K. permit us to drink coffee, and permit us not to drink coffee. 
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If it is just nomologically possible that p, in a given world, then there must be another 
world that differs only in respect of the truth-value of p (or p until a specific time 
therein) - this is afagon de parler to the extent that there will be something different 
about that world which makes it the case that p has a different truth-value - but is 
otherwise maximally similar. For example, if we adopt an indeterministic 
interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, such that the Stern-Gerlach 
measurement of the spin of an electron along a particular axis has a propensity of 0.5 
to give each of the two possible results (positive or negative spin of Vi), we might say 
that for each such experiment, there is a world in which each of the results occur. 
(Imagine there were only one such experiment ever performed here: there would be 
another world that had an identical history up to the time the experiment was 
performed, and in which the same laws held, but in which the experiment gave a 
different - the other nomologically possible - result.) In short, it might be consistent 
with the laws herein that event a (or outcome a) occurs in a given experiment, and it 
might also be consistent with the laws herein that event b (or outcome b) occurs in 
that very same experiment. (And if the two outcomes are collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive, according to a law, then it cannot be the case that 'Event a occurs 
and event h occurs'.) 
Henceforth, I shall call this system R.'^ And let me continue by introducing some 
rules that interrelate R with S5TWM, since we already know how SCPA is related to 
this: 
(a) • tp-^(Dn{M;}pvO„{H;}p)&(Dn{n; /}pvO„{w;/}p& . . . 
What (a) says is that if it is the case in all worlds that p, then in each world it is either 
consistent with the laws therein that, or necessary given the laws therein that, p. (If 
preferred, we may express this as Dtp • t (nnP v Onp).) This includes the actual 
world, such that if it is the case in all worlds that p, then the laws in the actual world 
must either necessitate, or be merely consistent with, p. If preferred, the point may be 
stated (indeed, derived from the axioms in S5TWM and R) as follows: Dtp ^  p{A}, 
p{A} -> D n i A j p V On{A}p, thus Dtp ^ D n f A l p V On{A}p. This is also equivalent to 
• t p - D n l A I - p , since On{A}p - D n f y v j - p , from (iii); to there not being a law in 
the actual world which makes p not the case. 
But what if it is nomologically necessary that p, in a given world; if there is a law in 
that world such that p (or that makes p the case)? Well, we might notice that since p 
will therefore be the case in that world, from (ii), it must follow that there are some 
worlds such that p. This result may be expressed as follows: 
( P ) D n l w l p ^ O t P 
We might expand upon this by noting, further, that if there is a world w in which there 
is a law such that p, and another world wj in which there is a law such that not-p, then 
it follows that it is not the case that p in all possible worlds, but is the case that p in 
some possible worlds. In logical terms: Dn ivv lp & D n l w / l p Otp & - D t p . (And we 
can imagine a wide range of such formulae, each spanning a different number of 
worlds, which can be constructed in a similar fashion.) 
" I have no idea whether it is novel, but suspect it is not. 
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When it comes to considering transworld possibility, though, the required axiom 
would seem to be rather uninteresting. For from the mere fact that there are some 
worlds in which it is the case that p, it need not follow either that p holds in any given 
world, or indeed that p is consistent with the laws therein. To return to the earlier 
example of the blue swan, the mere fact that there is a world containing such a swan 
does not mean that it is possible in a nomological sense for there to be such a swan in 
the actual world. The following would seem to capture this intuition (and w may be 
substituted for A): 
( Y ) 0 , p ^ D n { A ) p V O n { A } p V D n { A } ~ p 
Yet on the other hand, if it is nomologically possible that p, in a given world, does this 
entail anything more substantive with respect to transworld modality? Prima facie, it 
might seem not. In particular, and in close analogy to (y), it might be thought that the 
following axiom ought to hold: On{A}p ^ Dtp v Otp v Dt-p. I want to deny this, 
however, as should be suggested by my earlier example of the Stern-Gerlach 
experiment: 
(5) 0 „ { A } p ^ O , p & ~ n , p 
If preferred, we may write this as On {A }p 0,p & 0(~p. But hold on. If this is 
correct, then (a) is too weak. Why? Again, because for each world where Onp & p, 
there is a (maximally similar) world where Onp & ~p. So if it is the case that p in 
every world, then there cannot be a world in which it is nomologically possible that p. 
In other words, (a) must therefore be replaced with: 
(a*) • , p ->nn { w } p&nn { w / } p & . . . 
This is a rather interesting result, which allows us to claw back some hope for 
determining nomological necessities. 
Prima Facie Conceivability versus Ideal Conceivability 
Even given S5TWM, SCPA, and R, it is clear just how difficult our task of 
discovering laws - those nomological ones which just so happen to hold here, and 
those transworld considerations (which may be thought of as 'higher level laws') that 
constrain them - would seem to be. Yet miraculously, it would also seem that we 
enjoy considerable successes in our inquiry. And if those apparent successes are 
genuine, then it would seem that we are either extremely lucky - that we are regularly 
struck by lightning - or really are gifted with some form of intuition that serves to 
allow us to delimit possibilities, in addition to those sensory faculties that allow us to 
select between delimited possibihties. If liked, I invoke something similar to 
Putnam's 'No Miracles' argument, here: if inductivism is wrong, conventionalism is 
false, observations are theory-laden such that 'facts' are not just handed to us on a 
plate, and 'the truth is hidden in the deep', then how do we so well without an 
intuitive grip on possibility space? That is, without something a little special, at the 
level of the context of discovery, with respect to modality? 
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Of course, I frankly admit that we might just be lucky, and maintain that only context 
of justification is relevant with respect to the logical analysis of objective knowledge. 
But I believe in intuition, given that I also believe we have made considerable 
progress in discovering truths, particularly in non-empirical domains such as pure 
mathematics; indeed, such a 'No Miracles' argument seems to me to be persuasive, 
although it is clearly not compelling. But if I am right in the foregoing, how should 
we proceed in metaphysics? How are we to perform the check on conceivability (7), 
and thus the check on possibility (8), which I suggested in II.4? Allow me to return to 
the analogy between observation statements and conception statements, in order to 
answer this: 
Imagine an individual were to claim that she had seen an abominable snowman, while 
walking in the Alps. How are we to test this statement? Well first, we might ask for a 
specification of the alleged 'snowman'. How did it appear? Was it tall, or short? 
Was it of anthropomorphic form? What colour was it? Second, we might ask about 
the circumstances involved in the sighting. Was anyone else there to see it? How 
close was it, when seen? Was it seen clearly, and distinctly? (Was it foggy?) And 
third, we might ask about other possibilities that this woman had considered: about 
her personal level of conviction that she saw an abominable snowman, and about 
where possibility of error in this statement might lie. For instance, had she been 
drinking? 
But the purpose of all these questions is just to understand, first, what precisely the 
'abominable snowman' amounts to: to understand precisely what she is claiming. 
Second, to get some grip on the possibility space involved: to attempt to ascertain 
whether she may have seen something else she mistook for an 'abominable 
snowman', for instance a human. At this level, we are trying to work out whether the 
hypothesis that she really saw an 'abominable snowman' - understood in the fashion 
revealed by her answers to some of the questions - can stand up to non-empirical 
criticism, or empirical criticism based on observation statements already possessed. 
However, we are also trying to work out in what way the associated claim - there is 
an abominable snowman in the Alps - might be independently tested. For instance, 
were she to say it appeared to be a large hairy beast, around eight foot tall, we might 
extrapolate to the likely size of its footprints, and perform a search for them in order 
to test the hypothesis. Further, we might expect that such a creature would need to eat 
and sleep, qua animal, and consider what its potential food sources in the area could 
be, what sort of lair would be suitable, and so forth. In the end, we may find that what 
was prima facie observed was in fact not observed at all. But if it was observed, we 
would be sure it was observable. 
Now analogously, an individual might claim that she had conceived (of the 
possibility) that the morning star was not the evening star. How are we to test this 
statement? Again, we might ask for a specification of the alleged stars in question. 
Does she intend 'evening star' to rigidly designate, or is she using it as a sign for a 
particular definite description which we will need to understand in order to fully grasp 
the putative conception? For instance, does 'star' really refer only to 'celestial body', 
in this instance? Again, we might ask about the circumstances involved in the 
conception: what.else^was envisaged?;-were-the same laws of nature that are currently 
thought to hold here also holding in the situation conceived of?; and so forth. Finally, 
we might also ask whether something else might, in fact, have been conceived of. For 
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example, might it have been the case that she was merely conceiving of 'evening star' 
having a different referent to 'morning star': that the possibility she was envisaging 
was purely linguistic! 
Our means of testing will involve employing our own faculties of conception, just as 
our means of testing in the case of an observation statement (or an existential claim on 
the basis of such a statement) will involve employing our own faculties of perception 
(provided it passes the non-empirical tests). For instance, we might try to examine 
whether the consequences following from what was putatively conceived of cannot 
themselves be conceived of. In logical terms, we may determine that Op —> Oq, but 
~0q therefore ~0p, since q cannot be conceived of, and is therefore classifiable as 
inconceivable. And naturally enough, what was prima facie conceived of may turn 
out not to have been conceived of at all; instead, it may be the case that something 
else was really conceived of, or even that there was no genuine act of conception at 
all. (Of course, in either of the foregoing examples, the individual could simply be 
lying.) 
In closing, however, I ought to explain why I think it reasonable to classify a situation 
- one that might be represented by a proposition or collection of propositions, no 
doubt - as inconceivable just because it cannot, at a particular point in time, be 
conceived of. And this is where the analogy I have used above breaks down, in so far 
as it is not necessarily reasonable to classify something as unobservable just because 
it has not been observed. Indeed on the contrary, sometimes the very fact that we 
have not observed an entity that is metaphysically classified as observable, despite 
attempts to do so, is our very ground for believing that it does not exist. 
What to say, then? Well it has to be frankly admitted that the move from 'It has not 
been conceived that p' to 'It is inconceivable that p' is out, even as a fair gamble. 
However, there is an alternative move, namely from 'It is not presently conceivable 
that p' and 'It has not been conceived that p' to 'It is inconceivable that p' which is 
somewhat better, in so far as to have grounds for saying the former, one would have 
to really try to conceive that p. And while this move is clearly not truth-preserving, I 
contend that it is pragmatically required qua epistemic heuristic. The primary 
argument for this claim is a reductio along the lines of my 'argument from the killer 
possibility', above. We all recognise that we might be mistaken in classifying p as 
inconceivable on the suggested basis, and should therefore be willing to reclassify p 
as conceivable if it is conceived of (or seems to be conceived of). This is vital. But if 
we shirk from the process of such classification then we will achieve only paralysis in 
inquiry. So as I suggested in chapter II, the lesson is just that we have to be willing to 
take some risks. And the risks are allowable just because we can make such 
classifications tentatively, and remain receptive to criticism. 
I might add that those who would want to disagree with what I advocate will have to 
put something in its place, for we cannot really do without classifying some things as 
possible and others as impossible (in either transworld, or nomological, senses). I 
simply do not understand how one could say with their hand on their heart that they 
had no interest in what was possible, and how such an individual could genuinely 
-funetion-in-everyday life. For who is not interested in whether it is possible to survive 
after drinking a pint of household bleach, or to warm oneself by sitting close to a fire, 
and so forth? 
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2. T H E R O L E OF A R I S T O T E L I A N AITIA IN T H E M E T H O D O L O G Y OF 
M E T A P H Y S I C S 
[A] certain fatigue and boredom may have set in . . . the dispute has taken on a somewhat 
ritualistic air where neither party seems to gain any decisive advantage - Armstrong'* 
The debate between nominalists and metaphysical realists, which is still ongoing, has 
a long and distinguished history. Yet rarely, it seems, do metaphysicians engage in 
open discussion about the proper methods of metaphysics; instead, most are content to 
employ a somewhat loose form of argumentation, based primarily upon informal 
logic, and manipulation of language. 
Oliver, however, is a welcome exception to this general rule.'^ For he has recently re-
emphasised that the mere manipulation of language is surely insufficient to the task of 
deciding between metaphysical theories, just because to say that one sentence may be 
rewritten as another, e.g. 'This is a red apple' as 'This apple exemplifies redness', 
does not provide any reason to favour the first fo rm over the second. Rather, one 
must look elsewhere for criteria of theory-choice in metaphysics: in particular, Oliver 
suggests, to considerations of explanatory power and economy. 
One might wonder, here, i f some sub-set of the virtues which Kuhn suggests for 
theories in natural philosophy - accuracy, simplicity, consistency, scope, and 
fruitfulness - might do the job.^° In so far as metaphysics has an empirical 
dimension, qualitative accuracy of a theory is vital. Simplicity, although obviously a 
pragmatic consideration at the very least, might be thought by some to be a guide to 
truth-likeness.^' Internal logical consistency of a theory is a basic requirement for our 
accepting it as a candidate, and external consistency between one metaphysical theory 
and the others which one holds is likewise expected. On the other hand, a theory with 
too great a scope is liable to make some metaphysicians suspicious; consider God as a 
truth-maker in Berkeley's philosophy. And similarly, few would suppose that 
metaphysical theories are often, or should be, f ru i t fu l in a Kuhnian sense: that they 
'should disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships between those 
already known.' That is, although some applied metaphysical theories can be f ru i t fu l , 
in common parlance, of new research findings."'^ 
However, the appeal to theoretical virtues, taken alone, is surely not sufficient to tease 
out the salient differences between the disciplines of metaphysics and natural 
philosophy. For example, were one to ask a neuroscientist why it is that we sleep, one 
might expect a purely physiological answer: gamma-aminobutyric acid is released 
Armstrong [2003] 
'''Oliver, A. [1996] 
™ Kuhn [1977], pp.321-322. 
'^-Sober-supports this view, although he 'denies that the justification of simplicity depends on this fact'. 
Sober [1975], p.l68. 
For example, Shimony correctly describes the Aspect experiments, based on the EPR paradox, as 
'experimental metaphysics'. Shimony [1989], p. 27. 
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f rom the ventrolateral preoptic area of the hypothalamus, and this inhibits brain 
activity. Were one to ask a philosopher, such as Aristotle, one might expect a very 
different sort of answer: 'its goal is the conservation of animals'.^ But here, one 
should note that both sorts of answer are equally legitimate. For although it might 
seem curious for an individual to reply to the question 'Why are you tired?' by stating 
that a chemical had been released in her brain, rather than referring to circumstances 
in her l i fe (such as having been awake for a long period of time, etc.), it is nonetheless 
a permissible, i f pedantic and gauche, answer. 
This suggests that the acceptable modes of explanation in natural philosophy need not 
exhaust those acceptable in metaphysics. Certainly, the metaphysician need not 
restrict herself to the fo rm of explanation advocated by Hempel"''', nor indeed to an 
event based, or inference related, conception of causation; after all, this word has its 
root in the Latin 'causa', which may reasonably be understood as ' for the sake o f , 
such as in the phrase 'honoris causa\ (As van Fraassen points out: 'The idea of 
causality in modern philosophy is that of a relation among events. Hence it cannot be 
identified with efficient causation, its nearest Aristotelian relative.'"^) Indeed, the 
claim that explanation, in particular what is taken to constitute a good explanation, is 
based on not only fact and theory, but also context, seems reasonable enough.^^ For 
Bacon, for example, 'the final cause rather corrupts than advances the sciences', at 
least when assigned to other than 'human action[s]', although he nevertheless believes 
' I t is a correct position that 'true knowledge is knowledge by causes [ in the sense of 
' ama ' , presumably]' ." Yet I , for one, have no problem with the claim that flowers 
turn towards the sun in order that they might better nourish and support themselves; to 
maximise the energy that they derive f rom the light thereof (This fo rm of 
explanation is complementary to that involving photosynthesis, and the mathematical 
consideration that maximising the area of petals exposed to sunlight w i l l maximise 
energy gained, etc.) Moreover, in point of fact, I simply do not know whether flowers 
have souls, but I remain open-minded on the issue. Etymologically speaking, the 
language that we employ is riddled with indications that such was once thought so; 
consider the root of 'animation'. And Kepler's idea of an anima matrix emitted f rom 
the sun did not seem to seriously impair his ability to make significant progress in 
natural philosophy.^^ 
Of course, it cannot be denied that the prevalent form of explanation in the academy, 
at present, has a scientistic basis. And one finds many modern philosophers who are 
all too eager to reduce philosophy to the status of handmaiden to 'science'. 
Historically, such a move has precedence, for in the Middle Ages philosophy was 
expected to serve the needs of theology and the Church. However, as I argued in I I . 1, 
the move also has precedence in failure; and I would opine that critical thought, and 
trust in the faculties of the individual agent and communities of such agents - viz. in 
the capacities of human, qua reasoner - should remain our leading light. The only 
metamethodology suitable for our making progress, i f we are capable of such, is 
Aristotle, On Sleep, 455''20-25. 
I refer to Hempel's deductive-nomological model of explanation. See Hempel [1965], pp.335-359. 
van Fraassen [1980], p. 113. 
However.-it should be emphasised that one need not accept van-Fraassen-s account of causation in 
order to accept such a claim. Ibid., ch. 5. 
Bacon [1620], Book II, Aphorism 2. (Bacon quotes from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.) 
See Kuhn [1957], pp.214-216 & 245-249. 
162 
criticism; that is, in the sense of critical reflective thought, in which all putatively 
'obvious' truths are ultimately questionable. 
Furthermore, a hearty dose of humility would seem to recommend itself, at least i f 
one thinks that lessons can profitably be drawn f rom history. I daresay that many 
Romans thought themselves to be highly 'advanced', in comparison to members of 
earlier societies which had faded away; indeed, the Roman invasion of Britain is still 
seen by many to be an act of 'civilisation'. A l l this is mistaken, although tempting. 
For one doubts the ingenuity of ancient humans at one's peril, i f modem 
archaeological findings, such as those in Skara Brae, are to be lent any credence. 
Thus, cautious optimism seems a prudent compromise, and the proper role of 
metaphysical inquiry should be taken to be the critical examination and re-
examination of all claims about the nature of being, without systemic bias. 
Unsurprisingly, this brings us back to Philosophus, to the distinction between Gscopia 
and T£xvr|, and to the notion that having explanations is constitutive of genuine 
knowledge (and hence indicative of wisdom).^^ To remind: 
With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and we even see 
men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without 
experience.. .But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather 
than experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience.. .and this 
is because the former know the cause, and the latter do not. Hence we think that the 
master-workers in each craft are more honourable and know in a truer sense and are 
wiser than the manual workers.. .we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being 
able to act, but of having having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes.^" 
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till 
they have grasped the 'why' of it.^' 
Now these quotations suggest that ' ama ' should certainly not be read as 'cause', 
rather than 'ground' or 'explanation'. That is, in so far as it is highly dubious to plug 
'causa' into natural philosophy of today, thereby derive what 'causation' really is, and 
then pronounce, in a naive scientistic fashion, that Aristotle posited 'Four Causes'. 
(After all, Aristotle clearly states that Plato used only essential and material causes; 
and the latter posited Forms."^^) So my claim is that an mxia is a because; and such an 
interpretation does, as I shall attempt to show, prove to be enlightening in a deep 
metaphysical sense. 
An Elucidation of the Four Becauses in a Metaphysical Context 
29 There is an important caveat: a crude reading of Aristotle as a justificationist, in the sense that 
knowtedge is 'justified true belief, is not advisable. 
™ Aristotle, Metaphysics, 98Pi0-981" 10. 
" Aristotle, Physics, 194" 15-25. 
Ans\b\.\e,Metaphysics,'9^%''\-\5. ~ ~ ~ ' ' 
Ultimately, if my interpretation of Aristotle is held wanting, I still contend that it is valuable. After 
all, I am interested more in ideas than people here; and just as a poem may impart much that the poet 
did not intend, so may the work of a philosopher. 
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Typically, outlines of the four becauses involve examples drawn f rom a physical, or 
biological, context. For example: the material cause of the strength of a bridge might 
be the concrete f rom which it is constructed; the formal cause of a correct 
classification of a tasteless, transparent, and odourless substance as 'water' might be 
that it is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen, in a ratio of 2:1; the efficient cause of 
a cigarette's ignition might be one's holding it to a flame; and the f inal cause of 
sexual intercourse might be the propagation of one's species. However, it is clear that 
a more careful account of the becauses w i l l be required i f they are to be applied in 
metaphysics, and this is what I shall try to provide. 
First, the material because concerns the internal nature of an entity (or category of 
entity) under discussion. Is it primitive, or compound? For example, how would an 
entity such as a given apple have to be, in order to display the properties, such as 
colour and shape, which it does? Need it merely be a bundle of particular things, viz. 
tropes, such as a particular shape, and particular colour? Or might it , instead, be 
composed of a substratum which partakes of, or displays, other entities, viz. 
universals? I f the former, is some metaphorical 'glue' necessary to hold the 
particulars together? I f the latter, then w i l l one not need to consider the other entities, 
viz. universals, in a material sense? '^* In either case, how is it that the material of an 
apple is sufficient to support change? 
Second, the efficient because concerns why an entity remains the same, or undergoes 
change, and the explanans is always other entities (and perhaps their material, etc.). 
For example, why does the relation 'greater than' necessarily obtain between the 
numbers two and one (as an ordered pair)? Is the answer not because two and one are 
themselves unchangeable? What of the relation 'distance between', when considered 
of Durham and London? Does this not change, given that Durham and London 
change in area? (Consider the merging of Buda and Pest.) Would the relation cease 
to exist, were Durham to suffer the fate of Calleva Atrebatuml^^ However, yet more 
fundamentally, to state an efficient cause might be to point to an entity (or category of 
entity) without which another could not be; that is, could not remain the same, in the 
more essential sense of remaining period. Could the triangle be without the line? 
Could the line be without the triangle? Is a green book dependent for its existence 
upon the universal of green? Or is the universal of green dependent for its existence 
upon at least one concrete particular that might exemplify it? (Perhaps the two are co-
dependent.) The point, here, is that the notion of efficient because is sufficient to 
capture what might also be referred to as metaphysical dependency; indeed, along 
related lines, also to suggest the idea of 'supervenience'. 
Third, the formal because concerns the identity-conditions of an entity (or category of 
entity), with regard, often, to generation and corruption. Why could it be that an 
apple can only support certain forms of change, while remaining an apple? That is, 
why is it that an apple is destroyed when eaten, but not in undergoing a change of 
colour while ripening upon a tree? (Is to say that an apple is rotten to point to changes 
in a related group properties of the apple, such as water content, shape, and colour, or 
is 'rotten' a property in itself?) What is essential to being an apple, or the ship of 
Theseus, or water? Or on a more fundamental metaphysical level, what is essential to 
The idea, here, is that universals could be efficient becauses of properties; hence, their 'material' 
nature would also need to be considered. (Although the inverse is also a possibility.) 
This question leads into the formal because, as will become clear. 
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being a relation? Are all relations not dependent upon at least two other entities, for 
their existence? Do we not say that Calleva Atrebatum was, but is not, west of 
Londiniuml And would we not want defend the claim that Londinium became, or is, 
London? (Change in designator need not, and plausibly does not, correspond to 
change in a metaphysical sense.) 
Fourth, and (as is appropriate) finally, the final because concerns the ends for which, 
i f any, something is true of an entity (or category of entity). Why does the apple 
provide nourishment, yet fa l l f rom the tree and decay i f not eaten? Consider that it 
contains seeds, which may be spat out, or excreted, by one who eats the apple; else, 
they may f ind their way into nearby soil when the flesh of the apple decays. 
Similarly, what is the explanans of the shape of the sycamore seed? Is it not disposed 
to ' f l y ' , viz. be easily carried over considerable distances by the wind? And might it 
be that these dispositions can be properly explained by appeal to the ends of trees: 
their w i l l to reproduce?^^ Yet more, is it not the end of all l ife to reproduce? (Is there 
a lesson, here, to be learned about l i fe itself?) I f anything is to provide an ultimate 
account for the nexus of entities that are, their relationships, and how they integrate, 
then it is final becauses. Indeed, when one is asked a seemingly trivial question such 
as 'Why do we exist?', the only recourse seems to be to offer a final because, or to 
deny the question its intended mean ing . (S imi l a r l y , in dealing with theological 
problems such as the 'problem with ev i l ' , whether with respect to natural events, or 
the acts of humans.) Prima facie, i t may seem strange to demand a final because in 
fundamental metaphysical matters, for example to attempt to answer the question 'To 
what end are universals exemplified?' The proof is in the pudding, however, and a 
claim such as 'universals w i l l themselves to be exemplified, since that is the only 
manner in which they can reveal themselves to beings in space and time' is certainly 
compatible with the scholastic claim that a universal could not exist without 
something to exemplify i t . 
3. O N I N F E R E N C E , L O G I C , T R U T H , AND M E T A P H Y S I C S 
All men have opinions, but few men think - Bishop Berkeley 
Earlier herein, I have argued not only that it is doubtful that inductive practices exist -
and dubious, therefore, that a Humean model of learning is sustainable - but also that 
inductive inferences are invalid, even i f it a psychological fact that we are predisposed 
to employ them.^^ This said, I thoroughly reject the notion that we must use them, at 
least when we are engaged in critical reflective thought, on the rather straightforward 
The other alternative, of course, is that a given tree exists just because it can reproduce successfully, 
and that the mechanisms employed were 'selected' in a Darwinian sense. Yet the plausibility of such a 
claim rests, inter alia, on a privileging of event causation, in a modern natural philosophical sense; and 
the metaphysician need not be bound by such a notion. 
Many a philosopher will have been asked such a question, say in a public house. Yet what I have 
found, in attempting to answer it in informal discussions, is that answers based on aught else than final 
becauses do not often seem to satisfy the questioner. (The slip to 'aliens put us here' merely shifts the 
question of the finali7ecauie"tO"their'doing"so.~Of course, it theiiTaises the question of why "those 
aliens exist/existed. An infinite regress might follow.) 
Remember the caveat, that the latter is only (clearly) the case if truth is construed in a non-epistemic 
sense. 
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basis that I do not. It might be added that there is no reason to suppose that all our 
activities are geared towards discovering the truth, and it may well be the case, 
psychologically speaking, that we are prone to bouts of 'lazy thinking', which we 
should strive to guard against. 
This aside, in considering inference the key insight is that it involves performing 
operations on truth-bearers - utterances, sentences, or propositions'*^ - in order to 
issue, in result, different truth-bearers. The operands, in any given instance, are 
referred to as premises; the results of the operation are referred to as conclusions. 
Thus, a rule of inference is a means by which to move between one group of truth-
bearers, and another. Here are two candidate rules, and examples of inferences based 
upon those rules: 
Rule (1): For any proposition p, i f it is the case that p, then it is the case that 
not-p. 
Premiss: The sky is green. 
Conclusion: The sky is not green. 
Rule (2): For any conditional, i f it is the case that its consequent is true, then it is 
the case that its antecedent is probably true. 
Premises: I f Ludwig Wittgenstein was a philosopher, then I am the Queen of 
Sheba. 
I am the Queen of Sheba. 
Conclusion: Ludwig Wittgenstein was probably a philosopher. 
The structure of argument is, then, clear. Or is it? Don' t the rules, above, appear to 
be truth-bearers themselves? And might they not be thought of as premises? 
Although this might seem to be the case, prima facie, it is really a category error; a 
simple misunderstanding. For rules of inference are indubitably expressible by truth-
bearers, but are not themselves truth-bearers. Similarly, what makes it right to assert 
"The sky is blue", in the actual world, is not just 'The sky is blue'. 
This leads us to consider the xskoq of argument. For its purpose is not merely to 
generate new sentences, or propositions; a monkey sitting at a typewriter and pressing 
keys at random could succeed in such a task, yet haphazardly. As such, there is a 
great deal more to be said, and we might start with the recognition that when we offer 
an argument, we are often interested in the premises for one reason or another: we 
consider them to be special, of a fashion. But how so? Typically, because either we, 
or someone else, would hold that they were worthy of asseveration: sincere and 
solemn declaration. In other words, because someone holds them forth as 'true', and I 
'^^  My personal view is that propositions are primary truth-bearers, and sentences are only derivatively 
truth-bearers, in so far as they provide the means by which to pick out propositions. Here, however, it 
is too early to draw this view into the discussion. 
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use the scare quotes to indicate that I do not want to assume any particular theory of 
truth, just yet. This is a useful starting point, and we might now look to the end for 
which rules of inference were formally laid down, by taking a brief detour through the 
history of ideas. 
From Parmenides to NATO: The Significance of Truth 
Since antiquity, it has been held by many scholars that the pursuit of truth is not only 
an imperative for the individual, but derivatively for humanity. Perhaps the first 
suggestion of this view may be found in Parmenides' poem On Nature, where a 
distinction is made between 'the Way of Truth ' , and 'the Way of Opinion': 
And you must ascertain everything -
both the unmoving heart of well-rounded truth, 
and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true trust (pistis). 
But nevertheless you will learn these too."*" 
For Socrates, i f one is to take Plato's Apologia to be significantly representative of his 
thought, there was an important distinction between being 'an accomplished speaker', 
viz. an expert in persuasion, and a 'man who speaks truth', the latter being preferable 
in an axiological sense."*' And this thread is woven through Plato's dialogues, in 
which it is further developed. The mere aim of 'winning a dispute', and the 
acquisition of the associated art which enables this, is implicitly frowned upon by the 
philosopher f rom Elea, in the Sophist; he helps Theaetetus to reach the conclusion that 
the sophist only has expertise in 'the word-juggling part of production that's marked 
of f as human and not divine.''*^ But in stark contrast, as beautifully expressed in the 
Phaedrus: 
The reason there is so much eagerness to see the plain where truth stands is that this 
pasture has the grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul, and it is the 
nature of the wings that l if t up the soul to be nourished by it."*^  
This is a core aspect of the intellectual legacy which Aristotle inherited, and 
systematised, with a specificity which was thitherto unparalleled, in his Sophistical 
Refutations. And the significance of this work, the locus classicus of the claim that 
all truth seeking requires a specific method, a particular 'set of tools', so to speak, is 
not to be underestimated. As I argue elsewhere herein, the promotion of this belief in 
the Latin West, and the associated move f rom faith in authority to trust in reason, was 
vital to prepare the ground for the 'Enlightenment era'."*"* (To reiterate, briefly: there 
are significant respects in which the Enlightenment involved movement towards, 
rather than away from, the Aristotelian method of inquiry, and its Socratic root, where 
this is not taken to be the use of syllogism specifically, but rather, more generally, 
advocacy of a critical approach to knowledge claims, involving deductive logic.) 
Moreover, indeed, any student of contemporary Western philosophy w i l l still cover 
See the discussion in Barnes [1979], ch. IX, section (a). 40 
*^-P\at07 Apology, 17b. -
Plato, Sophist, 268d. 
Plato, Phaedrus, 248b-248c. 
'••See II. 1-II. 1.3 
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highly derivative material regarding what constitutes a fallacy (or 'contentious 
argument') - the petitio principii, ad hominem, etc. - and be instructed, in a fashion 
which Aristotle might have described as didactic, that it is essential to the activity of 
philosophy that fallacies be avoided. In essence, these fallacies are based upon the 
core laws of Aristotelian analytics: the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, 
the law of the excluded middle, and the law of rational inference (from that which is 
known, to that which is unknown). They are principles that underpin all inquiry, for 
Aristotle, only since the goal of inquiry is naught other than truth. That is to say, he 
holds that logic forms the core of all other disciplines, although each involves other 
principles, 'appropriate to. . . [the] subject'."^ And 'that... which involves no action, 
i.e. that which is true or false... is absolute.''*^ 
Given this, one might imagine my surprise at several conversations which I have had 
with fellow philosophers who have disputed the claim that the aim of philosophy is 
truth, yet have still appeared to abide, in non-trivial respects, by the same set of rules 
which were suggested by Aristotle. They are of t lightning-quick to detect a fallacy, 
and expose it , yet w i l l hold that the aim of the activity is not truth. For example, 
according to Dr. X - the name has been omitted to protect the guilty - it is "the 
resolution of disagreements". 
Now upon hearing this, my first reaction was to retort: "Is it true that the aim of 
philosophy is the resolution of disagreements?" However, while this response is a 
reasonable one, it remains insufficient in so far as it presupposes that truth is not 
constituted by something akin to 'resolution of disagreements'; and it is only fair to 
presume that Dr. X was aware that I used the word 'truth' in an absolute sense. (He 
should have a pretty good idea of my line.) But it seems to me that i f one were to 
accept his point - his understanding of ' truth' - then the avoidance of fallacies would 
be of little concern; for plausibly, there are many rhetorical techniques that are suited 
to resolving disagreements, and bringing about consensus. Indeed, another strategy to 
achieve this aim would be to impose one's own beliefs on others. To deprive one's 
students of sleep, or to submit them to a regime of starvation, might aid in this goal; 
certainly some might believe that such actions were immoral beforehand, but they 
would soon 'learn' otherwise, under the tender ministrations of such a consensus 
seeker. 
Granted, this example is rather extreme. But the lesson to be drawn f rom it is, I think, 
of paramount import. To a first approximation, it is as follows: what is a legitimate 
rule of inference is determined by the purpose for which argument is employed. And 
to a second approximation, i f it can be agreed that the aim of argument is truth: what 
is a legitimate rule of inference is partially determined by what truth is, viz. by which 
theory of truth is itself true. But here, there might seem to be a problem. For is it not 
the case that any coherent theory of truth must be true, but only so according to its 
own account of truth? It seems so, and thus, talk of 'theories of truth' appears to be 
misguided, i f we are to avoid being pluralists about truth, given that theories are 
usually taken to be able to be compared on the basis of their relative verisimilitude. 
(The point: any one understanding of truth w i l l be incorrect according to another.) 
Thus, I propose the fol lowing formulation: 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, \6S^\. 
Aristotle, De Anima, 431 "10. 
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First Principle of Truth-Seeking: One's understanding of truth partially determines 
the rules of inference that one takes to be acceptable in the pursuit of truth. 
Now while I have not seen this claim made explicitly in any text - or i f I have, I have 
forgotten - it seems so fundamental that I cannot bring myself to believe that it has 
not been explicitly stated before. And one of its most significant consequences is that 
how we understand truth-makers has a radical effect on how we think we should try to 
get at the truth. To hark back to my earlier rejection of ampliative inferences, for 
example, remember that I went to some effort to emphasise that my claim would not 
necessarily hold i f truth were based purely upon coherence. Indeed, I argued only 
A T - ^ ~ET. 
Truth-Makers for the Alethic Realist: Logic as a Slave to Metaphysics 
Nowhere in this thesis do I defend alethic realism, as such. But I do contend that 
since it is a prerequisite for any serious realism about natural science, pace the later 
Putnam, this is not strictly necessary. Rather, what we should be interested in, which 
accords wi th the project undertaken herein, is what rules of inference are appropriate 
for moving f rom truth-bearers that could be made true by the mind-independent and 
objective, to further truth-bearers that would be made true by the mind-independent 
and objective were the former to be made true by the same. This might seem like a 
clumsy way of writing, but the point is just that what we should be interested in is 
how beings, and sortally distinct beings (viz. beings fall ing into different categories), 
interrelate. 
Now this being the case, mere concentration upon the possible/orm* of truth-bearers, 
and rules that relate those/orm.s, w i l l prove to be radically insufficient. Consider, for 
example, the fol lowing inference: 
X is red all over 
X is green all over 
X is red all over and green all over 
Deductively speaking this is valid; it involves use of the conjunction introduction 
rule, often denoted ( & I ) . In terms of form alone, and in accordance with the canons 
of classical logic, it is an acceptable inference. However, most of us would be wi l l ing 
to concede that the two premises cannot both be true; that is to say, they are mutually 
exclusive. How so? Well we should notice that this is not simply a result of the 
definitions of 'red' and 'green', nor indeed 'red all over' and 'green all over', plus the 
laws of logic."*^ Rather, classical logic allows us to perform an operation that we 
should not be allowed to perform, when taking into account the content of the two 
propositions (or more generally, truth-bearers) - in particular, the possible states-of-
affairs to which they refer, and would have as their truth-makers, were they to be true. 
'^ it might be thought, here, thatT~'gloss over' this possibility. Biit I would encourage the reader to buy 
into the assumed account of truth, and try to provide a definition of colour which is not parasitic on 
claims about (posited) mind-independent and objective entities. (Reliance on contemporary physics is 
already ruled out.) For more on this, see Ewing [1951], ch.2. 
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Of course, it might be argued that this is no problem for logic: that i f the premises 
were true, the conclusion would be true. But against this, I would point out that other 
examples, equally ridiculous, are not hard to f ind: 
I believe that Frodo is a hobbit {Existential introduction) 
There is something that I believe is a hobbit 
A l l dodos are extinct 
Daisy was a dodo 
Daisy was extinct 
Jonathan Lowe is a good philosopher 
Jonathan Lowe is good 
We might want to adjust classical logic, but then we would f ind ourselves with an 
inference system that did not merely account for relations between sentences in virtue 
of their structure (or form). (Nothing like 'Free Logic ' , viz. logic 'free of existence 
assumptions with respect to its terms, general and singular', could help us here!"* )^ 
For all that could motivate such adjustments would be considerations relating to 
being, qua being; again, remember the understanding of truth operating here. 
Imagine, for a moment, that propositions exist, and are abstract entities. Then would 
not the relations between them, with respect to truth, be utterly dependent upon the 
relations between their truth-makers? (Even i f propositions do not exist, the same 
would plausibly be the case for sentence types, although there would be pressing 
problems to be tackled - one of the explanatory benefits of propositions is that they 
account for syntactic and semantic ambiguities in the sentence types that we employ, 
another that they account for the inter-translatability of our languages.) Under such 
an understanding, it could never be the case that ' I am sitting at this moment and I am 
standing at this moment', because the state-of-affairs (orfact) that would make ' I am 
standing at this moment' true precludes the state-of-affairs (or fact) that would make 
' I am sitting at this moment' true. In a similar fashion, a given triangle could not be 
both right-angled and isosceles, or both acute and obtuse. 
And while we are thinking of what might exist, we might be rather suspicious about 
the existence of analytic propositions; it might seem that they could only ever be 
useful fictions. For example, the sentence ' A l l bachelors are unmarried men' really 
reduces to ' A l l unmarried men are unmarried men', and ends up being an 
consequence of a simple identity law, P=0 Vx(Px <-> Qx). The fact that there are 
two different ways of saying the same thing, in this case, is plausibly just an artefact 
of language; this, although it may have some pragmatic benefits. Philosophers often 
use words with the suffix '-ism' - alas, this thesis is f u l l of them! - on pragmatic 
grounds; for while they detract f rom the perspicuity and precision of discourse, they 
facilitate concision. 
To these issues - how we should understand truth-bearers and truth-makers - 1 w i l l 
return. But what I wish to emphasise, here, is that rules of inference are, properly 
construed, just rules for moving f rom true premises to true conclusions; as such, they 
See Lambert [2003], ch.8. 
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are not just within the province of logic, for the alethic realist. And let me marshal 
one further argument to this effect, which is due to Lowe:"*^ 
'I t is not the case both that Daisy is a ditzy dodo and Daisy is not a ditzy dodo' - call 
this proposition a - is an instance of the logical law of non-contradiction. However, 
a is not itself a statement of said law. Thus, we need to think about the status of a 
further proposition, call i t proposition p, 'a is an instance of the logical law that for 
any proposition p, it is not the case both that p and not-p.' Yet p is not a law of logic. 
And i f P were to be taken to be a consequence of the laws of logic, then we could 
consider another proposition, y, of the form 'P is an instance of the logical law(s) that 
Pi, , Pn ' An infinite regress looms, and Lowe concludes that: 
Strictly logically necessary propositions are ones that are true in virtue of the laws of 
logic alone - and sometimes this is a matter of the propositions in question being 
logical consequences of those laws: but true propositions stating the existence of 
logical consequence relations between other propositions are only broadly logically 
necessary - they express metaphysical necessities. The lesson would seem to be that 
logic, in the strict sense, is undergirded by metaphysics - as indeed is every other 
intellectual discipline. 
Lowe goes a long way, here, but I do not have the faintest idea why any alethic realist 
should genuinely want to disagree, even when alethic realism is understood in the 
minimal sense advocated by, say, Alston.^'^ Anyone who attaches a thesis to their 
understanding of truth that puts up a 'barrier' to truth-makers - rendering the 
identification of true statements, under their own conception, radically impossible -
might as well be a sceptic. This, or they might want to rethink their account of truth; I 
offer this advice to the transcendental idealist - consider noumena - in particular."^' 
"The truth is out there, but we cannot reach i t " is verging on the incoherent, and only 
seems to motivate us to hang up our gloves. And not only is it an irrefutable thesis - a 
vice, not a virtue - but also thoroughly undesirable in a pragmatic sense; it is the 
philosophy of the pessimist, who has given up on all that he once held dear. 
4. T H E O B S E R V A B I L I T Y C R I T E R I O N 
Is ail that we see or seem 
But a dream within a dream? 
- F o e 
We move, from the very start, in the field of intersubjectivity, of the give-and-take of 
proposals and of rational criticism. - Popper'" 
Appeals to the distinction between that which is 'observable' and that which is not 
were first employed by analysts of natural science, such as Mach and Poincare, in 
order to challenge what is now called the semantic thesis (ST) of scientific realism. 
Lowe [1998], ch.l, section 6. 
'° Alston [1996] 
" See also the discussion towards the beginning of 1.2.2. 
Popper [1983], p.87. 
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(In the literature, this is sometimes referred to as 'semantic realism'.''^) And although 
the history of the resultant debate is long, convoluted, and rather painful to recount^"*, 
it is clear that this distinction underpinned the approach to epistemology of science 
which dominated the first half of twentieth-century Western philosophy, particularly 
with respect to the realism issue. For the Vienna Circle, only verifiable statements 
were meaningful, and only 'observation statements' were verifiable; hence, only 
'observation statements' were meaningful. Elsewhere, Ramsey undertook the task of 
showing how a scientific language devoid of 'theoretical terms' might be developed, 
and why such was to be preferred. And later, Craig's theorem was employed by some 
philosophers in order to argue that any class of terms that was deemed unwanted 
could indeed be dispensed with in scientific discourse.^'' 
Even as late as 1966, we f ind a congruous position being advocated by Carnap. 
According to his syntactic view, the terms employed in scientific discourse are 
divisible into 'observational' and 'theoretical' groupings; 'observational' terms 
mapping onto 'observable' entities, and 'theoretical' terms mapping onto 
'unobservable' (or 'non-observable') entities. Further, he distinguishes between 
'empirical' and 'theoretical' laws. In his words: 
Empirical laws...are laws containing terms either directly observable by the senses 
[sic] or measurable by relatively simple techniques... The laws relating pressure, 
volume, and temperature of gases are of this type [e.g. Boyle's law]... The terms of a 
theoretical law do not refer to observables even when the physicist's wide meaning 
for what can be observed is adopted. They are laws about such entities as molecules, 
atoms, electrons, protons, electromagnetic fields, and others that cannot be measured 
in simple, direct ways.^^ 
For Carnap, 'theoretical laws' are only testable in so far as they allow 'empirical 
laws' to be derived; it is 'empirical laws' that must then be compared with 'facts'. 
And what is a 'fact'? Not much is clear other than it must be 'spatiotemporally 
specified', Carnap's only example being: 'the expansion of this iron bar observed this 
morning at ten o'clock when it was heated'.'^^ No doubt this is a neat little ontology, 
which fits quite nicely with the way that many scientists talk, casually, about their 
practices. Unfortunately, as I shall subsequently show, it is not even wrong; rather, it 
is so vague as to be devoid of substance or value, at least as aught other than a 
heuristic for secondary school pupils, who are just coming to grips with laboratory 
work. Indeed, Camap's obvious error in the antecedent passage seems to mirror the 
underlying mistake of language-based philosophy: he writes of terms when he should 
be writing of entities. He also writes of theoretical entities being 'measured', which 
seems to preclude their being fictional. Besides, neither the total volume of water in 
my body, nor the distance between the Earth and Pluto, can be measured in a 'simple' 
and 'direct' fashion. Are this volume and this distance therefore 'theoretical entities'? 
" Nagel [1950]. 
Psillos [1999] provides a broad, if partisan, overview; ch.1-3. 
Graig [1956]; see also Hempel [1965], ch.8. It should be noted that this is only true in principle, not 
in practice; it is a logical result. 
Carnap [1962], pp.226-227. 
Camap also claims that 'CorrespondenceRules', such as 'The temperature...of a gas is proportional 
to the mean kinetic energy of its molecules', are vital in order to connect 'nonobservables' to 
'observables'. Ibid., ch.24. 
Ibid., p.230. 
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Yet it would be wrong to suggest that there are many contemporary philosophers of 
science who are 'syntactic instrumentalists', or even 'neutralists' in the (later) 
Carnapian vein.^^ In part, this is because a semantic view of scientific theories has 
become more popular. Further, because it is widely accepted that the arguments for 
the semantic thesis of scientific realism (ST), such as those offered in Psillos [1999], 
are sound. 
However, soon after these 'anti-realist' avenues were considered to have been closed, 
it became apparent, through the work of van Fraassen, that another was available.^° 
Instead, one might take a semantic view of scientific discourse, and understand it 
literally, but hold that it is always permissible to remain agnostic about the existence 
of posited 'non-observables'. One might hold that it is possible to 'accept' such 
posited entities for all practical purposes (viz. behave as if they exist) without really 
committing to belief in them; further, that inference to the best explanation (or 
abduction) does not function when dealing with the 'non-observable' realm (e.g. 
when inferring f rom the 'observable' to the 'non-observable'). As such, my 
subsequent attack on the observable-unobservable distinction is an attack on both 
instrumentalism and constructive empiricism; said distinction underpins both, and 
neither can stand against the storm of realism, without this foundation.^' 
Now with respect to van Fraassen's position, consider first his statement of 
'constructive empiricism': 'Science aims to give us theories which are empirically 
adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically 
adequate.' Second, his statement that a theory is 'empirically adequate' i f and only i f 
it accounts for the observable(s): ' . . . a theory is empirically adequate exactly i f what 
it says about the observable things and events in this world is true - exactly i f it 'saves 
the phenomena'.'^^ 
But even upon repeated reading, I believe that these claims should seem very strange 
indeed, for what is true of the table that I am observing presently might be precisely 
that it is constructed, inter alia, of electrons. Indeed, I would suggest that normal 
language fails van Fraassen for a reason. A table is an observable thing, we all agree. 
A table might be composed of electrons, we all agree. (Van Fraassen endorses ST.) 
So van Fraassen cannot mean 'empirically adequate i f . . . what it says about the 
observable things... is true', without countenancing the idea that the aim of science is 
to discover the truth about entities that he would classify as 'theoretical', e.g. 
electrons. Does he mean 'observable properties of observable things'? Wel l now we 
have a rather strange ontology beginning to emerge, which looks decidedly 
metaphysical. Moreover, notice that 'empirically adequate' cannot stretch to 'how 
observable things interact', but can involve only 'how observable things appear to 
interact'. This, for observable things may interact precisely in virtue of their 
unobservable components. 
The latter position was a forerunner of contemporary structuralism. See Psillos [1999], p.41. 
°^ I refer to both positions as 'anti-realist' because this is standard practice in contemporary philosophy 
of science. See, for example, van Fraassen [f980], section l.2." 
'^ It should be noted, however, that van Fraassen's new position, outlined in The Empirical Stance, 
might still be thought tenable. This is tackled in the next section. III.5. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
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A l l this raises the suspicion that there is some sleight-of-hand at play here, whereby 
'observable things and events' must be taken to be some sort of internal 
representations, or at least to dwell in a distinct 'realm of appearances', i f van 
Fraassen's point is to be comprehensible; this, for that which is true of a 
representation need not be what is true of that which it represents. And even though 
Ladyman suggests that van Fraassen is really a direct realist about perception, we 
might remain somewhat suspicious, for he still seems stuck on the distinction between 
that which is sensed and that which is responsible for that which is sensed, and the 
epistemic significance of this, which I argued against in 
In any event, i f the distinction between 'observable' and 'unobservable' collapses, at 
least in so far as it pertains to entities existent in space and time, then so does van 
Fraassen's account of science.^ "^ Therefore, I shall now take the opportunity to 
develop the discussion in the previous chapter, by tackling the issue of perception 
more directly. 
New Dog, Old Tricks - The Empiricus Stance 
The basis of van Fraassen's view is not as new as it might seem. Rather, modern 
empiricism -'constructive empiricism' being the exemplar - has much in common 
with the scepticism written about by Sextus Empiricus, in late antiquity.^^ For this 
scepticism, which might be better labelled Pyrrhonism, is nothing like the fol lowing, 
modern, notion: 
For a given proposition, p, on philosophical grounds, one cannot decide (rationally) 
whether p or not-p.^^ 
Instead, Empiricus urges that it cannot be doubted that there are appearances. What 
may be doubted is that which grounds what is (patv6|j.8vo<; (apparent) - perhaps even 
//"anything grounds it - and how one appearance relates to another: 
When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take 'belief in the sense in 
which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics 
assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances - for example, they would not 
say, when heated or chilled, ' I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'.*^ 
In other words, Empiricus does not advocate the idea that there is equipollence 
(loooGtusiu) between arguments for, and against, there being appearances; that is. 
" Ladyman [2000] 
" It might not seem unreasonable to suggest that abstracta are unobservable, if they exist; indeed, there 
is a strong metaphysical basis for such a contention, which presents a distinct line of demarcation 
between the 'observable' and the 'non-observable'. I return to this point later. 
Empiricus [~30]. It should be noted that Empiricus may just have been cataloguing different forms 
of pre-existent scepticism, and the arguments employed therein, rather than advocating an original, and 
coherent, viewpoint. 
This is rough, and might need to be extended to sets of propositions, etc.; nonetheless, it serves its 
purpose in context: A similar view is put forward by Barnes in his discussion of Empiricus' 
philosophy. Ibid., pp.xix-xx. 
Empiricus [~30], I, 13. See also I, 29: '...we say that they [Sceptics] are disturbed by things which 
are forced upon them...'. 
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although his typical strategy to diffuse philosophical arguments is precisely to show 
the equipollence - viz. equal rational force, or at least power to convince^^ - of 
arguments for opposing claims (or positions). (The law of non-contradiction seems to 
be a given for Empiricus.) The goal of establishing equipollence is to enable sjtoxri, 
or suspension of judgement; this achieved, dxapa^ia, a profound sense of tranquility, 
may be attained; and maintained by immersing oneself in appearances, and 'everyday 
l i fe ' , but naught else. Indeed, philosophical argument is only good for the purpose of 
therapy, according to Empiricus: it may be justly employed only in order to bring 
oneself or another to suspension of judgement, and hence tranquility. 
Now there is an everyday sense in which 'appearances' may deceive, whereby one 
might claim to have been 'misled by the way things seemed', but it must be 
emphasised that this is not the sense of 'appearance' intended by Empiricus. For 
example, although it might 'appear' to be evening at midday, due to heavy cloud 
cover, this is not what he has in mind: rather, this would be an obvious example of a 
theory-laden mistake. Instead, he has in mind that one might 'see a tree' when 
confronted with something else, e.g. a sword, or nothing whatever.^^ (Considering 
appearances in a dream context might prove illustrative.) 
Furthermore, and second, Empiricus does not clearly state that being a sceptic should 
involve having no beliefs whatsoever. Instead, one might understand his position as 
follows. What is taken to be 'bel ief in common parlance can be divided into 'bel ief 
and 'acceptance' - to accept something is not necessarily to believe it, and vice versa. 
So to suspend one's judgement (achieve STioxrj) might involve a refusal to move f rom 
acceptance to belief; and this reading, suggested by Barnes, is reminiscent of van 
Fraassen's agnosticism about the existence of theoretical entities.^'' 
To extend upon this analogue further, it might be emphasised that Empiricus is not 
wil l ing to countenance the use of the indicative sign, but is wil l ing to give his 
imprimatur to the use of the associative - or what Barnes calls the 'recollective'^' -
sign. For whereas the former (indicative) sign would supposedly allow us to infer the 
existence of entities unobservable-even-in-principle, the latter (associative, or 
recollective) sign would only allow us to infer the existence of that which may be 
unobservable at a particular point in time (or perhaps space), but is observable-in-
principle. Empiricus writes: 
There being two different sorts of signs, as we have said, we argue not against all 
signs but only against indicative signs, which seem to be a fiction of the Dogmatists. 
For recollective signs are found convincing by everyday life: seeing smoke, someone 
diagnoses fire; having observed a scar, he says that a wound was inflicted. Hence not 
only do we not conflict with everyday life, but we actually join the struggle on its 
side, assenting without opinion to what it has found convincing and taking a stand 
against the private fictions of the Dogmatists.'^ 
He writes: 'By "equipollence" we mean equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing...' 
Ibid., I, 10. 
'^^  See Empiricus [=30], I, 44-52. This makes it amply clear that he has something like sense-data, or at 
least sensory experiences, in mind. 
™ Ibid., p.xxiv. 
'^ Ibid., p.xxiii. 
Empiricus [=30], 11.102. 
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In other words, Empiricus is neither opposed to induction, nor indeed to inference to 
the best explanation in the realm of the observable. And this brings to mind a passage 
f rom van Fraassen: 
I hear scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears 
- and I infer that a mouse has come to live with me. Not merely that these apparent 
signs of mousely presence will continue, not merely that all the observable 
phenomena will be as if there is a mouse; but that there really is a mouse.^ ^ 
The point is that mice are observable-in-principle: the wall could be demolished by 
use of a sledgehammer, or a trap could be set, in order to f ind the mouse in the 
example above. But likewise, one could walk towards the smoke in Empiricus' first 
example, in order to see the fire. (Moreover, one could also legitimately infer to 
observable-in-principle events in the past, such as in the example of the scar. One 
could have seen the wound inflicted.) Thus, Empiricus is beginning to look rather 
like the first constructive empiricist, largely because of his acceptance of what we 
now call the 'theoretical-observable' distinction. Hacking would agree: '[Empiricus'] 
scepticism anticipates many of the concerns of a modern logical empiricist, but we do 
not f ind h im. . . enunciating any sceptical problem about the future.'^"* But against 
this, I seek to motivate the view that induction and inference to the best explanation 
need either to be accepted as legitimate practices, or abandoned wholesale: this, 
precisely because the aforementioned distinction is not a genuine one. (It is worth 
adding that to reject the idea that 'inference to the best explanation' is worthwhile is 
not to reject the demand for explanation. III .2 should be seen in this light, as I further 
explain in III.5.) 
It is not unreasonable to characterise the Greek philosophy in the time of Empiricus as 
having undergone a considerable shift f rom that in the time of Plato or Aristotle. The 
shift was this: Plato and Aristotle - central in the academic tradition - put 
metaphysics first in philosophy, whereas the sceptics and dogmatists tried to put 
epistemology first.''^ Of course, some would say the same thing has happened again, 
post-Enlightenment: van Fraassen's 'anti-metaphysics', tackled in the final section, 
seems to be a case in point.^^ 
How then is the metaphysician to engage with, and attempt to persuade, an Empiricus 
or a van Fraassen? (Of course, the latter does not directly say ' I t cannot be doubted 
that there are appearances', but does mention an 'observable wor ld ' , and implies that 
it is composed of 'observable t h i n g s ' . H e also uses an even more perplexing phrase 
on occasion, observable phenomena', the meaning of which is opaque.^") Let her 
start by examining precisely the claim that supposedly cannot be doubted: 'There are 
appearances'. What questions might she ask? 
" van Fraassen [1980], pp. 19-20. 
Hacking [1975], p. 179. 
Plato is still seen by many as an ethicist, first and foremost: however, the core of his ethical system is 
based upon considerations relating to essence, in particular that which lies outside the Cave. 
Further, I will argue that both Empiricus and the later empiricists were motivated by subjective 
epistenfiologies; "and"that"this"contributed"to their 'inside-ouf view'.~ Tfiefe"is"a link, Here, to their 
undedying take on justification, which I have argued against in chapter two. 
van Fraa.ssen [1980], pp.54-55. 
Ibid., pp.57 + 64. 
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Well first and foremost, she might ask 'Are there appearances?' in the sense of 'To 
what does "appearance" refer?' Are appearances things-in-themselves? They had 
better not be, without the claim being ontological, in so far as it is founded on the 
category of 'entity'. Yet even i f this is accepted, appearances could not have a 
'grounding' either, without there being things-in-themselves; a claim such as 
Empiricus' - that there are such things - would then be that appearances are not 
ontologically fundamental, or basic. For example, one might see them as involving 
relations (a category), between us (qua members of a natural kind, another category), 
and other particulars (yet another category). 
Building on this, she might point out that were we to be denied access to categories, 
discourse would be rendered impossible. For example, 'discourse' would not refer -
or at the very least, we could not take it do so - in the previous sentence. (This holds 
even i f meaning is determined by use, fol lowing the later Wittgenstein, for it would 
not be possible for us to use anything without identifying some things, and we could 
not identify any things whatsoever without categorial access.) In other words, even 
the reasonably innocuous claim 'There are appearances' is indefensible without 
appeal to ontology, be it implicit or explicit. Hence, it would seem to be the case that 
there are arguments for and against the notion that there are appearances. So why 
should these not be equipollent? What makes arguments for appearances so 
remarkably strong? Empiricus has no straightforward answer to this question, and 
more surprisingly, I do not think that van Fraassen does either. In short, this is since 
appearances are precisely theoretical entities according to the very observable-
theoretical distinction that underpins his empiricism, as I shall now argue. 
Maxwell's Challenge 
The locus classicus for the challenge to the epistemological significance of the 
'observable-theoretical' distinction - although as van Fraassen happily admits, 'such 
expressions... are on the face of it , examples of category mistakes' - is a paper by 
Grover Maxwell , named The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. And 
although this paper might seem a little confused f rom a contemporary perspective, 
since it has so many targets, it is not too problematic to draw out the core arguments 
therein. They are as follows: 
(a) A form of observable-theoretical distinction is accepted, but its 
'ontological significance' is denied. According to Maxwell 's 
understanding of perception, 'theoretical entities are no worse o f f than so-
called observable physical objects' because we may come to see that 
which we previously only theorised about. In particular, he holds that we 
can, with sufficient effort, 'train ourselves to "observe directly" what were 
once theoretical entities'.^*^ One of his examples is as follows: 
After listening to a dull speech while sitting on a hard bench, we begin to 
become poignandy aware of the presence of a considerably strong 
gravitational field, and as Professor Feyerabend is fond of pointing out, i f we 
79 van Fraassen [1980], p.14. 
Maxwell [1962], p. 1060. 
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were carrying a heavy suitcase in a changing gravitational field, we could 
observe the changes of the G\iv of the metric tensor.*' 
(b) Maxwell accepts that there are such things as sense contents, but believes 
that we usually do not observe them - rather, we observe physical objects 
and 'other publicly observable entities'.^" He argues that we may see a car 
without seeing its colour, or indeed its shape. A further example (mine): 
the victim of a crime who is asked to describe the perpetrator may be 
confident that he was a man, and even be able to describe the shape of his 
face in great (and accurate) detail, without being able to report the colour 
of his eyes. Maxwell 's claim is that such occurrences are not due to 
memory lapses. 
Indeed, Maxwell goes further by suggesting that sense data may be 
thought to be theoretical entities. He writes: 
If theoretical physics, psychology, neurophysiology, etc., were sufficiently 
advanced, we could give satisfactory answers to these questions, using, in all 
likelihood, the physical-thing language as our observation language and 
treating sensations, sense contents, sense data, and "inner states" as 
theoretical (yes, theoretical!) entities P 
It is unfortunate that he adopts a physicalist line, but his point seems well 
made: again we see the rather infuriating see-saw effect which I argued 
against in II .2, whereby one might do away with 'inner states' by 
appealing to observable 'physical objects', just as one might do away with 
theoretical 'physical objects' by appealing to observable 'inner states'. It 
seldom seems to occur to participants in this sort of discussion that there 
might be both, and that both might be neither observable nor theoretical in 
the relevant epistemological sense (viz. as 'foundations of knowledge'). 
(c) The epistemic significance of observation is not denied, but it is claimed 
that it is only important in so far as it provides a 'base' to allow us to 
confirm particular statements. (Maxwell mentions statements 'which. . . 
refer to entities which are unobservable at a given time', although it is far 
f rom obvious precisely what he is getting at. One plausible interpretation 
is that he is iry'mg to collapse the distinction betv.'een indicative and 
associative/recollective signs, as mentioned in the foregoing sub-section.) 
However, Maxwell does not want to accept the idea that it is the 
observation term which provides such a base; rather, it is the quickly 
decidable sentence. In his words, this is: 
.. .a singular, nonanalytic sentence such that a reliable, reasonably 
sophisticated language user can very quickly decide whether to assert it or 
deny it when he is reporting on an occurent situation.*'* 
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Examples are easy to provide, for such sentences are the stuff of simple 
discussion, in our daily lives. Upon entering a pub with a friend, I might 
say "There's a table over there", meaning (more properly) 'There is a table 
over there which is surrounded by unoccupied chairs.' M y friend might 
then state, without hesitation, "Yes, but I don't want to sit there. It 's too 
near to the toilets.", and I might swiftly agree to the latter sentence (i.e. 
that the table is close to the toilets). 
Unfortunately, though. Maxwell does not make it clear whether he wants 
to have it that what is considered a quickly decidable sentence is partially a 
matter of convention, fundamentally dependent upon tradition, or whether 
it is grounded in the nature of human, qua natural kind. Nevertheless, a 
reasonable middle ground might be adopted, where it could be recognised 
that such sentences are dependent upon both considerations. Thus, i t is 
consistent with his account that one group of humans might f ind it easier 
to 'spot' some things than another, because of different theories which are 
intersubjectively shared within that group. 
Most important is that such a basis allows us to get moving in the business 
of inquiry - to issue snap judgements, which are nonetheless susceptible to 
future critical re-evaluation, about whether some sentences (or 
propositions) are true or not. And in so far as this involves a traditional 
component, this in no way necessitates that we be trapped with just one set 
of quickly decidable sentences. Rather, it could still be possible to 
undergo shifts, as suggested by Popper's arguments against 'The Myth of 
the Framework', with which I expressed some sympathy in 11.4.^ ^ 
(d) That which is considered unobservable at one point in our investigations is 
subject to be considered observable at a later stage. For example, although 
there may have been a time at which it was right to say that bacteria were 
unobservable, it may now be the case that they are observable. Further, 
that they have, in fact, been observed. Maxwell writes: 
the line between the observable and the unobservable is diffuse... it is 
constantly being pushed toward the "unobservable" end of the spectrum as 
we develop better means of observation - better instruments.^* 
Here, it is important to understand the distinction between observable-in-
principle and observable-in-practice. His point is best understood as 
follows: we might posit something which is not observable-in-practice, but 
may well be observable-in-principle. Thenceforth, activity might be 
geared toward observing it in practice. 
Maxwell 's argument is rather muddled, and there are some ambiguities. For instance, 
it is not obvious how point (a) - that 'we can train ourselves to "observe directly" 
See Popper [1970], pp.56-57. 
Maxwell [1962], p. 1060. 
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what were once theoretical entities' - could coherently relate to point (d), above; 
surely no amount of training w i l l alone develop a 'better means of observation', or 
'better instruments'. Thus, it seems that the training would have to come after better 
instruments were developed, and this would suggest that only the instruments could 
allow direct observation; that is, enable the move f rom observable-in-principle to 
observable-in-practice. 
Nevertheless, Maxwell does provide a f o i l for van Fraassen, who considers his paper 
to be worthy enough to require engagement with. And the examination of his 
response w i l l provide a useful platform for me to launch my critique of his alternative. 
Van Fraassen's Reply 
Against Maxwell , van Fraassen draws our attention to the distinction between 
observing and observing that, and claims that the former is possible without the latter. 
His example involves an individual playing with a tennis ball, but not observing that i t 
is a tennis ball, due to a lack of awareness that there is such a game as tennis: 
He cannot get that information through perception; he would first have to learn a 
great deal. To say that he does not see the same things and events as we do, however, 
is just silly; it is a pun which trades on the ambiguity between seeing and seeing 
that.«' 
Prima facie, this does seem persuasive. Most of us can remember pointing at an 
object in our childhood, and asking "What is that?" Indeed, I have often seen a bird 
without seeing what genus it was a member of; I recently saw an ibis without seeing 
that it was an ibis, as I have subsequently learned f rom a book. Yet I would contend 
that van Fraassen's argument is too quick, and only skims the surface of what is, in 
truth, a far more complex issue. Consider the fol lowing example: 
While on a recent trip to South Africa, I was a passenger in a car that was being 
driven by my father. And as we were travelling through the Drakensberg mountains, 
he suddenly exclaimed "Did you see that snake?" A t this I paused, uncertain about 
what I should say - that is, although I was not moved to thinking reflectively - and 
could only mumble "On the road?" Yet even when he replied in the affirmative, I 
was still not sure how to respond. I suppose this might seem strange, but let me try to 
explain. 
Over the course of the journey I had been reading a novel, and only sporadically 
looking up in order to take in the view, and appreciate the terrain; I was quite aware of 
the road when looking up, although not directing my f u l l attention toward it. What is 
more, I had been looking up f rom my novel just before my father's exclamation, and 
had registered what might be described as a 'dark patch on the road'. But had I seen 
the snake! M y answer at the time was in the negative, after a pregnant pause. 
Instinctively this seemed to be correct, although van Fraassen would presumably want 
to have it that I saw the snake, although not that it was a snake. 
van Fraassen [1980], p.l5. 
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However, while there is a sense in which I would want to agree with van Fraassen, it 
is only in so far as I would agree that a snake may have been partially responsible -
perhaps causally - for that which I saw. And what I saw was a dark patch on the 
road. In natural language, this is the only genuine account that I can offer of my 
sensory experience: to say more would be to lie. 
It is true, of course, that I might see van Fraassen without seeing that he is van 
Fraassen. Still further, I might see this man without seeing that he is a man; he might 
be disguised as a woman. A l l this is accepted, as is the underlying notion that one has 
sensory experiences which need not, and should not, be confused with the inferences 
made on the basis of, or beliefs arrived at f rom, those experiences. But in this sense, I 
think it is even true that one could see a colour without seeing that it was a colour, or 
a shape without seeing that it was a shape, and would therefore want to resist the 
fol lowing dogma: that sensory experience is possible without beliefs or expectations 
on the part of the perceiver, which serve to partially constitute such experience. This 
returns us to my point about the snake on the road, assuming that there really was one: 
we may say that / saw it in so far as my sensory experience would have been different 
had it not been there, but in doing so we are holding my expectations/beliefs constant. 
Had my expectations and beliefs been different at that moment, it is possible that I 
may not have been able to report a 'dark patch on the road'; indeed, I may just have 
reported the road, while looking in precisely the same direction. 
Now the crux of this thought is that it is not possible to see anything without seeing 
that something. Consider a man who claims to have seen something while asleep: the 
report can only be made because he could see that there was something. And no-one, 
I contend, ever asseverates ' I saw something' when they can offer no further 
description of what was seen, e.g. movement, or a swirl of colours. Consider a solider 
on watch, in this regard. Or even more controversially, consider a non-human animal. 
For I think it would be extremely strange to want to say of an animal that it could 
genuinely see, while simultaneously positing that it had no awareness of anything 
outside itself - that it had no ability to see that (anything). For instance, is a typical 
dog not at least capable of seeing that a bone is food, even i f it cannot see that it is a 
bone? And is it not in virtue of this that we can say that such a dog is capable of 
seeing a bone? Coates gestures in this direction: 
For seeing to occur, in the basic extensional sense... the subject must, at most, 
entertain some minimal conceptual component in experience - perhaps merely to the 
effect that there is something present in the surroundings.. .^ ^ 
At this juncture, I should emphasise that this suggestion is neutral on the question of 
whether we forge internal representations of external objects, and whether it is those 
that we truly perceive. Furthermore, it is neutral on the question of whether an entity 
perceived {qua external existent) is constitutive of the sensory experience that allows 
such perception, and uniquely determines said experience.^^ (As Coates also writes: 
'...there is no obvious path leading f rom claims about the epistemic character of 
Coates [1998]; to be fair, it is unclear whether Coates wishes to include animals other than humans. 
Inl3th'er"woras7nothing I^ have s^aid has^t'faro^ a caTTsal theWylJf perception oveTaHisjunctive 
one. To return to my first example: all I have said is that were a snake not there, ceteris paribus, I 
would have seen something different; that is the sense in which the snake was responsible for what I 
saw. 
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experience to claims about its ontological nature.'^") However, as I shall show, a f u l l 
account of what perception entails is vital to a defence of the 'theoretical-
observational' distinction; indeed, even to suggest that the distinction exists. But let 
me work backwards, and try to show why a concept empiricist - one who believes in 
sense data - would commit to belief in it. 
According to the concept empiricist, or 'sense empiricist' as Popper puts it, 'to see X ' 
is 'to see a mental representation of X ' . Thus, all the things that one sees or touches, 
hears or smells, are inside oneself. (Here we see how such a view is liable to lead to 
idealism, even of an extreme form such as Berkeley's. In Popper's words: 'the world 
becomes the totality of my ideas, of my dream.'^') The scheme is essentially as 
follows: something 'out there', viz. not inside oneself, may stimulate one. Based on 
that stimulation, a model of the stimulator is constructed inside (and/or by) one's 
mind, and it is that model (or picture) one is aware of. In other words, as I have 
already argued in I I . 2, there is a sense in which one is radically detached f rom the 
world: all one's interaction with it is mediated by a process of 'internal 
representation'. Of course, the distinction between 'phenomena' and 'noumena' -
that of Kant, who clearly states 'representation... is in us'^^ - almost falls out. The 
phenomena are like little internal pictures, constructed by some mysterious process in 
our bodies and/or minds of which we are entirely unaware. Things-in-themselves are 
somehow responsible for what the little pictures look like, but we can't really be sure 
how. Indeed, this was precisely why Kant wanted to hold that things-in-themselves 
were radically inaccessible to us; that we could not even conceive of how they might 
be. 
But let us pause, here, to draw a breath and attempt to return f rom the clouds. For 
what has been described is a complex and extremely shaky theory about the way 
things are; about our place in the world, and the nature of our interaction with it . I f it 
were right, then we would do well to treat claims about things-in-themselves with a 
pinch of salt. But it is wrong. It is based on a false theory of perception, motivated 
by the addiction to justificationism - the quest to preserve certainty, or near-certainty 
in the guise of 'probable truths' - and arrived at via a detour through amateur 
psychology. Cast your mind back to the view of Russell, mentioned in the previous 
chapter: 
[I]t is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive certainty. And this 
applies to dreams and hallucinations as well as to normal perceptions... the certainty 
of our knowledge of our own experiences does not have to be limited in any way to 
allow for exceptional cases. Here, therefore, we have, for what it is worth, a solid 
basis from which to begin our pursuit of knowledge. The problem we have to 
consider is this: Granted that we are certain of our own sense-data, have we any 
reason for regarding them as signs of the existence of something else, which we can 
call the physical object?'^ 
However, this account must be wrong, for unless being asleep and being awake were 
qualitatively different in an experiential sense, we would not even be aware of the 
^°Coates-[1998] 
" Popper [1983], p.82 
See Kant [1997], A378. 
"'Russell [1912], pp. 19-20. 
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distinction - we would not even posit it . (Likewise, we can only posit 'hallucinations' 
i f we assume we can genuinely perceive external entities some of the time.) Further, 
we could not establish them as qualitatively different, in an experiential sense, on the 
basis of sense-data alone, even were we to have this. (This is even more obvious in 
the case of hallucinations.) Thus, perception understood as 'access to sense-data 
alone' cannot be established as a basis without appealing to something more basic: in 
this case, Russell appeals to a wake-dream distinction which he cannot hold that he is 
certain of. His argument evanesces because he tries to tackle Cartesian scepticism via 
a subjective epistemology, and seems to miss the fact that his starting-point is 
underpinned by a rich, and prejudiced, metaphysic. He is a vict im of the highly 
infectious 'Epistemology as First Philosophy' pathogen which I have repeatedly 
inveighed against herein. 
But back to van Fraassen, who unfortunately does not deign to share his theory of 
perception, and remember the earlier quotation: 
.. .a theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things 
94 and events in this world is true - exactly if it 'saves the phenomena'. 
We now see that the best strategy to illustrate the problematic nature of this claim is 
not to discuss causal theories of reference, pace Psillos.^^ Rather, i t may be supposed 
that van Fraassen would grant that we can successfully refer to objects such as 'tennis 
balls', and events such as 'car crashes' - that is, objects and events that we can see. It 
may then be urged that we can see entities such as electrons, i f they exist; that much 
scientific activity has been geared towards creating conditions in which they may be 
seen. In other words, i t may be emphasised that "We can see tables and chairs" is no 
more or less problematic, in either an epistemic or metaphysical sense, than "We can 
see electrons." (With Maxwell , 'theoretical entities are no worse o f f than so-called 
observable physical objects', although not for the reasons he gives.) Ultimately, i t 
may even be quite defensible to suggest that we, qua humans, could in principle see 
any entity which exists in space and time. 
So in the next sub-section, I shall examine van Fraassen's argument to the effect that 
we cannot see electrons - the 'jet argument' - and defuse it. This achieved, I shall 
elucidate how a correct understanding of perception reveals the 'theoretical-
observable' distinction to be underpinned by a conflation between metaphysical and 
epistemic issues. Specifically, I shall argue that it is a bizarre juxtaposition of two 
separate distinctions - the first between the observable and the unobservable, and the 
second between the theoretical and the observed. 
Beforehand, though, it is worth adding that the empiricist who wants to defend the 
'theoretical-observational' distinction could, as a first effort, try to appeal to the 
claims of contemporary natural science. That is, he could talk of three types of 
photoreceptor cones in our eyes, each containing a different visual pigment attached 
to 1 l-c/5-retinal, and disposed to absorb photons of differing energies; further, he 
could accouiit for delJtefafiopia and protanopia as pne t ic abnormalities.^^ Yet none 
of this w i l l do, for to rely on such talk would be to appeal to the very 'theoretical 
Ibid., p. 12. 
Psillos[1999],ch.l2. 
This could support the claim that 'blue' was an internal response. 
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entities' which we are not supposed to want to commit to belief in: light, molecules, 
and so forth. 
The Jet Argument 
For van Fraassen, 'observable' is a vague predicate; he claims that it is only usable in 
virtue of i t having 'clear cases and clear counter-cases.'^^ A clear case of observation 
would be employing the naked eye to read a book. Furthermore, and derivatively, 
watching the moons of Jupiter through a telescope, just because they would be able to 
be seen by the naked eye of an astronaut who was close to them (at least, according to 
contemporary theory). But both Maxwell and I would accept these as clear cases, so 
what van Fraassen needs to provide, as he correctly recognises, is a clear counter-
case. His attempt involves a comparison between the effect of a charged particle 
passing through a cloud chamber, and that of a jet f ly ing through the sky: 
The resuhing silver-grey line [when a charged particle passes through a cloud 
chamber] is similar (physically as well as in appearance) to the vapour trail left in the 
sky when a jet passes. Suppose I point to such a trail and say: 'Look, there is a jet!'; 
might you not say: ' I see the vapour trail, but where is the jet?' Then I would answer: 
'Look just a bit ahead of the trail.. .there! Do you see it?' Now in the case of the 
cloud chamber this response is not possible. So while the particle is detected by 
means of the cloud chamber, and the detection is based on observation, it is clearly 
not a case of the particle's being observed.'^ 
Now I f ind this line of argument quite baffl ing: it seems to establish precisely nothing, 
other than what our conventions are. In particular, because in reply to van Fraassen's 
"Do you see it?", I might say: " I ' m not sure. Maybe I see a jet, but not that it is a jet. 
I see a dark patch moving, against the blue of the sky, which is consistent with the 
presence of a jet." And now let us turn this around, imagine that I were stood next to 
a cloud chamber, pointing at the front of a trail developing in real-time, and asking 
"Do you see the charged particle?" of van Fraassen. The character of his reply would 
not seem to be any different f rom this: " I ' m not sure. Maybe I see a charged particle, 
but not that it is a charged particle. I see movement about a point - a perturbation, in 
a background that is relatively static - which is consistent with the presence of a 
charged particle." The point is simple: in the first case, I may remain agnostic 
because although what I see is consistent with there being a jet present, I might be 
misled. I might be seeing a rocket. Why, then, should the second case be any 
different? 
In the first case, van Fraassen could pass me binoculars or a telescope. While looking 
through them, towards the dark moving patch, I might then see something else 
consistent with there being a jet in the sky. But so what? In the second case, we 
could repeat the experiment with a large metal block in the middle of the cloud 
chamber, and notice that the trail would not penetrate it ; but surely this is something 
else consistent with there being an electron in the cloud chamber. So what is there of 
significance here, other than that when one sees a jet, i t is easier to see that it is a jet, 
given that the theories required are commonly held and instilled in us f rom an early 
97 
Ibid., p. 17. 
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age? (Of course, it is less common to f ind oneself in a situation where one can see an 
electron, given the status quo. But that is contingent.) And what is there to stop me 
from saying I ' l l accept the claim that jets exist, because it saves the colours and 
shapes I see that there are, but I won't commit to belief in them? It is not as i f I 
somehow grasp jets in their completeness, on the assumption that such things exist: I 
do not have privileged epistemic access to jets. And to baldy assert otherwise seems 
to be to appeal to an empiricist dogma, which is based on veiled metaphysical 
assumptions about other entities that exist in the world, and the range of our possible 
interactions with them. 
I f this does not convince, let me put it another way. Imagine I w i l l grant that the sky 
exists, that tables exist, and that almost all 'normal' objects of perception ('publicly 
neutral objects') - those that we refer to in common discourse, or 'everyday l i fe ' -
exist. But I w i l l be a local sceptic about jets. I w i l l accept, of course, that the way 
everything else that I believe in is affected is perfectly consistent with the existence of 
jets. Yet I w i l l refuse to commit to belief in jets, and hold that I am perfectly rational 
to do so. No metaphysical argument w i l l deflect me: I scoff at metaphysics, and hold 
that the only necessity is verbal necessity. Besides, why bother to convince me that 
there are jets, when I can behave as if there are jets, and reap all the pragmatic 
rewards that believing in jets would bring? 
As a rebuff, it might be objected that I am being silly. What's the harm in believing 
in jets? M y answer, delivered with a straight face, is that I don't need to believe in 
such occult entities - ' f ly ing machines' - and that by remaining agnostic I w i l l be less 
liable to have made a mistake. Sure, the position of the individual who believes in 
jets is as rational as mine, but I ' m just that little bit cleverer; I won't look like an idiot 
i f everyone else changes their mind on this. 
To rejoin, my opponent could ask on what principled basis I distinguish between the 
jet and 'everything else'. I w i l l repeat that I scoff at metaphysics. I reject that sort of 
talk, because I reckon epistemology comes first, and there is an epistemic distinction 
between jets and non-jets. Challenge me a bit further, and when I get tired of 
finessing my way out of your arguments - remember, I am clever after all - I ' l l end 
up telling you that I 've got an 'anti-jet stance': "You know, that's just the way I see 
the world!"^^ 
But enough polemic, for van Fraassen's position is really an anthropocentric one. In 
particular, he seems to think that what is observable is somehow determined by 
'everyday l i f e ' , or is forthrightly obvious, because he regards 'what is observable as a 
theory-independent question'. '°'^ So the real problem, I think, is that van Fraassen 
does not recognise that what we think is going on is almost always theory-dependent; 
outside, as well as inside, contemporary natural science. Take this example: were I to 
turn o f f the light-switch in my room, now, I would hold that my bookcase was still 
there, although I could not see it. This, because I believe I could see it were the light 
on. But would I want to hold that my shadow, a great candidate for an observable we 
could agree on, was still there? I say not. Still further, I would mention holes (and 
could, further, talk of gaps). I don't believe, for one second, that holes are things-in-
^ I argue against the invocation of 'stance' in the next section. 
Van Fraassen [1980], p.57. 
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themselves, but I ' m pretty sure that I can point at holes, and talk about holes - "Look, 
there's a hole, can you see it?" - without seeming mad. I can accept hole talk, and 
behave as j / there are holes. The silver bullet cometh: / can rationally hold an 'anti-
hole ' stance, while holding that holes are observable in van Fraassen's sense! But 
this seems to me to make a mockery of the claim that his distinction has any genuine 
epistemic significance. 
A Reconstrual of the Observability Criterion 
A l l this said, there remains a significant distinction between that which is observable 
and that which is non-observable. This is metaphysical, or ontological. There is also 
an important difference between a theoretical entity and an observed entity. This is 
epistemic. 
As far as the first is concerned, we may make metaphysical posits about entities that 
do not exist in space and time, and could not, therefore, be the objects of perceptual 
awareness. That is, on the reasonable assumption that we exist in space and time, and 
that perception - being radically dependent, inter alia, on our embodiment - only 
grants direct awareness of other entities in space and time, viz. concreta. (Notice it is 
not precluded that abstracta - e.g. laws of nature, under some accounts - be involved 
in the process of, or governance of, acts of perception.) The thought, simply, is this: 
i f entities such as universals had causal effects, then we might be able to set up a 
situation suitable for 'viewing them' (that is, in a possible world in which they 
existed). However, any thing eternal and unchanging, located literally nowhere (in a 
proper spatial sense), is clearly not a potential object of perception. There is no sense 
in which any (sane) individual would wander o f f in search of blueness and circularity, 
unless they were something like a devout Platonist, and intended to 'explore' by 
dying, and having their soul released f rom its fleshy prison! Here is a demarcation 
criterion between the observable and non-observable in emergence: since all abstracta 
are unobservable, might it not be that all concreta are observable? Might it not be 
reasonable to deny that '[T]he term "observable" has logically nothing to do with 
existence', at least under a broad construal of 'logically'?"^' 
This further claim might seem, at first glance, to be extremely dubious. For instance, 
might one not conceive of an inert substance, existent in space and time yet 
undergoing no interactions whatsoever? The reply is emphatically in the negative, 
and not just because we should not assume a priori that there is no 'hopelessly opaque 
surd'.'"^ For to be in time is precisely to be capable of change; time is the dimension 
of change, or even is change. To be in space is precisely to be in a position - no pun 
intended - to interact with (a set of) other entities. (In both cases, relations are 
entered into.) A l low me to borrow f rom contemporary science in order to persuade, 
since it provides some of our best current guesses about how things are. 
Any 'inert entity in space and time' would need to have substance without volume or 
mass, i f it were not to 'resist' the intrusion of other objects (due to the space it 
occupied) or undergo (and exert) gravitational influence. Yet it could not be 
'°' Ibid., p. 18. 
'°' I refer back to the quotation from Blanshard in III. 1. 
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something like an electromagnetic wave, without violating Einstein's infamous 
equation, E^=p^c^ -i- mo^c'*, by being capable of changing momentum (inter alia); this 
since a photon has no rest mass, and the equation reduces to E=pc. In short, this 
suggests that anything existent in space and time can be seen, in the correct 
conditions. But this in no way implies that it is a trivial task to spot each and every 
concrete thing, or each and every sort of concrete thing - to get into the right situation 
to observe the aforementioned either in a physical, or psychological, sense. For 
example, to observe 'dark matter', i f it exists, is no easy business for the moment. 
But it may well be that case that black holes have already been observed, through the 
x-rays emitted by the accelerated gases that form the accretion disk about them.'""^ 
This, in the same way that one might locate a plughole in a bath f i l led by murky water 
which is draining away, by noticing a whirlpool. 
Second is the distinction between a theoretical entity and an observed entity, or more 
properly a theoretical entity and an entity believed to have been observed. And 
needless to say, this is purely epistemic. For instance, imagine I was to posit that 
there is a small planetoid which orbits the Sun on a path that lies within the volume 
formed by a solid of revolution (about the Sun, at the origin) of the 2-d area bounded 
by the orbital paths of Earth and Venus. But imagine, further, that I roughly specify 
its orbit, by arriving at an approximate solution to the many body problem involved, 
and tell you where and when you w i l l have to point a telescope, in order to attempt to 
view it. Would i t not be reasonable to classify it as 'observed', and no longer 
'theoretical', provided such attempts to view it were successful (viz. provided the 
relevant observation statements were classified as true)? Or to put it differently, 
would a particular set of observation statements - treated as such because they deal in 
terms that refer to entities already classified as observable-in-principle, because 
classified as observed'*^'' - not serve to corroborate the hypothesis that there existed 
such a planetoid, and thereby allow for a classification of that hypothesis as truel 
And would the classification of that theory as true not be because of the classification 
of the planetoid as observed! On this level, it strikes me that there is no greater 
epistemic security in classifying any one entity as 'observed' than any other. Rather, 
it just so happens that it is much harder to classify some entities as 'observed' than it 
is others, because we do not often f ind ourselves in situations suitable to do so, in 
terms of entities already classified as 'observed', and sometimes hence 'observable' 
(in the ontological sense), according to dominant traditional theories. But it strikes 
me that asking "How would this snow on the ground be affected were an abominable 
snowman to walk over it?" is very similar to asking "How would the washing-up 
liquid in this tank be affected were a neutrino to be absorbed by it?"; the fact that an 
abominable snowman could also be seen by the naked eye in a particular class of 
circumstances does not seem to have any epistemic significance at all. Consider, in 
particular, the reconstruction of the appearance of a dinosaur such as a diplodocus, on 
the basis of the discovery of bones: plausibly no human w i l l ever see such a creature, 
but we do not classify it is theoretical. Besides, the fact that I cannot see the chair I 
am sat on when I am not in the room does not make me doubt its existence, and the 
fact that I cannot feel that chair when I am asleep on it does not make me doubt its 
It is difficult to know whether van Fraassen would want to have it that a black hole is observable, 
-but I shouid say it would not berwere his (imputed) view of perception to be correct" 
Here I gesture at the following: to make the test possible, particular theories about the existence of 
telescopes, the effects of looking through them, their very existence, their observability, and so forth, 
must be accepted. 
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existence. Nor, indeed, does the fact that I have never smelt it, or tasted it. 
5. METAPHYSICS, CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM, AND T H E EMPIRICAL 
STANCE' 
The Empirical Stance has considerable scope, yet it clearly builds upon van 
Fraassen's earlier work, in particular The Scientific Image. Its central question is 
clear: 'What is empiricism, and what could it be?''°'^ And while some of the tactics 
that van Fraassen employs in order to answer this should be familiar by now - for 
example, he maintains the view that explanatory power should only be construed as a 
pragmatic virtue for theories, that the only forms of possibility and necessity are 
verbal, and that there is a radical distinction between acceptance and belief - his 
overall strategy has developed considerably. Most noticeably, he now has 
metaphysics f i rmly in his sights, whereas beforehand, he has only hinted at such 
antipathy. 
It is to this move that I wish to object, and I shall endeavour to f u l f i l two distinct tasks 
in this section, in order to set the stage for subsequent internal and transcendent 
critique. First, I want to elucidate the notion of 'stance', which is bound up with van 
Fraassen's view of philosophy qua activity, and the pragmatic/existentialist vein in his 
thinking. Second, to provide an overview of his arguments against metaphysics, with 
particular focus on disclosing what he understands 'metaphysics' to be. 
The Notion of Stance 
In attempting to establish what empiricism might be, van Fraassen first considers it as 
an historical movement, and draws the conclusion that it is characterised by 'a 
recurrent rebellion against the metaphys ic ians . 'However , since this is precisely 
the point at issue - and it w i l l be contended that van Fraassen's view of metaphysics 
is too narrow - it cannot bode well for us to accept this, as it stands. Instead, this 
claim might be moderated somewhat, and we might accept, pending further 
investigation, that empiricism is at least characterised by its opposition to certain 
forms of metaphysics. (As w i l l be explained below, van Fraassen does tend to use the 
term 'metaphysics' in a rather lax fashion, and this leads to considerable confusion 
about what, precisely, he is targeting.) 
More revealing and cogent, however, is his subsequent analysis of what empiricism 
cannot be. In brief, he argues that the empiricist cannot engage in a critique against 
metaphysics - or for our purposes, any form of metaphysics - i f she accepts a 
'Principle Zero' such that: 
van Fraassen [2002], p.xiii. 
'""^  See the introduction to van Fraassen [1980], where it is implied that Aristotelian philosophy 
inhibited"progress"iirthe Middle"Ages, ffid'thaf there is stronglimilafity'ljetween the reasons fdf^hich 
nominalists oppose metaphysical realism, and those for which empiricists oppose scientific realism. 
See also the opening chapters of van Fraassen [1989], and van Fraassen [1991]. 
van Fraassen [2002], p.36. 
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For each philosophical position X there exists a statement X + such that to have (or 
take) position X is to believe (or decide to believe) that X+.'°^ 
Why? Just because to hold that there is a factual thesis which is not only immune to 
empiricist criticism, but is also the foundation of the empiricist's attack on 
metaphysics, is quite incoherent; for instance, it might be open to metaphysical 
criticism. Either this, or the empiricist must confess to being basely dogmatic, but no 
more so than the metaphysician with an opposing foundational claim need be: a 
stalemate ensues. 
But how might we view a philosophical position i f 'Principle Zero' is to be violated? 
The answer: as a 'stance', which involves beliefs and opinions, but also 'involves a 
great deal more, w i l l not be identifiable through the beliefs involved, and can persist 
through changes of belief.' "'^ And this knits nicely with van Fraassen's suggestion 
that the history of ideas plays an important role in giving us an orientation: ' In every 
century we must reinterpret ourselves to ourselves. We do not come into our century 
with a tabula r a s a . ' " ° 
Unfortunately, van Fraassen's characterisation of 'stance' is still very vague; we are 
left wi th only two and a half pages of prose to tell us what philosophy could be . ' " 
What is clear is that a 'stance' is radically dependent on the value-judgements and 
attitudes of one that holds it: 'toward l i fe , love, and laughter'."^ Yet it is also 
supposed to be reasonable to compare 'stances' on some sort of intersubjective basis: 
for van Fraassen, they are not 'purely subjective'. For example, in comparing the 
'stance' of materialism with that of empiricism, van Fraassen thinks it is illuminating 
to examine how proponents of each view (empirical) science. But an obvious 
objection still looms: 
Is there a difference that makes a difference between assuming a stance and acquiring 
a set of beliefs, except perhaps for what Peirce called "a certain contrite fallibilism"? 
If a student emerges from Philosophy 101 convinced that there is no point in trying to 
describe either the world or knowledge in the wholesale ways characteristic of 
metaphysics and epistemology, does her acquisition of that negative belief count as 
taking the empirical stance?"' 
Now I do not want to guess how van Fraassen would want to answer. Rather, I 
simply want to emphasise that Rorty does not do him a disservice by suggesting that 
one must be a fallibilist in order to hold any 'stance'; van Fraassen wants to avoid 
dogmatism at all costs, and this is his motivation for rejecting the aforementioned 
'Principle Zero'. 
'™ Ibid.,p.41. 
Ibid., p. 62. 
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The Argument Against... What? 
In order to understand van Fraassen's argument against 'metaphysics', we first need 
to understand what he takes 'metaphysics' to refer to. He inveighs against, variously, 
'a seventeenth-century style of metaphysics'"'*, '[Quinean] analytic ontology'"^, and 
'materialism'' But hidden away in a footnote is a more substantive definition of 
that which he opposes: 
The type of metaphysics to which I refer, and which I take to be the enterprise 
engaged in by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz, is characterized by the attempted 
construction of a theory of the world, of the same form as a fundamental science and 
continuous with (as extension or foundation of) the natural sciences."^ 
This is fair enough, i f again undesirably vague. But what leaves a bad taste in the 
mouth is van Fraassen's declaration in the introduction, ' I do not reject all 
metaphysics'"^, coupled with his apparent association of 'metaphysics' with ' trivial 
pursuits'' at the end of chapter one, and thenceforth. On the one hand, his point 
might be understood as this: many activities that involve 'puzzle-solving' (in Kuhn's 
sense) are trivial, but we need not reject them; all metaphysics is 'word play', but 
need not be rejected as long as it is not accompanied by 'false consciousness' (e.g. the 
belief that it is disclosing some special knowledge about the actual). On the other, it 
might be thought that he owes us an explication of what sort of metaphysics is 
meaningful, and useful, under his painfully brief account of what constitutes 
philosophy. Besides the recognition that van Fraassen is opposed to philosophical 
approaches that are overly respectful of the content of natural science, rather than its 
methodology, we are at an impasse. Needs must we look beyond The Empirical 
Stance, to van Fraassen's earher work, in order that we might progress. 
Unfortunately, it has to be noted such a move confronts us with a serious obstacle, for 
in his earlier scholarship van Fraassen offers a dogmatic characterisation of 
empiricism, far removed from the notion of 'stance': 
By empiricism I mean the philosophical position that experience is our source of 
information about the world, and our only source. 120 
Here we have a substantive thesis - an X-f- to the X of empiricism, i f 'Principle Zero' 
holds - with which many a metaphysician would want to strongly disagree. This, 
because it seems to hark back to the naive associationism of Hume and M i l l , which 
Pinker has recently argued 'became the core of most [subsequent] models of 
learning... ' '^ ' , and against which I argued at length in 1.2.3 (and to a lesser extent, 
II.2). But for the moment, let us just accept that there is room for serious debate here, 
and that one might fairly asseverate '[CJulture is crucial, but culture could not exist 
without mental faculties that allow humans to create and learn culture to begin 
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with.' '^^ This is an explicit nod to van Fraassen's belief that 'we do not come into our 
century with a tabula rasa', but need not result in the acceptance of a Kantian (or Neo-
Kantian) conception of metaphysics, founded on categories of thought about being, 
rather than categories of being, and resulting in a robust empirical realism constructed 
upon the swampy ground of transcendental idealism. 'What are our faculties, and 
their limitations?' is a question that I wish to keep open, and w i l l return to towards the 
end of this thesis. (A similar question, about whether we have a priori knowledge, 
also looms large.) I have digressed, here, only in order to suggest that it is unclear 
how it is not relevant for the 'new model van Fraassen': the one with 'the empirical 
stance'. 
So, back to the main thread of this sub-section: 'metaphysics' for van Fraassen. Let 
us first look to Laws and Symmetry, and second to Quantum Mechanics: An 
Empiricist View. In the former, we f ind van Fraassen arguing that 'the end of the 
eighteenth century marks a great turning-point in p h i l o s o p h y ' w h i c h involved a 
desire, on the part of empiricists, to separate science f rom not only theology, but also 
'metaphysics'. '^ '^  ( I have already denied this in I I . 1.) As i f to corroborate the 
importance of the brief digression above, he continues by citing Kant's Critique, and 
makes it clear that the sort of metaphysics being attacked therein involved the dubious 
claim that 'reason can bring us to logical.. . certainty of truths that transcend 
experience'.'^^ Further, we f ind a clue as to what form of metaphysics may be 
acceptable to van Fraassen. One that bears surface similarity to the Kantian 
conception, in so far as it only allows for: 
the critical archaeology of ideas to uncover the actual presuppositions in actual 
history of science, plus the analysis of possible presuppositions that could constitute a 
foundation for science.'"* 
In the latter, we f ind a further development of this position, whereby van Fraassen 
expresses his dislike for scientism, according to which science 'is elevated (?) to the 
status of metaphysics.' '^^ Again, the point seems to be that obsession with the content 
of contemporary science, i f that content is taken to disclose the truth or approximate 
truth about the 'way the world is' (viz. the actual), is inadvisable: as such, his 
arguments against scientific realism and metaphysics of a certain sort do seem to 
come together. But note that being interested in the content of science in another way 
is perfectly permissible for van Fraassen: 
Pinker [2002], pp.viii-ix. 
'"van Fraassen [1989], p.8. 
This might seem curious because traditional metaphysics was arguably a core component of 
theology from the Middle Ages onward, as I argued in II. 1, given that medieval theologians had 
eagerly discussed issues such as whether God could create a universal without anything to instantiate it. 
It remains unclear whether-metaphysics is supposed to be some sort of method for van Fraassen, or 
whether it can legitimately be taken to be a discipline in its own right. I will argue that these two 
conceptions are deeply intertwined: that metaphysics mirrors mathematics, in so far as it has pure and 
-applied-domains. - — ^ 
'-' van Fraassen [1989], p.8. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p.9. 
'" Van Fraassen [1991], p.l7. 
191 
When we come to a specific theory, the question: how could the world possibly be the 
way this theory says it is? concerns the content alone. This is the foundational 
question par excellence, and it makes equal sense to the realist and empiricist alike.''^ 
This is a striking statement, because van Fraassen clearly wants to have it that it is, 
after all, perfectly reasonable to be interested in, and even carefully examine, the 
content of contemporary science. What is wrong is to be an epistemic realist in the 
mould of those that march under the flag of 'scientific realism'; as Psillos puts it, to 
regard 'mature and predictively successful scientific theories as well-confirmed and 
approximately true of the world. ' '^^ (Here, it is worth re-emphasising that a realist 
conception of truth is assumed by all parties in this d i s c u s s i o n . T o opt for an anti-
realist account of truth, such as that of Dunmiett, would be to avoid the debate 
between 'scientific realism' and 'constructive empiricism'.) The point: van Fraassen 
fails to tell us why the metaphysician should need to commit to belief in scientific 
realism. Does she need to? This is a question to which we w i l l return in due course. 
Despite what has been gleaned, it remains the case that the van Fraassen of The 
Empirical Stance neither succeeds in providing a rigorous account of metaphysics, 
nor considers a representative sample of the contemporary takes on the discipline. 
Understandably, given the nature of his project, van Fraassen goes to great pains to 
distinguish his empiricism f rom that of Locke and M i l l , in answering what empiricism 
is. '^' But the Principle of Charity would seem to suggest that he should have isolated 
his target with equal care, by also providing an account of the development of 
metaphysics in the history of ideas, similar to (but perhaps broader than) the one I 
offered in I L L Still , allow me to put that line aside, and concentrate on a more direct 
philosophical argument. 
One overarching problem is this: can questions about the kind of knowledge 
metaphysics attempts to provide be cleanly separated f rom those about its very scope? 
The answer, unfortunately, seems to be that the two concerns are intertwined: thus, we 
might do well to start by asking just what kind of knowledge it does attempt to 
provide. We might remain extremely cautious about attributing any particular view of 
metaphysics to van Fraassen, instead concentrating on what sorts of activity, sorts of 
epistemic moves, and attitudes, he associates with 'metaphysics'. I f we can then show 
that there is a special science that deserves the name 'metaphysics', but doesn't 
involve those activities, moves, or attitudes, then it w i l l emerge that van Fraassen's 
'anti-metaphysics' arguments are ineffectual, because they target too small a domain. 
5.1 ABDUCTION AND ' METAPHYSICS ' 
From the foregoing overview, two salient conclusions have already been gleaned: 
(A) That any 'stance' must involve fall ibil ism; thus, that metaphysical knowledge 
must be understood to be fallible in order for there to be a 'metaphysical 
stance', oi' for hietaphysics to be compatible with the 'enipirical stance'. 
'^^IbidTp:4: 
'-^  Psillos [1999], p.xix. 
See, for example, Alston [1996], ch. 
Van Fraassen [2002], ch.2. 
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(B) To inquire into the content of a scientific theory is perfectly permissible, 
according to van Fraassen, as long as it is not just assumed that such content 
will be a key to successfully carving the (actual) world at its joints, at least in 
so far as that should concern the unobservable.'^^ 
For the moment, however, showing how metaphysics can be understood to be fallible 
- as suggested by (A) - is best left on hold, until the objects of its inquiry can be 
delimited. This is where (B) comes in, for it does not explicitly disallow metaphysics 
from having the content of empirical science as one of its objects. Keeping this in 
mind, as a suitable background to the ongoing discussion, let us now examine one of 
van Fraassen's central arguments against 'metaphysics': 
(a) Objection to the use of abduction, in the context of ontology: 'Where is the 
metaphysician who shows us how likely it is that inference to the best 
explanation in ontology will lead to true conclusions?''^^ 
Now (a) should be familiar, for van Fraassen also uses a similar argument against 
inferences to the unobservable from the observable in The Scientific Image, 
employing the memorable example of 'a mouse in the wainscoting'.''''' But let us 
accept that he is right about this - that there is a sound epistemic distinction between 
the observable and the unobservable, that what is observable is not a theory-
dependent question, etc.'^ "'' - and ask "Are all the objects of ontological inquiry 
unobservable?" Plausibly not, for this can involve the investigation of categories such 
as 'event', and there would seem to be 'observable things and events', at least in some 
manner of speaking, by van Fraassen's own admission. But hold on. What does it 
mean to posit a category? Doesn't the metaphysician want to infer the existence of 
the (unobservable) category of events, from the existence of events? The answer is 
emphatically negative. Categories do not exist, rather 'entities belong to different 
ontological categories on account of their different existence-conditions and/or 
identity conditions.' '^ ^ To do ontology is to enter into a process of classification, 
whether concerning observable entities, or (posited) unobservable entities. And this 
being the case, there is no obvious motivation for van Fraassen to want to reject it 
wholesale. 
'No obvious motivation' does not mean 'no motivation', however. Still restricting the 
domain of ontology to the observable - an ephemeral conceit - why would an 
empiricist want to inveigh against the project of category classification? Not, I think, 
on the grounds that it is useless to inquire into the identity-conditions of objects such 
as chairs, tables, and desks. Rather, she might have some serious doubts about what 
'^ ^ This is a consequence of constructive empiricism, and is a part of van Fraassen's empiricism, 
although it is unclear whether this need be part of the empirical stance. 
I mentioned this in III.4: see van Fraassen [2002], p. 16. 
van Fraassen [1980], pp. l9--23. 
'^ ^ For clarification on this issue beyond my discussion in III.4, see Monton and van Fraassen [2002]. 
'^ ^ van Fraassen [1980], p. 12. Remember also that van Fraassen professes to be a direct realist about 
perception of everyday oBjectsTfor he"writes: ' we can and do see~the"truth"about"many things:' 
ourselves, others, trees and animals, clouds and rivers - in the immediacy of experience.' van Fraassen 
[1989], p. 178. 
Lowe [1998], p.l79. 
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an existence condition is supposed to be; how such a notion could be useful, let alone 
interesting. But allow me to give an example. 
Take a group of entities that both the metaphysician and the empiricist should have 
little problem committing to belief in: humans, trees, apples, swords, and statues. Is it 
the case that there is a significant distinction between swords and statues on the one 
hand, and trees and apples on the other, in so far as their existence conditions are 
concerned? An ontologist might want to answer in the affirmative, just because 
swords and statues - call these artefacts - are dependent for their existence upon that 
of humans, whereas trees and apples are not. (More carefully, it might be conceded 
that other sentient life-forms could craft artefacts, so we might want to suggest a 
category of sentient life-forms to place humans in, and then relate that to the category 
of artefact.) Not dependent, of course, in the sense that were all sentient life-forms to 
be suddenly extinguished, the swords and statues now in existence would suddenly 
cease to exist. The point is that the category of sentient life-forms would have to be 
non-empty in any possible world in order for the category of artefacts to be non-
empty in that world. And here, please understand the talk of 'possible worlds' to be 
no more than a convenient fiction; this, since van Fraassen argues that '"world" is not 
a count noun', and this argument needs to be confronted before an alternative account 
can be maintained. 
However, even given that some sort of sense might be made of the notion of existence 
conditions - the metaphysician needs to motivate a de re account, against van 
Fraassen's de dicto account'^^ - the fact of the matter is that many metaphysicians 
want to allow for the inclusion of entities in their ontology which they would candidly 
admit to be unobservable, should they exist: the most obvious cases are abstracta, 
such as universals. Is it not the case that they need to employ abduction, or inference 
to the best explanation, in order to posit the existence of such things? 
Well, we might start to tackle such a question by recognising that there are 
metaphysicians who would want to answer in the negative. For example, Lowe 
writes: 
[W]hat is central to the concept of rational inference is the notion that if the premises 
of an argument are true, no alternative is possible but that the conclusion is also true. 
This view is confirmed by the fact that we all naturally consider it to be a fatal 
weakness in someone's argument if he has failed to perceive that other alternatives 
besides his conclusion are compatible with his premises. But this means that what 
distinguishes demonstrative inference from non-demonstrative inference is the kind of 
'possibility' involved.'"^ 
So here, we have a realist metaphysician who would want to declare that all 
ampliative inferences are invalid, even irrational, but does not want to endorse the 
pure deductivism of Popper, and subsequent critical rationalists such as Miller. How 
does he want to have it that he can do this, while maintaining that 'metaphysics can be 
genuinely concerned with the structure of reality itself...and at the same time can 
van Fraassen [2002], pp. 18-25. 
'^ '^  van Fraassen [1977] 
Lowe [1975], p.3. I should add that this remains his view: see also Lowe [1987]. 
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have a non-empirical character which distinguishes it from natural science'?'" '^ It is to 
the investigation of this question that our attention should now turn. 
A short answer might simply be that Lowe believes we have a priori knowledge, 
which provides us with the ability to delimit categories of being; that he denies 
'experience is our source of information about the world, and our only source.'' 
However, this is far too quick, albeit verisimilar, for it runs the risk of caricaturing his 
position, which has developed from his early thoughts about the structure of argument 
and modality. At the core of his philosophy is the idea that there is a form of 
necessitation that is neither strictly logical, nor narrowly logical; that is, neither a 
result of the laws of logic, nor the laws of logic plus the meanings/definitions of non-
logical terms. This is broadly logical necessitation, or metaphysical necessitation, an 
example of which is "Al l water is HiO".''*^ And although the empiricist is liable to 
want to interject with " I f that can be known, it can only be known a posteriori", Lowe 
does not want to disagree. He wants to admit that some metaphysical necessities 
cannot be established a priori, and clarify his position by adding that 'metaphysics by 
itself can only tell us what is metaphysically possible, not which of various 
metaphysical possibilities actually obtain.' This statement requires unpacking and 
refinement, though. How should one understand this notion of metaphysical 
possibility? The answer: 
Metaphysical possibility is... the possibility of a state of affairs (one which is 
representable, no doubt by a proposition): and so in this sense it is a 'real', or de re, 
possibility. The notion of a state of affairs, of course, is itself a metaphysical notion, 
just one of a large family of such notions... These notions are not purely 'logical' 
notions: they are ontological. They concern being and its modes, whereas logic, 
properly understood, does not concern being in general but, rather, the formal 
properties of and relations between propositions (which constitute only a small part of 
what there is)."" 
So what Lowe has in mind - talk of possible worlds still held as a convenient fiction, 
for the reasons mentioned earlier - is that we may be able to establish a priori that 
there are, inter alia, impossible states of affairs. And it would follow, of course, that 
such states of affairs could not obtain in the actual world. Are there any simple 
examples? Let us take one from mathematics. Start with four congruent right-angled 
triangles, with sides of length a, b, and c, as depicted below: 




A W r d oT warning: Lowe's position should nofbe confused with"that expressed iiTKfiplce"! 
For discussion of the similarities and differences, see Lowe 11998], pp. 13-27. 
Lowe [2002], p. 11 
van Fraassen [1989], p.8. 
1980]: 
145 
Lowe [1988], p.22 
Ibid., pp.9-10 
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Now if we consider the enclosed gap between the triangles, we notice that it is a 
square, with sides of length (a-b). And the sum of its area, (a-b)^, and the area of the 
four triangles, 2ab, must be equal to the area of the square formed by the longest sides 
of the triangles, c^ . Thus, by simple arithmetic, 
c^=(a-b)^ + 2ab 
= 2i- - 2ab + b^ + 2ab 
= a^  + b^ 
This is, of course, a simple yet elegant proof of Pythagoras' theorem. But it is far 
from obvious that said theorem is true just in virtue of the definitions of terms such as 
'angle', 'triangle', 'square, 'line', and 'area', plus the laws of logic, (hideed, many of 
us will remember a time when we understood such terms, and possessed an intuitive 
grasp of simple logic, but did not see the truth of the theorem.'"*^) Rather, it might be 
true in virtue of the nature of the right-angled triangle: we might want to say it is an 
essential property of any right-angled triangle that the square of the length of its 
hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the lengths of its other sides. And this 
being the case, we would not want to countenance empirical research into (drawn 
approximations of) right-angled triangles. That is, we would not want to be a part of a 
research project where right-angled triangles of different areas and shapes were 
drawn, day in, day out, in the search for a triangle which violated Pythagoras' 
theorem. 
It is open to dispute whether any triangles exist (in the actual world). However, there 
is a metaphysical necessity that does not depend on assuming that they do: the point is 
that //"right-angled triangles exist in the actual world, they all have the essential 
property described above. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the set of 
possible worlds in which there are right-angled triangles that do not obey Pythagoras' 
theorem is empty. As Lowe puts it: 'the conclusions of metaphysical arguments will 
often have the form of conditional statements, which are themselves shown by such 
arguments to be unconditionally true. For instance, such a conclusion might be that if 
time is real, then some persisting substance must exist.' ''^ ^ The rub is that the 
metaphysically possible relates to the actual only in so far as it delimits it; it partially 
determines, but does not uniquely determine, that which is actual. We return to the 
notion of existence conditions, which Lowe takes it that it is the role of metaphysics to 
Let us also remember that the project to reduce mathematics to logic - that of Principia 
Mathematica^failed." 
Ibid., p.22. 
But note that strict and narrow logic also serve to delimit the actual: e.g. for any x, it is not the case 
that X does exist and x does not exist. 
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examine; we have come ful l circle, although perhaps we now have a better 
understanding of where we find ourselves. Let us pause, and take stock. 
We started by asking whether it was the case that the metaphysician needed to employ 
abduction in order to make her pronouncements, or appeal to it in order to defend her 
conclusions. But it has emerged that she does not need inference to the best 
explanation at all; rather, she wants to delimit the metaphysical possibilities 
(necessities, and impossibilities) about the objects of our experience and objects of 
our conceptions. It is plausibly true, of course, that she is interested informs of 
explanation that van Fraassen does not favour, but this is a distinct issue. In short, 
inferring to the possible explanations is not inferring to the best possible explanation, 
and (a) misses the mark. What is particularly illustrative is that Lowe would not even 
want to countenance the use of abduction (with respect to context of justification) in 
the realm of the observable. Nor, indeed, would I . 
There is more than this that we can take from this discussion, however. First, it has 
been suggested that metaphysics need not have the content of contemporary science, 
and only the content of contemporary science, for its object. Rather, metaphysics can 
investigate mathematical claims, and indeed (some) claims about the observable 
directly; the prior examples concerning Pythagoras' theorem and the category of 
'artefact', on both of which contemporary science has little to say, were cases in 
point. Second, it has become apparent that a central issue in the debate about the 
status of metaphysics is modality; it is precisely the modal realism of Lowe - his 
belief in possibilities de re, but not necessarily possible worlds - which furnishes his 
philosophy with its distinctive character. Third, it has emerged that the metaphysician 
is liable to want to have it that we possess a priori categorial knowledge, whereas the 
devout empiricist is liable to want to deny this (although is not bound to, i f construed 
as having a 'stance', since to hold a 'stance' is not to commit to belief in any 
particular dogma.). Fourth, and finally, that the forms of explanation we want will 
also affect our views on metaphysics. 
Now it is not possible to examine these issues in greater depth here, let alone to 
engage van Fraassen on so many fronts; this, although I should like to draw attention 
to Ladyman's ongoing challenge on the core issue of modali ty .Rather , I want to 
show how one who has a view of metaphysics similar to that of Lowe can be both a 
constructive empiricist, and hold what would seem to be an empirical - but not van 
Fraassen's personal - stance. 
5.2 REALIST METAPHYSICS AND CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM 
Lowe holds that the role of metaphysics is to examine the possible. But how are we 
to determine which metaphysical possibilities actually do obtain? His answer is as 
follows: 
''""For examplerthe realist metaphysician may be inclined to think of Aristotelian aiTia'as being 
important forms of explanation, as I argued in III.2. See Aristotle, Physics, book II, chapter 3. Barnes 
[1984], pp.332-334. 
See Ladyman [2000], Monton and van Fraassen [2003] 
197 
In a word [sic]: by experience. Knowing how the world could be in respect of its 
fundamental structure, we must judge as best we can how it is by determining how 
well our experience can be accommodated with this or that alternative metaphysical 
possibility as regards that structure. This may appear to give metaphysical theorizing 
a status similar to that of scientific theorizing, but the similarity is only superficial. A 
judgement that the world actually exhibits a given metaphysical feature - for 
instance, that it contains substances or that time is real - will indeed be an a posteriori 
judgement, being responsive to the evidence of experience. But the content of the 
judgement still retains its modal character as expressing a genuine metaphysical 
possibility, albeit one judged now to be actualized.'" 
Now according to this account, experience is extremely important as a source of 
knowledge; indeed, the ultimate purpose of metaphysical theorising is to enable us to 
get at how the world actually is, via experience. And this being the case, we might 
think that there is a genuine sense in which Lowe is an empiricist, albeit in the 
Aristotelian, rather than British, tradition. There is nothing to stop Lowe from 
committing to belief in a thesis such as this: 'Experience is our most important source 
of information about the (actual) world.' This, although he would want to defend the 
idea that experience requires categorial access; that it is metaphysically laden, so to 
speak. 
But does Lowe - or more importantly the Lowean metaphysician - need to be a 
scientific realist? In particular, does his account of metaphysics imply that he should 
commit to belief in the claim that the (allegedly 'well-confirmed') theories of 
contemporary science are approximately true, literally construed? It seems not, and 
on several grounds. First, he is an anti-inductivist, and would reject the notion of 
confirmation (but could allow for 'corroboration' in something like Popper's sense); 
his views on what constitutes a rational argument make that clear. Thus, for Lowe, it 
follows that successive generations of theories in science may often move further 
away from the truth, rather than closer; as Miller puts it: 'we are in permanent peril of 
classifying statements incorrectly or doing things wrong.'''^^ Second, he is not 
prevented from holding that the distinction between the observable and the 
unobservable is important in a purely epistemic sense; that empirical adequacy is 
much easier to achieve than the unvarnished truth.'^^ Third, and finally, he might 
want to argue that certain theories are metaphysically impossible, although they 'save 
the phenomena'. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics might be a 
suitable 'theory' to level such a charge at. 
Might Lowe be a constructive empiricist, then? Might he assent to the claim that: 
'Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a 
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate''^''? Well he does have 
an auspicious starting-point according to Monton and Van Fraassen, because '[it] is 
certainly much easier for a modal realist to be a constructive empiricist than anyone 
else.' '"^ " However, much might seem to depend on whether the second use of 
'theory', in the definition of constructive empiricism above, refers only to 'theory in 
empirical science'. Is there any reason to think that it should? Again considering 
'" Lowe [1998], p.23. 
Miller [1994], p.70. 
'^"^  Here, I put my arguments in III.4 aside. 
van Fraassen [1980], p.l2 
Monton and Van Fraassen [2003], p.406. 
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pure mathematics, it at least becomes plausible that van Fraassen could not have been 
referring to all theories, in all forms of inquiry, since such an enterprise has a 
distinctive non-empirical character. Therefore, it remains unclear that one needs to 
believe that acceptance of a metaphysical theory 'involves as belief only that it is 
empirically adequate' in order to be a constructive empiricist; what constitutes 
acceptance in a metaphysical context might be an entirely different matter. And 
further, there is nothing to stop Lowe from having it, with deference to van Fraassen, 
that acceptance of a metaphysical 'theory of the world, of the same form as a 
fundamental science and continuous with (as extension or foundation of) the natural 
sciences' '^ ^ should involve only belief that it is empirically adequate, and hence 
possibly true in the same epistemic sense that any unfalsified theory is.^^^ For one 
would have to be very bold indeed, to expect any more from a theory with such wide 
scope; to think that metaphysics, even with the benefit of the content of empirical 
science, enables us to posit cosmological theories which are approximately true. 
There is no harm in the speculation, though, as van Fraassen candidly admits: 'the 
term "metaphysical baggage" wil l , of course, not be used when the detour pays off.. . 
even the useless metaphysical baggage may be intriguing... because of its 
potentialities for future use.''^^ Metaphysical analyses may have pragmatic value in 
natural science, although there is never any guarantee that a given metaphysical 
analysis will; but this is something in favour of metaphysical analysis. If we can all 
agree that '[tjheories with some degree of sophistication always carry "metaphysical 
baggage".' then it is arguably important to have some people with expertise in 
metaphysics: this, just because they might provide heuristics for teaching, 
understanding (viz. organising relationships between phenomena in manner which is 
easy to grasp), and motivating new research projects. As Feynman puts it: 
[EJvery theoretical physicist who is any good knows six or seven different theoretical 
representations for exactly the same physics. He knows that they are all equivalent, 
and that nobody is ever going to be able to decide which one is right at that level, but 
he keeps them in his head, hoping that they will give him different idea for 
guessing. 
In short, it is not necessary to concede that metaphysics only has pragmatic value, but 
the fact that it does is something in its favour, when it is performed humbly, and 
without any pretensions of establishing anything with certainty, or even 'high 
probability'. iVlistakes are liable to be made in any form of inquiry, and we should 
remain ever cognisant of this. This recognition brings us on to the discussion of how, 
and why, metaphysics should be thought to be fallible, in accordance with (A). 
5.3 FALLIBLE METAPHYSICS AND 'THE EMPIRICAL STANCE' 
On the one hand, in order for a metaphysician to be recast and reconstituted as 
holding a 'stance', she must accept that her discipline is fallible. But on the other, to 
'^ ^ van Fraassen [2002], p.231. 
Here, the underlying notion is that being empirically adequate is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for a theory to be true. 
van Fraassen [1980], p.68. 
'•'Ibid. 
""Feynman [1965], p. 168. 
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claim that reason can provide one with certain truths is to fall foul of the Kantian 
arguments against traditional metaphysics, understood as investigation into categories 
of being, with which van Fraassen would seem to have sympathy. However, as I 
argued in 1.2.2, this is not a problem for the realist metaphysician just because 
adopting fallibilism is precisely the response to Kant's Critique; indeed, because this 
move plays a vital role in deflecting the force of Kant's arguments against 
transcendental realism. But let me briefly survey this argument again, and ask the 
reader to reconsider this passage: 
For since it will not be supported on grounds of experience, but everything that is 
necessary should be cognized a priori, the principle of connection requires 
universality and necessity, thus complete certainty, otherwise no guidance to the truth 
is forthcoming at all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics: one 
must know, or else refrain from all judgement.'*' 
Now I argued, first, that Kant's requirement for 'judging from pure reason' is too 
stringent, giving the examples of Fermat's last theorem, two parallel lines in non-
Euclidean geometry, and the Dirac delta-function. Second, that Kant was trying to 
preserve the 'absolutely certain and non-empirical character of metaphysical 
knowledge' and this was why he argued that metaphysical claims were claims 
about the structure of our ways of thinking. I agreed with Lowe's reply to Kant, 
which might be understood as a plea for us not to confuse a priori knowledge with 
certain or necessary knowledge: 
[EJven granting the truth of this metaphysical assertion [that metaphysical claims 
must be claims about the structure of our thought about reality, if they are all to be 
certainties], why shouldn't we respond to it by saying not that metaphysical 
knowledge as traditionally conceived is impossible (itself a self-defeating claim, 
inasmuch as it is precisely a metaphysical claim as traditionally conceived), but rather 
that metaphysical knowledge is almost never certain knowledge - that is, that 
metaphysical knowledge-claims can almost never be absolutely invulnerable to 
falsification or disproof?'*'' 
Naturally, the instances of 'almost' would probably cause van Fraassen, or an 
empiricist in the British tradition, to balk. Yet Lowe would want to rejoin with ' I 
included the "almosts" because not to have done so would have smacked of the very 
dogmatism that I am opposing.' And this is an incisive point. By his own credo, it 
would be 'false consciousness' for van Fraassen understood as holding an 
'empirical stance' - to rule out such a possibility. Think of it this way: i f more than 
one sort of metaphysics is compatible with the phenomena, and ampliative inferences 
do not provide us with a means by which to choose between those systems, then we 
are not obliged to choose one over the other. None of this makes it irrational to 
conunit to belief in one, rather than another, as a leap of faith, or even on pragmatic 
grounds. And such metaphysics would not obviously be 'trivial', nor would it 
obviously be mere 'art'.' ^ Rather, it would involve an honest attempt to work out 
how the world - understood in a common sense fashion, as yours and mine - might 
Kant [1787], A822-A823. 
'" Lowe [2002], p.9. 
Ibid., p.9. 
Personal correspondence. 
See van Fraassen [2002], p.30 and van Fraassen [1989], p.9 
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be. It might not only be commendably optimistic, but also vital as an activity at the 
nexus of modes of human exploration, which strives to discover the common rules 
underlying those modes, and to draw ostensibly different strands of endeavour 
together. 
So realist metaphysics, in particular the form of realist metaphysics advocated by 
Lowe, can be understood to be fallible. This, and it can be understood to be 
compatible with constructive empiricism, i f the argument in the preceding section 
goes through. But are these facts, taken alone, sufficient for it to be compatible with 
an 'empirical stance'? It seems not, for van Fraassen writes: 
[I]f empiricism is a stance, its critique of metaphysics will be based at least in part on 
something other than factual theses: attitudes, commitments, values, goals.""^  
Thus, what is needed, in addition, is a basis of considerable agreement, in terms of 
these four factors, between the empiricist who repudiates realist metaphysics, and the 
empiricist who endorses it (should this be allowed). In other words, for pro-
metaphysics empiricists and anti-metaphysics empiricists to be able to disagree on a 
variety of factual theses, without significant disagreement on the basis of attitudes, 
commitments, values, and goals. We should look, then, to how van Fraassen 
characterises the empirical stance in these respects. 
First, and negatively, he denounces two forms of deference that he thinks are shown 
to science by materialists: 'the belief that the scientific description of the world is 
true, in its entirety or near enough, and at least a strong inclination towards 
completeness claims for the content of certain sciences. "This is true, and nothing 
else is true" would express such claims.' '^ ^ But little needs to be added to the prior 
discussion of these issues, where it has been shown that metaphysics can have more 
than the content of any given science as its object, and that there is no radical link 
between scientific realism and realist metaphysics, let alone one between naturalism 
and realist metaphysics (for which, see 1.2.5). Realist metaphysicians need not be 
deferent in the way that materialists are. 
Second, and positively, he writes that the empiricist takes an admiring attitude 
towards (natural) science, but in virtue of its methods, rather than purely its content; 
this point should seem familiar from the earlier discussion. He writes: 'Science is a 
paradigm of rational inquiry. To take it as such is precisely to take up one of the most 
central attitudes in the empiricist stance.''^^ But let us not forget point (B), in 
particular that it is perfectly permissible to inquire into the content of empirical 
science with the correct spirit, which would seem to be best encapsulated as follows: 
All our factual beliefs are to be given over as hostages to fortune, to the fortunes of 
future empirical evidence, and given up where they fail, without succumbing to 
despair, cynicism, or debilitating relativism.'^' 
166 van Fraassen [2002], p.48. 
Ibid, p.63. 
"•^  Ib.d. 
'^'Ibid. 
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However, this spirit should also seem familiar: it reminds us of the quotation from 
IVIiller, in the foregoing argument for the compatibility of realist metaphysics and 
constructive empiricism. And this might suggest that the realist metaphysician who is 
also an empiricist may take an admiring attitude to the methods of natural science for 
different reasons than van Fraassen. She may agree with Popper that: 
[Tjhere is a method which might be described as 'the one method of philosophy'. 
But it is not characteristic of philosophy alone; it is, rather, the one method of all 
rational discussion, and therefore of the natural sciences as well as philosophy. The 
method I have in mind is that of stating one's problems clearly and of examining its 
various proposed solutions critically.™ 
In other words, it may be held that criticism is at the core of inquiry, and this goes for 
determining what counts as 'empirical evidence' as much as it does anything else, as I 
argued at length in II.4. And while there are consequences of this view, for example 
that 'normal science' in Kuhn's sense is undesirable'^', it would seem rather strange 
to classify Popper as anything other than an admirer of science, when it is done 
properly. 
There are internal disputes in metaphysics, about how the discipline should be 
approached. Charges of dogmatism are sometimes levelled, as is evinced by a recent 
paper of Oliver's.' But there are similar disputes in the natural sciences: take the 
Solvay Conference of 1927 as a case in point. And it would be a mistake for the 
metaphysician to issue the charge at physicists, en bloc, that they are instilled with a 
positivistic spirit, just because the Copenhagen Interpretation of non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics became entrenched in the discipline (due to Bohr, Heisenberg, 
Bom, and Pauli): the work of men such as Schrodinger, de Broglie, Einstein, and 
Bohm, also needs to be taken into account."^ However, this cuts both ways. The 
natural scientist, as well as the philosopher of science, should be wary of picking out 
one group within another discipline as representative of the rest. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The overarching aim of this concluding discussion is to suggest that empiricists can 
be metaphysicians too, and that neither natural science, nor philosophy of science, 
provide a stick with which to beat metaphysics. But upon reflection, this should be no 
surprise. For mathematical assumptions, like their metaphysical counterparts, are 
almost invariably a part of scientific theories, yet few would seriously contend that an 
examination of their role therein could ever provide ammunition for the opponents of 
mathematics, or give imprimatur to the issuance of prescriptive comments about 
mathematical practice. And none of this is to deny that there is an important 
interaction between mathematics and natural science. They can lead one another: 
complex numbers were discovered in mathematics before they were used in physics, 
just as the Dirac delta-function was discovered in physics before it was given careful 
'™ Popper [1980], p. 16. 
See Popper [1970] 
Oliver [1996], 
See Bohm [1987] and Gushing [1994]. 
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mathematical examination. There has been similar interaction between natural 
science and metaphysics, and will no doubt continue to be. 
It is admitted, of course, that van Fraassen has some powerful arguments against 
realist metaphysics. Four questions that are key to the debate about its status, on each 
of which van Fraassen has a considered opinion, have been identified: "What are its 
proper objects?"; "How should we understand modality?"; "What are the sources of 
knowledge?"; and "What is explanation?". So if there is to be a debate between the 
proponents of revisionary metaphysics and its detractors, then let us concentrate on 
these factual issues. Let us engage in rational discussion, in the hope that we might 
get closer to the truth of the matter. But let us not pretend that there need be any 
serious disagreement on the basis of attitude - let alone that philosophy of science is 
'First Evaluative Philosophy' - for a practitioner of any discipline can be instilled 
with the critical spirit. 
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EPILOGUE 
There might seem to be something rather strange about the position that I have argued 
for here. Am I pancritical rationalist, or a metaphysician? And would I give up 
pancritical rationalism for realist metaphysics, or realist metaphysics for pancritical 
rationalism? Whence the link? In concluding, 1 think I owe a simple and direct 
answer. 
As a pancritical rationalist - I prefer 'Socratic philosopher', since it is less pretentious 
- there is part of me that wishes I did not need to depend on metaphysics, or even 
logic, in order to proceed in my efforts to inquire, particularly with others. In this 
sense, I am a Socratic philosopher more than anything else. But I am also a Socratic 
philosopher who currently believes that inquiry requires logic, and requires 
metaphysics, and hence that we are stuck with them. Moreover, I am also a Socratic 
philosopher who currently believes that realist metaphysics is the only self-consistent 
form of metaphysics on the table. But this is not necessarily a good thing. 
The overarching point is that if we have to do metaphysics, and have to do logic, then 
we had better take them seriously. But this need not bind us, in principle, to any 
particular system of metaphysics, or any particular system of logic. And likewise, 
absolute truth is a nice regulative ideal, but it may not be the only one. Hence, I can 
only think that we have many exciting discussions ahead of us, to which I look 
forward. Let us begin, having cast our commitments into the wishing well, with the 
hope of achieving not only wisdom, but also good wil l to our fellows. We may be 
doomed to fail, but optimism is the master aptitude. 
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ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE 
Stanford, California 9 4 3 0 5 - 2 3 2 3 
As from Professor W. W. Hartley, I I I 
33 Castle Lane 
Oakland, California 946U 
May 3, 1986 (Saturday) 
Mr. Rafe Oiampion 
77 Holt Avenue 
Creniome 
New South Wales 2090 
Australia 
Dear Rafe, 
I am Just back from six weeks in Freiburg and Vieni^, and am 
writing this in my sleep. 
F i r s t to your question: Agassi's work on metaphysical research 
programmes, which cei*tainly uses those terms, although he also 
speaks of "principles of interpretation", appears in his thesis, 
v^ich I mentioned i n an earlier l e t t e r to you. And I believe that 
Watkins gave him a footnote on this in his Mind a r t i c l e . 
I suppose you- are right to be persistent about the MRP issue. 
I can accept that KRP and I have constructed an "evaluationed and 
methodological research program" that differs from a l l earlier 
such "evaluational and methodological" programs, and would 
moreover maintain that mucdi of p h i l o s o i ^ since the 17th century 
has been devoted to the development of such evaluational 
programs. Moreover there i s indeed a close connection to 
metaphysics, since these programs were very often intended to 
weed out metaphysics. But my view, in and of i t s e l f , i s not 
metaphysical; whereat a metai^ysical reseach program in Popper's 
sense i s an untestable view of the world that guides and steers 
research i n the sciences. 
As to your h i s t o r i c a l question, I wouldn't c a l l Agassi and 
Watkins's behaviour "Inactivity" (Worrall cones much later, and 
has virtually nothing to do with the Popper story, only with the 
Lakatos aftermath), but we can go. into a l l that i f i t interests 
you vrtien we meet next summer. For as you w i l l know fron Greg 
Lindsay I had a confirmation of the invitation, and expect to be 
in Australia for pairt of next August. You w i l l know the details 
better than I do, but I believe the meeting i s in Sydney, which I 
know only from i t s airpoti;. 
Yes, there i s a "check of metaphysics", as well as a check on 
metaphysics. 
Yes, the ideas of the old programme need to be brought together 
and refuted as a s e t . I s t a r t e d to gather than together years ago 
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when I was at the Warburg Institute and lectured on this at the 
LSE and at Berkeley and have some manuscripts and tapes talking 
about such things, but I never had the time to carry out the task 
prior to the Popper-Lakatos fight, and I 4»as too demoralized 
eurterwards, and l e t i t a l l drop. 
Shock-horror? Or the desire to create the impression that one i s 
deep, profound, different, non-superficial - that one has seen 
t h r o u ^ everything, that nothing matters (indeed that nothing 
exi s t s ) , that morality i s an i l l u s i o n , that a l l human striving 
and elevated sentiment amounts to no more than plastic flowers 
a l l too inadequately covering over feces and semen? 
We must talk about Hayek. Must as I'd l i k e to dissolve everything 
in my metacontextual jjudding, I think there are real tensions in 
Hayek. Interesting ones. But I ' l l be interested to see what you 
come up with In your prize paper. 
All the best, 
W. W. Bartley, I I I 
P.S. I liked your "Essentialism and the Organic State", and have 
not finished the other things you sent. A propos of "The Austrian 
School of Economic and Social Theory", I learned i n Viama two 
weeks aigo from Popper's young friend K a r l i Milford (son of Peter 
Milford and grandson of Karl Hilferding: see preface to the 
Poverty), that Carl .J4enger»s two fundamentcil problems i n h i s 
Methodenlehre were, guess what?, the problem of induction and the 
problem of demarcation. Writing about Toi^ O'Hear, who i s a sweet 
boy whcm we have a l l spent years trying to educate, i s a waste of 
time. He can't learn, or rather, he i s one of those many people 
who are in a sense clever but who can't think. 
Popper i s thriving in Vienna, where he i s now Honorary Professor 
in the University of Vienna and head of the new Ludwig Boltanann 
Institute for Theory of Science. (He has also jvist accepted a 
Senior Research Fellowship at the Hoover Institution, and w i l l 
spend some time each year here.) He has written a b r i l l i a n t paper 
on "Active Darwinism", with quite new and important ideas. I f you 
read German, write to him to ask for a copy. Otherwise, you w i l l 
have to wait tmtil he writes a version in English. 
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As from Professor W. W. Hartley, I I I 
33 Castle Lane 
Oakland, California 94611 
2H May 1986 
Mr. Rafe Qiampion 
77 Holt Avenue 
Cremome 
New South Wales 2090 
Australia 
Dear Rafe, 
I got your pile of manuscripts and offprints. 
I particularly enjoyed the a r t i c l e on psychology in The American 
FS3^d)ologist, which i s quite well done and very useful i n getting this 
information to that particular audience. 
About the second a r t i c l e : "Rafe Champion on Popper, Campbell and Stove", I 
wonder vAiether you can advise me, a propos of Anderson and the Axjstralian 
invitations to Popper, vdiether there are archives in Australia, for example 
the papers of Anderson, that might be worth consiiLting in connection with my 
Popper biography when I come to Australia next sunnier? Or memoirs, whether 
in book or in essay form? I found a few of these in New Zealand, but of course 
Popper actually lived there for nine years. 
Your a r t i c l e on "The Philosophy and Economics of Liberalism" i s excellent, 
and I shall be happy to forward a copy to Hayek. But you must not ejqpect Hayek 
to reply, or for that matter, to read i t . As I think you know I have just 
returned from a month i n Freiburg with Hayek, and he i s in rather bad sha.pe 
physically - at the grand old age of 87 - and also mast cope with bouts of 
depression that lead him to expand his inmense knowledge of English and 
French literature - the novel and history - bvit to shrink from philosophy and 
econanics as i f i t were the plague (which i t i s ) . Hayek does however enjoy 
getting l e t t e r s , and you should not hesitate to write to him, or to send your 
stuff to him directly, i f you l i k e , at the following address: Professor F. A. 
von Hayek, UrachstraBe 27, D78 Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany. 
Now a few c r i t i c a l comments about the l a t t e r essay. These are, incidentally, 
not made out of modesty, for I have a h i ^ opinion of my work, and haven't any 
doubt that I can outdo most of my "professional" philosophical 
contemporaries. They are made, rather, out of a sense both of realism and of 
truth. In saying things l i k e "Popper, Hayek and Hartley are perhaps the 
three leading l i b e r a l thinkers-of modem times", you of oourse.please me: I 
would love to be in that category. But what you say i s not true and cannot be 
defended successfullyj and hence you, by writing such things, reduce your 
credibility. I don't want that to happ)en. 
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A few words about how things actually stand. And these are said 
confidentially. I do think that my old work on rationality revolutionizes 
epistemology and theory of rationality and does generalize Popper's work in 
an exceptionally important way. I'd love more recognition for that, and I'd 
l i k e i t i f my work eventually had some more impact and made the areas I t 
touches more interesting. But this - althougji i t makes a fundamental 
contribution to the theory of liberalism ( i n the European sense) does not 
put vae i n the same league as Popper and Hayek. Tliere i s perhaps a sense i n 
which I am in the same league as Hayek: I don't doubt that I am every b i t as 
"original" as he i s , and in many ways we have the same sort of minds. But our 
achievements don't ccmi»re. He has written fourteen quite important books, 
plus a number of historical studies (of vhich most people don't even know) 
that would alone secure him an important niche. Moreover he was one of the 
main antagonists in the very important practical and theoretical battles of 
the t h i r t i e s , and i s one of the most influential people in the world today. 
And you should add to this a generosity of s p i r i t and truly noble character 
that I don't have at a l l . 
As to Popper, there i s simply no comparison. I have had one really important 
idea and a lot of middling ideas. But he has enriched everything he has 
touched, and he has touched almost every area of human thought. He has many 
human faults, but i s also a true genius, one of the towering inte l l e c t s of 
a l l time. Moreover, you don't f u l l y get t h i s from his writings - here he 
differs from Hayek: everything that Hayek has to say he has written - Popper 
creates constantly, and effortlessly, as he talks, and the world would be a 
greatly richer place intellectually had a tape-recorder been running at his 
side for the past seventy years. I t i s t h i s - and this I haven't yet published 
- which accounts, really accounts, for the great h o s t i l i t y to him. 
Such richness c a l l s up intense envy in anyone who has intellectual ambitions 
(and you should read Helmut Shoeck's book Bivy to understand how these 
things work; Shoeck i s one of the few sociologists who has seen how things 
are i n "society"). I think you can perhaps get a glimpse of Popper's effect 
( i f you haven't met him or met him only briefly) i f you have seen the play 
Amadois (or even the movie, a l t h o u ^ the movie does not do i t so well). There 
i s a scene where Mozart i s to be presented to Joseph I I , and the court 
musician, Kapellmeister,' or-vrtiatever, S a l i e r i , produces a l i t t l e march to 
welcome Mozart to the audience chamber. Itozart enters, and after the 
presentation turns to S a l i e r i and says something l i k e : "That i s a very nice 
l i t t l e march you have composed for me. May I try i t ? " Mozart s i t s down at 
the harpsichord, plays back S a l i e r i ' s march perfectly, looks up, and says: 
"Let's try i t a l i t t l e faster." He then plays i t twice as fast, but reaches a 
chord and pauses, saying: "Well, that's not quite right, i s i t ? " He then 
starts to improvize, and as you watch - or l i s t e n scxnething that was 
competent and ordinary i s transformed into something of the most exquisite 
beauty and originality. While S a l i e r i writhes in pain and envy. This i s the 
only portrayal on stage of which I know (and one of the few in literature) of 
true transformation, of World 3 creation, and of the ambition and envy that 
accompany i t . Popper has this same effect - both in his conversation and in 
his writing. " 
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Now I have already said enough things that shouldn't be «aid for one l e t t e r . 
I genuinely appreciate vrtiat you said, and am grateful for i t and touched by 
i t : but next time t e l l the truth. 
With very best wishes, 
Yours, 
/( 
W. Bartley, I I I 
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o f / A / / ^ ^ ^ ^ 
[He i s c l e a r l y feeling very disturbed, so I urge him to continue 
reading which, however, he does not do at t h i s time.] 
S i r K a r l : I want actually to say something about, about the thing 
which led B i l l on to get, i n my opinion, l e t us say, 
trapped i n th i s debate about CCR. See, i t . . . I could 
have l e f t i t , and perhaps should have l e f t i t , by 
saying: I mean by rationalism the attitude, "you may 
be r i g h t , I may be wrong and together we may get nearer 
to the truth by discussion." I could have l e f t i t with 
that. Perhaps i t would have been the best. I said the 
addition to i t was something which, I think, i s the 
point which B i l l r e a l l y didn't l i k e , namely, that one, 
I , or...perhaps I had the attitude of f a i t h i n reason. 
Now instead of saying t h i s , I could have said that I 
believe or I have to face that t h i s attitude "you may 
be wrong[quickly correcting himself] right, I may be 
wrong and together we may come to the truth," i s , l e t 
us say, a good attitude or an attitude which I would 
l i k e to propagate among people, especia l l y among 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . That i s a l l I meant. Now, i n 
propogating t h i s attitude, l e t us c a l l i t , l e t us c a l l 
mine CR, " I may be wrong and you may be right and 
together we may get nearer to the truth," l e t us c a l l 
t h i s GR. Now, i t i s n ' t enough j u s t to formulate such 
an attitude, i t i s also that one adopts the attit u d e . 
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The adoption of an attitude of course i s nothing 
absolutely f i n e r . I adopt t h i s attitude and I t r y to 
propogate i t , but i f somebody comes, i f B i l l comes and 
says t h i s i s n ' t quite the right attitude: you should 
say also that even i n your adoption of t h i s attitude 
you are open to c r i t i c i s m , you should add that. Then I 
would have said, yes, yes, but does that not lead, i f 
one goes on, to an i n f i n i t e regress? That i s to say, 
i f I say yes to you and say: now, I adopt CR but I 
adopt CR with a comment that I'm quite ready to learn 
that CR i s n ' t the best, i s not then what about i f 
another B i l l comes and says that's not quite i n order: 
you should say that even t h i s attitude i s n ' t quite the 
best so we go on to i n f i n i t y and that i s dangerous and 
therefore i t ' s j u s t as well we go back to CR. I t i s n ' t 
a dogmatic attitude. I haven't said, " I may be r i g h t 
and you may be wrong." I have started with, " I may be 
wrong and you may be rightm" and t h i s prevents 
dogmatism. And, i s i t s e l f enough to show that we 
should be open. So t h i s i n a nutshell, now, i s r e a l l y 
why I wasn't i n favor of CCR without going i n a l l these 
things. And I do think actually that the debate with 
a l l i t s unpleasantness i s j u s t what we have now s a i d . 
That i s to say, CCR i f improved i n t h i s direction, CR 
i f improved i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n and i f we add to i t that 
we are r e a l l y not even completely bound to CR i s not 
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better because i f we accept that t h i s i s an e s s e n t i a l l y 
improvement we are d i r e c t l y accepting an i n f i n i t e 
regress. So, and i t i s n ' t necessary and so on. Now, 
i n B i l l ' s form i t was much more complex, and t h i s 
complexity i n i t s e l f , i s I f e e l not right i n questions 
which are fundamentally moral queistions. And i n these, 
r e a l l y i t i s actually that the adding of another phrase 
i s something which has, for t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t reasons, 
not for logic reasons, but for t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
reasons, i s bad. Namely, i t excludes people who 
could...perhaps...find CR very a t t r a c t i v e , but who 
would...CR with that new addition...with that new 
addition, find a b i t too, how s h a l l I say? Too 
i n t e l l e c t u a l . And t h i s i s a quite d i f f e r e n t c r i t i c i s m 
and, i n my opinion, that i s a very important c r i t i c i s m . 
Not c r i t i c i s m now i n B i l l ' s sense but c r i t i c i s m i n 
sense of human effectiveness and human attractiveness. 
And I think r e a l l y that as far as the group of my 
students concerned who became involved i n t h i s debate: 
they were a l l damaged by i t . A l l of them, not only 
B i l l . One shouldn't be too wise, too clever... better. 
I better say, one shouldn't be too clever. I t i s the 
kind of cleverness which repels not only simple people 
but I would say, for example, s c i e n t i s t s . A s c i e n t i s t 
i s not the man who i s for such finesses, you see. I t ' s 
a finesse and one shouldn't have fin e s s e s . And I t r i e d 
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to explain t h i s to B i l l and I'm sure i t hurt him and of 
course I didn't want to hurt him, but I was a f t e r a l l 
h i s teacher and had to t e l l him what I thought. And 
anyway, I do think...how s h a l l I say? I t was...what he 
wanted was i m p l i c i t i n saying " I may be wrong," instead 
of, " I may be right and you may be wrong but together 
w e ' l l find i t , " by st a r t i n g with " I may be wrong and 
you may be right." This prevents the kind of thing 
which the additional phrase would have prevented, l e t 
us say, would have prevented, namely: What can i t 
prevent? Dogmatism, even...how s h a l l I say? l o g i c a l l y 
seeing i t the two formulas, " I may be right and you may 
be wrong," l o g i c a l l y but by putting i t i n the way, " I 
may be wrong and you may be right," by putting i t i n 
t h i s way, I imply i n a non-logical way that t h i s i s 
under no circumstances to become a dogma. This i s 
implied and so I even now think he was wrong. I 
may have been wrong to say f a i t h i n reason. Now l e t me 
say something about that, somewhere i t has to be 
admitted that t h i s i s an attitude one adopts. This 
question of adoption, of adoption, t h i s i s a s p e c i a l 
question, quite d i f f e r e n t from the formulation of what 
I adopt. He discussed only the formulation of what he 
thinks we should adopt. The difference between CR and 
CCR i s only a difference of the attitude which we 
should adopt. But why should we adopt i t ? See, the 
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question of truth makes i t c l e a r . I f because i t i s 
true, but that we don't want to say, we don't want to 
be dogmatic. So, he can only answer: why should we 
adopt i t ? Why not? But why not i s not good enough. He 
can then say: a l l r i g h t , why not i s not good enough, I 
adopt i t . But that i s , there we are faced with a 
dogma. You can say, "why shouldn't I adopt i t , I'm 
free to adopt anything." But because I'm free to adopt 
anything, I can ju s t as well adopt the opposite 
attitude. So we are back to that question. So the 
adoption question i s a separate question and i t i s t h i s 
question which I meant when I said f a i t h i n reason. 
A l l r i g h t , I admit I shouldn't have said f a i t h i n 
reason and I wouldn't have said i t i f I had h i s 
background of discussion of Protestant f a i t h and so on. 
But i n t h i s point, i t did not help me. I would now 
say, f a i t h i n reason, I mean no more and i t could be 
replaced by the following: This i s an attitude which 
f i r s t of a l l I adopt, and secondly I would recoiranend my 
readers to adopt. And i f my readers ask me why do you 
recommend me to adopt i t , of course, I simply say, 
because I believe i t ' s a good attitude and there comes 
the word b e l i e f i n of f a i t h and I f e l t I should not 
subverse such a point even though I'm not for f a i t h i n 
theories. But a f t e r a l l , f a i t h i n an attitude, l e t us 
say, i n the attitude of f r i e n d l i n e s s , to take something 
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very simple. I believe i n the attitude of 
f r i e n d l i n e s s . Start with, s t a r t i f you meet a person 
for the f i r s t time, assume that he or she i s a nice 
person and be friendly to him or her. That i s , we 
can't get away from such things. So I think, I think, 
somehow or other that he did not achieve, even with 
everything, apart from a l l that there i s written about 
what i s rationalism, there i s a question, do you 
yourself adopt the attitude of rationalism? To which 
he probably would have said: provisionally. Oh yes, 
yes, I wouldn't have said anything else. (Note: l a s t 
sentence not e n t i r e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e ) I adopt i t at 
present provisionally. Why do you adopt i t at present 
prov i s i o n a l l y and not the other attitude? I can't get 
around i t because I think i t ' s the right thing to do. 
Why do you think i t ' s the right thing to do? We can't 
go on l i k e that forever. I t ' s j u s t so, that i s what we 
need. I t i s , f a i t h i n f a i t h d i f f e r e n t from the f a i t h of 
the r e l i g i o u s people of the protestant with a small " f " 
rather than with the big "F"? I don't think that t h i s 
i s a f a i t h i n which the fact that i t i s a f a i t h means 
anything very s p e c i a l l y great or good or admirable, or 
anything l i k e that, but i t i s j u s t that I think i t i s 
the best thing to do and we... beyond that we can't 
go.^ 
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A l l t h i s I have t r i e d as well as I could to explain to 
B i l l . Probably I can, i t perhaps...now better.^ That 
i s possible. But i t goes i n a completely d i f f e r e n t 
d i r e c t i o n from what Watkins and what i s h i s 
name...Post...have discussed and i t remains very much 
near to what I have said i n the Open Society and i t i s 
not because I am dogmatic and s t i c k to what I have s a i d 
i n the Open Society. I'm, I'm....how should I say? I 
explain i t to B i l l . I'm happy for any improvement and 
^ Or, as someone el s e once put i t , "what we cannot t a l k about we 
must pass over i n silence." Or, as the same author wrote, "The 
book's point i s an e t h i c a l one. I once meant to include i n the 
preface a sentence which i s not i n fact there now but which I 
w i l l write out for you here, because i t w i l l perhaps be a key to 
the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was t h i s : My 
work consists of two parts; the one presented here plus a l l that 
I have hot written. And i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s second part that i s 
the important one. My book draws l i m i t s to the sphere of the 
e t h i c a l from the inside, as i t were, and I am convinced that t h i s 
i s the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those l i m i t s . In short, I 
believe that where many others today are j u s t gassing, I have 
managed i n my book to put everything firmly into place by being 
s i l e n t about i t . " 
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I have accepted h i s improvements and so on. I t wasn't any 
dogmatism. I t was really...and, and David's paper has the same 
f a u l t . I t ' s the same f a u l t . I t gets into i n t e l l e c t u a l questions 
and so on and behind these questions i s t h i s i n f i n i t e regress, of 
course. And, how s h a l l I say? One need not to be clever to see 
t h i s i n f i n i t e regress? And the i n f i n i t e regress may be turned 
into something e l s e and, but I hate to be so clever as to bring 
Godel i n here [ t h i s refers to David's paper. You understand. So 
I think a l l t h i s i s r e a l l y an error in...how s h a l l I say?...an 
error j u s t i n that way i n which i t damages rationalism. I t t r i e s 
to make rationalism stronger than i t can be made and of course 
thereby r e a l l y makes people say tu quoque and so on. You get 
into that mess, and he did get into that mess. And so did David 
and everyone el s e . So I think t h i s part apart from, apart from, 
from eliminating repetitions and such things or where I was 
ungrammatical, I think you [He i s referring to what he wants 
L e s l i e to do i n editing t h i s for publication] should r e a l l y , 
e s s e n t i a l l y , adopt t h i s I have s a i d . Not too long. 
3 T f i t ' s not c l e a r , he means that i n 1992 he better able to 
explain thTs than he was able to t h i r t y years earlxer. 
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L e s l i e (spoken): No, I understand. 
S i r K a r l : But anyway, the question of which he so to speak had 
forgotten, there i s an attitude and the question i s why 
do you adopt the attitude? Then you can eithe r say: 
why not, why shouldn't I adopt i t ? I f you c r i t i c i z e 
i t , I won't adopt i t i f your c r i t i c i s m i s good, but 
s t i l l , there are so many other opposed attitudes which 
one could adopt, so you have to say " I l i k e i t , " at 
l e a s t , " I l i k e t h i s attitude." Perhaps that i s better 
than to say I have f a i t h i n reason..."! adopt t h i s 
attitude because I l i k e i t . " But I i t ' s a mistake 
to overlook that we have to confess that we adopt the 
attitude. Hm? 
L e s l i e (spoken): I understand what you're saying. I'd l i k e you 
to f i n i s h reading t h i s and then we'll go on to some 
other things. 
[But S i r Karl continues his t r a i n of thought.] 
S i r K a r l : I t i s perhaps the most important point that i t i s very 
sad i f a man l i k e B i l l gets l o s t i n that. And I r e a l l y 
did my best to prevent him and he only f e l t that I for 
some probably unconsious reasons, I didn't want him to 
make t h i s important discovery. And I r e a l l y was, even 
then, afraid...not very a f r a i d because I thought he 
w i l l get i t , get over i t , but I was a f r a i d that he 
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would lose himself i n t h i s nonsense. So I f e l t i t was, 
you see? And I mean, a l l t h i s i s theory, but my theory 
i s that he thought I wasn't ready, I was too dogmatic, 
I wasn't ready to admit that somebody el s e l i k e he 
could make a great contribution to a very important 
subject. Very sad. Really very sad. And t h i s i s the 
f i r s t time that I w i l l publish a work about i t , d i r e c t 
about i t . But I [he now continues reading my 
previously prepared comment, reading part of i t out 
loud] 
S i r K a r l : yes, 'what I would l i k e to say i s that B i l l cannot 
have'... ( i s reading my question, or statement, reads 
the part "his l i f e cannot have been a f a i l u r e i n any 
way"... 
L e s l i e ( w r i t t e n ) : Anyway, what I'd l i k e to say i s that B i l l 
cannot have personally regarded h i s l i f e as having been 
a f a i l u r e i n any way. 
S i r K a r l : I'm af r a i d , I r e a l l y am a f r a i d , he had regarded i t a 
b i t l i k e that, but t h i s we s h a l l not say, I...perhaps 
f a i l u r e i s too much, but I do think he knew he could 
have or should have made a contribution to philosophy 
rather than to, to, biography. That i s , I mean i t i s 
more creative to have new ideas rather than to describe 
the l i f e of a man even i f the man i s more important 
than Mr. Erhard...or what was i t ? i s i t ? ( L e s l i e : 
21 
Erhard i s correct) Hmmm? ( L e s l i e : Erhard's correct) 
Yes, yes. ( L e s l i e : read t h i s ) I think, I think, he 
somehow f e l t i t . That i s very...very l i k e l y to be 
true, what you say here and yet, there, I am sure there 
was an element of disappointment i n what he has been 
able to do. You must read t h i s book, t h i s thing, book, 
where Braithwaite plays a r o l e . ( L e s l i e : OK.) You 
must read t h i s book. There are ideas developed which 
perhaps are not e n t i r e l y his but which I'm sure have 
never been so well put and which as I say were over my 
head. That i s to say, I would never have looked at 
r e l i g i o n i n t h i s way. I t ' s a r e a l , very important, 
book, and i f a man can do that, he could do more than 
that about, t h i s man, Werner Erhard, who a f t e r a l l i s a 
b i t of a swindler. I mean, the whole organization, a l l 
that, i t i s a very dubious a f f a i r . That again i s 
between me and you. 
L e s l i e (spoken): Right 
S i r Karl (reading out loud some sentence fragments): 
"he was interested i n . . . " 
L e s l i e (written): He didn't regard any part of i t as having been 
wrecked, and c e r t a i n l y not by anything to do with you. 
B i l l was interested i n learning new things; i n t h e ' % ^ 
22 
and music played a, the, major role i n that school and 
she was very happy, a l l through her school years, so 
( L e s l i e : we've done a l l those) Yes. ( L e s l i e : Now I 
have to give you t h i s , and I w i l l take t h i s ) This very 
f a c t that t h i s [ S i r Karl i s holding and r e f e r r i n g to 
David M i l l e r ' s contribution to the memorial volume, 
which David had faxed to him on the previous day] has 
so many pages and so many people and so much 
l i t e r a t u r e , I mean a l l that i s somehow r e a l l y , r e a l l y 
wrong, not only an error and not very clever and so on, 
but morally wrong, because i t destroys the moral aspect 
of that att i t u d e . Do y o u — ? I couldn't read i t 
beyond page 3. The paper i s for the book? ( L e s l i e 
laughs, somewhat h y s t e r i c a l l y , and says: well, anyway, 
here i s a present for you. I found i t i n the bookstore 
t h i s morning. She gives him a copy of E r i c Lerner's 
book about the big bang, which he had expressed an 
i n t e r e s t i n on Tuesday.) Does i t say what he i s ? Yes. 
( L e s l i e : And here's one more, The Creative Moment) 
I . . . I believe not that the big bang never happened, but 
that we don't know anything about i t . I mean, I have 
no reason to believe i n the big bang. Who's Joseph 
Schwartz? I believe that E i n s t e i n ' s theory has been 
now refuted. I t was a very in t e r e s t i n g theory, and i t 
was the f i r s t theory since Newton and i t had 
in t e r e s t i n g aspects which made i t ...tape runs out and 
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i s changed... yes, yes, that i s right, 
u n i n t e l l . . . . i n t e r e s t i n g . He got a good publisher, 
Jonathan unintell...the great, yes...seems to be good, 
probably better than that. This [referring to Lerner's 
book] i s too big. I t r e a l l y i s . This i s not true, 
Orsted did not discover the f i e l d concept. I t i s true 
that Orsted i s very important, but he did not do that. 
Of course, one can, he could t a l k himself out of i t , 
but...I'm sure I should have to object to more i n that 
even than i n the other. He i s very dogmatic i n h i s 
formulations. He writes dogmatically. He makes a l l 
sorts of assertions. I mean, j u s t opening i t I found 
at l e a s t three assertions which a l l three are not quite 
i n order, you see, yes, he's very dogmatic. Thank you 
very much. 
[ L e s l i e writes a note to the e f f e c t that she f e e l s i t i s time to 
wrap things up.] 
S i r K a r l : I t i s true that I am not w e l l , you see, I don't know. 
Do you know about blood pressure? ( L e s l i e : Yes) Yes. 
I had on the night you l e f t , I had what I have 
sometimes, a bad tachychardia, with I have a machine to 
measure i t automatically which I rang the Mews and Mr. 
and Mrs. Mew came and they brought the machine down and 
measured and I had 183 and the blood pressure was 7 0 
over 40 which i s almost nothing, i t i s r e a l l y very 
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very bad. I , so to speak, r e a l l y almost died, because 
i t was p r a c t i c a l l y nothing. And, I didn't dare to l i e 
down before they ceime because of I didn't know that I 
could get up again but then they came, I l i e d down and 
then i t s e t t l e d i t s e l f soon. So i n a way i t was 
nothing, but i t made me f e e l very weak. I mean that I 
wouldn't have believed i t i f the machine hadn't shown 
i t . The pulse, also the machine measures the pulse, 
you see, I couldn't f e e l i t any longer. I t was r e a l l y 
pretty bad, so i t i s wise i f I don't do much work, and 
I thank you, I'm sorry that you are leaving tomorrow, 
and I can't, I hope I have also encouraged you a 
l i t t l e . 
L e s l i e (spoken): Yes. 
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